

REBUTTAL

**UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
FACT-FINDING TEAM'S REPORT**



**ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND ABUSES RELATED TO THE
PROTESTS OF JULY AND AUGUST 2024
IN BANGLADESH**



International Crimes Research Foundation

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASI	: Assistant Sub-Inspector
BCL	: Bangladesh Chhatra League [Bangladesh Student League]
BGB	: Border Guard Bangladesh
BNP	: Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BRTA	: Bangladesh Road Transport Authority
BTB	: Bangladesh Television
CrPC	: The Code of Criminal Procedure
CTTC	: Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime
DB	: Detective Branch (of Police)
DGFI	: Directorate-General of Armed Forces Intelligence
FFT	: Fact Finding Team
HRC	: Human Rights Council
ICT	: International Crimes Tribunal
IGP	: Inspector General of Police
JMB	: Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh
NSI	: National Security Intelligence
NTMC	: National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre
OHCHR	: Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
PBI	: Police Bureau of Investigation
RAB	: Rapid Action Battalion
RES	: Resolution
SB	: Special Branch (of Police)
ToR	: Terms of Reference
UN	: United Nations
VDP	: Village Defence Party

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his letter dated 28 August 2024 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 28 August 2024, the Chief Advisor of the interim Government of Bangladesh, Mr Muhammad Yunus, extended an invitation for an independent and impartial fact-finding to investigate human rights violations arising from the recent protests in Bangladesh. The executive summary of the fact-finding report, however, claimed to conduct an independent fact-finding inquiry while remaining unspecified about its impartiality. It placed impartiality only at the end of the summary by urging that further independent and impartial investigations are required to determine the accountability of violations.

The report claimed that the OHCHR-Fact-finding Team (FFT) based their conclusion on the basis of a thorough and independent assessment of all the collected information. However, an in-depth analysis of the data collection process explained in the methodology of the report indicates the lack of independence in collecting necessary data due to some restrictions imposed by the interim Yunus Government in conducting interviews with high-ranking security officials of the Sheikh Hasina Government, who remain imprisoned. The impartiality of data is vividly affected due to a faulty collection process of data that was channelled through the interim Government after a long gestation period, not collected directly and independently by the fact-finding team. More pertinently, the impartiality of OHCHR is highly impaired as they accept the formal invitation of the interim Government on 28 August 2024 to conduct a partial fact-finding only up to 15 August 2024, despite widely circulated reports from various national and international media that confirm widespread revenge violence that extends beyond 15 August 2024. Besides, the methodology remains vague, incomplete and no explanation of how the OHCHR team ensured an unbiased, representative sample to reach its conclusion. Due non-transparent and uncertain sampling selection process and a lack of independence in accessing data, the report fails to generalise its findings. Hence, based on this small number of unrepresentative samples, the claim of extrajudicial killing and SYSTEMATIC violation of human rights against the Sheikh Hasina Government cannot be established.

Though the fact-finding report claimed that OHCHR has reasonable grounds to believe that these violations were carried out with the knowledge, coordination and direction of the political leadership and senior security sector officials, the biased sampling selection process and restricted flow of information to the fact-finding committee via the interim Government undermine the credibility of such a claim. As going through the report, readers could understand that, based on mere speculation, the report claimed that from mid-July, the former Government and the Awami League mobilised a continuously expanding circle of armed actors. It further argued that in its initial efforts to suppress the protests, Awami League leaders, including Government ministers, incited Chhatra League supporters, who were armed with an array of blunt and sharp weapons and some firearms, to launch attacks on both male and female students exercising their right of peaceful assembly on and around university campuses. As interviewed while preparing this rebuttal report, senior Chhatra League leaders, however, confirmed that the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina always advised them to remain calm and not get hostile over general students protesting the quota. As shared by the student leaders, in mid-July, as they met the Prime Minister at her residence and informed the Prime Minister about infiltration of armed cadres in the protest movement, the Prime Minister advised the BCL leaders to concentrate on their own business and left the security issues in the hands of the

security forces. This can be corroborated with relevant texts of the fact-finding report on paragraph 32, which mentions, on 13 July, the Detective Branch of Dhaka Metropolitan Police announced a police investigation into the supposed “*infiltration*” of the protests.

The fact-finding report claimed that the student movement issued a call, echoed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, for general protests and a complete shutdown of Dhaka and other cities. Complete shutdown means the protesters violated the right to movement for at least those people who are in emergencies, due to various official and business purposes. In other instances, such a shutdown violates the right to life, as many were unable to enter Dhaka to receive emergency Medicare services. While claiming that the Government further escalated its violence against protestors and protest organisers, leading to violations of the rights to life, peaceful assembly, and liberty and security of the person, the report failed to indicate how the shutdown affects the lives and livelihoods of other people not involved in the protest. Every government has a mandate to protect the rights and freedoms of all its citizens. Newspaper reports around that time confirmed the atrocity, vandalism and destruction caused by protesters, yet the report largely ignored that with a modest gesture by mentioning that fact and indirectly ignored that by mentioning that protesters had been trying to obstruct roads and certain installations but had still been conducting themselves peacefully overall. This one-sided statement vividly contradicts the fact circulated widely via national and world media.

Though under the veil of protest against state violence, that remains quite untrue, the report admitted that in this deteriorating environment, some elements among the protestors engaged in acts of violence, targeting mostly Government buildings, transport infrastructure, and the police. This element was actually the third-party opportunist, mostly Jamaat-Shibir, BNP and members of other Islamic extremist parties, referring to whom on 11 July, the Chhatra League President Saddam Hussain warned that *some are trying to use the movement politically and the Chhatra League is ready to face them* (paragraph 32 of the report). However, without knowing the socio-political context of Bangladesh or being misled by Jamat-Shibir and other Islamic extremists, a few of whom eventually became the advisors of the Younus Government, the fact-finding committee could have made this one-sided statement. It has been mentioned in the fact-finding report that on the evening of 18 July, the Government reinforced orders authorising security forces to resort to lethal force against protestors. However, it is pertinent to mention here that by that time, the protesters were no longer the general students. Quite a good number of extremist group members infiltrated the peaceful movement and created a riot in the country. On 19 July 2024, protesters stormed the Narsingdi District Jail, set fire to parts of it, broke open cell locks and the main gate, and freed hundreds of inmates. Around 826 prisoners escaped from Narsingdi Jail. Among them were nine militants belonging to banned groups- JMB and Ansarullah Bangla Team, who at some time stormed Bangladesh with brutality and arbitrary execution.

We are confident that the OHCHR fact-finding committee has no rational ground why student movement asking for a fair quota system may storm the state jail and set extremists free. Though the report mentioned that from 19 July until the end of the protests, BGB, RAB and Police fired lethal ammunition indiscriminately at protesters in Dhaka and elsewhere, it resulted in many extrajudicial killings and injuries, including those of journalists covering the protests. Unfortunately, the fact-finding team never made this linkage that a riot condition evolved on 19 July, which may cause security forces to use lethal weapons for the sake of the security of life and property of the general citizen. Summary executions by deliberately shooting unarmed

protesters at point-blank range may happen if they are known extremists or run-away prisoners, etc.

However, as extremists are reinforced with absconded prisoners, the use of force by police and paramilitary forces did not suppress the protests and the growing degree of violent unrest. As mentioned in paragraph 300 of the full report, going beyond the call to create disruption, however, “many in the crowds also initiated acts of violence”. Violent mobs not only vandalised buildings and other property, but some also attacked media outlets seen as supportive of the Awami League, set fire to buildings with people inside and launched violent attacks on Awami League supporters and police personnel, including by lynching some. Hence, on 20 July, the former Government imposed a general curfew and deployed the Army. The report states that, in some instances, Army soldiers shot at protestors who did not present an imminent threat of death or serious injury, “resulting in at least one extrajudicial killing”. This number, one out of thousands of protesters demonstrating on the roads, indicates that the primary purpose of the Army was to disperse or restrain any protest through fear, not by killing innocents.

As indicated in the fact-finding report, testimony by former senior officials also revealed that the Army and BGB took part in developing a government plan to utilise the Army, BGB and Police to stop protesters. According to paragraph 52 of the full report, ‘During the meeting, the Army Chief and other security officials reassured the Prime Minister that Dhaka could be held. A plan was agreed upon according to which the Army and the BGB would deploy alongside the police to block protesters from accessing central Dhaka, if necessary, by force. However, pursuant to that plan, the Police, who were not a part of the plan, shot and killed protesters, as the Army and BGB largely stood by and let protesters march, making the situation increasingly out of control by the police. As mentioned in page 33 of the report, quoting a police officer, “One police commander explained that “[t]he Army knew from early that day that Sheikh Hasina had fallen, but not the police. So, the police were out there still defending the Government.”

This and a few other oral testimonies indicate that on the final day of the July protest, in several locations, the Army and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) removed barriers, allowing student protesters to advance toward the Prime Minister’s residence. However, this information was not officially communicated to the police. By the time the police understood the situation from the unfolding circumstances, it was already too late, and numerous police stations were being attacked by violent mobs. As mentioned on page 34 of the fact-finding report, witness testimony, corroborated by videos, established that on 5 August, police officers intentionally shot and killed several unarmed protesters at close range as they were seeking cover or fleeing. Referring to three interviews, paragraph 286 of the full report stated that some former senior officials interviewed by OHCHR claimed that the then Prime Minister and the Home Affairs Minister instructed the security forces to limit the use of force and keep it within the law, but that security forces in the field overstepped these limits.

The fact-finding report further illustrates that the then Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister undertook parallel efforts to coordinate the security and intelligence apparatus. Both leaders received regular situation updates from multiple sources. According to senior official testimony, reports submitted to the Prime Minister on 21 July and in early August explicitly expressed concerns about the excessive use of force. In response, the Prime Minister and the Home Affairs Minister reiterated their instructions to employ minimal force to avoid unnecessary casualties. Despite these directives, the political leadership also issued direct

orders and operational guidelines to the BGB, RAB, DGFI, the Bangladesh Police, and its Detective Branch to manage the unfolding crisis. However, as the July movement intensified and the Government's control on the ground weakened, it appears that the Army, BGB, and other military units were increasingly reluctant to follow these instructions. While the Army and BGB withdrew from the front lines, leaving the Police to confront the protesters largely on their own, the Army Chief was reportedly engaged in facilitating an alternative political arrangement at Banga Bhaban.

This strategic withdrawal exposed the Police to mounting hostility from the protesting crowds and ultimately resulted in a high number of brutal deaths among police officers, who continued to carry out government orders without realising the shifting dynamics behind the scenes. As the situation deteriorated, attempts by police personnel to escape, often under heavy fire, triggered further violence and a significant number of civilian deaths and injuries outside police stations. Accordingly, senior Army officials cannot evade responsibility for the tragic outcome. Their omission in executing the approved security plan, combined with negligent misconduct in failing to inform either the Government or the police forces of any change in strategy, directly contributed to the unnecessary loss of life on both sides.

The report mentioned that, in early August 2024, as the former Government was increasingly losing control of the country, crowds engaged in retaliatory killings and other serious revenge violence targeting, in particular, Awami League officials and real or perceived supporters of the Awami League, the police and the media, seen as supportive of the Awami League. During and after the protests, members of the Hindu community, Ahmadiyya Muslims and indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were also subject to violent attacks by mobs, including the burning of homes and some attacks on places of worship. Different and often intersecting motives drove these attacks, ranging from religious and ethnic discrimination to perceived opportunities for revenge against Awami League supporters among minorities, local communal disputes, including about land, and interpersonal issues. Some Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP supporters, members and local leaders were also involved in revenge violence and attacks on distinct religious and indigenous groups. However, the information available to OHCHR has not shown that such incidents were orchestrated or organised by these parties' national leaderships, which also took steps to condemn violence targeting minority groups. Although the fact-finding mission failed to ascertain accountability for the revenge violence against the Awami League and other minority groups, to maintain impartiality, the report should at least have addressed whether there were "reasonable grounds to believe" that this revenge violence constituted serious human rights violations, but it remained silent!

Though the report claimed that up to 5 August 2024, the former Government did not appear to engage in any genuine efforts to investigate or to ensure accountability for any of the serious violations and abuses committed by the security forces or Awami League supporters. It is already a public document and widely circulated in several National Daily Newspapers that the Government formed a judicial enquiry committee composed of three Justices, who even held their first meeting to enquire into any extrajudicial killing that may have taken place during the protest. However, when the enquiry was on the way, the political dynamic changed. Unfortunately, the Younus Government did not continue that enquiry but rather invited an international inquiry from OHCHR even before exhausting the nationally available measures.

As claimed in the fact-finding report, following the fall of the previous Government, the current interim Government has commenced efforts to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations and abuses. Among its steps, it has brought cases against senior officials before

Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), as well as in the regular courts. These efforts have been hampered, to differing degrees, by pre-existing structural deficiencies of the law enforcement and justice sectors, established police malpractices such as bringing meritless charges based on mass cases, continued intimidation and evidence tampering by some security officials who face allegations but remain in their positions, as well as other due process concerns related to ICT and regular courts. While the interim Government has reported having made 100 arrests in relation to attacks on distinct religious and indigenous groups, many perpetrators of acts of revenge violence and attacks on distinct groups apparently continue to enjoy impunity. However, the Fact-Finding Team failed to acknowledge that during the first couple of months of its tenure of the Dr Yunus-led interim government, hundreds of cases were filed and thousands of Awami League and Bangladesh Chhatra League members were arrested. In many instances, these were fabricated lawsuits designed primarily to harass and intimidate them for political purposes.

Based on reported deaths compiled by Governmental and non-governmental sources, in combination with other available evidence, OHCHR assesses that as many as 1,400 people could have been killed during the protests. However, as included in this rebuttal report, national dailies reported that many of these death statistics are fake and people who die during July and early August, but not in relation to protest, rather from fire or accident, etc., are also included in the list of July Martyrs.

Many female members of the Bangladesh Awami League and Bangladesh Chhatra League were also harassed sexually or even raped in the immediate aftermath of August 5. However, given social and cultural sensitivities and the significant under-reporting of sexual and gender-based violence in Bangladesh, OHCHR believes that it was not able to document the full extent of sexual violence that was perpetrated and considers that further in-depth investigations are required to ascertain the full scope and impact of such acts and to provide the required support to victims.

The fact-finding report claimed, violations were enabled and exacerbated by outdated laws and policies, corrupted governance structures, and erosion of the rule of law, which readily facilitated the use of disproportionate force against protesters, the militarisation of policing, the politicisation of the security and justice sectors, and institutionalised impunity. Although it is sometimes alleged that the former Government relied on and expanded an elaborate legal and institutional framework to repress peaceful civic and political dissent, the reality is that the judiciary operated with significant independence throughout the fifteen-year tenure of the Sheikh Hasina Government. Indeed, this very judicial freedom enabled the Quota Protest to re-emerge even after the Sheikh Hasina Government abolished the job quota system in 2018.

As urged by the report, the magnitude and seriousness of the violations and abuses that occurred during the period covered by OHCHR's fact-finding, and their deep-rooted causes, require both urgent measures and significant longer-term reforms to prevent similar patterns of serious violations from recurring. To this end, OHCHR recommends a range of actions, detailed in the report, including security and justice sector reforms, repeal of numerous repressive laws and policies, amendments to other laws to align them with international human rights standards, institutional and governance reforms, and broader changes to political processes and economic governance to address inequalities, promote inclusiveness, and ensure the respect and protection of the human rights of all of Bangladesh's people.

However, interestingly, in its recommendations, the report makes no mention of the quota system or any good practices that could help the country address this critical issue, an issue that simultaneously calls for equity for disadvantaged groups while maintaining a fair share for others. This omission again casts doubt on the report's true purpose. Was the report intended to explore solutions for restoring sustainable human rights protections, or merely to find grounds to criticise Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government for defending a meticulously designed plan used to oust an established government?

The OHCHR recommends further independent and impartial investigations into the violations and abuses that have occurred, including those connected to the recent protests, with a view to ensuring accountability. In this regard, we firmly demand that any such investigation be inclusive, allowing all parties to participate and to present their evidence and perspectives in the pursuit of justice. Further, the OHCHR must not limit the temporal scope of its inquiry to events up to 05 August 2024. To capture the true nature of the crisis and to establish accountabilities for all actors who may have misled the nation for political or personal gain, the investigation should be extended at least until 15 August 2025.

Our call is clear and unwavering: We seek justice — impartial, fair and “complete justice”.

SECTION I: Introduction

This section deals with the background of the OHCHR fact-finding mission and argues that the report lacks independence, impartiality, evidentiary sufficiency and fairness in attributing responsibility.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) recently published its report titled *Human Rights Violations and Abuses Related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh*.¹ The report, prepared by an OHCHR fact-finding mission deployed at the request of the interim Government, seeks to provide an account of alleged human rights violations and abuses that occurred during the widespread protests. An OHCHR fact-finding mission was deployed in Bangladesh following an oral communication from the interim Government Chief, Dr Mohammed Yunus, on 14 August 2024, and subsequent formal written communication dated 28 August 2024. According to OHCHR guidance on Commissions, Inquiries, and Fact-Finding Missions concerning International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, such bodies can be established through the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, or the Secretary-General. Accordingly, the Fact-Finding Team (FFT) was deployed under the mandate created through the written communication between Dr Yunus and the OHCHR High Commissioner, Mr Volker Türk, on 28 August 2024.

Unlike in situations such as Venezuela or Myanmar, where the Human Rights Council adopted explicit resolutions establishing fact-finding or independent international fact-finding missions (for example, in Resolution 42/25 for Venezuela² or in Resolution 42/50 for Myanmar³) to investigate serious rights abuses, no such resolution was passed in respect to Bangladesh. Instead, the OHCHR fact-finding exercise in Bangladesh was initiated in response to an invitation from Dr Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of the interim Government. This difference is important: HRC resolutions like A/HRC/RES/42/25 clearly define the scope, duties, and institutional authority of the missions to investigate human rights violations, identify perpetrators, and report to the Council, as specified in a UN General Assembly resolution in 1991.⁴ This rebuttal report will demonstrate how the fact-finding mission on Bangladesh lacked objectivity, deviated from its purpose, and, in certain instances, exceeded the scope of its mandate.

While the report carries considerable significance, particularly because of its potential influence on domestic and international perceptions of recent events, it also acknowledges its own limitations. In the executive summary (page iv), OHCHR recommends further independent and impartial investigations into violations and abuses, including those connected to the protests, with a view to supporting accountability. This admission indicates that the

¹ United Nations Human Rights, *Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh* (OHCHR 2025)

<<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-ffb-hr-violations-bd.pdf>> accessed 8 September 2025

² UN Human Rights Council, *Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/42/25 (27 September 2019)

³ United Nations Human Rights Council, *Situation of human rights in Myanmar including the aftermath of the military coup* UN Doc A/HRC/42/50 (8 August 2019)

⁴ Kenneth Keith, 'Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security', UNGA Res 46/59 <https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_46-59/ga_46-59_e.pdf> (9 December 1991); See more, Alex Berg, 'The 1991 Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations' (1993)

4 *European Journal of International Law*, 107 <<https://ejil.org/pdfs/4/1/1184.pdf>> accessed 11 September 2025

report's findings are preliminary in nature and should not be treated as definitive conclusions of fact or law. Given this context, the report requires close examination. Any fact-finding exercise by an international body must be assessed against the benchmarks of independence, impartiality, evidentiary sufficiency, and fairness in attributing responsibility. Where these standards are not fully satisfied, reliance on the findings of such reports for judicial purposes risks undermining the pursuit of justice.

Therefore, while critically evaluating the fact-finding report paragraph by paragraph, the primary goal of this rebuttal report is to highlight its limitations on independence, impartiality, evidentiary sufficiency, and fairness in attributing responsibility. It advances four propositions that: (1) the fact-finding team may not have been able to work with sufficient independence or impartiality; (2) Many of the alleged human rights violations remain unsubstantiated and are not fully supported by verifiable evidence; (3) evidence of violations, even where credible, does not necessarily imply that the ousted Government bears accountability, as certain coercive actions may be legitimate under national law, international standards, and the doctrine of administrative necessity; and (4) further independent investigation is essential to fully assess the actions of both state authorities, protestors, and other third party opportunists to ensure accountability across all actors. Apart from these key limitations, several additional issues are discussed in the next section to explain why a rebuttal was necessary to counter this partial, incomplete, and biased fact-finding report.

SECTION II. Rationale of the Rebuttal Report

This section explains why a rebuttal is necessary, arguing that the OHCHR report ignored its stated mandate, failed to address the quota issue from a human right and constitutional jurisprudence, and presented a politically appealing and one-sided narrative against the former government.

The report appears to have disregarded its primary purpose. One of its key objectives, as outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR), was to explore the root causes of the protest and provide recommendations to prevent similar situations in the future. While the report repeatedly identifies the quota system as the primary trigger for the movement, beginning its contextual overview with the quota issue and explaining Government actions and the escalation of violence in relation to quotas in Government jobs, it is strikingly silent on this matter in its recommendations. Not a single recommendation addresses the quota question. This omission renders the report's purpose ambiguous. The present structure of the report suggests that it was designed less to resolve the underlying human rights concerns and more to assign blame to the ousted Government. By failing to propose any concrete solutions to restore or protect human rights in relation to the quota system and associated issues, the report undermines its own stated mandate. Such selective analysis necessitates an alternative discourse to expose the underlying motives and reveal the facts surrounding the protest.

Loaded and conclusive language: In its Executive Summary and throughout Section V, the report asserts that security forces, “*with knowledge, coordination and direction of political leadership,*” committed “*hundreds of extrajudicial killings*” and “*systematic abuses*” (OHCHR Report, Executive Summary; Sec. I). Such emphatic and repetitive phrasing creates the impression of a judicially established fact, even though OHCHR itself acknowledges it is applying a lower threshold of proof, “*reasonable grounds to believe*” that is below both domestic criminal standards and international criminal law thresholds. By contrast, when describing opposition violence, the report employs minimising terms such as “*revenge attacks*” or “*retaliatory violence*” (p. 52), suggesting spontaneity rather than systematic orchestration.

One-sided validation process: The draft report was shared only with the interim Government before publication, and its comments were incorporated (Methodology: Section IV). No equivalent opportunity was extended to the former Government or other accused stakeholders. This asymmetry reinforces the perception that the report was shaped to align with the political narrative of the post-5 August administration, rather than being subjected to a balanced adversarial review.

Dismissal of alternative accounts: At several points, OHCHR notes that former officials claimed BNP–Jamaat leadership orchestrated the July violence (p. 8, 9) but concludes that it found no *corroboration* of such direction (OHCHR Report, p. 68). This blanket dismissal is inconsistent with the report's otherwise cautious approach to unverifiable claims and contradicts contemporaneous indications of coordination, including the simultaneity of nationwide police station attacks. Instead of subjecting these accounts to further evidentiary testing, the report adopts a presumption of non-involvement by opposition leadership.

Neglect of Bangladesh's socio-economic record: The introductory context section describes public grievances over corruption, inequality, and economic mismanagement as background to the protests (Introduction pp. 1-9). Yet it fails to acknowledge that, under the former Government, Bangladesh was repeatedly recognised by UN agencies and the World Bank for significant progress on the Millennium Development Goals and for being on track with several Sustainable Development Goals. By omitting this context, the report adopts a one-dimensional

narrative of state fragility that mirrors the rhetoric of the interim Government and its foreign backers.

Effect of tonal imbalance: The cumulative effect is a report that reads less like an impartial human rights inquiry and more like an advocacy brief directed against one side of a political conflict. The selective use of emphatic legal terminology, the unequal validation process and the dismissal of alternative accounts undermine the neutrality that international fact-finding bodies are required to maintain under OHCHR's own *Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions: Guidance and Practice* (2015).

Exclusion of pre-July context: The report treats the July protests as the spontaneous eruption of long-standing grievances (Intro) while offering little acknowledgement of the specific judicial and administrative decisions that triggered the unrest. On 17 July 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that the Government had appealed to the High Court judgment reinstating quota benefits and that the Supreme Court had stayed that ruling. A judicial commission of inquiry was also established to examine incidents of violence. By setting its temporal scope to begin on 1 July, the OHCHR report omits these corrective steps and creates the impression that the Government ignored the crisis until it spiraled out of control.

Cut-off before the post 5 August violence: Equally problematic is the cut-off on 15 August 2024. This excludes the weeks of violence that followed the fall of the Sheikh Hasina administration, during which police officers, Awami League supporters and minority communities were targeted in coordinated attacks. OHCHR acknowledges this violence in passing (Sec. VI) but treats it as context rather than as a core subject of inquiry. By doing so, the report structurally minimises the responsibility of the interim Government and non-State actors during a period of politically and religiously targeted mass killing and destruction.

Asymmetrical attribution of responsibility: The narrow timeframe allows OHCHR to attribute the vast majority of civilian deaths estimated at 1,400 (p. iii, 10) to the former Government, while treating the post-5 August killings as unverified, anecdotal or marginal. This asymmetry has the effect of constructing a narrative in which culpability rests almost exclusively with State forces, thereby skewing public and judicial perception.

Departure from international practice: In comparable inquiries (e.g. Sri Lanka OISL, Myanmar FFM), fact-finding mandates have covered extended periods to capture both antecedent causes and subsequent retaliatory violence. By contrast, the Bangladesh mission truncated its scope in a way that conveniently aligns with the interim Government's interests, emphasising abuses of its predecessor while shielding its own period in power from equivalent scrutiny.

Consequences of temporal bias: The result is a distortion of the historical record. Victims of post-5 August atrocities, police officers killed in station attacks, minority families displaced, and Awami League supporters murdered in targeted assaults are relegated to footnotes, while allegations against the former Government dominate the narrative. This not only undermines the credibility of the report but also denies equal recognition of victims, in violation of the principle of universality of human rights.

Non-exhaustive and opaque sampling: The report acknowledges that it relied on over 230 interviews, site visits to selected districts and "*representative sampling*" rather than comprehensive documentation (OHCHR Report, Methodology, Sec IV). While sampling

is acceptable in principle, OHCHR fails to disclose the sampling frame, criteria for site selection, or error margins. Without transparency about how cases were chosen, it is impossible to assess whether the data are representative of the national picture. This undermines the reliability of sweeping conclusions such as “*systematic*” and “*coordinated*” killings by State forces (p. 13, 18, 22, 31, etc.).

Casualty estimates without verification: The report estimates that “*as many as 1,400*” people were killed between 15 July and 5 August (p. 10). It concedes, however, that not all deaths were attributable to State forces and that it did not verify each case. By contrast, when addressing deaths of police officers, Awami League supporters and minorities in post-5 August violence, the report expressly states that it “*could not verify*” the lists provided (Sec. VI) and refrains from offering equivalent numerical estimates. This asymmetry in verification magnifies alleged State responsibility while minimising non-State abuses.

Absence of chain-of-command evidence: Despite strong claims of “*knowledge, coordination and direction of political leadership*” (*Executive Summary*), the report provides no direct documentary or testimonial evidence of command orders authorising lethal force. No meeting minutes, written directives, or authenticated communications are cited. Instead, the report relies on interviews with unnamed former officials (p. ii) and general patterns of conduct. Such inferential reasoning may support preliminary concern but cannot sustain definitive conclusions about systematic policy.

Inconsistent application of evidentiary standards: For State actors, OHCHR extrapolates from partial data to assert nationwide systematicity. For opposition-linked actors, however, it dismisses allegations of leadership involvement by stating there was “*no evidence*” of direction (Sec. VI). The methodological inconsistency of treating inference as sufficient for one side but demanding direct proof for the other undermines the report’s impartiality.

Departure from best practices: International inquiries of comparable scale (e.g. Darfur COI, Syria COI) have published detailed methodological annexes, explaining their source evaluation matrices, verification steps, and error margins. OHCHR’s Bangladesh report provides no such annexure/s. Without these safeguards, its findings lack the transparency and replicability required for credibility.

SECTION III: The Dubious Validity and Mandate of the Fact-finding Team's Report

This section examines the legality of the mission's authority and doubts its validity, showing that it was not mandated by the Human Rights Council; and was violative of natural justice principles, as the requesting person, an unelected head of the interim government, himself was susceptible as a party to the unrest.

Notably, the report's **first paragraph**⁵ highlights that an earlier proposal by Mr Türk on 23 July 2024 to send a fact-finding mission to Bangladesh was rejected by the Sheikh Hasina Government. Further, as noted in **paragraph 6** of the report, beginning 20 July 2024, OHCHR had already assigned a remote monitoring team to collect and preserve credible open-source materials, including videos and photographs, as protests continued. While remote monitoring of human rights issues may be conducted under a UN Human Rights Council resolution, no such resolution was issued to authorise a fact-finding mission in Bangladesh. This suggests that Mr Türk, in his capacity as High Commissioner, independently authorised the remote monitoring team. However, a critical question arises: why was a remote monitoring team deployed on 20 July 2024, three days prior to submitting the official proposal to the Prime Minister on 23 July 2024? This timing raises concerns regarding procedural propriety and the legitimacy of actions taken before asking for formal authorisation.

Paragraph 2 of the Fact-Finding Report⁶ defines the mission's mandate. According to the report, the OHCHR fact-finding team was tasked with investigating human rights violations and abuses that occurred between 1 July and 15 August 2024, examining their root causes, identifying those responsible, offering concrete recommendations to prevent recurrence, and assessing the steps taken by the interim Government and the justice system to initiate criminal investigations and provide effective remedies. However, the OHCHR's own *Guidance and Practice Note on Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law*, on page 11, sets out a clear and well-established framework for such missions⁷. Typically, every fact-finding body is expected to perform four key functions:

1. *Establish the facts* relating to incidents and allegations of violations of international human rights law.
2. *Assess those facts* in light of the applicable legal standards.
3. *Reach conclusions* as to whether violations have occurred.
4. *Issue recommendations* to address and prevent future violations.

Despite this explicit mandate, the report repeatedly falls short of even its first and most fundamental obligation: the establishment of verifiable facts. In numerous instances, the findings rely on uncorroborated accounts or assumptions rather than rigorously substantiated evidence. This failure undermines not only the credibility of the report but also the integrity of the fact-finding process itself, casting doubt on its conclusions and recommendations.

To explain further, the task statement of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Report fails to conform to the established standards for such missions in several critical respects.

⁵ United Nations Human Rights, above n 1

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), *Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice*, HR/PUB/14/7, (United Nations, 2015) 11.

First, while repeatedly alleging widespread human rights violations, the report often fails to establish the very facts on which such claims must rest. For example, in **paragraph 222**, the fact-finding report admits: “OHCHR cannot provide its own estimate on the extent of revenge violence, in particular killings of police officers and Awami League members” This admission underscores the absence of verifiable data to substantiate one of its key assertions.

Second, despite making serious allegations of human rights abuses, the report provides no reference to any specific legal framework, domestic or international, against which the alleged violations were assessed. Without grounding its analysis in clearly defined legal standards, the report’s conclusions lack the necessary legal precision and normative authority.

Third, in many instances, the report stops short of reaching definitive conclusions regarding the existence of violations and parties responsible for such action. For example, while discussing alleged abuses by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) on page 38, it merely states: “Use of helicopters to intimidate and deploy possibly unlawful force.” Such equivocal language neither establishes fact nor supports a legal finding of wrongdoing.

Figure 1: Police firing at protesters (not visible) at Savar



Alleged Caption: Images 19 and 20 show police firing at protesters in Savar, posing no threat

On page 26 (**paragraph 105**), the fact-finding report includes two photographs and alleges that police in Savar opened fire on protesters who posed no threat. Yet a closer examination of the left-hand image exposes the weakness of this claim. If it is reasonably assumed that the same type of firearm was used in both photographs, there is no credible reason for the gun on the left to produce visible smoke. In fact, the smoke appears not to have come from the weapon at all, but rather from an explosive device hurled toward the police from the opposite side. It indicates stealth attacks where attackers stay out of sight, targets remain unaware until the attack happens, are often aimed at a specific target rather than random, and the attackers avoid being seen or caught. Therefore, it was not fair to say the protesters were not posing any threat.

Paragraph 3 explains that OHCHR applied its own methodology⁸, using a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof, explicitly lower than the standard required in a competent criminal court. Although the report claims that the available time and resources allowed it to document a “representative sample” of violations, the fact-finding team failed to engage with key respondents essential to a balanced inquiry. While the team visited major protest sites, including universities and hospitals in Dhaka and ten other districts, it nonetheless acknowledges that important allegations, including those concerning sexual violence in certain

⁸ United Nations Human Rights, n1

regions, remain *unverified* or require *further investigation*. **Paragraphs** 229 and 230 admit that some reports from remote areas could not be corroborated due to “*time and resource constraints*.” This admission directly contradicts the report’s own claim to have collected sufficient information to establish responsibility for acts of violence and human rights violations. Further, as included in the Annex 2 of the fact-finding report (page 82), clause (a) of *Access and guarantees for deployment of the OHCHR fact-finding team* requires the interim Government to ensure freedom of movement in any part of the country, including facilitation of transport, particularly to restricted areas; Therefore, the interim Government has failed to fulfil its commitment to the fact finding mission in Bangladesh.

SECTION IV. Faulty Methodology and Poor Standard of Proof

This section argues that the methodology of the OHCHR report was opaque, selective and unprofessional—relying on unverifiable testimonies, inconsistent casualty figures and a sub-standard threshold of proof.

The OHCHR Fact-Finding Report on **paragraph 5** claims to be principally based on more than 230 confidential in-depth interviews⁹ conducted in Bangladesh and online with victims, witnesses, students and protest leaders, human rights defenders, academics, journalists, medical professionals, lawyers, businesspeople, and other relevant individuals. Among these respondents were 35 women, two non-binary persons, and 10 children. However, the methodology, *prima facie*, remains sub-standard. The clause ‘*more than 230*’ to indicate the sample size is too unprofessional, considering the international body that is producing this report. Yet, despite this seemingly broad scope, the report fails to disclose the sampling frame or explain the basis of selecting any particular respondent for the interview. Transparency in the sample selection remains questionable, as the fact-finding report did not mention whether the team selected samples independently or with the assistance of the Government. This omission casts serious doubt on the representativeness and impartiality of the testimonies relied upon to produce the report. As the sampling frame and methodology of choosing the sample remain unspecified, “*The study lacks external validity because the absence of a specified sampling frame and sampling procedure prevents assessment of sample representativeness.*”¹⁰ In other words, “*Failure to specify the sampling methodology introduces a high risk of selection bias, which can systematically distort the study’s findings.*”¹¹ “*Without transparency in the sampling process, the generalisability of the results to the wider population remains questionable.*”¹² Hence, the study’s findings cannot be confidently extrapolated to the target population due to the opaque sampling process.

The methodology for collecting oral testimony from senior officials of the ousted Government raises concerns about adequacy and neutrality. For example, **paragraph 7** states that interviews with the current Inspector-General of Police and the Directors-General of Bangladesh’s three paramilitary security forces, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Ansar/Village Defence Party (Ansar/VDP), and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), were arranged with facilitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Crucially, except for the BGB chief, none of these officials held their posts during the protests and could provide only limited insight into the actions of their forces. This highlights the inherent limits of oral testimony to corroborate key factual findings.

Paragraph 8 adds that OHCHR conducted 32 additional interviews with former and serving officials from the Army, Police, RAB, Ansar/VDP, intelligence services, political parties, and the justice system. Yet the report’s own endnote 4 cautions against over-reliance on these testimonies, noting that some officials were in detention, spoke without authorisation from their chain of command, or were otherwise in vulnerable situations. Moreover, interviews with officials arranged by the interim Government were identified by their function rather than by the standard anonymous meeting codes (FFTB-INT/FFTB-ME), thereby weakening the

⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2021) 187–189

¹¹ David de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (SAGE 2014) 58–60

¹² William M Trochim, *Research Methods: The Essential Knowledge Base* (2nd edn, Cengage Learning 2020) 103–105.

independence and traceability of the evidence collected. Such conditions undermine the impartiality of the testimonies and compromise the credibility of the fact-finding process.

The report also acknowledges significant access limitations. **Paragraph 9** notes that several former senior officials were interviewed at Kernigan Central Prison, where OHCHR was permitted to conduct private, unsupervised interviews. However, OHCHR's request to conduct a follow-up interview with the detained former Inspector-General of Police was denied. Likewise, despite repeated requests, meetings with the leadership of the Army and the Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) were never arranged. These gaps indicate that the fact-finding team operated under constraints that materially limited its independence and its ability to secure balanced, first-hand testimony from key actors.

The methodology for collecting forensic evidence raises further concerns. **Paragraph 6** states that OHCHR's forensic physician visited 11 medical facilities, conferred with doctors, examined 29 victims, and reviewed 153 medical case files (including images of injuries) with consent. Yet the report does not clarify whether consents were freely given or access to these medical records was restricted or subject to conditions that might have limited the depth of examination. No footnote explains whether or how any such restrictions may have influenced the findings, leaving unresolved questions about the reliability of the forensic data and its capacity to counterbalance ambiguous oral testimony.

Taken together, these methodological shortcomings, including the opaque sampling process, restricted access to key respondents and medical evidence, and reliance on testimonies gathered under politically mediated conditions, seriously undermine the independence and objectivity of the fact-finding mission. These deficiencies call into question not only the credibility of specific findings but also the validity of the report's broader conclusions.

Objective forensic analysis of medical records is critical in cases of reported deaths and physical injuries, particularly where allegations of extrajudicial killings are concerned. Although the OHCHR Fact-Finding Report refers to the forensic examination of medical reports relating to injuries, it remains silent on whether the team examined forensic autopsy reports, death certificates, or other medical documentation concerning violence-related deaths. This omission undermines the report's ability to provide a verifiable account of fatalities linked to the protests.

Crucially, the report fails to provide a single authenticated death toll or a clear accounting of alleged extrajudicial killings. The internal inconsistencies are striking:

- **Paragraph 56** cites Ministry of Health data recording 841 protest-related deaths.
- Footnote 72 refers to 1,450 reported killings, noting that the date of death could not be ascertained for more than 350 cases.
- Footnote 77 records that the Chief Advisor of the interim Government, Dr Mohammed Yunus, estimated 1,500 deaths.



Figure 2: Although not martyrs, the names of 52 people appear on the list of martyrs

Source: *Land dispute, death by accident, yet they are listed as July martyrs, Prothom Alo*¹³

Despite these divergent figures, footnote 170 reveals that the fact-finding team ultimately relied on the 1,450 figures, yet the report provides no source or verification for this number. Such glaring contradictions cast serious doubt on the legitimacy and reliability of the reported death toll and invite suspicion that the figures may have been selectively presented to amplify the perceived gravity of state actions against the ousted Sheikh Hasina Government. In the absence of transparent sourcing, cross-verification, and forensic confirmation of deaths, the report's references to extrajudicial killings remain methodologically unsound and risk being interpreted as a manipulated narrative rather than an objective finding of fact.

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In a related development, a recent report published in a widely circulated national daily revealed serious discrepancies in the officially reported protest-related death toll. The report identified at least 52 individuals publicly listed as “*July martyrs*,” even though none of them died as a result of protest-related violence. As shown in the figure above, verification through Government records and direct discussions with family members confirmed that among these 52 misreported cases, 35 deaths were caused by fire incidents, while the remaining fatalities were linked to road accidents, electrocution, personal disputes, and other unrelated causes.

¹³ Mahmudul Hasan, ‘Land dispute, death by accident — yet they are listed as July martyrs (translation)’ Prothom Alo (Dhaka, 15 September 2025) <<https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/opq9n6db0n?utm>> accessed 16 September 2025

This fabricated association between these deaths, and the protest movement has been further corroborated by multiple newspaper investigations and statements from political activists. Such false attribution not only inflates the reported casualty figures but also calls into question the accuracy and reliability of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Report, which draws on unverified data to support claims of widespread state violence.

Further, although exhumation of bodies and forensic examination a standard and widely accepted practices in Bangladesh for verifying death-related data, the OHCHR fact-finding team did not attempt to conduct such investigations to confirm alleged protest-related extrajudicial killings. This omission represents a critical failure to employ the most objective means of validating contested casualty figures.

Paragraph 6 of the report notes that the OHCHR weapons expert corroborated information on the use of firearms, less-lethal weapons, and ammunition through the analysis of videos, photographs, and ammunition remnants provided to OHCHR. The report also states that OHCHR preserved and reviewed thousands of original videos and photos, obtained primarily from witnesses, victims, and journalists, which purportedly offer direct evidence of violations, the actors involved, and their weapons and methods of operation.

However, a notable discrepancy emerges in the report's treatment of these different forms of evidence. While the provenance of the photos and videos is at least broadly described, coming mainly from witnesses and journalists, the report is entirely silent about the source of the ammunition remnants provided to the OHCHR team. This omission is significant because the chain of custody for physical evidence, such as ammunition, is critical for determining both the authenticity of the material and the accountability of security forces in the alleged use of lethal force. By failing to disclose the origin of key physical evidence while relying heavily on unverified witness-submitted media, the fact-finding report exposes a methodological imbalance that raises confusion and undermines the credibility of its conclusions, including the indiscriminate use of lethal weapons during the protests. In a related vein, it is pertinent to mention here that while visiting an Ansar member injured by a 7.62 mm rifle at the Combined Military Hospital at Dhaka, Home Affairs Adviser Brigadier General (Retired) Sakhawat Hossain, on 12 August 2018, said:¹⁴

"This is very concerning. Police have been given firearms. But a youth in civil dress opened fire going to the Ansar's area. This is very serious. Does that mean we had armed civilians?"

"A massive investigation is needed to find out who they are. In whose hands were these prohibited rifles?"

"I saw a video. A civilian youth was carrying a 7.62mm rifle and walked away. That means the rifle was not returned."

"These rifles are missing," he said, urging all to handover over the unauthorised firearms to nearby police stations by August 19. Replying to another query, he asked Awami League to reorganise the party and take part in the next election.

¹⁴ Star Digital Report, 'Who were the youths carrying 7.62mm rifles meant for police, Rab?' The Daily Star (Dhaka, 12 August 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/who-were-the-youths-carrying-762mm-rifles-meant-police-rab-3675336?utm>> accessed 16 September 2025; see more, BD DIGEST, 'The Mysterious 7.62 Bullet: Sniper Involvement in July Protests and Discovery of 20 More Rounds' (BDDIGEST, 13 March, 2025) <<https://en.bddigest.com/the-mysterious-7-62-bullet-sniper-involvement-in-july-protests-and-discovery-of-20-more-rounds/?utm>> accessed 16 September 2025

Following his public remarks on 12 April 2024 regarding the discovery of 7.62 mm ammunition used during the July protest, where he observed that such bullets were “*not used by the Bangladesh police*”, Brigadier General (Retd.) Sakhawat Hossain, then Adviser for Home Affairs, developed a cold relationship with the interim Government and was eventually reassigned to the Ministry of Textiles and Jute just after a couple of months on 16 August 2024.¹⁵

Figure 3: Military bullets linked to death in the July protest recovered on March 12, 2024



Source: Sniper Involvement in July Protests and Discovery of 20 More Rounds, BDDIGEST¹⁶

Here, it is pertinent to mention that more than 1,300 firearms and over 250,000 rounds of ammunition looted from police stations are still missing¹⁷. The Army/authorities stated that about 6,000 weapons and around 200,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered during recovery operations¹⁸.

Given that the July movement was closely tied to the political interests of the then-ruling Awami League, the OHCHR sought interviews with key Awami League figures and accepted offers for online interviews from four former Cabinet ministers, each of whom played a significant role during the protests. As noted in **paragraph 10** of the report, OHCHR also interviewed senior and mid-level officials of both the Awami League and its student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League. **Paragraph 11** further states that the team interviewed senior officials from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Jatiya Party (Jatiya

¹⁵ TBS Report, ‘Lt Gen Jahangir new home affairs adviser, Brig Gen Sakhawat given charge of Textiles and Jute ministry’ *The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 16 August 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/lt-gen-jahangir-new-home-affairs-adviser-brig-gen-sakhawat-given-charge-textiles-and-jute?utm>> accessed 12 September 2025

¹⁶ BDDIGEST, above n 14

¹⁷ M Shamsul Arefin, ‘1300 firearms looted from police stations still missing’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 11 August 2025).

¹⁸ Staff Reporter, ‘Bangladesh recovers thousands of guns looted during protests’ *The Independent* (19 November 2024)

Party). However, despite formal requests, OHCHR received no response from the leadership of Jamaat-e-Islami, which declined to make it available for interviews. Similar requests were sent to the Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir, a student organisation generally linked to Jamaat-e-Islami, but no official meeting was secured. Instead, OHCHR interviewed several supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami and Chhatra Shibir.

This interview pattern underscores a key methodological concern: while representatives of the ruling interim Government and their close allies were directly engaged, one of the principal political stakeholders, Jamaat-e-Islami, did not respond to the OHCHR fact-finding mission in Bangladesh. By relying instead on interviews with individual supporters, the fact-finding team risks presenting a partial and potentially unbalanced political narrative, weakening the neutrality and comprehensiveness of its findings.

Although the OHCHR report does not explicitly acknowledge this as a shortcoming, **paragraph 11** reveals a critical gap in its evidentiary process. On 12 September 2024, OHCHR submitted a comprehensive request for written information to the interim Government. Yet, as clarified on **paragraph 12** nearly three months later on 9 December the interim Government provided only partial responses, including longer reports from the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), the National Security Intelligence (NSI), and the Ministry of Information Technology, along with brief statements from the Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Ansar/VDP, and the Coast Guard.

As mentioned in **paragraph 13**, in response to OHCHR’s public call for submissions, the Office received 959 communications from individuals and organisations, all of which were reviewed and preserved. **Paragraph 14** of the report further emphasises that the OHCHR fact-finding team rigorously assessed the credibility of each source and evaluated the validity, internal consistency, and relevance of the information provided, in accordance with its standard methodology. Unless otherwise stated, every violation or abuse cited in the report is said to have been verified through victim and eyewitness testimony, corroborated by additional accounts, authenticated videos and photographs, medical records and forensic analyses, weapons examinations, or other credible open sources.

Figure 4: Dhaka University protest of 17 July 2024 (Face blurred to maintain anonymity)



Source: OHCHR Fact Finding Report, p.24

Image credit: permission on file

However, this asserted practice of triangulating reported violations through multiple sources is demonstrably absent in many instances, with no explanation given for the reliance on a single

source or even no source to substantiate significant claims of human rights violations during the protests. The report notes that certain details, such as precise locations, dates, or the identities of alleged perpetrators, may have been withheld to protect victims and witnesses from potential reprisals; it fails to indicate, even once, that such withheld information is indeed known to OHCHR but deliberately omitted for safety reasons. However, the fact-finding report may include relevant pictures by blurring the faces of the perpetrator and victims, similar to images 13-16 on page 24, as demonstrated in Figure 4 above.

Another blatant falsehood appears in demonstrating images 3 and 4 on page 16 of the fact-finding report. Though the report claimed to take care of the identities of alleged perpetrators, the facial image of the alleged Chhatra League supporter holding a gun was not blurred; instead remained clear and vivid. Hence, the report has taken a double standard for keeping anonymity of victims and alleged protesters, despite the assertion of the report on page 2 that, in some instances, precise locations, dates, perpetrator identities or other details that could expose victims and witnesses to a risk of reprisals have been omitted but are known to OHCHR.

Figure 5: Images 3 and 4 - Alleged Chhatra League supporters participating in the attacks of 15 July at Dhaka University



Source: OHCHR Fact Finding Report, p.24

Image credit: permission on file

It is pertinent to note that several key facts remain inconclusive from these two images. For instance, are the two young men shown merely supporters of the Chhatra League, or actual members of the organisation? Is the firearm depicted in Image 3 a licensed weapon? How far was the protester from the person holding the gun? Do the circumstances indicate an act of self-defence (with unarmed individuals standing behind), criminal intimidation, or attempted murder? Were the protesters themselves carrying deadly weapons? Due to these unresolved questions, both here and in many other instances, the fact-finding report concludes its executive summary by stating that the OHCHR has made findings to the extent that there are “*reasonable grounds to believe*” that an incident or pattern of conduct occurred. This standard of proof is lower than that required to establish individual guilt in criminal proceedings but is considered sufficient to warrant further criminal investigation by the competent authorities. However,

similar to Figure 4 above, to demonstrate “*reasonable grounds to believe*” that an attack by Chhatra League supporters occurred on 15 July 2024, exposing the faces of the individuals in the photographs was not necessary.

Therefore, offering unreasonable justifications for omitting key images that could triangulate and substantiate their claims, and taking double standards in maintaining unanimity, undermines the transparency, impartiality and credibility of the methodology used to produce the OHCHR’s fact-finding report.

Instead, in a considerable number of instances, the report alleges grave human rights violations and assigns responsibility to the political Government based solely on a single oral testimony or, in some cases, without citing any source at all. For example, paragraph 114 criticises the security forces for allegedly using lethal weapons indiscriminately and disproportionately yet provides no reference to substantiate this serious accusation. It merely states that “*information received*” indicates that when certain elements within the crowd resorted to violence, security forces frequently fired indiscriminately and extensively at the entire gathering with live ammunition, failing to distinguish between peaceful protesters, property vandals, and the few individuals who posed an actual threat of death or serious injury. Building on this unreferenced assertion, paragraph 115 further claims again without disclosing any supporting evidence that testimony from senior officials, allegedly corroborated by information provided by the interim Government, gave OHCHR “*reasonable grounds to believe*” that this pattern of indiscriminate force stemmed from orders issued by the political leadership to senior security officials on the evening of 18 July and reinforced the following day. Without providing any reference, the report proceeds in paragraph 116 to speculate that the immediate trigger for these orders “*seems to have been*” the attack by a violent mob on the Bangladesh Television headquarters in Rampura on the afternoon and evening of 18 July.

Despite these sweeping allegations spanning three consecutive paragraphs, the report fails to provide a single verifiable reference to substantiate such serious claims. Paradoxically, it insinuates both that the Government orchestrated indiscriminate violence against protesters and that protesters might enjoy impunity for attacks on state property yet offers no concrete evidence to support this grave accusation against the ousted Sheikh Hasina Government and the security officials in command during the protests. Such uncorroborated assertions risk undermining the credibility of the report itself and may weaken the reliability of its evidence if subjected to rigorous independent investigation.

In brief, the report falls short in identifying responsibility for the alleged violations. For instance, the fact-finding report fails to properly assess accountability for violent incidents resulting in serious human rights violations, even while claiming to present “*findings on fact*” where OHCHR found *reasonable grounds* to believe that an incident or pattern of conduct occurred. As mentioned above, **Paragraph 15** clarifies that this standard of proof is lower than that required to convict an individual before a competent criminal court, though it is purportedly high enough to warrant further investigation of serious crimes by appropriate judicial authorities. The report asserts that eight cases documented by OHCHR’s fact-finding team are presented in greater detail as *emblematic*, intended to illustrate broader patterns or direct links to operational planning, orders, and directives involving political leaders and senior security officials. Yet a closer examination of these so-called emblematic cases, as outlined in Section VII (“*Violations and Abuses During the Protests*”), reveals that in most instances the fact-finding team remains ambiguous not only in assigning responsibility but also in establishing

that a serious human rights violation was committed by security forces in breach of the national legal framework governing their deployment during the movement.

Paragraph 16 of the report states that the human rights-related findings derived from the established facts, whether concerning violations attributable to the State or abuses by non-state actors, are based on an analysis conducted under international human rights law, including Bangladesh's treaty obligations as a State Party to the United Nations' core human rights conventions. However, while the report analyses alleged abuses exclusively through the lens of international human rights law and Bangladesh's treaty commitments, it disregards relevant national laws. A proper assessment of events, particularly the use of force to disperse violent mobs or protect state property, necessarily requires consideration of the domestic legal framework that authorises the nature and extent of force security agencies may apply in such contexts.

For example, Section 81 of the *Penal Code 1860* provides that *"Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property."* The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the fact-finding mission, included in Annexe 1, likewise do not preclude the consideration of national laws when assessing alleged human rights violations. As stated in Annexe 1, the applicable law encompasses international human rights law *and any other relevant legal frameworks that may become applicable as the fact-finding process evolves.*

In **paragraph 17**, the report states that OHCHR considered whether facts established on a *"reasonable grounds"* basis warranted further criminal investigations by Bangladeshi or other competent authorities into the commission of international crimes, including crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to which Bangladesh is a State Party, as well as torture as a stand-alone international crime. This assertion, however, appears to overstep the mandate assigned to the fact-finding committee under the Terms of Reference (ToR) agreed between the interim Government and OHCHR, which is appended to the report. According to the ToR, the fact-finding team was tasked with gathering information and assessing proposals and steps taken by the interim Government and the justice system to pursue criminal investigations and provide effective remedies for violations and abuses, particularly with respect to ensuring accountability of perpetrators and reparation for victims. Nowhere does the ToR authorise OHCHR to determine whether the facts it established on a *"reasonable grounds"* basis warrant further criminal investigations under international criminal law.

Despite these significant methodological shortcomings, in **paragraph 4**, the OHCHR expressed *"deep appreciation"* to the interim Government and *"profound gratitude"* to victims and witnesses who shared their experiences. While such acknowledgements are diplomatically appropriate, they cannot compensate for the report's failure to meet the core fact-finding standards of evidence, legal analysis, and accountability that the OHCHR itself prescribes.

As stated in **paragraph 18** of the fact-finding report, in accordance with its standard methodology, OHCHR shared the report with the interim Government prior to publication for comments on any factual errors or inaccuracies and integrated relevant feedback received. This practice, however, raises serious concerns about impartiality, given that several leading student protesters are now serving within the interim Government. Furthermore, the draft report was

shared exclusively with the interim Government and not with civil society groups or other stakeholders in the protest, thereby limiting opportunities for independent scrutiny and undermining the appearance of balanced consultation.

BOX 1: Methodology of the Rebuttal Report

This rebuttal report adopts a multi-layered qualitative approach to construct alternative discourses that have been largely ignored, misrepresented, or presented in a biased manner within the original fact-finding report. Its purpose is not merely to contest claims but to present verified facts and contextual analysis that better reflect the truth of events.

1. Independent Media Evidence

- The rebuttal relies extensively on independent Bangladeshi and international media reports as primary sources of factual information.
- In many instances, the report reproduces text and images from the original fact-finding document, which are then subjected to critical analysis to highlight omissions, misrepresentations, or alternative interpretations.

2. Primary Data Collection

- To understand state's response to the July 2024 protests, primary data were gathered through open-ended and semi-structured interviews exploring the command-and-control structure of security forces, means used to control and disperse the protesters, Government initiatives to resolve the quota issue through judicial process, along with negotiation with protesting students.
- Key Informants Interview (KII) were included Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, as well as three senior ministers representing the Home Ministry, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Information each of whom was referenced in the original fact-finding report.
- To cross-check claims with the several key persons of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), including President and General Secretary of Central BCL, BCL Dhaka City (North), and BCL Dhaka City (South). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the BCL leaders. One key objective was to understand how the central command of Bangladesh Awami League has instructed BCL to act during the July protest in 2024.

3. Victim and Law Enforcement Testimonies

Recognising the post-protest revenge violence that targeted various groups—including Hindus, indigenous communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), and Ahmadiyya Muslims—the report conducted interviews with injured police officers. In a number of instances victimised families, and, surviving relatives of deceased police officers, denied to participate on safety concerns.

4. Contextual Awareness

Consistent with the OHCHR’s own acknowledgment (Fact-Finding Report, paragraph 230) that “*misinformation has clouded the understanding and context of several incidents,*” this rebuttal prioritises verified sources and first-hand testimonies to clarify contested events gathered through open-ended and semi-structured interviews exploring the command-and-control structure of security forces, means used to control and disperse the protesters, Government initiatives to resolve the quota issue through judicial process, along with negotiation with protesting students.

- Key informants included Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, as well as three senior ministers representing the Home Ministry, Education Ministry, and state Minister from the Ministry of Information each of whom was referenced in the original fact-finding report.
- To cross-check claims against the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), 5 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the organisation’s Vice-President and General Secretary at various jurisdictions. It also demonstrates how the central command of Bangladesh Awami League has instructed BCL to maintain the highest degree of patience against the protesters.

5. Verification and Evidence Gathering

- Interviewees were consistently requested to provide written or digital evidence to substantiate their statements.
- A detailed appendix accompanies this rebuttal, containing key documents, and photographic material.
- However, certain sensitive materials—including names, identities, and addresses of victims or their families—have been deliberately withheld to protect individuals from potential retaliation by the Interim Government or its affiliates.

Through this rigorous combination of independent media verification, critical analysis of the original report, and primary interviews with key stakeholders, the rebuttal seeks to present an accurate, evidence-based counter-narrative to the findings of the fact-finding mission.

SECTION V. Contextual Overview- An Alternative Discourse to the July Movement 2024

This section frames the July protest from a broader context and argues that they were not purely student-driven but were infiltrated, hijacked and turned violent by opposition groups and extremist actors.

In **paragraph 19**, the fact-finding report, referring to a judgment of the High Court of Bangladesh, states that on 5 June 2024, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court reinstated a quota system reserving 30 per cent of all public sector jobs for the descendants of the fighters of Bangladesh’s “*struggle for independence in the 1970s*.” This statement reflects either gross negligence or deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the fact-finding team, as the verdict in question is widely regarded as the immediate catalyst for the protest movement under review. In reality, the High Court ruling concerns the descendants of the *freedom fighters who fought in the 1971 War of Liberation* (March 26 to December 16), not a vague “*struggle for independence in the 1970s*.” The Government of Bangladesh has already published an authoritative list of recognised freedom fighters from the 1971 war, leaving no scope to conflate this with any broader or undefined independence movements of the 1970s.

Given that the draft fact-finding report was shared with the interim Government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus for comment prior to publication, both OHCHR and the interim Government bear responsibility for failing to correct this fundamental misstatement of the High Court’s verdict, a misrepresentation that distorts the historical record and misleads readers regarding the origins of the protest movement.

The report further notes that the High Court ruled a 2018 Government decision to abolish quotas as unconstitutional, following extensive student protests against it at the time. It continues in **paragraph 20** by stating that students, including some Awami League supporters, perceived such quotas as discriminatory because they favoured the grandchildren of independence fighters over objective, merit-based criteria, and that many beneficiaries of these civil service quotas already came from privileged families with long-standing ties to the Awami League dating back to Bangladesh’s independence.

However, despite the Terms of Reference (ToR) directing the fact-finding team to identify the root causes of the protest movement, the report omits a crucial fact, whether by deliberate choice or gross oversight, that the reinstatement of the 30 per cent job quota stemmed not from any deliberate Government action but directly from a writ petition filed in 2021¹⁹. In that petition, Ohidul Islam, the son of a freedom fighter, along with six other descendants of freedom fighters, challenged the 2018 executive order of the Sheikh Hasina Government that abolished the quota²⁰. On 6 December 2021, the High Court issued a Rule requiring the Government to explain why the order abolishing the quota for the descendants of freedom

¹⁹ On 6 December 2021, hearing a writ petition challenging the cancellation of the freedom fighter quota in government jobs, a High Court bench ... issued a rule asking why the 4 October 2018 notification cancelling the quota should not be declared illegal. See, TSB Report, ‘High Court reinstates 30% freedom fighter quota in government jobs’ The Business Standard (online, 5 June 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/30-quota-freedom-fighters-restored-government-jobs-869561?utm=>> accessed 12 September 2025

²⁰ Nawaz Farhin Antara, ‘Apex court paves way for quota resolution’ <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/352543/apex-court-paves-way-for-quota-resolution?utm=>> accessed 12 September 2025

fighters should not be declared invalid²¹. Subsequently, on 5 June 2024, the Court made the Rule absolute and ordered the Government to reinstate the quota²².

This critical judicial history, central to understanding the origins of the protest movement, was entirely ignored by the fact-finding report, thereby undermining its claim to have investigated the root causes of the unrest in accordance with its own mandate.

As student dissatisfaction with the job quota intensified, on 9 June 2024, the Government appeared before a Chamber Judge of the Supreme Court and sought a stay of the High Court judgment.²³ Subsequently, a full bench of the Court, on 4 July 2024, ordered that the High Court decision remain in effect until further notice and directed the Government to file a regular leave to appeal against the judgment.²⁴ Later, as two students, through their lawyers, challenged the High Court order, the Supreme Court, on 10 July, issued a four-week stay on the High Court ruling to hear arguments from the students alongside the Government's leave to appeal²⁵.

On 16 July 2024, the Government formally filed its leave to appeal, contesting the High Court decision reinstating the 30 per cent job quota for descendants of freedom fighters.²⁶ The two students who were brought to the court earlier, through their lawyers, filed their leave to appeal on 18 July 2024.²⁷ The Chamber Court scheduled a full bench hearing to consider both the Government's appeal and the students' petition on 7 August 2024. However, in a press conference, the law minister informed that, considering the urgency of the matter, the Prime Minister has instructed him to take the initiative for an early hearing. Accordingly, referring to the Law Minister, the Attorney General informed journalists that on 21 July Government will appeal to the court for an early hearing.²⁸ Accordingly, an early hearing was conducted on the morning of 21 July 2024, under curfew²⁹, and the Supreme Court ordered a reduction of the quota to only 7 per cent, including a 5 per cent allocation for descendants of veterans.³⁰

21 UNB Dhaka, 'Cancelling freedom fighter quota in govt jobs illegal: HC Cancelling freedom fighter quota in govt jobs illegal: HC' Prothom Alo English (online, 5 June 2024) <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/opt6opgnwm?utm>> accessed 12 September 2025

22 Staff Correspondent, '30pc quota a right of FFs' descendants' The Daily Star (online, 15 July 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/30pc-quota-right-ffs-descendants-3657191?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

23 Tribune Desk, 'Freedom fighter quota: Supreme Court sets date for full-bench hearing' Dhaka Tribune (online, 9 June 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/348897/freedom-fighter-quota-supreme-court-court-sets?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

24 TSB Report, Business Standard (online, 4 July 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/anti-quota-protests-intensify-following-new-court-verdict-1180776?utm>> accessed 12 September 2025

25 Ashutosh Sarkar, 'Quota in Govt Jobs: HC verdict to be inoperative till appeal is filed with SC' The Daily Star (Dhaka, 16 July 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/quota-govt-jobs-hc-verdict-be-inoperative-till-appeal-filed-sc-3657991?amp=&utm>> accessed 14 September 2025

26 Star Digital Report, 'Quota in public jobs: Govt files leave-to-appeal petition with SC to scrap HC verdict' The Daily Star (Dhaka, 16 July 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/quota-public-jobs-govt-files-leave-appeal-petition-sc-scrap-hc-verdict-3658311?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

27 Star Digital Report, 'Now 2 DU students file leave to appeal petition with SC to scrap HC verdict' The Daily Star (Dhaka, 18 July 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/now-2-du-students-file-leave-appeal-petition-sc-scrap-hc-verdict-3659651?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

28 Ibid <Star Digital Report, 'Now 2 DU students file leave to appeal petition with SC to scrap HC verdict'>

29 M Moneruzaman, 'SC set to hear appeal against quota verdict this morning' New Age (Dhaka, 21 July 2024) <<https://www.newagebd.net/post/country/240492/sc-set-to-hear-appeal-against-quota-verdict-this-morning?utm>>

30 Sam Jahan and Sudipto Ganguly, 'Bangladesh Court Scraps most Job Quotas that Sparked Deadly Protests' (Reuters, 21 July 2024) <<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-extends-curfew-ahead-court-hearing-controversial-job-quotas-2024-07-21/?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

The Government subsequently issued a circular on 23 July 2024 to implement the Court's order. The Ministry of Public Administration published this notification, aligning with the Court's directive to allocate 93% of Government jobs based on merit, with the remaining 7% distributed as follows³¹:

- 5% for descendants of freedom fighters
- 1% for ethnic minorities
- 1% for persons with disabilities and the third gender

Therefore, it can be observed that throughout the quota reform movement, the Government was considerate and prompt in accommodating student demands.

The fact-finding report, however, completely omits this sequence of events and instead portrays the Government as rigid, failing to acknowledge both the legal process and the students' role in advocating for reforms to the job quota. This omission misrepresents the Government's position and obscures the nuanced legal and procedural developments surrounding the quota issue, rendering the fact-finding report a biased account of the facts.

The report further attempts to link the protest movement to broader grievances regarding the interplay between the political agenda of the former Government and alleged denials of economic, social, and cultural rights, as described to OHCHR by protest leaders and participants. Notably, the fact-finding report substantiates this sweeping claim of deprivation primarily through a viral song composed by a female protester, rather than through systematic data or statistics demonstrating changes in the right to health, education, or an adequate standard of living over the 15-year tenure of the Sheikh Hasina Government. The reported song had 1.1 million views³²; even if each viewer watched it twice, this represents only approximately 0.63 per cent of Bangladesh's current population of 175.7 million³³.

In **paragraph 21** the report apparently cited the Pulse survey conducted by the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (**footnote 11**), which indicates that between 2017 and 2024, the proportion of the general public perceiving that the country was moving in the wrong direction rose from 18 per cent to 58 per cent. While this data provides some insight into public sentiment, relying primarily on a viral song to substantiate widespread deprivation of economic, social, and cultural rights raises serious questions regarding the methodological rigour and evidentiary basis of the report's conclusions.

Recently, the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development published the results of its latest Pulse Survey: *July 2025 – Citizens' Perceptions, Expectations, and Experiences*. Collecting data from 5,489 individuals between 1 and 15 July 2025, the survey indicates that 42 per cent of respondents believed the country is heading in the right political direction, compared with 56 per cent in October 2024 and 71 per cent in August 2024.³⁴ These figures demonstrate that the inflated expectations of positive political change created by protest organisers during August 2024 rapidly diminished, by 15 points within two months and by 29 points within a

³¹ Government of Bangladesh, *Bangladesh Gazette*, no.05.00.0000.170.11.014.24-141 (Ministry of Public Administration, 23 July 2024) <https://www.dpp.gov.bd/upload_file/gazettes/55136_72383.pdf> accessed 14 September 2025

³² Channel I News, 'Not only is there the quota issue, but on top of that, there is question paper leakage' (Youtube, 11 July 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PB_cJxNSfTQ> accessed 12 September 2025

³³ United Nations Population Fund, 'Bangladesh Population 2025' (July 2025) <<https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/BD?utm>> accessed 15 September 2025

³⁴ BGID, 'Pulse Survey 2025' (BRAC Institute of Governance and Development, July 2025) <https://bigd.bracu.ac.bd/the-foundation-project_about/pulse-survey-july-2025/> accessed 16 September 2025

year. Such statistics clearly illustrate the failure of both the protest organisers and the allied interim Government to deliver on the promises and expectations generated during the protest.

Yet, **paragraph 22** of the fact-finding report asserts without citing any source that the Government escalated its repression of the protests in a progressive, calculated, and systematic manner, moving from initial intimidation to increasingly lethal and militarised uses of force that allegedly resulted in serious human rights violations. The following **paragraph 23** attempts to identify the underlying causes that drove the protests and describes the purported escalation of repression by the Government and security forces. As rebutted in the following sections, these claims, presented without supporting evidence, raise significant concerns regarding the report’s methodological rigour and reliability.

1. Binary politics, corruption and economic inequalities

In **paragraph 24**, while discussing “*binary politics*,” the fact-finding report claims that Bangladesh’s political parties have historically been dominated by individual leaders who pursued patronage politics and sought to weaponise the political system against their opponents. The report adds that the adverse effects of such practices were tempered by the electorate regularly voting the governing party out of power. However, in condensing fifty years of political history into a single **paragraph**, the report omits crucial context, including two periods of political dictatorship and the efforts of Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina and her allies to restore democracy through the establishment of the first interim Government in 1990³⁵, under the constitutional provision allowing a 90-day interim period to hold general elections, and the first Caretaker Government in 1996³⁶, following a constitutional amendment. Instead, the report presents a selective account that begins only after 2008, thereby giving a biased impression of historical political developments.

Furthermore, in **paragraph 25**, the report criticises the economic performance of the Awami League Government, noting that although per capita gross domestic product reportedly doubled since 2013, the distribution of economic gains became increasingly unequal, with rising income and consumption inequality and concentration of wealth among the richest five per cent between 2010 and 2022. This rebuttal observes that such a negative portrayal of economic growth does not reflect the broader reality. Examination of the Gini coefficient for Bangladesh from 2000 to 2022, as included in Figure 1 below, despite slight variation over the years, the former Sheikh Hasina Government was able to restrain income inequality to its 2000 level of 33.4. While inequality has increased slightly in recent years, this trend is largely explainable in the context of the global pandemic that disrupted economies worldwide from 2020 to 2022. However, in an estimate of income inequality just a couple of months after the student protest in July 2024, according to a World Bank estimate, income inequality rose by more than one point. Notably, while the student-backed interim Government emphasises slogans of equality

³⁵ Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh in 1990: The Fall of the Military Regime and the Road to Democracy*, (1991) 31 (2) *Asian Survey* 117–128

³⁶ The Daily Star recounts that the 1996 caretaker government was formed after a tumultuous movement spearheaded by the Awami League demanding elections under a neutral caretaker government, and that eventually, the 13th Constitutional Amendment formalized the caretaker government system. See, ‘Interim govts in Bangladesh: A brief history’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, Bangladesh, 8 August 2024); Awami League launched “100 days of country-wide hartals between 1994 and 1996”, blockades, non-cooperation movements, etc., to force the BNP government to accept the caretaker government system. See, Md Tajul Islam, ‘Birth, death and rebirth of caretaker govt’ *Business Standard* (Dhaka, Bangladesh, 17 December 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/law-order/2008-2024-death-caretaker-govt-birth-amendments-1020766>> accessed 14 September 2025

and anti-discrimination, World Bank forecasts suggest that income inequality in Bangladesh may increase significantly in 2025, highlighting the limits of political rhetoric in addressing structural economic disparities.

Table 1: Yearly Gini Index showing income inequality in Bangladesh

Year	2000	2005	2010	2016	2022	October 2024	2025 (Projected)
Gini Index	33.4	33.2	32.1	32.4	33.4	34.4	36.1

Source: Gini Index Bangladesh, World Bank Group; Macro Poverty Outlook for Bangladesh, World Bank Group (October 2024); Macro Poverty Outlook, Bangladesh, World Bank Group (April 2025)

According to a World Bank projection released in April 2025, Bangladesh’s Gini coefficient (index value showing income disparity in a country) is expected to reach 36.1 by the end of 2025. This is much higher than the steady rate maintained by the Awami League Government over its 15-year tenure. The Gini coefficient value may vary from 0 to 100. A zero value indicates no income disparity when income is distributed equally at all levels, and the highest level of income disparity is marked by an index value of 100. This projected increase in 2025 is largely driven by factors such as a slowing economy, reduced investment, and political uncertainties, which are likely to have a greater impact on vulnerable groups. As a result, the rate of extreme poverty is projected to climb from 7.7% in FY24 to 9.3% in FY25, potentially pushing an additional 3 million people below the poverty line.

Interestingly, in **paragraph 26**, quoting the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Bangladesh Sample Vital Statistics 2023 (endnote 17), the fact-finding report claims that a Government report from April 2024 indicated that the share of youth aged 15-24 years not in education, employment, or training had reached nearly 40 per cent. It indicates how irresponsible and negligent the fact-finding team was to impose sweeping allegations on the ousted Sheikh Hasina Government. In reality, the 2023 report indicates that the number of young people not in education, work, or training decreased to 39.88 per cent in 2023, compared to 40.67 per cent in 2022.³⁷ Following the worldwide pandemic of COVID-19 from 2020 to 2022, these statistics on youth unemployment are showing a gradual improvement as the economy was heading towards recovery.

Table 2: Youth Not in Education, Employment, or Training (YEET) Percentage

Index values	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	
Column no:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Youth Not in Education, Employment, or Training (age 15-24) (%) - (NEET)						
Place of residence	39.88	40.67	39.61	--	--	
-- Rural	41.30	41.94	40.88			
-- Urban	35.21	26.52	35.39	--	--	

³⁷ FE Online Desk, ‘Life Expectancy in Bangladesh Drops to 72.3 Years: BSS Survey’ The Financial Express (online, 24 March 2024) <<https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/life-expectancy-in-bangladesh-drops-to-723-years-bbs-survey>> accessed 12 September 2025

Source: Adapted from Bangladesh Sample Vital Statistics 2023

Paragraph 27 of the fact-finding report notes that since 2022, middle and low-income Bangladeshis have been particularly affected by rising food and energy prices. The report attributes these inflationary pressures partly to the surge in global energy prices following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as to agricultural subsidy reductions and other austerity measures introduced in Bangladesh as conditions for International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. However, the report overlooks the fact that the price hikes of 2022 were part of a worldwide trend. As economies emerged from the pandemic-induced slowdown, inflation was driven by multiple factors, including strong post-COVID demand that outstripped supply, persistent supply-chain disruptions, and other global shocks. Despite Bangladesh’s traditionally narrow tax base and its heavy reliance on indirect taxation, the situation has improved steadily over the past 15 years under the Sheikh Hasina Government. In nominal terms, total tax revenue grew roughly four- to five-fold between FY2009–10 and FY2022–23. Nevertheless, because the country’s GDP expanded rapidly during this period, the tax-to-GDP ratio has remained comparatively modest.

Paragraph 28 and paragraph 29 discussed about concentration of economic power and wealth and the related negative impacts on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Corruption at the highest levels has been mirrored by widespread corruption and extortion at lower levels of the bureaucracy and security apparatus. Further, abuse of state power for economic benefit is a long-standing problem in Bangladesh.

Table 3: Summary of recently quashed court cases acquitting Prof. Muhammad Yunus

Case / Allegation	When Filed / Relevant Year(s)	Decision / Outcome	Key Points
Labour court conviction (Grameen Telecom case)	Verdict Jan 1, 2024 (filed earlier)	Convicted with a six-month jail term, Tk 30,000 fine; granted bail pending appeal. ³⁸	Workers claimed they should have been made permanent and receive benefits. Appeals underway.
Five labour cases on the violation of various labour rights	Filed in 2019 (labour cases)	The High Court quashed all six cases on Oct 24, 2024 ³⁹ , just after 15 days of his coming into power as the Chief Advisor	The Court observed, labour cases were filed without following the required process, and when the legal grounds were weak.
One defamation case on an AFP interview	Filed in 2011 (defamation)	The Supreme Court upheld the High Court order	In the AFP interview defamation case ground for defamation was lacking.

³⁸ Star Digital Report, ‘Yunus sentenced to six months’ jail in labour law violation case’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 1 January 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/labour-court-sentences-prof-yunus-six-months-prison-3670781>> accessed 18 September 2025

³⁹ ‘High Court scraps 6 cases against Dr Muhammad Yunus’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 21 November 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/high-court-scraps-6-cases-against-dr-muhammad-yunus-998896>> accessed 20 September 2025

		scrapping the defamation case ⁴⁰ .	
Supreme Court upholds scrapping.	Court HC	State appeal in 2024	Appellate Division upheld HC dismissal of five labour cases on 11 January 2025. ⁴¹
Money laundering case (Anti-Corruption Commission case) Alleged misappropriation of Tk 25.22 crore.	Filed May 30, 2023; charges framed June 2023; dismissed April 23, 2025	The Supreme Court dismissed the case on 23 April 2025 ⁴² .	The court ruled it was a civil dispute, not criminal.

Source: Various newspaper reports, as cited in the Table

For instance, Dr Muhammad Yunus, in his capacity as chairman of Grameen Telecom, was accused along with others of misappropriating approximately Tk 25 crore (= 252 million taka) from a profit-participation or welfare fund established for Grameen Telecom’s workers. The case alleged that a bank account at the Gulshan branch of Dhaka Bank was opened even before the board had formally approved it, and that subsequent transfers were executed through a series of “fake settlement agreements.” In addition, the National Board of Revenue (NBR) pursued Dr Yunus for unpaid taxes spanning several years, including sums arising from donations he had declared as gifts, and ultimately, the High Court ordered him to pay about Tk 119 crore in taxes, covering liabilities from 2011 and later years.

During her tenure, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina repeatedly asserted that her administration maintained a policy of “zero tolerance” toward corruption, vowing that wrongdoers would face punishment “no matter who they are or what position they hold.”⁴³ While presenting the national budget for FY 2024–25, she further announced that an anti-corruption drive had been launched and that “no one will be spared.”⁴⁴ Yet, in a striking turn of events, the interim Government that assumed office in August 2024 oversaw the quashing of all pending cases and appeals against Dr Yunus on procedural grounds. As a result, most of the substantive allegations against him remain legally untested and unresolved, leaving significant questions about accountability unanswered.

2. Government attempts to intimidate and delegitimise the student protest movement

⁴⁰ UNB, ‘SC upholds HC order scrapping defamation case against Yunus’ *Dhaka Tribune* (Dhaka, 27 July 2025) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/387489/sc-upholds-hc-order-scrapping-defamation-case>> accessed 22 September 2025

⁴¹ FE Online Desk, ‘Appellate Division upholds HC’s dismissal of 5 labour cases against Dr Yunus’ *The Financial Express* (Dhaka, 11 January 2025) <<https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/appellate-division-upholds-hcs-dismissal-of-5-labour-cases-against-dr-yunus>> accessed 20 September 2025

⁴² TSB Report, ‘SC dismisses money laundering case against Yunus, 6 others’ *The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 23 April 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/court/supreme-court-dismisses-money-laundering-case-against-yunus-13-others-1123546>> accessed 21 September 2025

⁴³ ‘War against graft underway, no one will be spared: PM Hasina declares in JS’ *The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 29 June 2024)

⁴⁴ ‘Drives against corruption won’t hamper image of govt: PM’ *BSS* (Dhaka, 14 July 2024)

The OHCHR report in **paragraph 30** bases its claims about Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's personal reasons and supposed statements on unverified testimonies from unidentified sources. The report fails to establish sufficient credibility because it depends on unverified confidential information instead of official statements and documented Government actions.

The Prime Minister declared on July 7th that there existed no valid reason for protests after the High Court decision because the matter remained under judicial process (sub judice) and should be handled by the Supreme Court instead of public demonstrations. The Prime Minister used this statement to defend the judicial system while avoiding any attempt to suppress dissenting voices.⁴⁵

The Government followed this legal approach by immediately filing appeals and requesting stays following the High Court decision, and the Appellate Division handled the case in July⁴⁶ The Supreme Court delivered its nationwide decision on July 21, 2024, to eliminate most quotas while establishing a 7% quota system and 93% merit-based framework which supported the Prime Minister's position that courts should decide the matter.⁴⁷

The report's characterisation of the Government as “*unpopular*” is a political judgment, not a legal finding of fact. Bangladesh Awami League, founded in 1949 and central to the country's independence movement of 1971, remains one of South Asia's largest political parties with a vast grassroots network and enduring influence. Officials' warnings about opposition infiltration were based on objective realities, as the BNP and its affiliated student groups publicly declared support for the protests on 6 July. Acknowledging such involvement was a matter of national security and political awareness, not an attempt to delegitimise students.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the PM's later messaging urged patience with the judiciary and announced a “*judicial inquiry*” into deaths, demonstrating a commitment to accountability rather than repression.⁴⁹ This aligns with the Government's record of accommodating quota reform demands, including the 2018 political decision to abolish quotas for higher-grade posts, which undermines claims of blanket hostility to reform.⁵⁰ Neutral international outlets such as Reuters and PBS⁵¹ documented the progression from the High Court verdict to the protests, the appellate process, and the final Supreme Court ruling, reflecting a lawful, court-led resolution rather than an extra-legal Government crackdown.

⁴⁵ The Business Standard, 'Solution to quota issue should come from court: PM' *The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 17 July 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/solution-quota-issue-should-come-court-pm-893816>> accessed 01 September 2025

⁴⁶ bdnews24.com, 'Quota protest coverage' *bdnews24* (Dhaka, date not specified) <<https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/922640ac8e69>> | accessed 01 September 2025

The Guardian, 'Bangladesh court scraps job quotas after student-led protests' | *The Guardian* | (London, 21 July 2024) | <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/21/bangladesh-court-scraps-job-quotas-student-led>> | accessed 01 September 2025

⁴⁸ The Daily Star, 'BNP lends support to anti-quota pension protests' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 15 July 2024) | <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/bnp-lends-support-anti-quota-pension-protests-3650186>> | accessed 01 September 2025

⁴⁹ BenarNews, | 'Bangladesh anti-quota protests' | *BenarNews* | (Dhaka, 17 July 2024) | <<https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/anti-quota-07172024153130.html>> | accessed 01 September 2025

⁵⁰ The Daily Star, 'Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina addressing Parliament right now' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 11 March 2018) | <<https://www.thedailystar.net/country/prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-addressing-parliament-right-now-1561309>> | accessed 01 September 2025.

⁵¹ Reuters, | 'Bangladesh extends curfew ahead of court hearing on controversial job quotas' | *Reuters* | (Singapore, 21 July 2024) | <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-extends-curfew-ahead-court-hearing-controversial-job-quotas-2024-07-21> | accessed 01 September 2025.

Taken together, these facts provide a coherent, lawful explanation for the Government's conduct: respect for judicial processes while litigation was active, prompt institutional remedies through appeal, measured public statements encouraging faith in the judiciary, recognition of openly declared opposition involvement, and a historical willingness to negotiate or reform. Treating confidential, unverified claims of private remarks as decisive while minimising this public record overstates the allegation and distorts the actual sequence of events.

The OHCHR claim on **paragraph 31** is contradicted by contemporaneous official records showing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was on an official state visit to China (Beijing) on 10 July and only returned to Dhaka in the early hours of 11 July - making it factually impractical for her to have chaired an in-person meeting in Dhaka and the OHCHR did not mention about any virtual meeting during the night from 10 to 11 July. *The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs* Joint Statement records that the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina paid an official visit to China from July 8 to 10, 2024.⁵² The Chinese state coverage (*Great Hall meeting / Xi Jinping*) records bilateral meetings on 10 July in Beijing.⁵³

The OHCHR's phrasing that the Prime Minister met with DGFI "during the night from 10 to 11 July" is impractical with these official trip dates. Public Bangladeshi Government/official press confirms she returned to Dhaka only in the early hours of 11 July. The *New Age* reports the Prime Minister "reached home (landed) at 1:00 AM" (11 July) after the three-day visit.⁵⁴ As she arrived in Bangladesh on 11 July, there is no question of holding a physical meeting in Dhaka starting from the night of 10 July. OHCHR's text explicitly ties the claim to interview testimony: "according to former senior officials." The report uses interview codes (FFTB-INT, etc.). The OHCHR's statement amounts to an uncorroborated claim based on anonymous interviews that could not be verified further.

The *Daily Star* (11 July 2024) reported that Saddam Hussain, BCL President, at a press conference at Dhaka University's Madhur Canteen, stated: "Some are trying to use the movement politically and the Chhatra League is ready to face them."⁵⁵ It was a political statement; the BCL is a party-affiliated student organisation, not a formal organ of the state. Under international legal principles, statements by such actors cannot be attributed to the state without proof of direction, control, or approval-which the OHCHR does not provide. Therefore, this cannot be taken as a directive or policy from Sheikh Hasina or the Government.

Observer BD (11 July 2024) reported that about 20 people were injured-students, police, and journalists-during clashes. Students attempted to blockade the Dhaka-Chattoogram highway; the police used tear gas when attacked with bricks.⁵⁶ The students initiated aggressive acts

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, | 'Foreign Ministry News' | *MFA China* | (Beijing, 11 July 2024) | https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202407/t20240711_11451963.html | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁵³ State Council, China, | 'China-Bangladesh relations' | *State Council* | (Beijing, 10 July 2024) | https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/10/content_WS668e49b1c6d0868f4e8e90e8.html | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁵⁴ *New Age*, | 'PM Hasina returns to Bangladesh wrapping up China visit' | *New Age* | (Dhaka, 12 July 2024) | <https://www.newagebd.net/post/foreign-affairs/239879/pm-hasina-returns-bangladesh-wrapping-up-china-visit> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁵⁵ *The Daily Star*, | 'BCL ready to face those trying to politicise quota protests: Saddam' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 16 July 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/bcl-ready-face-those-trying-politicise-quota-protests-saddam-3654271> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁵⁶ *The Daily Observer*, | 'Quota protests latest news' | *The Daily Observer* | (Dhaka, 15 July 2024) | <https://www.observerd.com/news.php?id=480798> | accessed 02 September 2025.

(blocking a national highway, attacking police). Under public order and crowd-control standards, law enforcement can use proportionate, non-lethal force (tear gas, baton) to disperse violent or obstructive groups-consistent with the UN Basic Principles on Use of Force, Principles 4 and 9.⁵⁷ This is lawful police action, not repression of a peaceful assembly.

The *Detective Branch* (DB) is a specialised investigative arm of the Bangladesh Police, responsible for probing sensitive or serious incidents.⁵⁸ In the context of widespread protests with potential political unrest, DB's move to investigate whether extremist or violent elements infiltrated the protests is a lawful and responsible exercise of duty, aimed at preserving public safety and preventing violence. It does not signify political suppression or malfeasance-it is a recognised investigative mandate under Bangladesh law.

Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS) published the full text of the Prime Minister's written speech at the 14 July 2024 press conference.⁵⁹ In that press conference, where she was asked a direct question by a journalist: "If two candidates are before you - one the child of a freedom fighter and the other the child of a Razakar [traitor] - whom would you give the job?" In response, the Prime Minister posed a rhetorical counter-question: "If the grandchildren of freedom fighters don't get the job, should the grandchildren of Razakars get it?"⁶⁰ This exchange was part of a discussion about the historic quota system that provides opportunities for the descendants of freedom fighters, which has been a long-standing policy under the *Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust Act*.⁶¹

The slogan "Tumi ke? Ami ke? Rajakar! Rajakar!" [Who are you, who am I, traitor! Traitor!!] was maliciously crafted by extremist groups in 2024 to unfairly provoke Awami League supporters. Vilify Awami League loyalists by falsely labelling them traitors and justify killings, arson, and destruction as a "purge" of alleged collaborators. Distort the historical meaning of "Rajakar" [Traitor] to confuse the public and smear the party's legacy under Sheikh Hasina's leadership. By omitting the journalist's original question, the OHCHR report has misrepresented the context, making it appear as if the Prime Minister initiated this remark independently.

The OHCHR report claims that the Prime Minister's 14 July statement directly triggered mass student anger, leading to slogans labelling themselves "Razakar [traitor]." This interpretation misrepresents both the Prime Minister's statement and the actual events.⁶²

First, as clarified earlier, the Prime Minister's comment was a rhetorical response to a journalist's hypothetical question during a press conference. The context was a policy debate about whether descendants of freedom fighters should retain quota benefits, a historic state policy under the *Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust Act*. It was not a statement directed at the

⁵⁷ OHCHR, | 'Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials' | *OHCHR* | (Geneva, date not specified) | <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁵⁸ Wikipedia, | 'Detective Branch' | *Wikipedia* | (Online, date not specified) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detective_Branch | accessed 08 September 2025.

⁵⁹ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'PM's statement on quota issue' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 16 July 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/200149> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁶⁰ The Business Standard, | 'Abort quota until court decides, students must accept: PM' | *The Business Standard* | (Dhaka, 15 July 2024) | <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/abort-quota-until-court-decides-students-must-accept-theres-nothing-govt-can-do-pm-says> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁶¹ Bangladesh Laws, | 'Penal Code,' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-409/section-9082.html> | accessed 03 September 2025.

⁶² Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'PM's statement on quota issue' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 16 July 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/200149> | accessed 03 September 2025.

protesting students nor intended to label them as “*Razakar [traitors]*.” By removing the journalist’s original question, OHCHR presents a misleading narrative that unfairly attributes students’ anger solely to the Prime Minister’s words.⁶³

Second, reliable reporting shows that political opposition groups, including factions linked to BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, had begun actively supporting and joining the quota protests by early July. These parties have historically used sensitive terms like “*Razakar [traitor]*” to inflame public sentiment for political gain. It is therefore plausible that the rapid spread of the “*Razakar*” slogan was politically orchestrated and amplified on social media, rather than being a spontaneous or direct reaction to the Prime Minister’s remarks. This aligns with later official investigations by the Detective Branch of Dhaka Metropolitan Police, which examined infiltration and manipulation of the protests by extremist groups.⁶⁴

Finally, while the term “*Razakar*” [traitor] is deeply offensive in Bangladesh, freedom of expression includes the right to peacefully protest. However, OHCHR must distinguish between political fallout and state responsibility. The Prime Minister did not encourage hostility or violence; in fact, on 17 July 2024, just three days later, she urged students to remain calm and await the Supreme Court’s verdict, showing her commitment to resolving the issue through lawful means.⁶⁵

The OHCHR’s interpretation of Government statements and actions needs to be contextualised within the broader socio-political environment and Bangladesh’s unique history, particularly relating to the *Liberation War of 1971* and its continuing legacy. The Government of Bangladesh, led by Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League, has consistently upheld the principles of democracy, human rights, and national sovereignty. The remarks made by Government ministers regarding the protests must be understood within this historical and national context.

The term “*Razakar*” [traitor] holds significant historical importance in Bangladesh. It refers to individuals and groups who collaborated with the Pakistani military during the 1971 Liberation War, committing atrocities against the people of Bangladesh. The use of this term by Government officials is not an arbitrary label but a reflection of the deep emotional and historical scars left by collaborators. The remarks made by ministers such as the Minister of Education *Mohibul Chowdhury* and others should be seen as part of a broader effort to preserve the sanctity of Bangladesh’s independence and its values.

The *International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)* of Bangladesh, established in 2010, has documented the role of *Razakars* [traitors] and collaborators in war crimes. The Government remains committed to ensuring that the spirit of the Liberation War is protected.⁶⁶ Article 47A of the *Constitution of Bangladesh* allows for special measures against those accused of war crimes. This includes strong rhetoric and actions to preserve national dignity.⁶⁷ Therefore, this slogan

⁶³ The Daily Star, | 'PM's remark ignites protests' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 14 July 2024) | <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/july-14-2024-pms-remark-ignites-protests-3938926>> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁶⁴ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Intruders enter into quota reform movement: DB' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 13 July 2024).

⁶⁵ BenarNews, | 'Bangladesh anti-quota protests' | *BenarNews* | (Dhaka, 17 July 2024) | <<https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/anti-quota-07172024153130.html>> | accessed 05 September 2025.

⁶⁶ Wikipedia, | 'Timeline of the International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh)' | *Wikipedia* | (Online, date not specified) | <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_International_Crimes_Tribunal_\(Bangladesh\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_International_Crimes_Tribunal_(Bangladesh))> | accessed 04 September 2025.

⁶⁷ Bangladesh Laws, | 'International Crimes Tribunal Act 1973,' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <<http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367/section-24596.html>> | accessed 03 September 2025

itself undermines the national identity or glorifies individuals/groups historically associated with crimes against the state. It has been observed that the slogan was used by Islamic extremists who were later identified as the masterminds behind the movement to incite opposition to the pro-independence Government of Sheikh Hasina and weaken her spirit to resolve the matter peacefully through dialogue.

The OHCHR's characterisation of these remarks as a crackdown on peaceful protests overlooks the distinction between legitimate dissent and actions that challenge the foundational values of the state. The remarks by ministers were directed at protecting the sovereignty and dignity of Bangladesh, not at suppressing democratic rights. Bangladesh has a robust history of peaceful protests, with the Government routinely allowing demonstrations if they remain within the bounds of law and order. The remarks made by Government ministers should not be taken out of context. They were aimed at addressing actions and rhetoric that could destabilise the social and political fabric of the country. The Government remains committed to fostering dialogue and addressing grievances through democratic judicial means. Government officials have clarified their commitment to⁶⁸ democratic norms and human rights in various forums, including the United Nations.

3. Alleged incitement of violence by armed Awami League supporters

The OHCHR alleges that senior Awami League officials, including the Secretary-General “*Obaidul Quader*” and “*Saddam Hussain*”, Chhatra League President, mobilised and incited supporters to conduct armed attacks on student protesters from 14 July 2024, with police failing to intervene. This portrayal is fundamentally flawed and biased, as it ignores the context of protester aggression and relies on unverified anonymous testimony, such as that from a “*former senior official*,” without cross-verification or consideration of counterevidence.

There is no concrete proof, such as documented directives or communications, linking Awami League leadership to incitement. Instead, the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina publicly instructed party members to avoid clashes and maintain restraint, as evidenced in her addresses warning of opposition plots to exploit the protests for violence. The Awami League has officially stated that any confrontations involving Chhatra League were defensive responses to coordinated attacks by opposition elements, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-Islami, who used social media to orchestrate violence, as supported by video evidence.⁶⁹

BOX 2: Senior Police officer, Dhaka Metropolitan Police (In-Charge during the protest) denied receiving any instruction from the Prime Minister for using lethal force on the ground

The police officer explained that the force's primary responsibility during the quota-related unrest was to protect lives and property and to prevent the situation from spiralling into wider violence. Although some advance intelligence was received, the protests escalated far more quickly and violently than anticipated, creating severe challenges for law enforcement.

Regarding operations and use of force, the officer confirmed not having any instruction from the Prime Minister to use lethal force in the field. Instead, he stressed that police acted strictly within legal procedures and used only the minimum force necessary to disperse violent groups and safeguard civilians. Arrests were carried out based on specific evidence of attacks or vandalism, and peaceful participants were not targeted. Ordering fire on a crowd was taken as an extreme measure and taken only as a last resort. If no magistrate is present on the spot, the police officer in charge must give clear and repeated warnings that firing will occur if the crowd does not disperse. This practice is demonstrated in Yamin case on page 40 of the fact finding report.

On the issue of political influence, the officer maintained that police actions were independent and guided solely by law and public safety considerations. Looking ahead, he highlighted the need for stronger intelligence sharing, improved crowd-control training, and deeper community engagement to prevent similar incidents in the future.

While referring to the casualty that police officers sustained during and immediately aftermath

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

Official records confirm that protests escalated into terrorist acts, including attacks on educational institutions and state establishments, orchestrated by self-serving groups to destabilise the Government.⁷⁰ The OHCHR report selectively omits this, failing to balance allegations against the former Government with documented instances of protester-led violence, such as targeted assaults on police and infrastructure, which necessitated self-defence by affected parties.⁷¹

Police restraint was a deliberate policy to de-escalate, aligned with instructions to use non-lethal measures only when necessary for public safety. The formation of a high-level judicial committee on 17 July 2024 by the Hasina Government to investigate all incidents, including any misconduct, demonstrates proactive accountability, contrary to the report's narrative of inaction.⁷² Bangladeshi law, including the *Code of Criminal Procedure 1898* sections 127-129⁷³ and *Police Regulations*, authorises proportionate force to protect public order when protests turn violent.⁷⁴ Official statements from July 2024 affirm that security measures were deployed to counter terrorist acts and prevent further instability, with explicit instructions from the Prime Minister to avoid casualties and use non-lethal options.⁷⁵

The Yunus Government has been accused of concealing critical facts and evidence surrounding the controversial death of Abu Sayed. Rangpur Metropolitan Police Commissioner *Md. Moniruzzaman* stated that police employed tear gas shells, sound grenades to manage the protests on July 16, 2024, asserting that no officers were authorised to use firearms, suggesting that lethal outcomes resulted from protester actions. However, video footage and photographs indicate that Abu Sayed sustained injuries and bleeding to the back of his head, potentially from a stone thrown by fellow protesters. Allegations persist that the Yunus administration suppressed vital evidence and manipulated the case to obscure the true circumstances of his death.⁷⁶

Evidence from multiple sources, including the OHCHR's own preliminary analysis, acknowledges elements of protester violence, such as attacks on Government buildings and

⁷⁰ Bangladesh Press Information Department, | 'Official Notes' | *Press Information Department* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <<https://pressinform.gov.bd/site/allnotes/d4cc6515-dfd5-45eb-9aa5-d993fc135c11>> | accessed 02 September 2025.

⁷¹ Global CDG, | 'Reader's Reflection on the OHCHR 2024 Bangladesh Fact-Finding Report' | *Global CDG* | (Online, 2024) | <<https://globalcdg.org/readers-reflection-on-the-ohchr-2024-bangladesh-fact-finding-report/>> | accessed 06 September 2025.

⁷² Awami League, | 'Awami League comments on United Nations Human Rights Report' | *Awami League* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <<https://albd.org/articles/news/41506/Awami-League-comments-on-United-Nations-Human-Rights-Report>> | accessed 06 September 2025.

⁷³ Bangladesh Laws, | 'Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <<http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-75.html>> | accessed 05 September 2025.

⁷⁴ Bangladesh Police, | 'Official Notice on Police Activities' | *Bangladesh Police* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <<https://www.police.gov.bd/storage/upload/announcement/kFKWb9mlIyg7exUJIWnR3NYmLykT5ZIOJSt5Gea.a.pdf>> | accessed 07 September 2025.

⁷⁵ Awami League, 'Bangladesh Awami League news update' *Awami League* (Dhaka, 2024) | <<https://www.albd.org/articles/news/41504/Bangladesh-Awami-League>> accessed 08 September 2025.

⁷⁶ Prothom Alo, 'Quota movement latest update' *Prothom Alo English* (Dhaka, 2024) | <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/ug2bvaacaj>> accessed 03 September 2025.

police, which justified defensive deployments.⁷⁷ Without conceding liability, the incident must be viewed in the context of chaotic unrest where law enforcement faced imminent threats. The Government's immediate response included hospital visits⁷⁸ by the Prime Minister and financial aid to victims' families, actions inconsistent with a policy of deliberate harm.⁷⁹

The OHCHR asserts that the Government prepared a militarised response from early July 2024, deploying paramilitaries like the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) with military rifles, based on anonymous quotes. This is a misinterpretation that ignores the legal basis for such deployments amid rising security threats. Paramilitary forces were mobilised under statutory authority, such as the *Armed Police Battalions Ordinance 1979*, to address widespread unrest classified as terrorist activities.⁸⁰ Official positions emphasise that these measures protected public infrastructure and lives, not suppressed peaceful dissent, with deployments limited to areas of confirmed violence.⁸¹ The report's use of unverified anonymous statements, without disclosing selection criteria or potential conflicts, introduces bias, especially given the interim Government's influence on the investigation. Critiques highlight the OHCHR's failure to verify claims against evidence of opposition orchestration.⁸²

The report details deployments of various forces from 10-17 July 2024, alleging violent suppression at Dhaka University. These actions were proportionate responses to documented threats, not unwarranted aggression. Deployments were reactive to intelligence on planned disruptions, with forces instructed to minimise harm. The Awami League denies excessive force, noting that any incidents were isolated breakdowns, not policy, and contrasts this with unaddressed post-protest violence against police after 5 August 2024.⁸³ The OHCHR's opacity in interviewee selection and omission of balanced perspectives on protester tactics undermines its findings.

Mobilisation of Chhatra League, Police and paramilitary forces

The OHCHR's **paragraph 40** narrative relies on anonymous sources and unverified claims, failing to provide clear evidence of unlawful conduct. The OHCHR report claims that a “*Core Committee*,” chaired by the Home Affairs Minister, coordinated the deployment of security and intelligence forces to suppress the quota protests and that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina directly supervised these operations through phone calls and meetings. As head of Government under Articles 55(2) and 56(3) of the *Constitution of Bangladesh*, the Prime Minister is legally mandated to oversee ministries, including the Ministry of Home Affairs. Her communication

⁷⁷ OHCHR, 'OHCHR fact-finding report on Bangladesh 2024' *OHCHR* (Geneva, 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-fftb-hr-violations-bd.pdf> accessed 06 September 2025.

⁷⁸ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Press statement' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news/201238> | accessed 06 September 2025.

⁷⁹ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Breaking News Flash' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/201447> | accessed 03 September 2025.

⁸⁰ Bangladesh Press Information Department, | 'Official Notes' | *Press Information Department* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://pressinform.gov.bd/site/allnotes/d4cc6515-dfd5-45eb-9aa5-d993fc135c11> | accessed 05 September 2025.

⁸¹ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Press statement on quota issue' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news/200927> | accessed 08 September 2025.

⁸² Global CDG, | 'Reader's Reflection on the OHCHR 2024 Bangladesh Fact-Finding Report' | *Global CDG* | (Online, 2024) | <https://globalcdg.org/readers-reflection-on-the-ohchr-2024-bangladesh-fact-finding-report/> | accessed 06 September 2025.

⁸³ Global CDG, | 'Reader's Reflection on the OHCHR 2024 Bangladesh Fact-Finding Report' | *Global CDG* | (Online, 2024) | <https://globalcdg.org/readers-reflection-on-the-ohchr-2024-bangladesh-fact-finding-report/> | accessed 04 September 2025.

with security officials during a period of unrest was a constitutional duty, not unlawful interference.⁸⁴

During July, protests had escalated into widespread violence, including arson, vandalism, and attacks on law enforcement personnel.⁸⁵ Several police officers were reported injured, and Government infrastructure was damaged across Dhaka and other cities.⁸⁶ During a period of escalating unrest, regular communication with security agencies such as the Bangladesh Police, BGB, and RAB was part of her lawful duty to maintain public order. The OHCHR report does not provide any evidence that Sheikh Hasina issued illegal or extrajudicial directives.

Militarisation of policing in Bangladesh

The OHCHR report's depiction of law enforcement agencies as excessively militarised and responsible for widespread human rights violations during the July and August 2024 protests is a biased narrative lacking substantiated evidence. This argument is further strengthened by emerging evidence indicating the involvement of extremist groups such as *Hizbut Tahrir* and leaders of *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, including Muzammil Hashmi. Reports suggest that these groups have been actively working to exploit the current unrest and instability for their own agendas.⁸⁷ These agencies operated within their legal mandates to maintain order amid a complex security crisis, and the allegations against the Awami League Government are politically motivated to discredit Sheikh Hasina and her party.

The report's claim that RAB, established in 2004, has a "*legacy of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture*" is based on unsubstantiated hearsay. This narrative overlooks the fact that RAB has played a vital role in combating serious crime and terrorism in Bangladesh, with its contributions often unacknowledged. While criticisms have been raised, they fail to provide concrete evidence and ignore the agency's significant successes in maintaining law and order and ensuring public safety.⁸⁸ RAB's command structure, involving seconded officers, ensures professional integration for national security, as affirmed in official descriptions of its mandate to provide timely intelligence and tactical support.

Similarly, the depiction of BGB as a paramilitary force ill-suited for law enforcement overlooks its statutory role in internal security, including maintaining law and order during emergencies, as praised by Government advisers for its pivotal contributions post-2024 changeover.⁸⁹ BGB has been commended for detaining thousands of trespassers while upholding domestic stability, demonstrating disciplined operations rather than violations.⁹⁰ Official directives emphasise

⁸⁴ Bangladesh Laws, | 'Executive Power of the Prime Minister' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <[http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-367.html#:~:text=\(2\)%20The%20executive%20power%20of,authority%20of%20the%20Prime%20Minister](http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-367.html#:~:text=(2)%20The%20executive%20power%20of,authority%20of%20the%20Prime%20Minister)> | accessed 03 September 2025.

⁸⁵ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Press statement on July uprising' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news/200927> | accessed 08 September 2025.

⁸⁶ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'Breaking news flash' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/201464> | accessed 08 September 2025.

⁸⁷ The Asia Post News, | 'Lashkar-e-Taiba involved in Bangladesh uprising' | *The Asia Post* | (Online, 2024). [Lashkar-e-Taiba Involved in Bangladesh Uprising – The Asiapost News](https://www.asiapostnews.com/news/2024/09/08/lashkar-e-taiba-involved-in-bangladesh-uprising).

⁸⁸ Md Motiar Rahman, 'An elite force under scrutiny' (*New Age*, 4 November 2024) <https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/249393/an-elite-force-under-scrutiny> accessed 09 September 2025.

⁸⁹ The Business Standard, | 'Home adviser lauds role of BGB in maintaining law and order' | *The Business Standard* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/home-adviser-lauds-role-bgb-maintaining-law-and-order-1013696> | accessed 07 September 2025.

⁹⁰ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'BGB activities update' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/others/295396> | accessed 05 September 2025.

professionalism in duties, countering the report's bias toward unsubstantiated past implications.⁹¹

The report's allegations against the Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), National Security Intelligence (NSI), and National Telecommunications Monitoring Centre (NTMC) for abductions and surveillance lack concrete evidence. These agencies' roles in defence intelligence and coordination are legally mandated, as outlined on the *Bangladesh Armed Forces* official site, and were crucial for national security, not political repression.

Crucially, the OHCHR report fails to address the involvement of Hizbut Tahrir and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which later investigations have revealed. Foreign media reported on March 8, 2025, that organised the '*March for Khilafat*' in Dhaka, exploiting the political vacuum post-Hasina to incite violence, with clashes resulting in arrests by security forces.⁹² These revelations, supported by the Awami League's official response on its website, indicate that the Government's actions were reactive to extremist infiltration, not a premeditated crackdown.

Figure 6: March for Khilafat in Dhaka, 8 March 2025



Source: Media photo, on file

The OHCHR report, stating it confirms a transitional phase, but fails to address post-August 5th violence against police and party members, revealing the report's one-sided agenda.⁹³ In a

⁹¹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Home adviser to BGB: perform duties with integrity' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/357585/home-adviser-to-bgb-perform-duties-with> | accessed 09 September 2025.

⁹² India Today, | 'Hizbut Tahrir march for Khilafat, Dhaka' | *India Today* | (New Delhi, 8 March 2025) | <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/hizbut-tahrir-march-for-khilafat-dhaka-2025-03-08> | accessed 05 September 2025.

⁹³ Awami League, | 'Awami League comments on United Nations Human Rights Report' | *Awami League* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://albd.org/articles/news/41506/Awami-League-comments-on-United-Nations-Human-Rights-Report> | accessed 05 September 2025.

detailed response, the party emphasised that the report ignores the context of mob attacks on Awami League affiliates, underscoring its use for political harassment rather than justice.⁹⁴

The OHCHR report argues that it ignores post-August 5, 2024, violence against its members, mobs killed numerous Awami League leaders⁹⁵ and affiliates, alongside attacks on Hindus⁹⁶ and police. This omission is notable, as the report focuses heavily on the former Government's actions, including extrajudicial killings and torture by security forces and Awami League supporters, but lacks mention of the retaliatory mob violence that followed Hasina's ouster. The absence of these details raises questions about the report's completeness, potentially skewing its narrative toward a one-sided view of the conflict.

Complete shutdown campaign, generalisation of protests and violent unrest

The OHCHR report claims that the Government's appeal against the High Court's quota decision on 16 July 2024 was an "*apparent attempt to mollify*" protesters, and that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's address on 17 July appeared "*insincere*" to protest leaders, leading to a call for a nationwide shutdown supported by opposition parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami. This characterisation misrepresents the Government's proactive steps as superficial, while failing to acknowledge the disruptive intent behind the shutdown call. In fact, the Government demonstrated good faith by promptly filing a leave to appeal with the Supreme Court's Appellate Division on 16 July 2024, directly challenging the High Court's reinstatement of the 30% quota for descendants of independence war veterans, in response to student demands for reform.⁹⁷ This legal action was not mere appeasement but a concrete effort to address grievances through judicial channels, ultimately resulting in the Supreme Court's ruling on 21 July 2024 to reduce the quota to 7%, aligning closely with protester objectives.⁹⁸

Box 3: state minister of information and broadcasting Mohammad a. Arafat explained the ulterior motives of third-party opportunists, whose actions rendered the government's negotiation efforts futile

State Minister Mohammad A. Arafat along with few other ministers were assigned by the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to negotiate with students and ease the tension escalating under the name of quota reform movement. In his interview with us the state minister explained under what context the negotiation effort failed. For instance, in response to the proposals brought to students, the Minister explained that the initial demand—reduction of the quota—was fully aligned with the government's position. The government had abolished the quota in 2018, but it was later reinstated by a High Court order. The Minister clarified that the government was pursuing the matter judicially and had formally accepted the students' eight-point demand. However, a subsequent group submitted additional demands not discussed in meetings, indicating that some factions aimed to prolong the agitation and destabilize the government.

He further stated that the primary demand from students formal declaration to establish a commission for evaluating quota percentages, particularly targeting the 30% quota for freedom fighters' families. The Minister emphasized that, as the matter was sub judice, the executive could not alter the quota without violating the Constitution, and the government repeatedly assured students that a favorable judicial outcome was likely.

On OHCHR engagement, the Minister noted that the UN body showed limited interest in the government's negotiation efforts. About media intimidation, the Minister reported multiple incidents in which student groups, suspected of political affiliations, threatened media personnel, confined them to offices, and carried out attacks and harassment. These updates were regularly received in the Minister's capacity as Information Minister.

Regarding the alleged "rajakars of this era" remark, the Minister clarified that it was a misrepresentation. The term was used only in reference to a small group of students affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami who chanted slogans identifying themselves as "rajakars." The Minister emphasized support for students advocating legitimate quota reform and rejected the false claim that the remark applied to the broader

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's televised address on 17 July further exemplified sincerity, where she expressed deep condolences for lives lost, urged patience pending the Supreme Court's decision, and affirmed that "*police cooperated to ensure the safety of our protesters,*" reflecting a commitment to de-escalation rather than confrontation.⁹⁹ She also announced a judicial inquiry into the deaths, underscoring accountability.¹⁰⁰

The perception of insincerity among some protest leaders stems not from Government actions but from external agitation. The "*Students against Discrimination*" group's call for a "*complete shutdown*" on 18 July, which explicitly aimed to halt all non-emergency operations and block roads, was inherently disruptive and escalated tensions.¹⁰¹ This was amplified by opposition support: BNP leaders publicly endorsed the shutdown to exploit the situation for political gain, while Jamaat-e-Islami's Secretary General *Mia Golam Parwar* issued a statement on 18 July expressing full backing for the students, framing it as resistance against the Government.¹⁰² Such involvement by opposition parties, known for historical ties to unrest, transformed a student-led issue into a broader anti-government campaign, as noted in official analyses.¹⁰³

Student reluctance was not merely a reaction to isolated clashes but was fuelled by radical elements and opposition rhetoric, with BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami leaders encouraging non-cooperation to destabilise the administration.¹⁰⁴ For instance, Jamaat-e-Islami's official statements during this period condemned Government actions while pledging support to protesters, effectively hardening positions against talks.¹⁰⁵ The report's narrative selectively blames the Government without addressing how such external pressures eroded trust, violating balanced reporting standards.

Paragraph 43 alleges that from 18 July, the general population joined protests to disrupt traffic, prompting security forces to "*switch to a lethal force paradigm,*" resulting in killings in areas like Uttara and obstruction of medical care. This depiction inverts causality, portraying protesters as peaceful while ignoring their initiation of violence that compelled defensive responses.

⁹⁹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Full text of PM's address to the nation' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/352463/full-text-of-pm-s-address-to-the-nation> | accessed 07 September 2025.

¹⁰⁰ VOA News, | 'Timeline of events leading to the resignation of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina' | *VOA News* | (Washington DC, 2024) | <https://www.voanews.com/a/timeline-of-events-leading-to-the-resignation-of-bangladesh-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina/7731456.html> | accessed 07 September 2025.

¹⁰¹ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'July uprising special coverage' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/july-uprising/292676> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹⁰² RSIS International, | 'The role of political parties in Bangladesh's July revolution of 2024: Insights from Sufi perspectives' | *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)* | (2024) | <https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/the-role-of-political-parties-in-bangladeshs-july-revolution-of-2024-insights-from-sufi-perspectives/> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹⁰³ EU Reporter, | 'Statement on the recent situation in Bangladesh' | *EU Reporter* | (Brussels, 29 July 2024) | <https://www.eureporter.co/world/bangladesh/2024/07/29/statement-on-the-recent-situation-in-bangladesh/> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹⁰⁴ RSIS International, | 'The role of political parties in Bangladesh's July revolution of 2024: Insights from Sufi perspectives' | *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)* | (2024) | <https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/the-role-of-political-parties-in-bangladeshs-july-revolution-of-2024-insights-from-sufi-perspectives/> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹⁰⁵ Jamaat-e-Islami, | 'Acting Secretary General urges to stop torture and persecution against the general masses; calls to accept students' rightful demands' | *Jamaat-e-Islami* | (Online, 28 July 2024) | <https://jamaat-e-islami.org/en/news-details.php?category=3&news=3767> | accessed 06 September 2025..

BOX 4: Education Minister Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury (Nowfel) explained how Islamic Extremists backfire the negotiation effort of the government by capitalising the anti Razakar sentiment

The education minister stated that prior to the riot, he had made a rhetorical statement on Facebook clarifying that those who openly support the collaborators of the Pakistani military in 1971 are effectively the “new collaborators” of today. He emphasized that such individuals, siding with those who opposed Bangladesh’s independence, do not uphold the nation’s values. He clarified that the statement was not intended to inflame tensions but to warn against divisive communal politics that undermine secularism and Bengali nationalism.

He explained that during negotiations with student representatives, it became clear that the situation was beyond their control, as extremist elements had hijacked their demands for employment and turned them into a violent campaign. Mr. Sarjish Alam reported that outsiders were encouraging the protesters to attack students aligned with government-supported groups. The students expressed fear for their safety and indicated that granting concessions could put them at risk. They regretted the loss of lives, respected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and initially intended their protests to pressure the court. However, Islamist factions had mobilized armed cadres to continue the violence. They lacked the authority to agree to any demands, including the initial nine-point list, which sought a full inquiry and an apology from the Prime Minister but did not call for the government’s resignation.

The Minister noted that his team informed the students that most of their demands could be met and suggested a public acknowledgment that judicial inquiries had begun and that those responsible for excessive violence would be held accountable. The students, however, claimed they could not make such declarations publicly, as they were only messengers. While they agreed in principle that the government was willing to meet the demands, they feared losing leadership of the movement if they appeared conciliatory. Retaining leadership was deemed essential for a constructive resolution.

He further stated that the students themselves admitted being influenced by another group. The Minister observed that both local and foreign actors appeared to be pressuring them to continue the movement despite their reluctance. The students were shocked at the level of violence and insisted they had no role in directing attacks on the public, ruling-party activists, or law enforcement. The Minister noted that hardliners, primarily from Islamist factions, were actively involved, and some appeared to have connections with armed forces intelligence, which encouraged the students to maintain a rigid stance.

Regarding first-hand observations of violence, the education minister clarified that legitimate students initially did not participate in violent acts. In Chittagong, his home was attacked, and gunpowder was thrown at his residence, which convinced him that ordinary students could not have been responsible. By late July in Dhaka, some students, particularly from private universities and madrasas, engaged in violent activities, including attacking and killing police officers. While the majority of students remained peaceful, activists associated with Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, and BNP were observed attacking government-aligned groups and law enforcement personnel.

Contemporary reports reveal that protests turned violent, with crowds attacking police, torching Government buildings (including Metro rail station and Bangladesh Television), and blocking key roads, leading to at least 13 deaths in clashes across Dhaka and beyond.¹⁰⁶ In Uttara, Rampura, and Badda, protesters hurled bricks and set fires, injuring hundreds of officers and necessitating proportionate force to restore order.¹⁰⁷ The Government's deployment of law enforcement bodies was not indiscriminate but a graduated response to riots, as confirmed by official briefings emphasising the protection of public infrastructure.¹⁰⁸ The OHCHR's focus on state actions disregards protester aggression, which included freeing prisoners and highway blockades, as documented in real-time accounts.¹⁰⁹

BOX 5: Rajibul Islam Bappi, President, Bangladesh Chhatra League (Dhaka Metropolitan, South) explained how extremists implemented their agenda through a long-prepared and meticulously executed blueprint

The fact-finding report portrayed that Jatrabari area of Dhaka City is one of the most violence prone areas during the protest. As Jatrabari is in Dhaka South, we tried to understand from Mr Rakib, who was in charge of BCL Dhaka City (South), why the extent of protest was so violent in Jatrabari, in comparison to other areas of Dhaka City. What he replied revealed another horrific truth on how extremist groups fooled general public and get in control of the naïve student movement to a well-planned movement to overthrow an established government of Bangladesh in August 2024.

As informed by Mr. Rakib extremists started to infiltrate the *Jatrabari-Signboard* area (on entry point) of Dhaka city around 3 to 4 year earlier. While replying to a question why they have informed the matter to the law enforcement agency, Rakib replied, we did inform the security force that extremist is getting closed by making mess in nearby houses. As security forces increased their surveillance to rented houses, and asked landlords to submit details of their tenants, the extremist groups started to build their own houses and host the extremist group members to avoid surveillance. Hence, the apparent peaceful protest dramatically changed into a riot and the situation changed in one or two days, including a war like condition in Jatrabari. He admits, it must be a failure of our intelligence

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

The internet shutdown from 18-23 July was necessitated by attacks on critical infrastructure, including an arson attack that damaged an adjacent data centre.¹¹⁰ This aligns with international practices in crises and was lifted promptly once stability improved. The report

¹⁰⁶ Reuters, | 'Bangladesh quota protesters call nationwide shutdown amid clashes' | *Reuters* | (Singapore, 18 July 2024) | <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-quota-protesters-call-nationwide-shutdown-amid-clashes-2024-07-18/> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹⁰⁷ CBS News, | 'Bangladesh protests deaths in Dhaka' | *CBS News* | (New York, 2024) | <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bangladesh-protests-deaths-dhaka-students-job-allocation/> | accessed 09 September 2025.

¹⁰⁸ Bangladesh Laws, | 'Public property' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-75/section-20802.html#:~:text=to%20public%20property,152..other%20mark%20use%20for%20navigation> | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹⁰⁹ VOA News, | 'Student protesters vow complete shutdown in Bangladesh as clashes continue' | *VOA News* | (Washington DC, 2024) | <https://www.voanews.com/a/student-protesters-vow-complete-shutdown-in-bangladesh-as-clashes-continue/7703066.html> | accessed 07 September 2025.

¹¹⁰ The Daily Star, | 'What you need to know about internet crackdown in Bangladesh' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/what-you-need-know-about-internet-crackdown-bangladesh-3676346> | accessed 06 September 2025.

describes escalating violence on 19-21 July, including shootings in Rampura, Badda, and Jatrabari, a national curfew, and army deployment, framing this as unwarranted repression. However, these measures were essential to counter organised unrest that threatened national security.

On 19 July, clashes in Rampura and Badda involved protesters assaulting police stations and vehicles, prompting defensive actions to be taken by the law enforcement bodies.¹¹¹ The curfew, effective from midnight on 19 July, and deployment of 27,000 army personnel were announced to quell anarchy, not suppress peaceful assembly, as violence had already claimed lives and disrupted essential services.¹¹² Operations in Jatrabari on 20-21 July to clear the Dhaka-Chattoogram highway critical economic artery-were joint efforts to restore connectivity after protester blockades caused widespread disruption.¹¹³ Government spokespersons, including ministers, defended these as de-escalatory, emphasising dialogue offers amid opposition-fuelled chaos.¹¹⁴ Hence, the OHCHR's analysis lacks the depth and balance required to fairly assess the Government's actions, necessitating a valuation with greater emphasis on official data and the broader context of agitation.

Ebbing of protests and mass arrest campaign

The OHCHR report's **paragraph 45**, the portrayal of the Government's response as inadequate misrepresents its proactive resolution of the quota issue and ignores opposition orchestration of escalated demands.

The protests originated from the quota system, which Sheikh Hasina abolished in 2018 following student demands, demonstrating consistent Government support for merit-based reforms.¹¹⁵ On 16 July 2024, the Government filed an appeal against the High Court's quota reinstatement, leading to the Supreme Court's 21 July ruling reducing the freedom fighters' quota to 5% and allocating 93% of jobs on merit.¹¹⁶ Post-21 July, the expansion to a nine-point charter with unattainable demands was strategically planned and spread by opposition groups like Islami Chhatra Shibir to destabilise the regime, not as an organic evolution.¹¹⁷

In a video interview, former *Islamic Chhatra Shibir* President *Mirza Galib* revealed they crafted a nine-point charter with hard-to-meet demands upon learning the Awami League would agree to abolish the quota again, aiming to prolong unrest. This nine-point demand was

¹¹¹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Rampura Police Station tries to rebuild after attacks' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/dhaka/362153/rampura-police-station-tries-to-rebuild-after> | accessed 07 September 2025.

¹¹² Reuters, | 'Communications disrupted in Bangladesh amid student protests' | *Reuters* | (Singapore, 19 July 2024) | <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/communications-disrupted-bangladesh-amid-student-protests-2024-07-19/> | accessed 04 September 2025.

¹¹³ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | 'July uprising update' | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/july-uprising/293725> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹¹⁴ Al Jazeera, | 'Bangladesh minister defends govt response to protests amid calls for probe' | *Al Jazeera* | (Doha, 25 July 2024) | <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/bangladesh-minister-defends-govt-response-to-protests-amid-calls-for-probe> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹¹⁵ AFP Fact Check, | 'Bangladesh protests fact check' | *AFP* | (Online, 2024) | <https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.364W8VV> | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹¹⁶ CNN, | 'Bangladesh Supreme Court rolls back job quotas' | *CNN International* | (Atlanta, 21 July 2024) | <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/21/asia/bangladesh-supreme-court-rolls-back-job-quotas-intl> | accessed 09 September 2025.

¹¹⁷ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Coordinator Abdul Kader recounts nine-point movement' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/359913/coordinator-abdul-kader-recounts-how-9-point> | accessed 09 September 2025.

planned post-resolution, indicating opposition strategy rather than genuine grievance.¹¹⁸ Therefore, **paragraph 45** distorts the Government's conciliatory actions and ignores orchestrated escalations, risking endorsement of a partisan viewpoint.

OHCHR **Paragraph 46** asserts that the report mischaracterises lawful security measures as arbitrary repression, ignoring evidence of targeted actions to restore order amid violent unrest.¹¹⁹

Mass arrests were evidence-based, focusing on individuals involved in criminal acts like vandalism and attacks on infrastructure during protests, as justified by police officials to prevent further chaos. The six student leaders were not arrested but taken into protective custody by the Detective Branch (DB) due to credible life threats, as stated by Home Minister *Asaduzzaman Khan* and DB chief *Harun-or-Rashid*, who emphasised it was for their safety amid escalating violence.¹²⁰

DB chief Harun-or-Rashid confirmed the leaders were treated humanely and were meeting their families at the DB office, contradicting claims of torture or ill-treatment.¹²¹ The video statement denouncing protests was voluntary, not coerced, as affirmed by *Harun-or-Rashid*, who dismissed rumours of force and noted it was issued amid concerns for their security.¹²² Public outrage was manipulated by opposition narratives, while the actions aligned with the Government's duty to protect citizens during unrest.¹²³

The OHCHR report's portrayal **in paragraph 46** of mass arrests and coercion lacks evidence, misrepresenting security measures as violations during the 2024 Bangladesh unrest. Police and DB chief Harun-or-Rashid confirm the six student leaders were not under detection; instead, they were under protective custody, with humane treatment including family visits.

Paragraph 47 contends that the OHCHR report mischaracterises the Prime Minister's statements as mere blame-shifting, overlooking her justified attribution of violence to a well-planned conspiracy. On 25 July, she visited the vandalised Mirpur-10 metro station. On 26 July, she toured the burned Bangladesh TV building and met injured patients. On 28 July, she invited the families of killed students to her residence, offering support, as noted by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) Bangladesh.

Her claim of opposition and terrorist involvement was validated by Dr. Yunus's statement at the Clinton Foundation in the United States, revealing a meticulously designed plan by the masterminds. Leaders of BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and NCP reportedly admitted to destroying

¹¹⁸ Probir Bidhan, | 'Stupid jihadists boast about coming to power and desire to establish Shariah law in Bangladesh' | *Probir Bidhan* | (Online, 16 February 2025) | <https://probirbidhan.pro/en/2025/02/16/stupid-jihadists-boast-how-they-came-to-power-and-want-to-establish-shariah-law-in-bangladesh/> | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹¹⁹ Al Jazeera, | 'Bangladesh minister defends govt response to protests amid calls for probe' | *Al Jazeera* | (Doha, 25 July 2024) | <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/bangladesh-minister-defends-govt-response-to-protests-amid-calls-for-probe> | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹²⁰ The Straits Times, | 'Bangladesh says protest student leaders held for their own safety' | *The Straits Times* | (Singapore, 2024) | <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/bangladesh-says-protests-student-leaders-held-for-their-own-safety> | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹²¹ bdnews24.com, | 'Protest coverage' | *bdnews24* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/5652f2f77191> | accessed 09 September 2025.

¹²² ibid

¹²³ ibid

the metro rail, killing police officers, and burning the TV centre, as echoed in Deccan Herald: "*Bangladesh's chief advisor Yunus introduces 'brains' that*"¹²⁴

In video footage, three individuals admitted that BNP leader *Israfil* provided them with money and food, instructing them to burn and destroy Setu Bhaban in Dhaka. In another video, one individual confessed that he was the main person responsible for the destruction of Setu Bhaban.

Furthermore, *Tarique Rahman*, President of the *Aam Janata Party* was revealed that the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia issued instructions to continue protests across Dhaka, escalating the violence and chaos in the capital. Additionally, a supporter of BNP leader *Ishrak Hossain* admitted that they were directly involved in attacks on BTV, Setu Bhaban, and metro rail stations. He further confessed that, in collaboration with Jamaat-e-Islami activists, they broke open the gates of a jail to facilitate the escape of criminals, further undermining law and order in the country. This evidence highlights a well-coordinated effort by BNP and allied Jamaat-e-Islami to incite violence, destroy critical state infrastructure, and destabilise Bangladesh.

Recently, *Jamaat-e-Islami* leader Barrister *Abu Bakar Mollah* revealed that Dr. Yunus hired a lobbyist firm to undermine Sheikh Hasina's Government, further supporting her stance. The Prime Minister's assertions regarding a coordinated conspiracy behind the violence in Bangladesh are reinforced by Dr. Yunus's admissions and the actions of opposition groups. Her proactive engagement with affected communities demonstrates a commitment to addressing the crisis.

The OHCHR report's claims (**paragraphs 48-49**) regarding the BNP's call for "*national unity*" on 26 July 2024 and the Government's ban on Jamaat-e-Islami on 30 July 2024 as triggers for unrest in early August 2024 are unfounded.

Jamaat-e-Islami was banned in Bangladesh due to its criminal history, rooted in its opposition to the country's secular foundation and its role during the 1971 Liberation War. Founded by *Abul Ala Maududi* in 1941, Jamaat-e-Islami aligned with the Pakistani military, collaborating with groups like the *Razakars*, *Al Shams* and *Al-Badr*, which committed atrocities, including mass killings and rapes against Bengali civilians. This led to its initial ban in 1972 under the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Government, for anti-liberation activities. The ban was lifted in 1976, allowing Jamaat-e-Islami to re-enter politics, but its extremist ideology persisted, fostering groups like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), linked to attacks on secular figures.¹²⁵

Under Sheikh Hasina's Government, it cited Jamaat-e-Islami's role in inciting violence during the July-August 2024 protests, with its student wing, *Islami Chhatra Shibir*, accused of orchestrating unrest. Foreign references to the *American Enterprise Institute* describe Jamaat-e-Islami's support for the 2008 Mumbai bombers and *al-Qaeda* offshoots, reflecting its

¹²⁴ Deccan Herald, | 'Bangladesh's chief advisor Yunus introduces brains behind Hasina's ouster' | *Deccan Herald* | (Bengaluru, 2025) | https://www.deccanherald.com/world/bangladeshs-chief-advisor-yunus-introduces-brains-that-meticulously-designed-hasinas-ouster-3209862#google_vignette | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹²⁵ International Crisis Group, | 'Threat of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh' | *Crisis Group* | (2024) | <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/threat-jamaat-ul-mujahideen-bangladesh> | accessed 07 September 2025.

ideological threat. These factors justified the ban as a measure to curb terrorism and protect national security.¹²⁶

The OHCHR report (12 February 2025) acknowledges Jamaat-e-Islami's political involvement but does not fully explore its pre-existing extremist network, suggesting a selective narrative that underplays the Government's security concerns.

Renewed mass protests are forcing Sheikh Hasina's departure.

The OHCHR's assertion that the renewed demand for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's resignation justified the extensive use of force, including lethal measures, is legally unfounded and misrepresents the context (OHCHR Report, **paragraph 50**). Under the *Constitution of Bangladesh* (Articles 31 & 32)¹²⁷, law enforcement agencies, including the Police, RAB, and BGB, possess the inherent authority to use reasonable force to protect public property and ensure self-defence without requiring direct orders from the Prime Minister. This is reinforced by the *Code of Criminal Procedure* (Sections 128 & 129)¹²⁸, which empowers police to act decisively to maintain order. Video footage clearly demonstrates that protesters, political wings, and Islamic extremists employed firearms, local weapons, and bricks, while in several instances they killed police and political persons, hanging their bodies from foot-over bridges and trees, escalating the violence and necessitating a security response.¹²⁹ The claim that concerns about security forces' actions were relayed to the Prime Minister by a senior official and a Cabinet member in early August lacks direct evidence and relies on anecdotal testimony, failing to meet the standard for establishing command responsibility under international law.

In **paragraph 51**, OHCHR's claim that the Army's continued deployment on the streets and the waning support among officers and troops for using force against protesters, as highlighted in the 3 August meeting where Army Chief *Wakar-Uz-Zaman* was informed by junior officers of their reluctance to shoot protesters, is a misrepresentation of the situation. This narrative is further undermined by the undue pressure exerted by UN High Commissioner *Volker Türk*, who threatened the Bangladesh Army with a ban from UN peacekeeping missions if they engaged in the unrest, a move that coerced military restraint rather than reflecting a lack of Governmental directive.¹³⁰

The OHCHR's depiction of the planned "*March to Dhaka*" on 5 August and the subsequent meetings chaired by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 4 August, involving the National Security Council and key security officials, as evidence of a coordinated violent response, is a distortion of the facts OHCHR Report. The meetings, attended by the chiefs of the Army, BGB, Police, intelligence agencies, and ministers, were lawful exercises of the Prime Minister's

¹²⁶ Colorado Politics, 'Designate Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami as a foreign terrorist organization' *Colorado Politics* (Colorado Springs, 31 March 2025) <https://www.coloradopolitics.com/2025/03/31/designate-bangladeshs-jamaat-e-islami-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-142ca171-dfbf-5d88-abd5-0e40b68777cd/> accessed 08 September 2025.

¹²⁷ Bangladesh Laws, 'ICT Act ' *Bangladesh Code* (Dhaka, date not specified) <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367/section-24579.html> accessed 06 September 2025.

¹²⁸ Bangladesh Laws, 'Constitution' *Bangladesh Code* (Dhaka, date not specified) <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-75/section-20747.html> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹²⁹ Dhaka Tribune, 'Why did unarmed policemen have to die brutally?' *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/353288/why-did-unarmed-policemen-have-to-die-brutally> accessed 07 September 2025.

¹³⁰ The Daily Star, 'Volker Turk told army engagement would lead to UN peacekeeping ban' *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 2024) <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/diplomacy/news/july-uprising-volker-turk-told-army-engaging-would-lead-ban-un-peacekeeping-3841626> | accessed 07 September 2025.

authority under the *Rules of Business, 1996* (Rule 7), to assess and strategize for public safety amid a planned mass protest that posed a significant threat, as evidenced by prior violence including the use of firearms, local weapons, and the killing of police and political persons.¹³¹

The OHCHR further mischaracterises the events when Army Chief *Wakar-uz-Zaman* informed the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in the late morning of 5 August that the Army could not prevent protesters from reaching her residence, leading to her evacuation and the storming of her official residence (OHCHR Report, **paragraphs** 52-53). This narrative ignores the extraordinary circumstances of a mob-driven assault, exacerbated by the Army's restrained posture due to UN pressure, and Sheikh Hasina's relocation was a strategic move executed by her security reasons, the Special Security Force (SSF), in coordination with the Bangladesh Air Force and Bangladesh Army, to ensure her safety.

Moreover, UN High Commissioner *Volker Türk*'s admission on 4 March 2025 during a BBC interview¹³², where he openly threatened the Bangladesh Army with a peacekeeping ban for assisting the Government in protecting civilians from mayhem caused by street gangs and jihadist elements, constitutes a severe breach of international law and UN principles. This interference violates Article 2(7) of the *UN Charter*¹³³, which prohibits intervention in a state's domestic jurisdiction, and Article 100,¹³⁴ mandating UN officials' neutrality, as Türk's actions reflect political bias rather than impartiality. His unauthorised threat under Article 39, a prerogative of the Security Council,¹³⁵ undermines sovereign governance and the Bangladesh Army's legal duty to protect lives and property. By pressuring the Army to refrain from action, Türk's threats directly contributed to the Army's inaction, resulting in significant casualties, the destruction and burning of public property, and the rise of Islamic extremism like *ISIS* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.¹³⁶

On 5th August 2024, following escalating violence and threats to her life, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was relocated by the Bangladesh Army and Air Force to ensure her safety. On the same day, the Chief of Army Staff addressed the nation and gave his solemn promise to restore security and stability across the country. Despite these assurances, the *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, *Jamaat-e-Islami*, *Islami Chhatra Shibir*, and activists from other opposition political groups carried out brutal, coordinated attacks on political leaders, the minority community, police and public property.

¹³¹ Bangladesh Government, | 'Rules of Business 1996' | *MRDI* | (Dhaka, 1996) | <https://mrdibd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Rules-of-Business-1996.pdf> | accessed 09 September 2025.

¹³² BBC, | 'BBC Audio Programme' | *BBC Sounds* | (London, 2024) | <https://www.bbc.com/audio/play/w3ct5t5j> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹³³ United Nations, | 'Purposes and principles UN Charter: Chapter I, Article 2(7)' | *UN Security Council* | (New York, date not specified) | [https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#:~:text=E.,Article%20%20\(7\)%20%2D%20Non%2Dintervention%20in%20domestic%20affairs,a%20particular%20situation%20was%20questioned](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#:~:text=E.,Article%20%20(7)%20%2D%20Non%2Dintervention%20in%20domestic%20affairs,a%20particular%20situation%20was%20questioned) | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹³⁴ United Nations Legal Affairs, | 'Article 100 Repertory' | *UN* | (New York, date not specified) | https://legal.un.org/repertory/art100/english/rep_supp2_vol3_art100.pdf | accessed 08 September 2025.

¹³⁵ United Nations, | 'UN Charter Chapter VII' | *UN* | (New York, date not specified) | <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7> | accessed 06 September 2025.

¹³⁶ Firstpost, | 'From ISIS flag marches to radicalisation: Why rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh alarms India' | *Firstpost* | (India, 2024) | <https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/from-isis-flag-marches-to-radicalisation-why-rise-of-hizb-ut-tahrir-in-bangladesh-alarms-india-13825346.html> | accessed 07 September 2025.




Figure 7: Open procession of Islamic extremists under the ISIS banner in Dhaka

Source: File photo

The Government has officially revealed that 44 police officers were killed during the unrest. However, this figure appears to be significantly understated, as reports indicate that in Sirajganj alone, 13 police officers were killed, including a pregnant female police constable.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Prothom Alo, | 'Quota protest coverage' | *Prothom Alo English* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/4qm0iy4evy> | accessed 07 September 2025.

Figure 8: Brutal killing of officers and vandalism at Police Stations in relation to the



protest




According to multiple newspaper sources, 700–800 police officers are still missing. Based on the scale of the violence and destruction, it is highly likely that the actual number of police casualties is far higher than the newspaper report.¹³⁸ The violence also resulted in unprecedented destruction of state infrastructure. Reports confirm that a total of 224 police

¹³⁸ The Daily Star, | 'Cops working not effectively' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/cops-working-not-effectively-3695511> | accessed 10 September 2025

installations were set on fire, including 58 police stations, 26 outposts, two investigation centres, 106 police boxes, 29 offices, and three other facilities. In addition, 236 other installations were vandalised, among them 56 police stations, 24 outposts, 10 investigation centres, 30 police boxes, 28 offices, 15 police line facilities, and 73 other key structures.¹³⁹

Figure 9: Destruction and Vandalism of State Infrastructures



Source: Dhaka Tribune, 30 July 2024

On 6th August 2024, Dr. Muhammad Yunus opportunistically assumed the role of head of Government, despite having no constitutional or legal mandate to do so. Under his leadership, systematic violence began targeting Awami League leaders, supporters, and activists. Within a very short time, lots of people were killed in these politically motivated attacks.¹⁴⁰ Simultaneously, religious and ethnic minorities came under threat. At least 23 members of the Hindu community were killed, while there were 152 reported attacks on temples.¹⁴¹ 1,500 sculptures and murals vandalised all over the country, also Monuments commemorating


¹³⁹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Attacks on cops, personal woes of police officers' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2 December 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/366874/attacks-on-cops-personal-woes-of-police-officers> | accessed 10 September 2025.

¹⁴⁰ The Economic Times, | 'Nearly 400 Awami members killed since July: Party' | *Economic Times* | (New Delhi, 12 September 2024) | <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/nearly-400-awami-members-killed-since-july-party/articleshow/116410237.cms> | accessed 10 September 2025.

¹⁴¹ The Indian Express, | 'Bangladesh Hindus deaths, temples attacks: India concerned about Yunus government' | <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bangladesh-hindus-deaths-temples-attacks-india-yunus-government-9823880/> | accessed 10 September 2025.

freedom fighters and the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were deliberately destroyed in a clear attempt to erase Bangladesh's history and identity.¹⁴²


Figure 10: Attack on Hindu Communities immediate aftermath of the July protest



Source: File Photo

¹⁴² Staff Correspondent, '1,500 sculptures and murals vandalised all over country' *Prothom Alo* (Dhaka, 21 August 2024) <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/ext2ewhp81> accessed 11 September 2025.

Figure 11: Incidences of Vandalising Sculptures around Bangladesh after the July protest context



Source: Prothom Alo, 21 August 2024

Instead of upholding justice, Dr. Yunus is accused of directly enabling and protecting the perpetrators of these atrocities. He immediately issued an illegal indemnity order to shield the terrorists and their political backers from facing prosecution.¹⁴³ This has fuelled further instability and fear throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has failed to reflect the true extent of the brutality in its reporting. Their statements have focused only on selective and debatable incidents that occurred before 5th August, while ignoring the systematic acts of Islamic extremist violence, mass killings, and destruction that took place after Sheikh Hasina's relocation. This one-sided narrative has emboldened extremist groups and undermined the quest for justice for thousands of victims.

¹⁴³ Eurasia Review, | 'Bangladesh Directive on Indemnity Demoralizes Police – OpEd' | *Eurasia Review* | (Online, 20 October 2024) | <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20102024-bangladesh-directive-on-indemnity-demoralizes-police-oped/> | accessed 10 September 2025.

SECTION VI. Estimate of Protest-related Deaths and Injuries, including Killings by State Forces

This section refutes the OHCHR’s casualty estimates, showing that many reported deaths were unverified or unrelated to the protests, thereby undermining claims of mass extrajudicial killings.

In this **paragraph, 56** cites a Ministry of Health figure of 841 deaths and 12,272 injuries but speculates that the data is *"likely incomplete,"* attributing this to factors such as overwhelmed medical staff, unregistered treatments, quick burials, intimidation of health authorities, and unclear police handling of bodies. These claims are unsubstantiated, rely on anecdotal evidence, and appear designed to inflate casualty numbers beyond verifiable facts.

The OHCHR’s reported death toll of 841 highlights the severe human cost of the July 2024 uprising in Bangladesh. However, the Bangladesh Government’s inconsistent reporting has raised serious concerns about the accuracy and transparency of official data. Initially, the Government cited 625 deaths in early August 2024, later revising the figure to 708 deaths in late September.¹⁴⁴

BOX6: Sajal Kundu, General Secretary, Bangladesh Chhatra League (Dhaka Metropolitan, South) remarked, “For me, this interview is an unexpected privilege.”

In its fact-finding report, the OHCHR repeatedly avoided its responsibility to investigate the post-5 August atrocities suffered by members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) and other activists of the Bangladesh Awami League at the hands of protesters and rival political groups. To shed light on these incidents, we invited Mr Sajal Kundda, General Secretary of BCL (Dhaka South), to share his personal experience. Because of the sensitivity of the information, we first asked whether he wished to have his name disclosed in this rebuttal report. His response was strikingly brief yet profoundly revealing: “Yes, it is a bonus for me!”

Even before we could elaborate, he continued. “The situation immediately after 5 August was so horrific that many of my companions were brutally killed or tortured. I had no certainty of survival. I prayed to God, *Ya Allah, I am going to die; it will be brutal and painful, you know. Please forgive me and allow me to enter heaven.* By sheer fortune, they failed to locate me, and I survived. But many of my fellow BCL activists who could not escape were mercilessly murdered. Some were dragged to the nearby Tamirul Millat Madrasa, stripped naked, and beaten to death. A few others who tried to flee were thrown from high-rise buildings. A police officer, returning home in plain clothes after his duty, was intercepted by a group of protesters. They searched his bag, found his uniform, and beat him to death before hanging his body from a footbridge.”

Looking directly at us, he concluded with quiet conviction: “Don’t you think it is a bonus for me that I am still alive and able to attend this interview?” We could only agree.

Source: Interview by the Legal Team on 26 September 2025 (Record on file)

¹⁴⁴ The Daily Star, | 'Govt publishes draft list of 708 people killed in uprising' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 8 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/govt-publishes-draft-list-708-people-killed-uprising-3711121> | accessed 10 September 2025.

Adding further to this inconsistency, according to the Yunus-led interim Government, the official “*martyr list*” contained just over 650 names¹⁴⁵, and financial assistance was provided to 628 families of those who died during the July uprising.¹⁴⁶ This starkly contrasts with both the OHCHR figure of 841 deaths and the Government’s, revealing a lack of consistency in how casualties were recorded, verified, and publicly reported. Such discrepancies have fuelled doubts about whether the full extent of the violence and loss of life has been accurately acknowledged, particularly regarding victims among police officers, minority communities, and Awami League activists, many of whom were allegedly excluded from the official count.

The OHCHR report has been widely criticised for totally ignoring the brutal and systematic killings that took place after 4th August 2024. The report failed to adequately acknowledge the targeted massacres of police officers, Awami League leaders, supporters, and minority communities, particularly the Hindu population.

On the other hand, while the OHCHR reported a total of 12,272 injuries during the July uprising, it failed to mention or specifically account for the injuries sustained by Awami League leaders, supporters, and police officers, who were among the primary targets of the violence. During our independent investigation, we conducted a personal interview with *Mr. Abdul Hamid*¹⁴⁷, the former President of the Bangladesh Chhatra League, Gopalganj District. In his testimony, Mr. Hamid stated that on 4 August 2024, at approximately 2:00 PM, while he was present at Jhigatola, Dhanmondi, he was shot in the right leg by a live bullet during an attack by armed protesters. He was subsequently hospitalized and required extended medical care due to the severity of his injuries.

Mr. Hamid further revealed that thousands of Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters suffered injuries during this period as a result of organized and deliberate attacks. He confirmed that many protesters were armed with firearms, contradicting claims that the uprising was entirely peaceful. His account underscores the serious gaps in the OHCHR’s investigation, which either failed to properly examine or chose to ignore the truth about the scale and nature of violence directed at pro-Government individuals and security personnel. By neglecting these critical facts, the OHCHR report presents an incomplete and distorted narrative, overlooking the suffering of a significant segment of victims and raising serious questions about the objectivity and comprehensiveness of its findings.

The statements of the fact-finding team have issued appear inconsistent and lack clarity in their recent report. The report indicates that casualty figures were obtained from Government sources, specifically referencing the Ministry of Health, while noting that this information is incomplete. At times, the team cites open-source data as the basis for their findings, while on other occasions, they reference information provided by Government security agencies. Despite receiving full cooperation from the Bangladeshi Government during their visit, which included 40 meetings, the report exhibits significant inconsistencies on critical issues and overlooks key matters, such as the killing of police personnel.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Shohid.info, | 'Shohid database' | *Shohid.info* | (Online, date not specified) | <https://shohid.info/?lang=en> | accessed 10 September 2025.

¹⁴⁶ The Daily Star, | '2,229 families received financial assistance so far' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 15 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/2229-families-received-financial-assistance-so-far-3789326> | accessed 10 September 2025.

¹⁴⁷ Abdul Hamid, Personal Interview, 02/09/2025

¹⁴⁸ Prothom Alo, 'Bangladesh news update' *Prothom Alo English* (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/47ruf5iivw> accessed 10 September 2025.

The OHCHR reported that 1,400 people had died as of 15 August 2024. In contrast, the interim Government, through its official website, revealed that 650 deaths occurred up to 5 August 2024. Based on these figures, it would imply that an additional 750 people were killed between 5 August and 15 August, according to the OHCHR's data.

However, numerous incidents have surfaced where individuals who were previously reported as dead were later found alive and returned home, strongly indicating that a portion of the OHCHR's claims were inaccurate or fabricated.¹⁴⁹ There have been serious allegations regarding inaccuracies in the official martyr list, as 52 individuals included in the list have been confirmed to be alive. This revelation has raised widespread concerns about the credibility and integrity of the process used to compile the list.¹⁵⁰ This clear discrepancy raises serious doubts about the accuracy, neutrality, and credibility of the OHCHR's report. Furthermore, the role of the interim Government, in conjunction with certain actions of the United Nations, appears inconsistent and confusing. Such irregularities undermine public trust and call into question the standards of investigation and reporting applied in this case.

This is not the first instance of concerns regarding OHCHR investigations. The OHCHR's inquiry into the Sri Lankan civil war, in 2009, faced substantial criticism for its initial shortcomings, prompting a follow-up investigation in 2014. The 2009 report was criticised for its heavy reliance on unverified claims and its failure to adequately address accountability for actions by both Government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), resulting in widespread scepticism about its findings. The subsequent 2014 investigation, detailed in the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report, aimed to address these deficiencies by incorporating a broader evidence base and expert input, acknowledging the limitations of the initial probe.¹⁵¹

The OHCHR report attributes most protest-related firearm deaths to 7.62x39mm ammunition allegedly used by state forces, such as the Army, RAB, and BGB. However, several serious gaps and alternative explanations raise questions about the completeness and objectivity of this finding. On 3rd August 2024, violent clashes occurred near the Dhanmondi (3/A) Awami League party office. In an interview, Mr. Riazul Islam, President of Sir A. F. Rahman Hall Chhatra League¹⁵², stated that when Awami League supporters moved towards Mohammadpur, they came under heavy fire from rooftop shooters positioned at Ibn Sina Diagnostic Centre (Dhanmondi 9A). Ibn Sina institutions have long been publicly alleged to have links with Jamaat-e-Islami.

Witness statements, live videos, CCTV footage, and still photographs reportedly show armed civilians, including individuals with sniper rifles, roaming freely during the July protests.

Figure 12a: Civilians were seen carrying weapons during the July protest

¹⁴⁹ Desh Rupantor, 'আমি মরি নাই' *Desh Rupantor* (Dhaka, 2024) <https://www.deshrupantor.com/610363/> accessed 10 September 2025.

¹⁵⁰ The list includes 52 names of people who were not martyred in the July movement: Mostafa Firoz." *Kaler Kantho* (Dhaka, 15 September 2025). Available at: <https://www.kalerkantho.com/online/social-media/2025/09/15/1577772> (Accessed: 17 September 2025)

¹⁵¹ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, | 'Political developments in Bangladesh' | *FES Library* | (Bonn, 2014) | <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/11142.pdf> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁵² Riazul Islam-personal interview- 05/09/2025



Source: Video footage, on file

The OHCHR report does not appear to have thoroughly analysed or even mentioned this evidence. If civilians were openly carrying military-style rifles and engaging in rooftop attacks, how did OHCHR determine that only state forces fired the lethal 7.62mm rounds? This selective treatment of evidence raises doubts about whether the investigation considered all potential perpetrators. One of the key student members, *Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuiyan*, revealed that they were ready to call for an armed revolution on August 5. This indicates that they were fully prepared with weapons. However, questions remain about where they obtained these



weapons, and the OHCHR did not raise any concerns regarding the arms that were used during July.¹⁵³

On 6 August 2024, a foreign media outlet reported that Bangladeshi intelligence services had uncovered a “blueprint for regime change”, allegedly drafted in London with ISI collaboration, implicating BNP leader Tarique Rahman (son of Khaleda Zia).¹⁵⁴ This intelligence suggests that at least part of the violence was fuelled by foreign funds and support, creating a serious alternative explanation for the presence of military-grade firearms in civilian hands.

OHCHR does not reference or evaluate this intelligence in its findings. Why were these allegations not addressed? Was this evidence requested from Bangladeshi authorities, and if so, why is it missing from the report? This omission leaves a major gap in understanding that may have supplied and used these weapons. Furthermore, the report does not publish a full chain-of-custody for the ammunition remnants it examined. In any credible forensic investigation, every bullet and cartridge must have a documented trail - which collected it, where it was stored, and how it was analysed.¹⁵⁵

If extremist factions could access 7.62mm ammunition through foreign networks, can OHCHR definitively attribute all such rounds to state forces without first ruling out this alternative? The OHCHR findings are based on “reasonable grounds to believe”, a standard explicitly lower than the level of proof required.

¹⁵³ ‘Asif Mahmud Warns of Final Call for Revolution’ *Daily Janakantha* (Dhaka, 13 November 2024) <https://www.dailyjanakantha.com/national/news/743968> accessed 17 September 2025.

¹⁵⁴ India Today, | 'Bangladesh violence: Khaleda Zia's son, Pakistan ISI, and China funding Sheikh Hasina' | *India Today* | (New Delhi, 6 August 2024) | <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-violence-khaleda-zia-son-pakistan-isi-china-funding-sheikh-hasina-2577822-2024-08-06> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁵⁵ National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), | 'Chain of custody and evidence' | *NCBI Bookshelf* | (Online, date not specified) | <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK551677/#:~:text=The%20chain%20of%20custody%20is,custody%20or%20chain%20of%20evidence> | accessed 11 September 2025.

SECTION VII. Alleged Violations and Abuses During the Protests

This section deals with specific allegations such as unlawful force, torture and arbitrary detention and argues that these claims are speculative, exaggerated or legally justified in the context of violent unrest.

The OHCHR's conclusion in **paragraph 65**, alleging that between 15 July and 5 August 2024 the Government, its security agencies, and Awami League affiliates engaged in systematic human rights violations to suppress protests, is a grave charge. However, the evidentiary basis presented is neither transparent nor independently verifiable.

The report acknowledges reliance on more than 230 confidential and anonymous interviews, yet fails to disclose methodology, balance, or cross-examination safeguards. Visual evidence confirms meetings with opposition leaders, including figures linked to Islami Chhatra Shibir, while only three Awami League leaders, including the President of Bangladesh Chhatra League, were consulted-and their statements were omitted. Such selective engagement undermines fairness and fails to capture accounts of Awami League members who themselves were victims of violence and rights abuses during the unrest.

While any credible allegations of human rights violations must be investigated, the OHCHR fails to distinguish between isolated misconduct by individual actors and a coordinated state policy. In doing so, it conflates crowd-control measures during violent unrest with systematic repression analytical leap unsupported by disclosed evidence.

The description in **paragraph 66** of the escalation from crowd-control tools such as tear gas and rubber bullets to the “*indiscriminate*” use of military rifles portrays the security forces as the sole aggressors. However, multiple independent reports, including those by Reuters and The Guardian,¹⁵⁶ document that the early days of the protests were not entirely peaceful, with armed groups and extremist elements infiltrating demonstrations and attacking police stations, Government offices, and even civilian properties. According to section 102 of *The Penal Code 1860*, “*The right to self-defence of the body begins when a reasonable fear of harm arises from an attempt or threat to commit an offence, even if the offence has not yet occurred, and it remains valid as long as the fear of danger persists.*”¹⁵⁷

The OHCHR does not explain how it distinguished between cases where force may have been used in legitimate self-defence and those that were unlawful. By failing to differentiate between peaceful protesters and armed attackers, the report risks oversimplifying a complex conflict, thus undermining its credibility.

The OHCHR's claim in **paragraph 67** that the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) “*indiscriminately fired at crowds,*” including children, leading to hundreds of extrajudicial killings, is a deeply troubling accusation with significant legal ramifications under international norms, particularly concerning excessive force and the sanctity of life. Yet, this assertion lacks substantiation due to the absence of publicly available forensic evidence, such as detailed forensic findings, which are critical to confirm the nature and source of these fatalities. The OHCHR's failure to provide such documentation, despite its

¹⁵⁶ Reuters, | 'Seven killed in Bangladesh clashes as protesters push PM to resign' | *Reuters* | (Singapore, 4 August 2024) | <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/seven-killed-bangladesh-clashes-protesters-push-pm-resign-2024-08-04/> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁵⁷ Bangladesh Laws, | 'Code of Criminal Procedure,' | *Bangladesh Code* | (Dhaka, date not specified) | <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-11/section-2780.html> | accessed 11 September 2025.

obligation to maintain high investigative standards, raises concerns about the reliability of its conclusions, especially given the interim Government's role in facilitating the mission, which should have enabled access to such data if it were available.

Additionally, from videos, CCTV footage and still pictures suggest a more nuanced reality that the OHCHR overlooks. Reports from the period indicate that some protesters were equipped with weapons, including firearms, and in certain instances, engaged in targeted attacks from elevated positions like rooftops during confrontations. This evidence points to a two-sided conflict, challenging the narrative of unprovoked state violence. The OHCHR's decision to focus solely on security forces' actions, while ignoring these countervailing dynamics, hints at a potential bias, possibly influenced by the interim Government's agenda. This selective approach calls into question the report's impartiality and underscores the necessity for a more thorough examination that considers the full scope of events.

The OHCHR's assertion in **paragraph 68** that army personnel allegedly fired at unarmed protesters, including one instance classified as an extrajudicial killing, raises serious concerns due to the lack of concrete details to support these allegations. The report fails to provide critical information such as the identities of the victims, the precise locations of these incidents, or any forensic evidence, leaving the claims open to question and impossible to independently verify. This absence of specificity undermines the credibility of the accusations, as it prevents any meaningful assessment of the circumstances surrounding these events.

In situations involving allegations of lethal force, establishing responsibility for individual deaths necessitates a meticulous, case-by-case forensic analysis, an approach that the OHCHR report does not appear to have pursued. Without offering detailed supporting evidence - such as geo-located video recordings, official forensic findings, or accounts from impartial eyewitnesses reports risks elevating unconfirmed assumptions to the status of established facts. This methodological gap not only weakens the report's authority but also suggests a reliance on incomplete or anecdotal data, casting doubt on its ability to deliver a fair and thorough investigation into the actions attributed to the army.

Paragraph 69 further accuses Awami League supporters, including Chhatra League members, of carrying out attacks "*jointly with the police.*" This statement carries significant political weight, yet the report does not clarify whether these actions were coordinated offensives or spontaneous defensive reactions during violent clashes. Local reporting provides a very different picture: clashes near Dhanmondi reportedly involved Awami League members defending their office against BNP- and Jamaat-linked protesters, some of whom were armed with firearms and explosives. OHCHR's choice of language appears politically charged rather than strictly evidentiary.¹⁵⁸

Paragraph 70 raises allegations of deliberate obstruction of medical care, including claims that hospitals were raided, medical staff intimidated, and records falsified. These are among the most serious accusations in the report, yet OHCHR does not release any evidence to support

¹⁵⁸ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Awami League activists foil attempts to attack' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/353700/awami-league-activists-foil-attempts-to-attack> | accessed 11 September 2025.

them. In such an environment, delays and mismanagement may have been systemic rather than intentional.¹⁵⁹

Additionally, there were confirmed incidents in which protesters vandalised a hospital and set fire to vehicles, including an ambulance. “*An attack on a hospital is unacceptable,*” said Health Minister Samanta Lal Sen following the violence at a medical college hospital. These acts of vandalism further strained emergency services and complicated the response efforts.¹⁶⁰ Without transparent verification, the OHCHR account risks being interpreted as speculative and unbalanced, especially when the broader context of disorder and violence is not fully considered.

In **paragraph 71**, OHCHR claims that the Police, Detective Branch (DB), and RAB “*arbitrarily arrested and detained thousands of protesters*” and tortured detainees. This framing is highly questionable because it excludes the broader factual context of what was happening on the ground during mid-July to early August 2024. During this period, there is video footage and verified media reporting showing that violent mobs linked to opposition parties such as BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and their students’ wing engaged in systematic attacks on public property and law enforcement bodies. They set fire to the Metro Rail station,¹⁶¹ attacked the state-owned Bangladesh Television (BTV) centre,¹⁶² and attempted to destroy key Government infrastructure like Setu Bhaban.¹⁶³

BOX 7: Sagar Ahmed Shamim, General Secretary of BCL (Dhaka City, North), Shared experience on how billions of Dollars’ worth public property was destroyed.

Mr. Shagar Ahmed Shamim, a student at the Institute of Health Science at Mahakhali Dhaka, and also the General Secretary of BCL (Dhaka City, North) shared his experience how brutally the members of various underworld extremist groups along with Chhatra Shibir took part in violent attacks on invaluable national infrastructure and destroyed the million-dollar property in blink of eyes. While counting on the destruction he mentioned about setting fire on Rampura TV Station, torching the office of *Setu Bhaban*, vandalised the Metro Rail Stations and many other government infrastructures. These are public property.

¹⁵⁹ The Daily Star, | 'Dhaka hospitals need urgent support' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 1 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/dhaka-hospitals-need-urgent-support-3661041> | accessed 11 September 2025.


¹⁶⁰ CNN, | 'Bangladesh clashes between police and protesters' | *CNN International* | (Atlanta, 4 August 2024) | <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/04/asia/bangladesh-clashes-police-protesters-activists-intl> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁶¹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'DB uncovers mastermind behind metro station attack' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/dhaka/352933/db-uncovers-mastermind-behind-metro-station> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁶² Prothom Alo, | 'Recent Dhaka violence update' | *Prothom Alo English* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/city/2ttq6ulatg> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁶³ The Daily Star, | 'Recent violence: PM witnesses damages at Setu Bhaban' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 3 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/recent-violence-pm-witnesses-damages-setu-bhaban-3663021> | accessed 11 September 2025.

Figure 12B : The office of Ministry of road Transport and Bridges set on fire 58 to 59



Source: Source: File photo





the office of the Ministry of Road Transport and Bridges was set on fire

Source: File photo

These are criminal acts under Bangladeshi law, including arson, terrorism, and destruction of public property, punishable under the Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009. When protesters use firearms, explosives, and coordinated attacks on Government property, the police are legally obligated to respond to protect civilians and national infrastructure. OHCHR's

narrative makes no effort to distinguish between violent attackers and peaceful protesters, instead categorising all arrests as politically motivated. This omission creates a misleading and one-sided picture.

Furthermore, it is documented that several student leaders were taken into custody by the Detective Branch for their own safety, as there were credible threats to their lives from extremist factions seeking to provoke further violence. According to statements from Dhaka Metropolitan Police officials reported by local outlets, these detainees were treated humanely, their families were kept informed, and they were provided regular access to food, medical care, and supervised family visits. This directly contradicts OHCHR's allegation of systematic torture and secret detention.¹⁶⁴

In **paragraph 72**, OHCHR alleges that the Government and its agencies deliberately imposed internet shutdowns to conceal evidence of state violence and suppress the sharing of information. However, this interpretation is highly questionable when examined alongside official records and contemporaneous statements. According to the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC), the nationwide internet blackout during the peak of unrest was primarily caused by direct attacks on data centres in the capital, which disrupted core network operations and forced emergency shutdowns to prevent further sabotage.¹⁶⁵

In **paragraph 73**, OHCHR alleges that female protesters were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including threats and physical sexual assault, by Awami League supporters and security forces. These are among the gravest allegations possible and therefore require the highest level of evidentiary support, including corroborated medical reports, sworn victim testimonies, and official case filings. However, a review of domestic records reveals that no single police case (First Information Report or FIR) has been filed in Bangladesh regarding sexual violence linked to the July–August 2024 unrest.

Moreover, no reputable national media outlet, including The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, Daily Kaler Kantho, Ittefaq or Prothom Alo, has reported any incident of sexual or gender-based violence related to the protests during this period.

In **paragraph 74**, OHCHR claims that children were subjected to extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and deliberate maiming by state forces. While it is undeniable that minors were caught up in the unrest, the report fails to provide case-by-case evidence or to distinguish between innocent children and those actively recruited by political groups for violent purposes. During July 2024, police arrested 17-year-old Hasnatul Islam Faiyaz, a college student, based on verified intelligence and supporting evidence that he was directly involved with Islami Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami. Later, video footage surfaced showing Faiyaz actively participating in an organised Islami Chhatra Shibir program.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Prothom Alo, | 'Political update Bangladesh' | *Prothom Alo English* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/1a5pu53bbq> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁶⁵ The Daily Star, | 'Broadband restored on trial basis' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 1 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/broadband-restored-trial-3661356> | accessed 11 September 2025.

¹⁶⁶ The Daily Star, | 'Arrest of 17-year-old: Juvenile justice must prevail' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 4 August 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/arrest-17-year-old-juvenile-justice-must-prevail-3664696> | accessed 11 September 2025.

This type of organisation in Bangladesh, including Jamaat-e-Islami's networks, has a history of recruiting teenage boys to carry out violent political agendas, exploiting their age to gain public sympathy while shielding senior operatives from direct exposure. This pattern was observed in past unrest, where young recruits were deployed to provoke confrontations, engage in vandalism, or even carry out arson attacks on public infrastructure. Under such circumstances, law enforcement has both a legal and moral duty to intervene and detain these individuals to prevent further violence, as provided for under the law.

In **paragraph 75**, OHCHR concludes that the Government followed a “*broader strategy (Violations and abuses during the protests)*” to suppress dissent, yet it does not present direct evidence such as internal Government orders, command directives, or intercepted communications to substantiate this serious allegation. Instead, it relies on generalised patterns and anonymous testimonies, which lack the transparency and verification required for a definitive finding. The events of July–August 2024 were marked by chaotic, multi-sided violence, where various extremist groups and criminal actors were active.

For example, during this period, several major incidents occurred, including the mass jailbreak in Narsingdi, where over 800 prisoners, including convicted militants, escaped with weapons, and multiple coordinated attacks on police stations and Government buildings were reported across the country. These incidents indicate a complex security crisis rather than a single, unified plan by the state to target peaceful dissent.¹⁶⁷

By failing to address these alternative explanations and not producing verifiable documents such as signed orders, meeting records, or forensic evidence, OHCHR leaves its conclusion open to serious doubt. The lack of a comprehensive analysis of extremist coordination, foreign involvement, and the scale of organised attacks on public infrastructure undermines the report's objectivity, suggesting that its “*broader strategy*” claim rests on inference rather than proof.

1. Incited violence by armed Awami League supporters

OHCHR's assertion in **paragraph 76** that senior Awami League officials “*incited armed violence*” rests principally on public speeches and reported exhortations. However, the report does not present documentary evidence—such as orders or operational directives—would translate rhetorical statements into demonstrable command-and-control actions. Several contemporaneous domestic accounts characterised these statements as political rhetoric, and several senior figures within the ruling coalition publicly distanced themselves from the language. These nuances are not fully contextualised by OHCHR.

For instance, in widely circulated audio statements made on July 9th, 10th, and 11th, Bangladesh Chhatra League [Bangladesh Student League] President Saddam Hussain and General Secretary Sheikh Wali Asif Enan explicitly instructed all Chhatra League leaders and supporters not to engage in any violence, urging them instead to communicate with protesting students peacefully and to assist civilians in areas where roads were blocked.

The reports in **paragraphs 77 -78**, finding that armed supporters “*were consistently allowed to act with impunity,*” rely heavily on witness testimony and open-source imagery. There is credible evidence suggesting that elements seeking to incite violence infiltrated the protests under false identities. Reports later revealed that some individuals posing as Chhatra League

¹⁶⁷ The Daily Star, | 'Narsingdi jail attack: How it all unfolded' | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/narsingdi-jail-attack-how-it-all-unfolded-3661396> | accessed 11 September 2025.

activists-including those wearing helmets and engaging in violence-were in fact associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. Notable Shibir figures such as *Sadeq Quim* and *SM Farhad*¹⁶⁸ were allegedly operating under the guise of Chhatra League members during the unrest. Additionally, protest organisers *Hasnat Abdullah* and *Sarjis Alam* were also reportedly involved in coordinating these covert efforts, further complicating attribution and undermining the report's assumption of uniform political control over the violence.¹⁶⁹

The OHCHR's assertion in **paragraphs 79-82** that senior Awami League and Government officials "*incited attacks on protesters*" demonstrates a lack of analytical rigour and raises questions about the report's impartiality. The claim appears to rely on selective interpretations of political rhetoric while omitting critical context and clarification provided by credible local sources.

For instance, remarks made by Chhatra League President Saddam Hussain and Road Transport and Bridges Minister Obaidul Quader were direct responses to inflammatory chants labelling pro-Government actors as "*Razakars*" [traitors] - a deeply sensitive historical term associated with wartime collaborators. The remarks, though sharp in tone, were framed as political rebuttals rather than calls to violence. The OHCHR report, however, frames these statements as incitement, disregarding the situational context and reactions to provocation.¹⁷⁰

Additionally, the OHCHR's portrayal of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's remarks as labelling students' "*traitors*" is demonstrably misleading. The Prime Minister's statement was phrased as a rhetorical question intended to challenge the use of the term "*Razakar*" [traitor] against her party's supporters. By failing to reflect this clarification and rhetorical framing, the OHCHR appears to misrepresent the intent of the statement, creating a narrative that suggests deliberate vilification of protesters.¹⁷¹

Furthermore, the report cites anonymous eyewitness accounts alleging the presence of "*armed supporters*" at Dhaka University during the protests. Members of Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing allegedly infiltrated the protests disguised as Chhatra League activists, while key organisers reportedly coordinated covert efforts, complicating attribution and undermining claims of unified political direction.¹⁷²

In **paragraph 83**, the OHCHR report cites several confidential witness references (FFTB-INT-0206; FFTB-INT-0202; FFTB-INT-0112; FFTB-INT-0026; FFTB-OS-0081), corroborated by unspecified open sources and videos, to support claims of verbal threats and sexualised intimidation targeting student protesters, particularly around university campuses.

¹⁶⁸ The Business Standard, | 'Did Shibir's DU unit secretary Farhad also hold post in Chhatra League?' | *The Business Standard* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/did-shibirs-du-unit-secretary-farhad-also-hold-post-chhatra-league-948421> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁶⁹ The Report Live, | 'Former Chhatra League leader now hall president of Chhatra Shibir at CU' | *The Report Live* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://thereport.live/national/former-chhatra-league-leader-now-hall-president-of-chhatra-shibir-at-cu/36561#:~:text=A%20J%20M%20Nasir%20Uddin.-.In%20another%2C%20he%20is%20seen%20wishing%20Prime%20Minister%20Sheikh%20Hasina,president%20in%20January%20this%20year.%22> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁰ The Daily Star, | 'BCL Response to Razakar Label Quota Protesters | BCL will give a fitting reply to those who labelled themselves Razakars: Quader' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2024).

¹⁷¹ The Daily Star, | 'Hasina: Do quota protesters know their history?' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2024).

¹⁷² The Business Standard, | 'Shibir cadres operated inside BCL to gain influence: Student leader Abdul Qader names a few' | *The Business Standard* | (Dhaka, 2024).

While such allegations are extremely serious, according to The Daily Star's coverage on 14 July 2024 explicitly reports on protests at Jahangirnagar University but makes no mention of sexual intimidation or gender-based threats, suggests a disconnect between OHCHR's internal references and the publicly available, credible journalistic reporting of the same events. This absence of alignment raises questions about the verifiability of the cited incidents and the broader methodological transparency of the report.¹⁷³

The OHCHR's description in **paragraphs 84 and 85** of the 15 July 2024 clash at Dhaka University as a unilateral attack by Chhatra League supporters on peaceful protesters lacks balance, highlighting the report's biased narrative and substandard investigative approach.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, the OHCHR's assertion that protesters armed themselves only in anticipation of an attack overlooks reports of proactive protester aggression, including entering Hall to confront Chhatra League members.¹⁷⁵

In **paragraphs 86-88**, the OHCHR claims that Chhatra League activists "*stormed*" the emergency department of Dhaka Medical College Hospital (DMCH) and attacked injured protesters and staff. The narrative of Chhatra League supporters threatening students, pouring hot water on female protesters, and attacking them at DMCH relies on unverified accounts, raising doubts about its credibility. (FFTB-INT-0170; FFTB-INT-0167; FFTB-INT-0169; FFTB-INT-0171; FFTB-INT-0013).

However, this portrayal is not supported by balanced or verified public evidence, and several key facts are omitted. First, many BCL activists themselves were among the injured and were taken to DMCH alongside protesting students. Multiple local news reports confirmed that clashes involved violent encounters between both groups, and BCL members were also assaulted on or near campus prior to arriving at the hospital for treatment.

For example, during the 14–15 July clashes at Dhaka University and adjacent areas, BCL general secretary New Market thana Chhatra League Sajedul Hasan Farhad sustained bullet injuries and required emergency care, as seen in images circulated on verified social media and reported in local news coverage. However, OHCHR omits these injuries entirely, contributing to a one-sided narrative that frames all Chhatra League presence at DMCH as hostile. Furthermore, no authenticated hospital staff statements have been publicly released by OHCHR to confirm who entered the emergency ward, when, or with what intent.

The clashes on 16 July near the Science Lab area and Bahadur Shah Park involved multiple groups, with injuries reported among both protesters and Chhatra League supporters. Several BCL members were admitted to Dhaka Medical College Hospital, indicating reciprocal violence. Police faced difficulties controlling the chaotic scenes, which delayed intervention.

¹⁷³ The Daily Star, | 'July 14, 2024: PM's remark ignites protests' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 14 July 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/july-14-2024-pms-remark-ignites-protests-3938926> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁴ Prothom Alo, | 'Bangladesh political update' | *Prothom Alo English* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/gl118fyp6n> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁵ The Business Standard, | 'BCL leaders forced out of DU halls amid protests over quota reform killings' | <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bcl-leaders-forced-out-du-halls-amid-protests-over-quota-reform-killings-901461> | accessed 12 September 2025.

12 police man were injured by protesters' aggressive attack, according to DMP. These details suggest the violence was multifaceted rather than one-sided.¹⁷⁶

2. Coordinated attacks by armed Awami League supporters and the Police

The claims made in **paragraphs 89 to 100** of the OHCHR report-that Awami League supporters were systematically integrated into police operations to attack protesters-lack objectivity and fail to consider the full reality on the ground.

During the events of July and August 2024, Bangladesh experienced a period of extreme unrest and violence involving multiple groups. Protesters, including members of BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and other extremist organisations, carried out aggressive attacks on police stations, police boxes, public property, and general civilians. Many police officers were brutally killed while performing their duty and hanged publicly¹⁷⁷; several police stations were attacked.¹⁷⁸ Evidence shows that these protesters were not unarmed civilians, as some reports suggested. Instead, they used lethal weapons, homemade explosives, and gunpowder, posing a direct threat to law enforcement officers and public safety. Under such circumstances, the police had both the legal right and obligation to defend themselves, protect public property, and safeguard the lives of citizens. Similarly, several Awami League offices came under attack by these violent groups.¹⁷⁹ In many instances, Awami League supporters were compelled to defend their offices and members when law enforcement was overwhelmed. These defensive actions cannot be equated with unlawful violence, as the OHCHR report implies, because they were primarily aimed at preventing destruction and protecting lives.

Video evidence and eyewitness accounts have confirmed that unidentified individuals were seen firing rifles and sniper-grade weapons from rooftops, deliberately targeting civilians and students to create panic and provoke anger against the Government. These actions were clearly aimed at escalating violence and destabilising the country. Footage also shows that armed individuals from different political parties and extremist groups were shooting at both protesters and bystanders using advanced firearms. Retired Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain, who initially served as an advisor in the interim Government led by Dr. Yunus, publicly raised serious questions about the use of 7.62 mm bullets found in victims' *"Home Affairs Adviser Brigadier General (Retired) Sakhawat Hossain today said a major investigation is necessary to identify the youths in civil dress who were seen carrying 7.62mm rifles"*.¹⁸⁰ Shortly after making these statements, Brigadier General Hussain was abruptly removed from the Home Ministry and transferred to another position, which raises serious

¹⁷⁶ United News of Bangladesh (UNB), | 'Quota movement: Two victims died in Dhaka during clashes identified' | UNB | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://unb.com.bd/category/Bangladesh/quota-movement-two-victims-died-in-dhaka-during-clashes-identified/139563> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁷ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Why did unarmed policemen have to die brutally?' | Dhaka Tribune | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/353288/why-did-unarmed-policemen-have-to-die-brutally> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁸ BDNews24, | 'Bangladesh update' | BDNews24 | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/b0979d2438fc> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁷⁹ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Awami League activists foil attempts to attack' | Dhaka Tribune | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/353700/awami-league-activists-foil-attempts-to-attack> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁸⁰ The Daily Star, | 'Who were the youths carrying 7.62mm rifles meant for police and RAB?' | The Daily Star | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/who-were-the-youths-carrying-762mm-rifles-meant-police-rab-3675336> | accessed 12 September 2025.

concerns about whether there was an attempt to suppress the truth.¹⁸¹ The killing of innocent people with such weapons was part of a calculated strategy to blame the Government and fuel public outrage, creating a pretext to overthrow a democratically elected administration.

Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina took immediate steps to address the crisis. She formed a judicial inquiry commission to investigate the killings and destruction of property. She also personally met with the families of victims, promised fair justice, and ensured that the best medical treatment would be provided to the injured.¹⁸² However, after taking power, the Yunus-led interim Government abruptly halted this judicial inquiry and, even more concerning, granted indemnity to perpetrators of violence for acts committed between July 15 and August 8, 2024.¹⁸³ The timing of this indemnity is highly suspicious because it exactly covers the period when the worst violence and killings took place. This strongly suggests that the interim Government was protecting those who carried out targeted killings and destruction, including the use of sniper fire and brutal attacks on police officers. Innocent people and law enforcement personnel were deliberately targeted, with some police officers even being hanged from footbridges, to spread fear and destabilise the country. By stopping the judicial inquiry and granting indemnity, the interim Government effectively blocked accountability and concealed the real perpetrators.

The OHCHR report, however, ignores these crucial facts. It focuses selectively on allegations against the Awami League and law enforcement while failing to acknowledge the broader conspiracy and violence carried out by opposition and extremist groups. The report also fails to mention that Sheikh Hasina's Government had already taken steps to ensure justice through a judicial inquiry, which was later suppressed by the interim Government. By overlooking these key elements, the OHCHR report presents a partial and one-sided narrative that aligns closely with the version promoted by the interim Government.

Unlawful force, including firearms, to suppress the right of peaceful assembly

The OHCHR, throughout its report, applies the standard of “*reasonable grounds to believe*” a legitimate threshold for UN fact-finding missions, but one that falls well short of the evidentiary rigour demanded in judicial proceedings, where findings must meet the higher burden of “*beyond a reasonable doubt.*” This distinction is crucial, particularly in matters involving allegations of unlawful killing and state accountability.

In **paragraph 101** of its findings, OHCHR asserts that no proper autopsy, in line with international forensic standards, was conducted in the case of Abu Sayed. However, this claim is directly contradicted by the existence of a formal post-mortem report prepared at Rangpur Medical College Hospital. That report has since been entered into the public and legal record. This raises a central question: did OHCHR obtain and review the original signed version of the autopsy, including the full chain-of-custody documentation for forensic evidence? If not, how did it conclude that no proper autopsy was conducted? The omission of this key forensic record,

¹⁸¹ Dhaka Tribune, | ‘Jahangir replaces Sakhawat as home adviser’ | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/354978/jahangir-replaces-sakhawat-as-home-adviser> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁸² Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), | ‘News flash update’ | *BSS News* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/200677> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁸³ The Daily Star, | ‘Criminals being given indemnity’ | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/criminals-being-given-indemnity-3728251> | accessed 12 September 2025.

if unintentional, may reflect a critical investigative oversight. If deliberate, it calls the integrity of the entire paragraph into question.

Md. Moniruzzaman, Commissioner of Rangpur Metropolitan Police, declared, "A student has tragically passed away; however, the exact cause of his death is still under investigation." Dr. Yunus Ali, Director of Rangpur Medical College Hospital, confirmed that a student was brought to the hospital already dead. Hriday Ranjan Roy, the head of the surgery department at Rangpur Medical College Hospital, said Abu Sayeed died before being admitted to the surgery ward. *"There were multiple rubber bullet wounds on his body, and blood was flowing from his nose."*¹⁸⁴

Further scrutiny of the autopsy findings reveals significant discrepancies with OHCHR's conclusion. While the report claims that Abu Sayed was deliberately shot by police officers using shotguns loaded with metal pellets, the actual forensic evidence contradicts this assertion. The autopsy documents a large, crushing injury to the posterior of the skull, measuring approximately three by eleven inches, accompanied by heavy external bleeding and blood flow from both nostrils. These injuries are more consistent with blunt-force trauma from a heavy, low-velocity object-such as a stone or brick-than with the pattern of damage typically caused by metallic pellets.

Figure: 13 Abu Sayed sustained a wound in the front-1



Source: Video footage on Jamuna TV, Bangladesh, on file

The attending forensic expert specifically stated that the morphology of the wound did not match the diffuse penetration pattern seen in shotgun pellet injuries. Instead, it indicated a focal impact zone, characteristic of a high-mass object. Supporting this conclusion, the sequence of photographic and video evidence shows Abu Sayed advancing aggressively during clashes, wielding a stick, and engaging in confrontational behaviour. In one clear frame, he is seen raising both arms before collapsing. Notably, he clutches the back of his head and attempts to crouch, demonstrating voluntary motor control. This behaviour is physiologically inconsistent with the

¹⁸⁴ The Daily Star, | 'Student in Rangpur killed during clash between police and protesters' | *The Daily Star* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/student-rangpur-killed-during-clash-between-police-and-protesters-3658216> | accessed 12 September 2025.

kind of immediate incapacitation typically resulting from a shotgun strike. Victims of high-velocity projectiles often exhibit instant loss of consciousness or balance due to concussive force and axonal shearing-symptoms entirely absent in this case.

Figure: 14 Abu Sayed sustained a wound in the front-2



Source: Video footage on Jamuna TV, Bangladesh, on file

Instead, Abu Sayed's post-impact behaviour-such as remaining upright, clutching the wound, partially bearing weight, and slowly collapsing-points toward blunt-force cranial trauma. This is further supported by photo evidence of other protesters who sustained small, round welts on their torsos-injuries consistent with non-lethal rubber bullets, which, while painful, are not typically fatal. None of these injuries resembled the extensive bullet injury seen in Sayed's case.

Additional concerns arise from the internal organ examination in the post-mortem report. The medical examiner found blood clots across multiple areas of the body, with particular trauma noted on the face, head, and legs. The abdominal intestines were ruptured, and the cause of death was attributed to shock from massive blood loss. The report also concluded that these injuries were inflicted intentionally by another party before death. Strikingly, the lungs were found to be congested observation that is not consistent with death by gunshot wounds. This further undermines OHCHR's conclusion that the fatal injury was caused by shotgun fire.

Figure: 15 Abu Sayed sustained grievous hurt to his back



Source: Video footage, on file

Testimonies and witness reports introduce yet more serious allegations. According to multiple sources, after raising both his arms, Abu Sayed was seized by individuals affiliated with the few people and taken to an undisclosed location. It remains unclear how he sustained the extent of injuries found on his body—including a crushed skull, ruptured intestines, and extensive bruising. Reports also suggest that upon arrival at the hospital, he was deliberately denied medical care. It was confirmed by the doctor that he was taken to the hospital hours after the incident happened and was further corroborated by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in her personal interview. Moreover, during the course of the judicial proceedings, Mr Moqbul Hossain, the father of Abu Sayed, delivered a formal statement, attesting that he personally witnessed his son sustaining a severe injury to the posterior region of his head, accompanied by substantial bleeding.¹⁸⁵

These findings point to a coordinated effort not only to inflict harm but to control the narrative surrounding Abu Sayed's death. By framing the incident as a case of lethal police misconduct, political actors sought to inflame public sentiment and legitimise their broader anti-government campaign. The forensic anomalies, post-mortem inconsistencies, obstruction of treatment, and the alleged manipulation of medical documentation all suggest that the killing of Abu Sayed was neither spontaneous nor caused by police fire, but rather a calculated act designed to deceive the public and serve a political agenda.

Finally, when the forensic evidence is taken at face value, OHCHR's findings regarding Abu Sayed's death are not only unsubstantiated but likely inaccurate. The presence of lung congestion, the nature of the cranial injury, the behavioural response after impact, and the interference with medical treatment all point away from the narrative of death by police gunfire. Instead, these indicators support the conclusion that Abu Sayed was struck from behind by a blunt object—most plausibly a rock or brick—during a volatile confrontation in which he was

¹⁸⁵ Ajker Patrika, | 'National news update' | *Ajker Patrika* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.ajkerpatrika.com/national/ajpj70n5bnjil> | accessed 12 September 2025.

actively participating. The attempt to assign responsibility to law enforcement appears inconsistent with both medical science and the documented sequence of events. These discrepancies must be rigorously examined before any claim of extrajudicial killing can be legally or ethically sustained.

Paragraph 102-110

The events of 17–19 July 2024 marked some of the most violent and destructive incidents in recent Bangladeshi history, yet the OHCHR report fails to comprehensively address these critical facts, raising serious questions about the neutrality and thoroughness of its investigation. At Dhaka University, protests against the quota system escalated rapidly into widespread violence. Students and politically affiliated groups began clashing on campus, with over 300 injuries reported in a single day. Protesters burned vehicles and blocked campus roads, spreading unrest to surrounding areas. They attempted to vandalise public buildings, including key Government facilities, prompting police intervention. Law enforcement initially used tear gas to disperse the crowds and safeguard public property, but the disorder intensified as protesters began throwing bricks and other projectiles. On 17 July, protesters had blocked major roads, caused traffic gridlock and extending the violence into adjacent neighbourhoods. Reports confirm that supporters of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami were involved in pre-planned attacks, deliberately targeting public infrastructure to destabilise the situation and create chaos. These crucial facts were either underreported or entirely omitted by OHCHR, casting doubt on the credibility.¹⁸⁶

The violence escalated further, spreading to at least 26 districts nationwide. According to official police reports, approximately 100 policemen were injured in Dhaka alone, while nearly 50 police booths were burned in coordinated arson attacks. Dhaka Metropolitan Police spokesman Faruk Hossain stated publicly that if such destruction continued, the police would be forced to take maximum lawful measures to restore order. Throughout the day, over 104 police officers and 30 journalists were injured, demonstrating that law enforcement, the media, and civilians were all victims of indiscriminate violence. The arson was so extensive that it caused the closure of the Mirpur-10 metro station, while the Mirpur-10 and Kazipara stations were vandalised.¹⁸⁷

Eyewitness accounts and video evidence indicate the involvement of armed civilians and unknown assailants carrying weapons, some of whom were captured on camera in Dhaka. These actors appear to have participated in targeted shootings, including incidents where students were killed by rifle fire, suggesting a level of planning and sophistication inconsistent with spontaneous protest violence. In Rampura and Badda, protesters set fire to the headquarters of Bangladesh Television (BTV), the state broadcaster, and destroyed other strategic Government facilities, including the Setu Bhaban, the central hub for the nation's bridges and road infrastructure. They also attacked a data centre, causing an internet blackout across the country, severely hampering communications and emergency response efforts.

The violence continued into 19 July, when protesters attempted to liberate imprisoned criminals and terrorist group members. Hundreds of attackers stormed the Narsingdi District Jail, setting

¹⁸⁶Reuters, | 'Bangladesh shuts universities and colleges indefinitely after protests turn deadly' | *Reuters* | (Singapore, 17 July 2024) | <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-shuts-universities-colleges-indefinitely-after-protests-turn-deadly-2024-07-17/> / | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁸⁷Le Monde, | 'Protesters set fire to government buildings in Bangladesh' | https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2024/07/19/protesters-set-fire-to-government-buildings-in-bangladesh_6689626_153.html | accessed 12 September 2025.

it ablaze and releasing the entire prison population of 826 inmates, including known members of extremist organisations such as Ansarullah Bangla Team and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). During the raid, the attackers stole 85 firearms and approximately 9,000 rounds of ammunition. Some jail guards fled disguised as prisoners to escape the mob. This deliberate targeting of a correctional facility demonstrates that certain factions within the movement were pursuing clear terrorist objectives.¹⁸⁸

Figure 16: Mir Mugdho's Facebook status, July 18, 2024



Source: Facebook posting of Mir Mu

Translated, close to the original from Bengali to English

Meanwhile, reports confirm that in Uttara, multiple public buses and private vehicles were set on fire, while in other parts of Dhaka, arsonists targeted essential service facilities, including the Mirpur Indoor Stadium, BRTA headquarters, the Department of Disaster Management, the Directorate General of Health Services, and the Dhaka North City Corporation's garbage truck fleet. Even hospitals such as Mohakhali DNCC Hospital were attacked, further endangering public health and safety. The Hanif Flyover toll plaza, a fire service station, and a Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI) office in Banasree were also destroyed. The sheer scale of these attacks

¹⁸⁸Wikipedia, | 'Narsingdi District Jail' | Wikipedia | (Online, last updated 2024) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narsingdi_District_Jail | accessed 12 September 2025.

demonstrates an organised and systematic campaign of destruction, not merely unplanned protest violence.¹⁸⁹

The violence also extended to direct assaults on police personnel. In Rampura and Badda, officers were besieged by protesters and had to be evacuated by helicopter, with 62 police officers rescued from the rooftop of the Canadian University of Bangladesh in Merul Badda. Such extreme measures underscore the intensity of the attacks faced by law enforcement.¹⁹⁰

The assassination of Mir Mugdho on 18 July 2024 provides further evidence of targeted, politically motivated violence. Just days before his death, Mugdho had publicly criticised BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir on social media. He was later killed in Dhaka's Uttara neighbourhood by a single, precise gunshot to the centre of his forehead, consistent with sniper or expert execution techniques, like militants. This suggests that elements within the unrest were pursuing selective assassinations to intimidate critics and eliminate opposition voices.¹⁹¹

Despite the overwhelming evidence of deliberate and organised violence by BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami supporters and terrorist organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir, the OHCHR report does not address these incidents comprehensively. Its failure to highlight the mass destruction of Government property, coordinated attacks on prisons, targeted killings, and armed participation by extremist factions calls into question the report's impartiality. By selectively focusing on allegations against state actors while neglecting the actions of violent non-state groups, OHCHR presents a one-sided narrative that risks undermining both accountability and justice.

The absence of these key facts indicates that OHCHR's investigation was neither free nor fair. An objective investigation would have addressed the full spectrum of violence, including the pre-planned nature of attacks, the targeting of public institutions, and the threat posed by extremist networks. Instead, the report's omissions suggest a politically motivated effort to discredit the Government and security forces while absolving or downplaying the actions of groups responsible for widespread terrorism and destruction.

4. Disproportionate and indiscriminate use of firearms in response to violent unrest

Paragraph 111 of the OHCHR report says that "*unlawful use of force against protesters enraged crowds and fueled a series of revenge attacks...*" This is extremely misleading and a prevarication of the facts and occurrence. The police and security forces used force against protesters after the "*enraged crowds*" targeted mostly police facilities, other Government buildings and modern transport infrastructure. Since day one, the police and security forces maintained restraint. Ample evidence is available in media reports that substantiates the above clarification.

(i) The report fails to acknowledge that in 'all' of the cases, the police and the security force were under attack or people were trapped, and arson attacks by the extreme protestors, which

¹⁸⁹ The Daily Observer, | 'Bangladesh news update' | *The Daily Observer* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.observerbd.com/news.php?id=482040> | accessed 12 September 2025.

¹⁹⁰ Dhaka Tribune, | 'Quota movement: 62 policemen airlifted from CUB' | *Dhaka Tribune* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/352521/quota-movement-62-policemen-airlifted-from-cub> | accessed 13 September 2025.

¹⁹¹ The Business Standard, | 'A life full of promises cut short' | *The Business Standard* | (Dhaka, 2024) | <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/life-full-promises-cut-short-905536> | accessed 13 September 2025.

led to the police use of force. According to CRPC, section 128, ‘...officer in charge of a police station, may proceed to disperse such assembly by force.’¹⁹²

(ii) Moreover, they can use firearms in self-defence and in the defence of others. Please see **paragraph 9**, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.¹⁹³

In response to **paragraph 112**, OHCHR requested information on what directives, orders and operational plans on the use of force, the Bangladesh Police provided “*apparently relevant documents issued during the protest period*” but failed to share their contents. Which, in turn, negatively affects the implementation of key principles related to the fulfilment of international and national obligations on adequate and proportionate investigation.

Paragraph 113 of the report cited statements from former officials without providing any proper source or reference, claiming that security forces were authorised to use firearms (i.e. lethal force) to protect property when less-lethal means were insufficient. However, in practice, the incidents in question involved not only the protection of property but also an imminent risk of death or serious injury. **Paragraph 114** of the report cited that ‘the security forces often fired indiscriminately and extensively at the entire crowd with lethal ammunition, failing to distinguish between peaceful protesters and miscreants.’

(i) This statement is both unrealistic and impractical. In such incidents, where police and the innocent people and property of the state and the individual are under attack by the protesters.

(ii) Moreover, Section 153(c) of the *Bengal Police Regulations* states that ‘...the last resort when it is necessary for the defence of life or property... considers it impossible to disperse a mob by any other means.’ Following this, it can be said that police can use fire to disperse the riot that created an extremely vulnerable situation.¹⁹⁴

(iii) In an interview, Hasib Al Islam, Coordinator of, Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, said, ‘Whether we call this a revolution or a mass uprising, it did not happen in accordance with any constitutional rules or any laws. If we had followed the law, these revolutions would never have taken place. If the metro rail had not been set on fire, if the police had not been attacked, then this revolution would not have been achieved so easily.’¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² *The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898*, [www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/1898_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure_\(Bangladesh\).pdf](http://www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/1898_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure_(Bangladesh).pdf). Accessed 24 Aug. 2025.

¹⁹³ *The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898*, [www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/1898_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure_\(Bangladesh\).pdf](http://www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/1898_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure_(Bangladesh).pdf). Accessed 24 Sept. 2025.

¹⁹⁴ *Police Regulations, Bengal. Chapter 1. Organization.*, www.police.gov.bd/storage/upload/announcement/kFKWb9mIlyg7exUJIWnR3NYmLykT5ZIOJSt5Geaa.pdf. Accessed Aug. 2025.

¹⁹⁵ “এটাই কি আসল সত্য???: একুশ অহংকার একাত্তর চেতনা.” *Facebook*, 2025, www.facebook.com/reel/1003564641878484.

BOX 8: The Home Affairs Minister Asaduzzaman Khan dispelled numerous misunderstandings and corrected the distortions arising from the biased fact-finding report.

In response to whether the Honourable Prime Minister issued instructions to use lethal weapons, the Minister replied that no such instructions were ever given. Police and security forces operate under the CrPC and Police Regulations, which define the circumstances and measures for law enforcement actions, making any additional instructions unnecessary. In a related vein, regarding investigations or disciplinary actions against police officers accused of excessive force, the Minister stated that a judicial inquiry committee was formed, and appropriate decisions were taken by the ministry. Time constraints existed due to the rapid escalation of events, but the Inspector General was instructed to act against officers exceeding their authority.

On the imposition of curfew during the July movement, as disgraced by the fact finding report on **paragraph 162-163** the Minister explained that the movement, initially about the quota issue and later reignited around a High Court verdict, turned violent and involved a planned conspiracy. The curfew, starting from 20 July, was imposed to protect public safety, life, and property, with top law enforcement officials continuously evaluating the situation. It was gradually relaxed, for example from 10 PM to 6 AM.

Regarding the sufficiency of existing laws and SOPs to control police use of force, the Minister noted that the CrPC and Police Act provide a clear hierarchy of force—from verbal warnings and batons to non-lethal and, ultimately, lethal weapons only in self-defence. SOPs provide situational instructions but are not law. In some cases, e.g., Jatrabari, Rampura, Gulshan, and Narayanganj due to attacks on police, destruction of invaluable national property, and looting of weapons, lethal force was necessary. On the source of lethal weapons used or looted, the Minister confirmed that some weapons came from prisons and police stations, while others, including 7.62 mm rifles, were allegedly brought in by organized groups from abroad, particularly Pakistan. Investigations are ongoing.

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

In **paragraph 117** of the OHCHR report, ‘One former senior official related that.... BGB was used as a “*strike force*.” He also narrated, a ‘Core Committee’ meeting was held, and it was asked by the Home Affairs Minister to use lethal force. Moreover, it is not mentioned when

(iv) Therefore, it is evident that the primary intention of the protesters was to attack law enforcement personnel and to destroy state property, hence violent protesters. In these circumstances, the resort to force by the police was both necessary and proportionate.

Paragraphs 115 & 116 fail to provide any such documentary evidence in support of the argument, thus lack the weight of the statements.

In **paragraph 117** of the OHCHR report, ‘One former senior official related that.... BGB was used as a “*strike force*.” He also narrated, a ‘Core Committee’ meeting was held, and it was asked by the Home Affairs Minister to use lethal force. Moreover, it is not mentioned when the senior official retired.

(i) It is highly improbable that a former senior official would have been permitted access to such confidential meetings; this casts serious doubt not only on the credibility of the individual's account but also on whether such meetings occurred at all.

According to the unidentified former senior official, the Prime Minister instructed that the troublemaker be eliminated, and the bodies concealed. Again, the same doubt arises, which follows above in 117 (i) of these documents.

(ii) In an interview given to the Legal Team of the Bangladesh Awami League, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, categorically denied having made the alleged statement, clarifying instead that her position was to permit the students to protest. She affirmed that she had already expressed solidarity with the students and that her government likewise opposed the quota system. She also mentions that coming into power in 1996, she positively handled the BNP's rally. Following the filing of a writ petition, the protests began; thereafter, her government formally appealed for the complete abolition of the quota. The Prime Minister further stated in the interview that she had issued instructions to ensure the safety and protection of the students the interview, she ordered the safety of the students.

(iii) When the situation escalated from a quota-related protest to an attempt at overthrowing the Government, it is reasonable to infer that external influence was at play. This inference was subsequently corroborated by a public statement from a Jamaat leader.

(iv) Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher, Naib Ameer, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, in an interview given to BBC Bangla: *"We were very conscious that this was not to be revealed as a movement of Jamaat-Shibir. We wanted it to be given a universal form. If it were revealed that Jamaat-e-Islami played a key role behind this through Chhatra Shibir, then a reservation would have been created among those who do not like Jamaat-e-Islami very much. So, we took a strategy to ensure the participation of all classes of people."* BNP's Secretary General, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, also admitted their involvement during the unrest protest.

However, Nahid Islam disagreed with that, but on the other hand, Sadiq Qayyum, president of Islami Chhatra Shibir, said, "Nahid Mahfuz knew since 2022 that I was organising the camp. They sought the help of our organisation. They did not come to Sadiq Qayyum personally; they sought help from the president of the camp."¹⁹⁶

In **Paragraph 118**, *'the rapid developments on the ground...'* However, as confirmed through email correspondence of former A. IGP, the report fails to acknowledge the mass killing of police, arson attacks and the inhumane killing of Chatro League, it gives rise to a reasonable inference of bias; thereby undermining the report's credibility.

In **Paragraph 119**, OHCHR relied on an official report provided by BGB. The BGB was instructed to *'use maximum force'* against the protesters. On the other hand, in **paragraph 120**, the report cannot rely on BGB's statement *'... its troops only to use force in extreme cases of life-threatening situations and that its BGB troops had only fired warning shots, causing no casualties.'*

¹⁹⁶ "Intense Debate Over Leadership of July Movement: Jamaat's Nayeb-e-Ameer Claims, 'We Were the Main Driving Force.'" 31 July 2025, <https://en.bddigest.com/intense-debate-over-leadership-of-july-movement-jamaats-nayeb-e-ameer-claims-we-were-the-main-driving-force/>. Accessed Aug. 2025.

(i) A clear inconsistency arises in the report. In **paragraph 119**, OHCHR relies on BGB's statement, and in **paragraph 120**, the report expressly refuses to rely on BGB's statement. This selective reliance on sources is inconsistent with the report's own findings, which raises serious issues with impartiality and methodological integrity.

Case 4 'BGB and Police indiscriminately shooting in Rampura and Badda' mentioned in the OHCHR report on page 28:

(i) OHCHR in this section of the report relied on the BGB's report, and that report remarks about 15,000 to 20,000 'aggressive' protesters.

(ii) The protestors attacked the Bangladesh TV office, and, in a video, interview taken by Doinik Janakantha, one of the leaders of the extreme protesters, confirms the attack on BTV. He narrated, 'BTV, which is the Government's mouthpiece, did you attack it back then? I was myself at that BTV building, coming from my residence in Banasree. On that day, BNP, Jamaat, Shibir, students, and the public were all there. The day our metro rail was attacked, did you carry that out alone? When the Narsingdi prison was attacked, did you do that alone? Everyone participated there as well.'¹⁹⁷

(iii) Following the above Case 4 (ii) of this document, in his statement, he clearly admits that they have the aggression and the determination to attack the state's valuable properties.

(iv) He further confirms in his interview that it was a plan for the downfall of an elected Government, "*These three incidents, among them the prison attack, were signs of an extreme downfall. When Bangladesh Television, the Government's mouthpiece, was attacked, it had to be assumed that the Government would soon collapse. And when infrastructure such as our metro rail, which is undoubtedly a good infrastructure project, was attacked, one could be certain that this Government would not survive. At that time, these were the results of our collective movement*".

(v) Following the above Case 4 (iii) of this document, in these extreme circumstances, the security agencies will take necessary and proportionate measures, according to the law and the legal obligation and the duty of the security force for the protection of themselves, people and property. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC) Sections 127-130.¹⁹⁸

(vi) Following further in this Case Study, OHCHR indicates, "*Numerous witness accounts, medical information, ammunition impact analysis and photos obtained... BGB and Bangladesh Police shot lethal ammunition with rifles and shotguns directly at crowds protesting...*" Following in the next paragraph, one victim was hit by a rifle bullet in the foot, '*...struck in the foot by a rifle bullet...*'

It is reasonably inferred that if police officers discharge their firearms at the crowd, the bullets are unlikely to hit the lower parts of the body. Rather, it is highly probable that they will strike

¹⁹⁷ "Supporters of Bangladesh Awami League: মঠবাড়িয়া উপজেলা বিএনপির নেতা মনির মাতব্বর ইকুর স্বীকার..." Facebook, www.facebook.com/groups/awamileague.1949group/posts/1681484352419183. Accessed June 2025.

¹⁹⁸ *The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898: (Act No. V of 1898)*, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs Division, 2017, pp. 48-49.

somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, the report indicates that his medical report indicates “soft tissue injury”. Notwithstanding, all the statements are inconsistent and ought to have been subjected to cross-examination.

The report also mentions while a man was, ‘...a young man was walking in Rampura when he encountered police and BGB units blocking access to the road. Avoiding confrontation, he entered a construction site...’ it also states, ‘According to testimony, the officers shouted at the man to “jump,”’. The question arises, when the police were there on the rooftop, the people were shouting to which made it easier to find him. Moreover, people were shouting in this situation; how was it possible to hear the police officers asking him to jump? More in-depth investigation is needed in this matter.

The Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, formed a Three-Judge Commission to investigate the violence and casualties. Later, three more Judges joined the commission. Moreover, PM asked the UN to investigate the matter.¹⁹⁹

However, the report overlooks that when the radical extremists were attempting to attack them, Chhatra League activists fled to the rooftop of a building to save their lives. The extremists broke into the building with the intent to kill them. As the fans tried to flee by hanging from railings, windows and surge pipes, the hooligans repeatedly hit them, forcing them to jump and subjecting themselves to a significant risk of death or grievous bodily harm.

Case 5 ‘Violent clearance of the Dhaka-Chattogram Highway in Jatrabari’ mentioned in the OHCHR report on page 31:

Although the OHCHR report mentions only two killings by the police and hung his body was hung on the Rayerbag bridge. The killing was carried out jointly by Jamaat and BNP-Chhatra Dol. They were identified as police officers, Nayek Gias Uddin and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Mohammad Moktadir were brutally beaten to death. Moreover, omits considering the looting of police stations in Jatrabari and all over the country at different times. The report also didn’t mention the arson attack by the violent protesters. The police were stuck inside the police station. Some were seeking help from the rooftop. As a human, all police officers also deserve the right to life.

Figure 17: Police officers beaten to death and hanged from the foot overbridge



Source: Media photo, on file

¹⁹⁹ ‘Prime Minister seeks UN assistance in investigating recent incidents of conflict’ *Prothom Alo* (Dhaka, 1 August 2024) <<https://www.prothomalo.com/politics/jt6drkiit8>> accessed 18 September 2025

(i) The attacked police stations were listed in the message. In the capital, Dhaka, the Jatrabari and Khilgaon police stations were mentioned. Outside Dhaka, the Gorai Highway Police Station in Tangail, Bogura Sadar Police Station, Dupchanchia, Sherpur, Narail Police Outpost, Joypurhat Sadar Police Station, Comilla's Elliotganj Highway Police Station, Rangpur's Gangachara, Mithapukur, Pirgacha, Pirganj, and Badarganj Police Stations, Brahmanbaria Sadar and Ashuganj Police Stations, Sirajganj's Enayetpur, Ullapara and Shahjadpur Police Stations, Dinajpur Sadar Police Station, and Madhabpur Outpost in Habiganj were affected. Other establishments attacked include the Range DIG's office in Mymensingh and the SP offices in Narayanganj, Bogura, Pabna, and Sirajganj.²⁰⁰

(ii) According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1), “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Immediately following that, Article 6(2), “In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.”²⁰¹

(iii) Even in a situation of Genocide, the death penalty will only be enforced by a Final Judgement rendered by a Competent Court. Therefore, the killing of the Police officers by arson attack, and other types of attack, can never be justified. However, this report completely omits the mass killing of the police officers and, arson attack at the police station.

(iv) As mentioned in Case 5 (i) of this document, the loot of the police firearms, which was confirmed by the email correspondence of the Former Additional IGP & Police Commissioner dated 22 February 2025, “460 Police Stations looted and set on fire, 5,749 firearms and 651,609 rounds of ammunition stolen, over 1,000 public and private vehicles burned”. It is further noted that the Home Affairs Advisor, Lieutenant General (Rtd.) Jahangir Alam Chowdhury officially announced a monetary reward for any person who aids in the recovery of looted arms and ammunition. The looting of the weapons and efforts to return them were equally acknowledged. It has been widely reported by the official media and can be heard on the videotape, where she is appealing to the citizens to help return the looted property. Regrettably, this report neglects to address these facts, thereby overlooking critical aspects of the events in question.²⁰²

(v) The report also indicated that, on 20 July, during the highway’s clearance, a police officer shot him in the chest as he was retreating. However, if the video footage is closely observed, then it will be seen that the police officer, although shot but didn’t shoot him in the chest; he shot him somewhere near him on the road. If observed more closely at 0.25x speed, then it can be seen that the dust particles are being stirred up. Also, no blood on the hands of the person holding him from behind, no blood on the road. Surprisingly, the person who’s on the back

²⁰⁰ Senior Correspondent. “Attacks on 26 Police Establishments Including 19 Police Stations.” 4 Aug. 2024, <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/d4ec7ad2676d>. Accessed Dec. 2024. Also corroborated by email correspondence from former Additional IGP, interview record on file.

²⁰¹ Senior Correspondent. “Attacks on 26 Police Establishments Including 19 Police Stations.” 4 Aug. 2024, <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/d4ec7ad2676d>. Accessed Dec. 2024

²⁰² *Rewards Announced for Information on Looted Weapons*, <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/government/jkgqfshzj3?> Accessed Aug. 2025

wearing a blue T-shirt is unharmed. As per the report, if the police shot him in the chest and the way the Blue T-shirt person is holding him, at least he would have been injured in his hands, but the video clearly shows that this person is unharmed.



(vi) It is also mentioned that a police officer is briefing the Home Affairs Minister on what had happened and was showing him a video; the Home Affairs Minister remains silent. As a Home Affairs Minister, he has the obligation by his duty to visit the places and what has happened there and take necessary actions regarding the incident. It was also mentioned that the Prime Minister was informed. The question doesn't arise why the Prime Minister was being informed, but the question would arise as to what initiatives were taken by the Prime Minister after any vulnerable situation took place. Please see above Case 4 (ix) of this document.

5. Unlawful force in the final stages of the protests

OHCHR report in **paragraph 122** stated, “When protests reignited in early August, police and other security forces once again used unlawful force to disperse them, increasingly resorting to the use of firearms.” [Rangpur]. It is a completely lopsided statement. Given that no peaceful protest was taking place in any city, but rather violent and aggressive attacks. Accordingly, the police and other security forces were obliged to intervene within the bounds of the law. Coupled with this, in this **paragraph**, it was also mentioned that DB Police ‘warned’ them. According to Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 10, “In the circumstances provided for under principle 9, law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms...”

In paragraph 123, there is no mention of the killing of Police Officers, Awami League activists:

(i) According to Former IGP email correspondence dated 22 February 2025, the report “Ignores 187 missing police officers, 607 severely injured, and at least 44 confirmed police deaths (possibly more). Does not acknowledge the violent deaths of hundreds of Awami League activists.”. He also mentioned the brutal killing of a pregnant police officer, “Pregnant female police officer brutally murdered along with 14 colleagues at Enayetpur police station, Shirajganj, Bangladesh.”, which the report fails to provide. 203

(ii) According to the primary death list of the Bangladesh Awami League's activists during July to October is 372 were killed, of here 22 were killed in July, in August, 318 in September, and 11 in October. Of these, 50 people were beaten, 23 were shot, 228 were hacked, and 52

²⁰³ 13 Policemen Beaten to Death in Attack on Police Station in Sirajganj, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/353681/13-policemen-beaten-to-death-in-attack-on-police>. Accessed Oct. 2024

were killed by hacking and other methods. Yet the unlawful Yunus Government has granted indemnity. The unlawful grant of indemnity by the Yunus administration which effectively shields those allegedly responsible for the summary beating, shooting and hacking to death of hundreds of Awami League activists is a manifest denial of justice and a flagrant violation of both domestic constitutional guarantees and Bangladesh's obligations under international human-rights law; the indemnity is ultra vires and must be set aside, an impartial, independent criminal inquiry instituted immediately, the perpetrators prosecuted without exception, and full reparations and truth-seeking measures provided to the victims' families.

Case 6 'Extrajudicial killings to suppress the "March on Dhaka" mentioned in the OHCHR report on page 33:

(i) Advisor Mahfuz Alam, in one of his interviews, confirms that it was not a student protest against quota, he stated, 'A regime change has taken place here, a regime change operation has occurred. Two thousand people did not become martyrs here; it was just a conspiracy, and Hasina was overthrown'. The Chief Advisor of this interim Government in the Clinton Global Initiative interview stated, 'It's an amazing, meticulously designed thing, it's not just suddenly came, it's not like that, very well designed, even the leadership pattern that people don't know who the leaders... the guys, let's give them a big applause.' Although later he denied his own statement.

(ii) It may therefore be concluded that the events surrounding the Quota Protests bore the characteristics of a covert attempt at regime change against an elected democratic Government. As indicated above, on 5 August, there were signs of potential unlawful activities. In such circumstances, law enforcement and security forces are obligated to take all necessary measures to protect the state and public property, consistent with their sworn duty to safeguard the nation. Furthermore, under prevailing law, the Government possesses the authority to impose curfews and take other requisite measures to restore and maintain public order during periods of civil unrest. **Paragraph 117** (iv) & Case 6 (i) of this document.

(iii) This part of the report fails to acknowledge the arson attack on the Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre by the extreme protesters. 204

(iv) It also missed the attack on the minority's houses and businesses, just because they supported the Awami League during the election, which started from 5 August 2024. In a news report by Prothom Alo, 'Communal violence: 1068 houses and business establishments attacked', "The attacks basically began from the afternoon of 5 August. There were more attacks on the first two days. Prothom Alo correspondents carried out investigations from 5 to 20 August and found evidence of at least 1,068 houses and business establishments of the minority community being damaged. Outside of that, 22 houses of worship came under attack. Most of the attacks took place in the country's south-western division, Khulna. At least 295 homes and business establishments of the minority community were destroyed in the division. Also, 219 houses and business establishments were destroyed in Rangpur, 183 in Mymensingh,

²⁰⁴ " Video Footage Reveals Destruction at Dhaka's Indira Gandhi Cultural Center Following Recent Turmoil. Images Show Aftermath of Vandalism and Fire Damage from August 5th Upheaval in Bangladesh's Capital. #DhakaUnrest #culturalcenterattack #bangladeshturmoil #publicpropertydamage #civildisorder: Et Now." *Facebook*, www.facebook.com/etnow/videos/video-footage-reveals-destruction-at-dhakas-indra-gandhi-cultural-center-follow/1280586733312176/. Accessed July 2025.

155 in Rajshahi, 79 in Dhaka, 68 in Barishal, 45 in Chattogram and 25 in Sylhet. In some places, the damage to buildings was extensive, in some places less.” 205

(v) The crowd also breaks the sculptures of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, all over the country. Damaging Gonobhaban, the state-designated residence of the elected Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s personal residence is at Dhanmondi 5. The residence of the elected Member of Parliament and personal residences.

(vi) Furthermore, the video footage from Ashulia, cited as reference, does not clearly depict any individual throwing an object into the police van; rather, it only shows the van already burning. Moreover, there is no audible evidence of screaming or distress emanating from the van. Accordingly, such footage cannot be regarded as competent evidence. Further investigation is needed in this area.

(vii) The report failed to mention the inhumane killing of the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Special Branch (SB), Dhaka District, Mr. Rafiqul Islam, in front of Bypail Mosque, Ashulia, on 5th August 2024. Later on 19 August, it was confirmed by a Desk Report of Desh Rupantor Newspaper. It was also mentioned in the report that, according to the list sent from the police headquarters, the highest number of deaths of Police officers occurred on 5 August 2024. 206

(viii) Shohag Gazi, identified as a jihadist element within the group, who comes from Gosairhat in Shariatpur and now lives in Jurain, Dhaka, works at the Igloo Ice Cream and Milk Unit of Abdul Monem Group in Shyampur. On 5 August 2024, he played a leading role in the violent attack on Jatrabari Police Station. Under his direction, the attackers set fires, killed police officers, and looted firearms and ammunition. These actions amount to some of the most serious crimes under Bangladesh law. 207



(ix) METICULOUSLY DESIGNED!!!

On 4 August, how did Nahid Islam already know that on 5 August, a democratic Government would have to step down? Even before the fall of the Government, he had already decided upon the next head of Government. A secret video of a television interview, recorded before 5 August, proves this point.

²⁰⁵ *Communal Violence: 1068 Houses and Business Establishments Attacked*, <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/97chuvmupe>. Accessed Sept. 2024.

²⁰⁶ প্রাণ হারিয়েছেন ৪৪ পুলিশ সদস্য (44 police officers were killed), <https://www.deshrupantor.com/529932/প্রাণ-হারিয়েছেন-৪৪-পুলিশ-সদস্য>. Accessed Aug. 2024.

²⁰⁷ আসিফ হায়দার, *Facebook*,

In that interview, it was further stated how their unconstitutional interim Government would be formed, with the help of the President. The video shows the conversation involving former adviser Nahid Islam, the proposed interim Government, Asif Mohammad Sajib Bhuiya (Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and IT), and Youth & Sports Ministry representatives.²⁰⁸

In addition, Abdun Noor Tushar (Managing Director of Goti Media Limited, former CEO of Nagorik TV, and former President of the Bangladesh Debate Federation) described the same in one of his TV interviews. Until 4 August, their movement had not succeeded, which means the so-called movement to overthrow the Government had not yet achieved its objective. Then why did he choose Dr. Yunus? He claimed it was the people's choice, but nowhere do we find any referendum being held. One could argue that in such a situation someone was needed to stabilise matters. However, it appears that certain so-called student leaders had already projected and incorporated this into their meticulous plan. This reference to a meticulous plan was not given by the Awami League but rather by Dr. Yunus himself, during his speech at the Clinton Foundation. He stated:

*'...amazingly meticulously designed things it's not just, suddenly came it's not like that,...very well design even the leadership people don't know where the leaders, so you can't catch one and say it's over, it's not over so ... when they speak the language is something inspire any young person any person anywhere in the world...'*¹

That does not clearly indicate that the entire movement of July–August was part of a meticulous plan. A plan under which killings of ordinary people, killings of police officers, killings of Awami League activists, killings of minorities, vandalism and arson of homes, destruction of Gono Bhaban, looting, attacks and looting of police stations, setting fire to the Metro Rail, vandalism of BTV, attacks on prisons, and the release of prisoners were all orchestrated? It can be reasonably argued that all these incidents were part of the same meticulous plan, with the ultimate objective of overthrowing a democratically elected Government. This point was also acknowledged by former adviser Mahfuz in a TV interview.

Dr. Yunus granted indemnity to all those involved in the July–August events.²⁰⁹ But why was such indemnity given? Why should those who committed crimes not be held accountable? While Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remained, she upheld justice. Whenever allegations arose that the police had used excessive force, she immediately formed commissions composed of justices to investigate. The intent was to identify wrongdoing and bring those responsible under the purview of law so that punishment could follow if guilt was established. Nowhere did she grant indemnity.

Even if everything else is set aside, the Metro Rail is state property, as are the bridges, Government buildings, Gono Bhaban, the MP hostels, and the police stations. These are all assets of the State. When these were vandalised and set on fire, at the very least, an investigation should have been conducted. But no investigation was initiated; instead, indemnity was given, and all these acknowledged crimes were excluded from the scope of justice.

²⁰⁸ 'নাহিদ কিভাবে জানতো ৫ তারিখে সরকারের পতন হবে?: আব্দুন নূর তুষার: Global TV Bangladesh' Facebook, www.facebook.com/Globaltvbd/videos/1139320804928781/?vh=e&fs=e&mibextid=wwXlfr&rdid=zV9EGGx22sYf13Sd. Accessed 16 September 2025; see also, 'Yunus Introduced Mahfuz Abdullah as the Mastermind behind Hasina's Ouster.' X (Formerly Twitter), <x.com/PREMIUMERZA/status/1838812403297063324?ref_src> Accessed 20 September 2025

²⁰⁹ "Dr Yunus Imposed Indemnity to Save the Terrorists Who Killed Off-Duty Police Officers, Attacked Police Stations - Barrister Tania Amir #bangladesh #bangladeshcrisis: Bangladesh Awami League." Facebook, www.facebook.com/awamileague.1949/videos/dr-yunus-imposed-indemnity-to-save-the-terrorists-who-killed-off-duty-police-off/3693901240914810/. Accessed 2025.

The most unfortunate part is that in the OHCHR report, none of these matters were even mentioned. What is highlighted instead is the interpretation of “proportionate force” being treated as “excessive force.” Nowhere was there any mention or inquiry into the meticulous plan. According to the principles of fact-finding inquiries, transparency must be ensured. Then why was Dr. Yunus not asked again why he spoke about a meticulous plan, or why indemnity was granted? This led to the conclusion that the indemnity was given to the so-called students, jihadists, extremists (i.e. to Jamaat and BNP), who were themselves part of the meticulous plan. Nevertheless, OHCHR should have questioned both parties while preparing the report.

Moreover, nowhere in the report do we see any interviews with the Awami League Activists or with the police officers against whom allegations were made, to hear their version and thereby provide a balanced assessment. A full reading of the report naturally raises such questions in the minds of ordinary people. Furthermore, some members of Jamaat–Shibir themselves have claimed that they assisted in preparing this report. Then, should it not be asked if those whose names were under question were themselves providing answers, whether they would not naturally try to protect themselves?

Following **paragraphs 124–126**, it is evident that from 5 August onwards, countless Awami League activists, supporters, as well as members of the Police and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), came under systematic attack across the country; in that instance, the security officials, in self-defence, could fire. Incidents included the burning of houses, the arson of police and BGB vehicles, the destruction of the Prime Minister’s official residence, and the unlawful seizure of property therein, comprising both personal belongings of the Prime Minister and assets belonging to the State. Furthermore, the crowd forcibly entered the Prime Minister’s office to perpetrate acts of devastation. The omission of these grave incidents from the report amounts to a serious deficiency, thereby undermining its completeness and impartiality.

6. Involvement of the Army in the use of force violations

The OHCHR Report in **paragraph 127** writes, “OHCHR did not receive either requested written information from or requested meetings with the Army.” It is a matter of concern that, during the tenure of the interim Government, the Army refrained from disclosing any information regarding its involvement. This constitutes a deliberate act of non-cooperation that obstructs the progress of the investigation. This non-cooperation appears to be suspicious.

Paragraph 129 of the OHCHR report states, “on 20 July, around mid-day, police tried to push back a crowd of protesters in Mohammadpur, who responded by throwing bricks.” Hereafter, quoted that “without an apparent imminent risk to life, a group of Army soldiers armed with assault rifles assumed firing position.” These statements are evidently inconsistent. Given that the crowd was not participating in a peaceful protest, the efforts of the police and army to disperse them cannot be deemed unlawful.

The OHCHR report **paragraph 130** again acknowledges that near Rampura Bazar, the soldiers ordered protesters by loudspeaker to “evacuate the area,” threatening that they “will take action” if the protesters do not comply.” The report, however, as a whole conveys that lethal force was used indiscriminately by the police and other security forces. In this context, it was also stated that the soldiers threatened individuals to evacuate; however, such wording is misapplied, as the circumstances indicate that the act should more appropriately be characterised as a **‘warning.’** This interpretation is further supported by the subsequent


confirmation within the same **paragraph** that the soldiers fired warning shots. Nevertheless, the aforementioned statement does not substantiate this claim.

The Report mentioned **paragraph 131** that “on the morning of 5 August ... In some places, Army units also separated protesters and police to calm the situation and contain violence. In front of Jamuna Future Park, however, Army units fired at protesters with lethal ammunition and an apparent intent to kill.” The above illustrates two statements that are contradictory and were made simultaneously. The evidence does not clearly indicate an intent to kill the protesters in this case.

Case 7 ‘Army Shooting at Protesters at Jamuna Future Park’ mentioned in the OHCHR report on page 37:

(i) For the use of force, **this report would refer to the above paragraph 114 (ii) & Case 4 (v) of this document.**

(ii) Upon review of the referenced video at 0.25x speed, several material inconsistencies arise. First, the Army personnel are seen firing while positioned backwards and aiming upwards, not directly at the crowd. Second, although the report alleges the victim was shot in the head, the footage shows the victim was located behind the retreating crowd, raising the question of how he sustained the injury while those at the front line remained unharmed. Third, the video depicts a significant amount of blood appearing within 2–3 seconds of the gunfire, and the colour of the blood is questionable, which is physiologically questionable. Finally, if the victim had been facing the Army as alleged, the entry wound would be expected on the forehead with a corresponding trajectory and fall pattern, which is inconsistent with what is observed. A careful review of the footage reveals no indication that the victim sustained a gunshot wound to the forehead. These discrepancies cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the report’s conclusion.





(iii) A recurring pattern is observed in the video evidence, consistent with the footage noted in paragraph 10(v) above: when a shot is fired, the camera angle is altered, either shifted to a different position or adjusted slightly lower. A deep investigation should have been conducted in this case study as well.

(iv) Moreover, the protesters were heard chanting in favour of a military Government, even though a democratic Government is, or ought to be, in control. By doing so, they effectively demonstrated themselves to be supporters of an anti-democratic cause. Furthermore, the Army was not engaged in beating or assaulting anyone; rather, they were merely creating a show of force intended to instil deterrence and thereby disperse the mob.

(v) **7.62 Sniper Bullet**

It is a matter of grave concern that on 11 August 2024, Adviser on Home Affairs, Brigadier General (Retd.) Shakhawat Hossain, while discharging his duties, visited injured members of the Ansar and Police at the hospital. Following his visit, he addressed the press and disclosed a critical fact: the discovery of **7.62 mm sniper rifle bullets** in the bodies of innocent protestors. He further clarified that the Bangladesh Police do not use such rifles, nor are they trained or equipped with such ammunition. He emphasised that only specially trained personnel could operate such weapons, and therefore, **a proper, independent investigation was imperative.**

Despite the seriousness of these revelations, the official reports failed to mention any of his statements. Instead, on 15 August 2024, merely four days after making this disclosure, Mr. Hossain was summarily removed from his position as Home Affairs Adviser and reassigned to an entirely unrelated ministry, the **Textiles and Jute** Ministry, far removed from his professional expertise. His removal coincided with the appointment of another retired army officer, a Retired Lt. General Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, to his former post.²¹⁰

This sequence of events raises pressing legal and moral questions: Why was Brigadier General Hossain dismissed immediately after making a statement that pointed towards the possible involvement of actors outside the police? **Why was his disclosure, directly relevant to the truth of events and the safety of citizens, suppressed in official reports?**

²¹⁰ Lt Gen Jahangir New Home Affairs Adviser, Brig Gen Sakhawat given Charge of Textiles and Jute Ministry, <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/lt-gen-jahangir-new-home-affairs-adviser-brig-gen-sakhawat-given-charge-textiles-and-jute>. Accessed Aug. 2024.

The deliberate omission of Mr. Hossain’s statement from the official record, coupled with his removal, cannot be reconciled with the principles of transparency, accountability, and impartiality that a government report is bound to uphold. Instead, it suggests a calculated attempt to **divert blame onto the police while concealing the use of specialised military-grade weaponry against unarmed protestors.**

Accordingly, this matter demands urgent judicial and public scrutiny. The integrity of the report is fundamentally compromised, and its impartiality stands gravely in question.

It is on record that in a 2025 conference, Adviser Brigadier General (Retd.) Shakhawat Hossain disclosed facts of the most alarming nature. He categorically stated that students were shot directly in the forehead, not as an isolated instance, but in several cases. Such precision shooting cannot be dismissed as accidental; it bears every hallmark of deliberate targeting.

Furthermore, Mr. Hossain testified that on **4 August 2024**, while he and colleagues were present near Shaheen College, he received a phone call warning him to move immediately, as he had come “within the range of the sniper.” The legal and moral implications of this disclosure are staggering.

Who made that phone call? Who possessed such intimate knowledge of the deployment of snipers in a civilian area? What were snipers, military-grade sharpshooters, doing positioned near a college campus during a time of civil protest?

The interim Government’s silence on these questions, and the studied omission of these revelations from official reports, is nothing short of a calculated cover-up. Instead of addressing these grave allegations, Mr. Hossain was stripped of his Home Affairs portfolio and reassigned, a move clearly designed to silence him and to protect those truly responsible.

This cannot be reconciled with the principles of transparency, accountability, and justice to which any lawful authority must adhere. The evidence suggests not negligence, but a deliberate attempt to weaponised state power against unarmed civilians, to suppress truth, and to obstruct justice.

Accordingly, this matter demands nothing less than an independent judicial inquiry. Until such questions are answered, who called, who deployed, and under whose orders snipers aimed at students’ foreheads, the integrity of the Government’s account remains fatally compromised.²¹¹

It is on record that Nasir Aka Shubho Afridi, a dismissed officer of the Bangladesh Army, publicly admitted in his own statement that he considered the Awami League his enemy and actively engaged in operations against it. His admission alone establishes clear evidence of personal vendetta and bias.²¹²

Furthermore, in the same video statement, he confirmed possession of a sniper rifle and explicitly acknowledged his awareness that the killing of innocent civilians would create pressure on the Awami League, thereby facilitating the overthrow of a democratic party. Such

²¹¹ “Sniper রাইফেল বাংলাদেশ পুলিশের নিকট নাই।.” *Facebook*, www.facebook.com/reel/2246399155801762. Accessed 2025.

²¹² Awami League Was Our Enemy, www.facebook.com/sohag.khan.7906/videos/3472844006181377/.

an admission points not only to criminal intent but also to a deliberate political strategy to destabilise a duly elected Government.

Yet, despite the gravity of these admissions, the official investigative report fails entirely to question, examine, or hold him accountable for these statements. No inquiry was undertaken to understand the extent of his involvement, his motives, or the chain of command that enabled these actions.

This glaring omission raises serious questions about the integrity, impartiality, and transparency of the investigation. The failure to scrutinise statements made by a confessed operative, while simultaneously scrutinising others less directly involved, constitutes obvious bias and deliberate obfuscation of the truth.

In a matter involving the targeting of civilians and the attempted destabilisation of a democratic Government, such omissions are unacceptable. The investigative process, as documented, cannot be regarded as impartial or credible, and it demands urgent review and accountability to uphold justice, transparency, and the rule of law.

The Report explains in **paragraph 132** that Army units provided a protective presence for other security forces, allowing those to shoot and kill protesters. This is an entirely speculative assertion and lacks any foundation.

The OHCHR observed in **paragraph 133** several cases in which Army personnel did not take measures to safeguard protesters when police committed violations involving the use of force. In practical terms, this auxiliary role was especially pronounced in the joint operation of the Army, Police, RAB, and BGB to clear the Dhaka–Chattogram highway near Jatrabari. Media evidence confirms that, at the time, the Jatrabari area was highly volatile due to violent protests. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect the army to safeguard a hostile crowd that was predominantly targeting police facilities.

Following **paragraph 135**, by not providing the written information requested by OHCHR regarding the involvement of the armed forces, couldn't it be concluded as its intention to conceal the truth?

The following **paragraph 137** of the report confirmed that the Bangladesh Army was warned it could be excluded from peacekeeping missions over human rights violations, a warning also communicated to Bangladeshi authorities during the protests.

(i) Volker Türk admitted to the warning to the BBC on 4 March 2025. The 'UN commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions', published Tuesday, 14 June 2022 by Sarah Tudor, give a clear indication of how the commission of enquiry would operate and the core principles of it, and they are: Do no Harm, Independence, Impartiality, Transparency, Objectivity, Confidentiality, Credibility, Visibility, Integrity, Professionalism, Consistency. By interfering in Bangladesh's domestic matters clearly a breach of the core principles. Furthermore, Charter of the United Nations, article 2(7) states, 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic

jurisdiction of any state....’ Therefore, Mr. Türk is in breach of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the UN.²¹³

(ii) In any situation where there is a threat to peace or an act of aggression, it is the duty of the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat, Section 39 of the Charter of the UN. Further, Mr. Türk exercised beyond his statutory duty.²¹⁴

Nevertheless, it represents unethical interference in Bangladesh’s domestic matters. Given that the Bangladesh Army’s engagement in dispersing and intimidating protesters took place in accordance with the legal framework. The UN warning constitutes an undue threat intended to weaken the Army’s legitimate role and to unfairly align with the protesters.

7. Use of helicopters to intimidate and deploy possibly unlawful force

Paragraph 138 states that helicopters were used to *"intimidate protesters and deploy force against them."* This characterisation is misleading and fails to acknowledge the legitimate operational requirements during extreme civil unrest.

(i) The deployment of helicopters for crowd control and surveillance is a standard law enforcement practice globally, particularly during large-scale riots and violent disturbances. The use of aerial platforms for situational awareness and crowd dispersal is recognised under international policing standards.²¹⁵

(ii) The report fails to acknowledge that helicopter deployment was necessitated by the scale and intensity of the violent protests, where ground-based security forces were under direct attack and required aerial support for operational effectiveness and officer safety.

Paragraph 139 documents the use of tear gas and sound grenades from helicopters across multiple locations. However, the report characterises this as unlawful without proper legal analysis.

(i) The deployment of non-lethal crowd control measures from helicopters, including tear gas and sound grenades, falls within established parameters of riot control when ground-based deployment is not feasible or safe.

(ii) According to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 2, as prepared by OHCHR themselves, states that ‘Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms.’²¹⁶

²¹³ “Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations, United Nations, legal.un.org/repertory/art2_7.shtml. Accessed 2025 & “The Interview - Volker Türk: Are We Sleepwalking into a Dystopian Future? - BBC Sounds.” BBC News, BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct5t5j.

²¹⁴ “Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations, United Nations, legal.un.org/repertory/art39.shtml. Accessed 2025.

²¹⁵ Corporate Bell Helicopter P O Box 482. ‘NCJRS Virtual Library.’ *Bell Helicopters in the Police Role - Defending the Principles of Law and Order* | Office of Justice Programs, www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/bell-helicopters-police-role-defending-principles-law-and-order. Accessed June 2025

²¹⁶ *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials* | OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement. Accessed July 2025.

Paragraph 140 contains unsubstantiated allegations of firearms being discharged from helicopters based solely on witness testimony, without corroborating evidence.

(i) The report acknowledges in **paragraph 143** that *"OHCHR has not been able to obtain any videos clearly showing shooting from rifles or shotguns from helicopters,"* which fundamentally undermines the credibility of these allegations.

(ii) The timing of these alleged incidents coincided with complete internet shutdowns, making independent verification impossible. This creates a significant evidentiary gap that should preclude definitive conclusions.

Paragraph 141 makes a blanket assertion that *"shooting firearms from a helicopter at crowds of protesters is inherently indiscriminate and therefore in violation of human rights standards."*

(i) This statement ignores the operational context where security forces were facing life-threatening situations from armed and violent protesters who had demonstrated the capability and intent to cause serious harm.

(ii) The report fails to consider that if such a shooting occurred, it may have been in direct response to imminent threats to life, which would be justified under international law principles of proportionality and necessity.²¹⁷

Paragraphs 142-143 present contradictory information from RAB and police officials, with RAB categorically denying the use of firearms from helicopters while acknowledging the use of tear gas and sound grenades.

(i) RAB reported firing 738 tear gas shells, 190 sound grenades, and 557 stun grenades from helicopters, but explicitly stated no rifles or shotguns were fired. This official statement should carry significant weight in the analysis.

(ii) The report's acknowledgement that tear gas launchers *"can look like rifles or shotguns from a distance"* suggests that witness accounts may have been based on misidentification of equipment, casting doubt on the reliability of testimony regarding firearms use.

Paragraph 144 concludes with an admission that OHCHR *"cannot confirm or exclude the shooting of rifles or shotguns from helicopters,"* effectively acknowledging insufficient evidence for the serious allegations made.

(i) This admission of uncertainty undermines the entire section's premise and demonstrates that the allegations lack the evidentiary foundation required for such serious accusations against state security forces.

(ii) The report's suggestion that victims may have been hit by *"rifles fired from elevated positions, by projectiles fired into the air and that then fell down, or by projectiles that ricocheted or fragmented"* indicates multiple alternative explanations that were not adequately investigated.

²¹⁷ "International Rules of Police Use of Force." *The Law on Police Use of Force*, www.policinglaw.info/international-standards. Accessed Aug. 2025

(iii) The call for "*further investigation, with the full cooperation of RAB, Police and Army*" acknowledges that the current findings are incomplete and speculative, yet the report presents these unproven allegations as established facts in its overall conclusions.²¹⁸

Methodological Concerns: The entire section demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the report's methodology by presenting unsubstantiated allegations as credible findings while simultaneously acknowledging the lack of corroborating evidence.

(i) The reliance on witness testimony during periods of complete communication blackout, without independent verification, fails to meet basic standards of fact-finding reliability.

(ii) The report's own acknowledgement of the inability to distinguish between legitimate crowd control equipment and firearms based on witness accounts raises serious questions about the credibility of all helicopter-related allegations.

Conclusion: This section of the report fails to provide credible evidence for its most serious allegations regarding firearms use from helicopters, while simultaneously characterising legitimate crowd control measures as unlawful without proper legal justification. The admission of evidentiary uncertainty undermines the section's conclusions and demonstrates the speculative nature of these allegations.

Rebuttal to the OHCHR Report Section 5: Allegation of 'Obstruction of medical care and denial of necessary medical documentation' from paragraphs 145-156.

8. Obstruction of medical care and denial of necessary medical documentation

Paragraph 145 establishes the legal obligation for authorities to ensure adequate medical facilities when force is expected to be used. However, the report fails to acknowledge the extraordinary circumstances and security threats that complicated medical response operations.

(i) During periods of violent civil unrest, security forces must balance the provision of medical care with the protection of medical personnel and facilities from on-going attacks by violent protesters.

(ii) The report does not consider that medical evacuation and treatment operations were significantly hampered by the hostile environment created by aggressive protesters who had demonstrated a willingness to attack state facilities and personnel.

Paragraph 147 acknowledges that BGB ensured medical care for 32 injured protesters but dismisses this as an "*exception*" without a proper analysis of the operational constraints faced by other security forces.

(i) The report fails to recognise that different security forces operated under varying tactical situations and threat levels, which would naturally affect their ability to provide immediate medical assistance.

²¹⁸ BSS, 'PM Hasina visits DMCH, assures of providing treatment to injured people' (Prothom Alo, 26 July 2024) <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/af81jphhkg>> accessed 20 September 2025; see also, BSS, 'PM visits victims of mayhem at BSMMU' (News Flash, 28 July 2024) <<https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/201475>> accessed 26 September 2025; see more, UNB, 'PM Hasina visits NITOR to see the injured of quota violence' (TBS News, 27 July 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/pm-hasina-visits-nitor-see-injured-quota-violence-904246>> accessed 20 September 2025

(ii) The characterisation of BGB's medical assistance as exceptional ignores the possibility that other forces may have provided similar care that was not documented or reported to OHCHR.

Case 8: Obstruction of medical care for police shooting victim Shykh Aashhabul Yamin contains several factual inconsistencies and analytical flaws that undermine its credibility.

(i) **Threat Assessment Context:** The report acknowledges that *"police officers, in the heat of the moment, may have perceived the man climbing the APC as a potential lethal threat"* and that *"police shouting urgent warnings that the man might be carrying a bomb."* This admission validates the legitimate security concerns that justified the initial use of force.

(ii) **Operational Reality:** The report fails to consider that during active riot situations; security personnel must prioritise immediate threats and operational security. The decision to move the incapacitated individual may have been driven by tactical necessity rather than deliberate obstruction of medical care.

(iii) **Medical Analysis Limitations:** The forensic conclusion that the victim *"was likely already at a terminal stage of hypovolemic shock and on the verge of death when he was brought to the hospital"* suggests that immediate medical intervention by police officers may not have altered the outcome, contradicting the report's assertion of causation.

(iv) **Video Evidence Gaps:** The report relies heavily on video evidence but acknowledges gaps in the footage. The absence of complete documentation of the incident raises questions about the completeness and accuracy of the narrative presented.

Paragraphs 149-151 describe various incidents of alleged medical care obstruction but fail to provide adequate context regarding the security environment and operational necessities.

(i) The incident involving tear gas deployment near a hospital (**paragraph 149**) may have been necessitated by the use of the hospital vicinity by violent protesters as a staging area, requiring dispersal for the safety of patients and medical staff.

(ii) The case of the 17-year-old boy in Farmgate (**paragraph 150**) lacks sufficient detail about the circumstances that led to police actions, making it impossible to assess whether security considerations justified the response.

Paragraphs 152-153 allege systematic obstruction by intelligence agencies, but the characterisation of legitimate security operations as obstruction is problematic.

(i) During periods of violent unrest, intelligence agencies have legitimate responsibilities to identify participants in violent activities and gather evidence of criminal conduct. Hospital surveillance and patient identification may be necessary for national security purposes.

(ii) The collection of medical records and CCTV footage could be justified as evidence preservation in criminal investigations, particularly when hospitals were treating individuals involved in violent activities against the state.

Paragraph 153 claims medical staff were pressured not to provide proper documentation but fails to distinguish between legitimate security requirements and improper interference.

(i) During active conflict situations, accurate documentation of injuries and their causes become crucial for both medical treatment and legal proceedings. Requests for specific documentation formats may reflect legitimate investigative needs rather than obstruction.

(ii) The report does not adequately consider that medical personnel may have been requested to follow specific protocols to ensure the accuracy and legal admissibility of medical records in subsequent criminal proceedings.

Paragraphs 154-155 describe the presence of Chhatra League supporters at hospitals but fail to acknowledge their potential role in maintaining security and preventing further violence.

(i) The presence of political party supporters at medical facilities may have been necessary to provide security for medical staff and patients against potential attacks by violent protesters.

(ii) The report acknowledges that *"some protesters accompanying patients also showed aggressive behaviour towards medical staff,"* which validates the need for additional security measures at medical facilities.

Paragraph 156 addresses autopsy procedures but fails to consider the practical constraints and security concerns that affect normal forensic operations.

(i) During periods of widespread violence and civil unrest, normal autopsy procedures may be suspended due to security threats to forensic personnel and facilities.

(ii) The decision to release bodies to families without autopsy may have been a humanitarian measure to allow proper burial rites during a crisis period, rather than deliberate obstruction of justice.

Overall, the report alleges that medical care was denied in different forms, completely disregarding the fact that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina explicitly stated that medical care should be provided to all the injured. In fact, subsequent events clearly demonstrated that the July injured have not been provided care after the Prime Minister left the country, resulting in multiple cases of riots and vandalism by the July victims [as evidenced by news presented in print and televised media]²¹⁹

Methodological Concerns: This section demonstrates significant bias by characterising legitimate security operations and crisis management measures as deliberate obstruction of medical care, without adequate consideration of the operational context and security necessities.

Conclusion: While the provision of medical care is a fundamental obligation, the report fails to adequately consider the extraordinary security environment that necessitated modified procedures and protocols. The characterisation of security measures and crisis management

²¹⁹ ‘PM Hasina Visits DMCH, Assures of Providing Treatment to Injured People’, *Prothom Alo* (Dhaka, 26 July 2024) <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/af81jphhkg>> Accessed 28 July 2025

‘PM Visits Injured Cops at CPH, Assures Proper Treatment’, *BSS News* (Dhaka, 28 July 2024) <<https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/201464>> Accessed 13 September 2025; see also, *PM Visits Victims of Mayhem at BSMMU*, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Medical University (BSMMU Hospital) – 28 July 2024 “The Prime Minister visited BSMMU to meet with injured patients, to their conditions, and ordered improved medical care.” (Source: BSS). Accessed 28 July 2025; *PM Hasina Visits NITOR to See the Injured of Quota Violence, The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 27 July 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/pm-hasina-visits-nitor-see-injured-quota-violence-904246>>. Accessed 26 July 2025

decisions as systematic obstruction lacks proper contextual analysis and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of operational realities during violent civil unrest.

Rebuttal to OHCHR Report Section 6:

9. Allegation of 'Mass arbitrary arrests, detention without due process, and torture and ill-treatment' from paragraphs 157-183.

Paragraph 157 characterises arrests as "*arbitrary*" without a proper legal analysis of the circumstances that justified detention during a period of violent civil unrest and attempted regime change.

(i) During periods of widespread violence, arson attacks on state facilities, and threats to public order, law enforcement agencies have both the authority and obligation to conduct preventive arrests under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Special Powers Act 1974.

(ii) The report fails to acknowledge that the arrests were conducted under existing legal frameworks, including the Penal Code, Special Powers Act 1974, Anti-Terrorism Act 2009, Arms Act 1878, and Explosive Substances Act 1908, as confirmed by Bangladesh Police data provided to OHCHR.

Paragraph 158 criticises arrests based on proximity to protest areas and possession of protest-related materials but ignores the legitimate security concerns during active investigations of violent crimes.

(i) The possession of photographic and video evidence of violent incidents constitutes potential evidence in criminal investigations. The examination of such materials by law enforcement is a standard investigative procedure, not arbitrary harassment.

(ii) Being present in areas where violent crimes occurred provides reasonable grounds for questioning and potential detention, particularly when individuals cannot provide satisfactory explanations for their presence.

Paragraph 159 criticises the use of "*mass cases*" but fails to understand the legal necessity of this approach during widespread coordinated violence.

(i) When dealing with coordinated violent activities involving large numbers of participants, the filing of cases listing multiple suspects is a recognised legal procedure under Bangladeshi law, particularly when individual identification during chaotic situations is challenging.

(ii) The report's criticism of judges granting remand applications ignores the legal presumption that judicial officers act within their discretion based on evidence presented, and the extraordinary circumstances requiring extended investigation periods.

Paragraphs 160-161 present arrest statistics but characterise them as arbitrary without establishing that due process was violated in specific cases.

(i) The arrest of 10,525 men, 25 women, and 63 children by Bangladesh Police, plus additional arrests by RAB, represents a proportionate response to the scale of violence and destruction that occurred during the period.

(ii) The report acknowledges it "*could not itself document a single case where due process was fully respected*" but fails to establish that this represents systematic violations rather than the practical constraints of processing large numbers of detainees during a crisis period.

Paragraphs 162-164 describe "*block raids*" but mischaracterise legitimate law enforcement operations as arbitrary harassment.

(i) Coordinated raids in areas known to harbour violent protesters and those planning attacks on state facilities represent standard counter-insurgency and riot control procedures recognised under international law enforcement practices.

(ii) The targeting of "*university students, opposition party activists and other potential protestors*" is justified when these individuals are suspected of participating in or planning violent activities against the state.

(iii) The cooperation of Awami League officials and Chhatra League activists in identifying protesters' homes represents legitimate community assistance to law enforcement, similar to neighbourhood watch programs.

Paragraphs 167-168 criticise arrests based on "*general characteristics*" but ignore the operational realities of identifying participants in mass violence.

(i) During widespread civil unrest, law enforcement must often rely on general indicators and behavioural patterns to identify potential threats. The detention of individuals who cannot provide identification or explanations for their presence in riot areas is a legitimate security measure.

(ii) The use of electronic surveillance through NTMC and intelligence gathering by DGFI, NSI, and Special Branch represents lawful intelligence operations necessary to identify and prevent further violence.

Paragraphs 169-172 describe arrests of injured persons but fail to consider that gunshot wounds and protest-related injuries constitute evidence of participation in violent activities requiring investigation.

(i) The arrest and questioning of individuals with gunshot wounds is a standard investigative procedure to determine the circumstances of injury and potential involvement in criminal activities.

(ii) Hospital raids and patient identification operations were necessary to prevent the treatment facilities from being used as safe havens by violent criminals evading justice.

Paragraphs 173-176 detail the arrest of student leaders but characterise legitimate counter-terrorism operations as arbitrary detention.

(i) The student leaders were actively coordinating and inciting widespread violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths and massive property destruction. Their detention was justified under anti-terrorism legislation.

(ii) The involvement of DGFI in these operations reflects the national security implications of the coordinated attempt to overthrow the elected Government.

(iii) The coerced statement acknowledging withdrawal of protest programs demonstrates that the detention achieved its legitimate objective of preventing further violence and loss of life.

Paragraphs 178-182 allege torture and ill-treatment but fail to provide credible evidence or consider the necessity of robust interrogation during terrorism investigations.

(i) The report relies primarily on uncorroborated testimony from individuals who had clear motivations to fabricate abuse allegations to support their political narrative.

(ii) During investigations of terrorism and violent crimes against the state, enhanced interrogation techniques may be necessary and legally justified under national security legislation.

(iii) The conditions described at detention facilities reflect the practical constraints of processing large numbers of detainees during a crisis period, not deliberate ill-treatment.

Paragraph 183 criticises temporary restrictions on court appearances and prison visits but ignores the security necessities during active civil unrest.

(i) The suspension of routine judicial procedures and prison visits was a necessary security measure to prevent the coordination of further violence and protect judicial personnel from threats.

(ii) These temporary measures were legally authorised under emergency powers and were proportionate to the security threats faced.

Legal Framework Justification: The arrests and detention procedures were conducted under existing legal authorities, including:

- Criminal Procedure Code Sections 54 (arrest without warrant) and 167 (remand provisions)
- Special Powers Act 1974 for preventive detention
- Anti-Terrorism Act 2009 for terrorism-related offences
- Public Safety Act provisions during civil unrest

Operational Context: The report fundamentally fails to acknowledge that the arrests occurred during an attempted violent overthrow of the elected Government, involving:

- Systematic attacks on police stations and Government facilities
- Looting of 5,749 firearms and 651,609 rounds of ammunition from police stations
- Deaths of at least 44 police officers and hundreds of Awami League activists
- Coordinated arson attacks on state infrastructure

Conclusion: The characterisation of legitimate law enforcement operations during violent civil unrest as "*arbitrary arrests*" and "*torture*" reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal authorities and operational necessities during counter-terrorism and riot control operations. The report's failure to acknowledge the scale of violence and threats to state security undermines its credibility and demonstrates clear bias in favour of those who participated in violent attempts to overthrow the elected Government.

Rebuttal to the OHCHR Report Section 7:

10. Allegation of 'Intimidation and attacks on journalists' from paragraphs 184-190.

Paragraph 184 presents casualty figures for journalists but fails to provide proper context regarding the operational environment and the challenges of distinguishing between legitimate journalists and participants in violent activities.

(i) During periods of widespread civil unrest and violent confrontations, the distinction between journalists and active participants in violent activities becomes blurred, particularly when individuals claiming to be journalists are present in areas of active combat without proper identification or authorisation.

(ii) The report acknowledges that *"in other cases, journalists were directly targeted with violence due to the exercise of their profession, including in some cases by protesters,"* which demonstrates that violence against media personnel was not exclusively perpetrated by security forces.

Paragraphs 185-186 describe specific incidents involving journalists but fail to consider the operational context and legitimate security concerns during active riot control operations.

(i) The incident on 18 July in Jatrabari occurred during violent confrontations where security forces were under attack. In such circumstances, individuals present in combat zones without proper press credentials or safety equipment may be mistakenly identified as participants in violent activities.

(ii) The acknowledgement by the current Inspector-General of Police on 22 December 2024 regarding the Sylhet incident represents the Government's commitment to accountability and transparency, contradicting the report's characterisation of systematic targeting.

(iii) The warning given to the photojournalist on Elephant Road demonstrates that security forces were attempting to protect media personnel by advising them to leave dangerous areas, rather than deliberately targeting them.

Paragraph 187 describes incidents where both security forces and protesters attacked journalists, but the report disproportionately emphasises security force actions while minimising protester violence.

(i) The beating of journalists by protesters who *"expressed anger that the local media were not sufficiently covering the killing of protesters"* demonstrates that media personnel faced threats from both sides, not exclusively from security forces.

(ii) The differential treatment of journalists based on whether they worked for local or foreign media, as evidenced by protesters relenting *"when he identified himself as working for foreign media,"* indicates that attacks on journalists were often politically motivated rather than random violence.

Paragraphs 188-189 continue to present incidents without adequate consideration of the operational context and the challenges faced by security forces in distinguishing between legitimate media personnel and violent participants.

(i) The incident in Sylhet on 2 August occurred during active confrontations where *"protesters threw bricks"* at police, creating a hostile environment where accurate target identification becomes extremely difficult.

(ii) The report acknowledges that *"Awami League supporters shot at a group of journalists"* and that *"a photojournalist was assaulted by protesters,"* further demonstrating that violence against media personnel was not exclusively perpetrated by security forces.

Paragraph 190 alleges systematic intimidation by authorities but characterises legitimate security and intelligence operations as improper interference.

(i) During periods of violent civil unrest and attempted regime change, intelligence agencies have legitimate responsibilities to monitor media reporting for national security purposes, particularly when media outlets may be used to coordinate violent activities or spread disinformation.

(ii) The report acknowledges that *"some media outlets published misinformation"* but fails to recognise that Government efforts to counter such disinformation represent legitimate information warfare operations rather than improper censorship.

(iii) The characterisation of intelligence visits to media offices as *"intimidation"* ignores the legitimate security concerns when media outlets may be compromised by hostile actors seeking to destabilise the state.

Operational Context: The report fails to acknowledge that:

- Media personnel operating in active combat zones without proper credentials or safety equipment create identification challenges for security forces
- The presence of individuals claiming to be journalists in areas of violent confrontation requires verification of credentials and intentions.
- Intelligence monitoring of media activities during national security crises is a legitimate state function.

Conclusion: While the safety of legitimate journalists is important, the report fails to adequately consider the operational realities of distinguishing between genuine media personnel and participants in violent activities during periods of widespread civil unrest. The characterisation of legitimate security operations as systematic targeting demonstrates bias and fails to acknowledge the complex operational environment faced by security forces.

Rebuttal to the OHCHR Report Section 8:

Allegation of 'Unjustified Internet shutdowns, lacking due process' from paragraphs 191-199.

Paragraph 191 establishes theoretical standards for internet shutdowns but fails to acknowledge the exceptional circumstances that justified emergency measures during an attempted violent overthrow of the elected Government.

(i) The report acknowledges that internet shutdowns may be justified *"in exceptional circumstances, as a last resort when necessary to achieve a legitimate aim such as national*

security or public order," which precisely describes the situation faced by the Government during the violent uprising.

(ii) The characterisation of *"blanket shutdowns"* as never justifiable ignores established international precedents where complete communication disruptions have been implemented during national security emergencies and attempted coups.

Paragraphs 192-193 criticise the lack of *"prior announcement"* and *"due process"* but ignore the operational necessities during rapidly evolving security crises.

(i) Prior announcement of internet shutdowns would have defeated their legitimate security purpose by allowing violent actors to coordinate alternative communication methods and accelerate their destabilisation efforts.

(ii) The requirement for *"prior authorisation by a court"* is impractical during rapidly evolving national security emergencies where immediate action is necessary to prevent loss of life and protect state institutions.

(iii) The decisions taken *"at the ministerial level"* through NTMC and BTRC represent proper Governmental authority and chain of command during crisis management, not arbitrary action.

Paragraphs 193-195 detail the timeline of internet restrictions but fail to correlate these measures with the escalating violence and security threats they were designed to address.

(i) The initial shutdown around university areas on 14-15 July was a targeted response to prevent the coordination of violent activities that had already resulted in deaths and property destruction.

(ii) The blocking of Facebook and YouTube on 17 July was necessary to prevent the spread of inflammatory content and the coordination of violent activities through social media platforms.

(iii) The five-day complete shutdown coincided with the most intense period of violence and represented a necessary emergency measure to prevent further coordination of attacks on state facilities and personnel.

Paragraph 194 criticises the economic impact of shutdowns but fails to weigh this against the security necessities and potential for greater economic damage from continued violence.

(i) While internet shutdowns created economic losses, the alternative of allowing continued coordination of violent attacks on infrastructure, banks, and commercial facilities would have resulted in far greater economic damage.

(ii) The complaint by business leaders on 22 July demonstrates that the Government was responsive to economic concerns and balanced these against security necessities.

Paragraphs 196-197 attack the former State Minister's explanations but ignore the legitimate security rationale for the measures.

(i) While the specific explanation regarding data centre attacks may have been inaccurate, the underlying security rationale for the shutdowns remains valid - preventing coordination of violent activities and protecting critical infrastructure.

(ii) The claim that shutdowns were implemented "to curb the spread of misinformation" represents a legitimate Government function during periods of civil unrest when false information can incite further violence.

Paragraph 198 mischaracterises the timing of shutdowns as evidence of improper purpose, but the correlation with violent incidents actually demonstrates appropriate crisis response.

(i) The timing of shutdowns "*just before the Government ordered a strategic escalation of force*" demonstrates proper coordination between communication security and operational security measures.

(ii) The characterisation of preventing "*information about violations from being documented and spread*" ignores the legitimate need to prevent inflammatory and potentially false information from inciting further violence.

Paragraph 199 acknowledges that shutdowns prevented protesters from organising but characterises this legitimate security benefit as improper.

(i) Preventing violent actors from coordinating attacks on state facilities and personnel through social media represents a core state security function, not an improper restriction on peaceful assembly.

(ii) The facilitation of tracking and arresting "*student protesters and opposition activists*" involved in violent activities represents legitimate law enforcement operations, not improper surveillance.

Legal Justification: The internet shutdowns were implemented under existing legal authorities, including:

- Emergency powers provisions in the Constitution
- National security authorities under the relevant telecommunications legislation
- Crisis management powers during periods of civil unrest

Operational Necessity: The shutdowns were necessitated by:

- Coordination of violent attacks on police stations and Government facilities
- Use of social media to incite violence and spread inflammatory content
- Need to prevent further loss of life and property destruction
- Protection of critical infrastructure and state institutions

Proportionality Assessment: The temporary nature of the restrictions, their correlation with security threats, and the gradual restoration of services demonstrate a proportionate response rather than arbitrary censorship.

Conclusion: The internet shutdowns represented necessary emergency measures during an attempted violent overthrow of the elected Government. The report's failure to adequately consider the security context and the legitimate state interest in preventing coordination of violent activities demonstrates bias and a misunderstanding of crisis management requirements. The characterisation of these measures as "*unjustified*" ignores both the

exceptional circumstances and the established legal authorities under which they were implemented.

Rebuttal to OHCHR Report Section 9:

12. Allegation of Violations and abuses targeting women and girls protesting 200-204.

Paragraph 200 acknowledges the active participation of female students in protests but fails to consider that their involvement in violent activities subjected them to the same legitimate law enforcement responses as male participants.

(i) The report's acknowledgement that female students were "*at the forefront of the early protests and their organisation*" confirms their active leadership roles in coordinating activities that escalated into violent confrontations with security forces.

(ii) The observation that "*male-dominated leadership structures had the effect of gradually sidelining them as the protests went on and Government repression intensified*" suggests that female participants may have been protected from more serious consequences by being moved away from leadership positions during the most violent phases.

Paragraph 201 lists locations where female protesters were attacked but fails to distinguish between legitimate law enforcement responses to violent activities and gender-based targeting.

(i) The inclusion of female protesters among those "*attacked*" in various locations fails to acknowledge that security forces were responding to violent riots and attacks on state facilities, not specifically targeting individuals based on gender.

(ii) The reference to women being "*subject to arbitrary arrest, torture and other forms of ill-treatment*" relies on the same unsubstantiated allegations that have been addressed in previous sections, without providing additional evidence specific to gender-based targeting.

Paragraph 202 characterises law enforcement responses as "*gender-based violence*" without establishing that the treatment differed from that applied to male participants in violent activities.

(i) The allegation that "*violence targeting female protesters was often gender-based in its aims and means*" lacks supporting evidence and appears to be based on speculation rather than documented systematic targeting based on gender.

(ii) The claim that physical assaults "*targeted specific body parts such as face, chest, pelvis, and buttocks*" fails to acknowledge that these are common impact areas during crowd control operations regardless of the gender of the participants.

(iii) The characterisation of law enforcement language as "*gender-based insults*" ignores the reality that harsh language is commonly used by security forces against all participants in violent confrontations, regardless of gender.

Paragraph 203 presents allegations of sexual violence but relies on uncorroborated testimony without independent verification or consideration of alternative explanations.

(i) The first incident described involves *"a group of men armed with bamboo sticks"* who are characterised as *"Awami League supporters"* based solely on the victim's account, without independent verification of their political affiliation or the circumstances of the encounter.

(ii) The allegation that these individuals searched the victim's belongings and found *"a Bangladeshi flag"* suggests they were conducting security screening during a period when flags and political symbols were being used to identify participants in violent activities.

(iii) The second incident involving *"two Chhatra League supporters"* similarly lacks independent corroboration and may represent misidentification of individuals during chaotic circumstances.

Paragraph 204 acknowledges the difficulty in documenting sexual violence but uses this limitation to speculate about unreported incidents without providing a factual basis.

(i) The report's admission that *"victims of sexual and gender-based violence in Bangladesh often refrain from reporting sexual violence"* due to various factors undermines the reliability of the limited accounts that were obtained.

(ii) The conclusion that *"substantially more incidents occurred than could be documented"* represents speculation rather than evidence-based findings and violates basic principles of fact-finding methodology.

(iii) The recommendation for *"further, gender-sensitive investigation"* acknowledges that the current findings are incomplete and insufficient to support the serious allegations made.

Methodological Concerns:

Lack of Comparative Analysis: The report fails to compare the treatment of female participants with that of male participants to establish whether differential treatment based on gender actually occurred.

Conflation of Issues: The report conflates legitimate law enforcement responses to violent activities with gender-based violence without establishing causation or intent.

Uncorroborated Testimony: The reliance on victim testimony without independent verification or corroborating evidence fails to meet basic standards for documenting serious allegations.

Speculative Conclusions: The assumption that unreported incidents occurred in greater numbers than documented incidents represent speculation rather than evidence-based analysis.

Operational Context:

Equal Treatment Principle: Security forces responding to violent confrontations apply crowd control measures based on the level of threat and resistance encountered, not on the gender of participants.

Identification Challenges: During chaotic riot situations, the political affiliation and specific identity of individuals involved in confrontations may be difficult to establish with certainty.

Security Screening: The examination of personal belongings and political symbols represents legitimate security screening during periods of violent civil unrest.

Legal Framework:

Non-Discrimination in Law Enforcement: While law enforcement must be conducted without discrimination, this does not exempt female participants in violent activities from legitimate security responses.

Proportionate Response: The use of force against any individual, regardless of gender, must be proportionate to the threat posed and the resistance encountered.

Conclusion: The report fails to establish that female participants in the violent protests were subjected to treatment that differed systematically from that applied to male participants. The characterisation of legitimate law enforcement responses as gender-based violence lacks evidentiary support and appears to be based on speculation rather than documented facts. While any incidents of actual sexual violence would be serious and warrant investigation, the report's methodology and evidence base are insufficient to support its broad conclusions about systematic gender-based targeting. The conflation of crowd control measures with gender-based violence demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of law enforcement operations during civil unrest.

Rebuttal to the OHCHR Report Section 10:

Allegation of 'Violations and abuses against children' from paragraphs 205-210.

Paragraph 205 acknowledges the active participation of children in violent protests but fails to address the responsibility of adult organisers who expose minors to dangerous situations.

(i) The report acknowledges that *"numerous teenage children actively participated in the protests, including high school students from colleges, students at religious madrasas and young workers,"* which confirms that minors were deliberately involved in activities that escalated into violent confrontations.

(ii) The admission that *"OHCHR received allegations of both Awami League and opposition parties recruiting and paying such children to engage in violence"* demonstrates that children were being exploited by political actors, yet the report fails to adequately condemn this practice or hold the organisers accountable.

(iii) The acknowledgement that children from *"socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds (known as tokai) were seen among Awami League supporters and among protesters"* indicates that vulnerable children were being manipulated by both sides, making it difficult to determine their voluntary participation versus exploitation.

Paragraph 206 lists locations where children were harmed but fails to distinguish between children who were active participants in violent activities and innocent bystanders.

(i) The broad geographic distribution of incidents across multiple districts suggests that children's involvement in violent confrontations was widespread and systematic, rather than isolated incidents.

(ii) The report fails to analyse whether the documented cases involved children who were actively participating in violent activities or were genuinely innocent bystanders caught in crossfire.

Paragraph 207 characterises security force responses as *"indiscriminate shooting"* but ignores the operational challenges of identifying minors during violent confrontations and the legitimate security concerns when children are used as combatants.

(i) The incident in Mohammadpur where police *"shot indiscriminately at mixed crowds of peaceful protesters and violent rioters"* demonstrates the tactical difficulty of distinguishing between different categories of participants during chaotic situations, particularly when children are deliberately placed among violent actors.

(ii) The report's assertion that a 17-year-old *"posed no threat at the time"* lacks adequate context about the immediate circumstances and whether the individual was engaged in threatening behaviour or was in proximity to others who were.

(iii) The case of the 12-year-old child who *"died from internal bleeding caused by impact of some 200 metal shot pellets"* suggests the child was in extremely close proximity to active combat, raising questions about adult supervision and the circumstances that led to such exposure.

Paragraph 208 describes the death of very young children but fails to address the responsibility of parents and guardians who brought minors to dangerous protest areas.

(i) The case of the six-year-old girl in Narayanganj who *"was killed by a bullet to the head while standing on the roof of her building, observing violent clashes"* represents a tragic incident, but the report fails to address the parental responsibility for allowing a young child to observe violent confrontations from an exposed position.

(ii) The characterisation of children being *"brought by their parents to protests"* raises serious questions about parental judgment and the adult responsibility for exposing minors to dangerous situations.

Paragraphs 209-210 criticise the detention and treatment of children but fail to consider the legal complexities when minors are involved in serious violent crimes.

(i) The detention of children *"at Detective Branch headquarters and in prisons, together with adults"* may reflect the practical constraints of processing large numbers of detainees during a crisis period, rather than deliberate mistreatment.

(ii) The case of the 17-year-old boy who was *"tortured for two days at Jatrabari Police Station to get him to confess to murdering a police officer"* involves a serious criminal allegation that requires thorough investigation, regardless of the suspect's age.

(iii) The report acknowledges that the boy's lawyer pointed out his minor status to the court, and that *"another judge finally ordered his transfer and continued detention in a child detention facility,"* demonstrating that the judicial system ultimately provided appropriate protections.

Legal Framework Considerations:

Juvenile Justice: While children deserve special protection, minors who participate in violent crimes, including the murder of police officers, must still be subject to appropriate legal proceedings under juvenile justice frameworks.

Operational Challenges: During periods of widespread violence, the immediate identification of minors among large numbers of participants creates practical challenges for security forces operating under extreme pressure.

Parental Responsibility: The involvement of children in violent protests raises serious questions about parental and guardian responsibility for exposing minors to dangerous situations.

Contextual Factors:

Child Exploitation: The report's own acknowledgement that children were being recruited and paid to engage in violence indicates systematic exploitation of minors by political actors.

Tactical Use of Children: The deliberate involvement of children in violent confrontations may represent a tactic to complicate security force responses and generate sympathy when casualties occur.

Family Dynamics: The presence of children at violent protests often reflects family or community pressure rather than independent choice by the minors.

Operational Realities:

Identification Challenges: During active riot situations, security personnel may have difficulty immediately identifying the age of participants, particularly when adolescents are engaged in the same violent activities as adults.

Threat Assessment: The age of an individual does not automatically negate the threat they may pose, particularly when armed or engaged in violent activities.

Proportionate Response: Security forces must balance the protection of children with the need to respond to immediate threats and maintain public order.

Methodological Concerns:

Lack of Context: The report fails to provide adequate context about the circumstances surrounding each incident involving children.

Responsibility Attribution: The focus on security force actions ignores the primary responsibility of adults who are involved with children in dangerous situations.

Comparative Analysis: The report does not compare the treatment of children with international standards for handling minors involved in violent conflicts.

Conclusion: While the protection of children is paramount, the report fails to adequately address the complex circumstances that led to minors being involved in violent confrontations. The primary responsibility lies with the adult organisers who deliberately involve children in dangerous activities and the parents who fail to protect their children from exposure to violence. While any mistreatment of children in custody is unacceptable, the report's characterisation ignores the legal complexities when minors are involved in serious crimes and the operational challenges faced by security forces during widespread civil unrest. The focus should be on

preventing the exploitation of children by political actors rather than solely criticising security force responses to situations created by adult irresponsibility

SECTION VIII. Violations and Abuses in the Aftermath of the Protests

This section looks at the ‘revenge violence’ after 5 August 2024, showing systematic targeting of police, Awami League supporters, minorities and women, and argues that the OHCHR report downplayed or ignored these atrocities.

The allegations of Governmental inaction in **paragraph 211** can be transparently and categorically rejected. On 17 July 2024, the competent authorities, acting under the direction of the then Government, promulgated legally binding directives mandating proportionate and non-lethal policing, the suspension of public assemblies posing imminent risks to life or property, and the establishment of an independent judicial inquiry under the Supreme Court²²⁰. Conversely, following the assumption of authority by the interim administration, entrusted under the Constitution with the primary duty to ensure public safety, the gravest acts of violence occurred after 5 August 2024. Credible contemporaneous documentation demonstrates the participation of extremist elements and orchestrated provocations in those incidents²²¹.

Revenge abuses targeting police, Awami League supporters and the media

Aligned to **paragraph 212**, the portrayal of the July-August 2024 events as unjustified "lynchings" of police and Awami League officials is a consequence of deception. Evidence confirms that numerous violent occurrences transpired following armed attacks by individuals or organised groups posing as protestors, including shootings and assaults on unarmed civilians and party supporters²²². Eyewitness accounts disclose that assailants in some incidents were distinct from typical protestors, demonstrating that the violence was commonly orchestrated

²²⁰ Ruma Paul, 'Bangladesh Shuts Universities, Colleges Indefinitely After Protests Turn Deadly' (*Reuters*, 17 July 2024) <<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-shuts-universities-colleges-indefinitely-after-protests-turn-deadly-2024-07-17/>> accessed 18 September 2025; see also, BenarNews, 'Bangladesh PM Tells Anti-Quota Protesters Court Ruling Will Not Disappoint' (17 July 2024) <<https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/anti-quota-07172024153130.html>> accessed 20 September 2025; Human Rights Watch, 'Bangladesh: Security Forces Target Unarmed Students' (22 July 2024) <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/22/bangladesh-security-forces-target-unarmed-students>> accessed 20 September 2025; Bangladesh Awami League, 'Response to the Report Published by the OHCHR on the Events of July-August in Bangladesh' (25 February 2025) <<https://www.albd.org/articles/news/41504/Bangladesh-Awami-League>> accessed 21 September 2025; see more, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Act No 367) <<https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367.html>> accessed 25 September 2025

²²¹ Bangladesh Awami League, 'Response to the Report Published by the OHCHR on the Events of July-August in Bangladesh' (25 February 2025) <<https://www.albd.org/articles/news/41504/Bangladesh-Awami-League>> accessed 21 September 2025, see also, Ruma Paul, 'Bangladesh Shuts Universities, Colleges Indefinitely After Protests Turn Deadly' (*Reuters*, 17 July 2024) <<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-shuts-universities-colleges-indefinitely-after-protests-turn-deadly-2024-07-17/>> accessed 22 September 2025; Eng Shafiq Islam, 'Bangladesh: South Asia's Next "Bloody Battlefield"?' (*The Hawk*, 7 July 2025) <<https://www.thehawk.in/news/world/bangladesh-south-asias-next-bloody-battlefield>> accessed 20 September 2025; see more, *South Asia Intelligence Review*, vol 23, no 12, South Asia Terrorism Portal <<https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-23-No-12>> accessed 21 September 2025

²²² Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'Bangladesh: UN Report Finds Brutal, Systematic Repression of Protests, Calls for Justice for Serious Rights Violations' *Press Release* (United Nations, 12 February 2025) <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls>> accessed 21 September 2025; Amnesty International, 'What Is Happening at the Quota-Reform Protests in Bangladesh?' (17 July 2024) <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/what-is-happening-at-the-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/>> accessed 25 September 2025.

by armed individuals trying to disrupt public order, rather than a spontaneous reaction to the party's lawful Government²²³.

The stated allegation that the former Mayor of Gazipur City Corporation, Mr. Jahangir Alam, “repeatedly opened fire on protesters” on 19 July 2024 is false, unsubstantiated, and contrary to first-hand testimony. In an interview conducted by Barrister Nijhoom Majumder, a legal researcher, Mr. Alam provided a detailed account of the events in question, which directly contradicts the aforementioned assertion.

Figure 18: Mayor Jahangir Alam’s Private Transportation was attacked by protesters




Source: Media photo, on file

According to Mr. Jahangir, on 19 July 2024, he was en route from Gazipur to Dhaka pursuant to an official call from the Hon’ble Prime Minister. Shortly after midday prayers, accompanied by councillors and party leaders, he entered the Uttara area, the main entry point to Dhaka (North), where he observed an unusual roaming of people along the roadway. Exercising his normal duty as a leader to greet people, he briefly alighted from his vehicle. Without provocation, he was then struck in the head by a projectile later identified as a bullet. He immediately collapsed, became covered in blood, and pleaded with his associates to take him to a hospital. And it was an attack on him, his people and his transportation.

²²³ Kanishka Singh, ‘UN Urges Probe of Killings in Bangladesh Protests, Minority Protection’ (Reuters, 30 October 2024) <<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-urges-probe-killings-bangladesh-protests-minority-protection-2024-10-30/>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, Human Rights Watch, ‘Bangladesh: Security Forces Target Unarmed Students’ (22 July 2024) <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/22/bangladesh-security-forces-target-unarmed-students>> accessed 20 September 2025;

Figure: 19 Mr. Jewel Molla being lynched by Mob Assailants and Attackers



Source: Media photo, on file

Contemporaneous witness statements recorded in the interview reveal that as Jahangir was being moved from Uttara Sector 07, bystanders were heard exclaiming in Bangla: “*Taake pawa geche, taake shesh korte hobe*” [“He has been found, he must be finished”]. Fearing for his life, he took shelter in a nearby building, later identified as a buying house by the residence of the Leader of the Opposition. Armed assailants surrounded and vandalised the building, searching for him floor by floor. He remained severely wounded and unable to staunch the bleeding, without access to water except from a bathroom tap, and mentally prepared himself for imminent death. There he was so thirsty that he even drank water from the bathroom tap. In this condition, he telephoned the Hon’ble Prime Minister and senior police officials to request immediate rescue.

Figure 20: Mayor Jahangir Alam, bloodied after the assault



Source: File photo

Figure 21: The body of Jewell Molla, dead and naked



Source: Media photo, on file

During this period, Jewel Molla, Organising Secretary of the Bangladesh Student League, traced Jahangir Alam's location to offer assistance. According to Mr. Alam's testimony, Mr. Molla was lynched and killed by the assailants solely because of his expressed association with Mr. Jahangir Alam. The circumstances of Mr. Molla's death, including his public humiliation and killing in broad daylight, constitute a prima facie violation of fundamental human rights and of Bangladesh's obligations under international law.

Mr. Alam further stated that three separate rescue attempts were required. The first, undertaken by local police, lasted two hours but failed. The second, by local residents and leaders, also failed. Only a third operation mounted by a specialised unit of the Bangladesh Police succeeded in extracting him; he was so gravely injured that he could not ascend to reach the evacuation helicopter. Even during medical evacuation, attackers impeded ambulance access first to Apollo Hospitals Dhaka and later to United Hospital. He was ultimately admitted to Kurmitola Hospital, where he received 22 stitches to his head and was informed by the attending physician that his condition was critical. That night, arrangements were made to transfer him to Singapore for emergency treatment, which continued until 2 July 2024.

This sworn testimony, corroborated by hospital records and police operational logs, demonstrates that Mr. Jahangir Alam was the victim, not the perpetrator, of a coordinated and lethal assault. The portrayal of him as an aggressor who "opened fire" on protesters is therefore legally unsustainable and factually baseless. Rather, the incident evidences a grave breach of

his right to life and security of person under Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and under Articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²⁴.

As well, in terms of the accused attack against Awami Leaders is also baseless when reports were done mentioning that both parties were involved in the clash, not any one-sided attack²²⁵.

Legally, any verdict of these incidents requires taking into account provocation, self-defence, and compliance with constitutional requirements. The Awami League's actions were sensible, proportionate, and aimed at protecting residents, contrary to narratives characterising the party as the source of unrest.

Paragraphs 213-216

Following 5 August 2024, public order in Bangladesh experienced a marked collapse under an interim administration whose capacity to control escalating violence was severely diminished. By that date, the Awami League had already relinquished executive authority, and operational command over law enforcement had passed to the caretaker Government. Allegations that police “fled” from duty during this period are therefore baseless: contemporaneous reports and command logs indicate that officers were frequently obstructed or physically prevented by armed assailants from maintaining their posts. Imputing responsibility to the Awami League or its supporters for incidents that occurred within this administrative vacuum disregards the actual chain of command and the constitutional allocation of security responsibilities in force at that time²²⁶.

Paragraphs 212-220 (Combining all the casualties, scenarios, took place in three different districts)

Although some reports have portrayed the Awami League as a principal actor in acts of vandalism, the evidentiary record reflects a markedly different reality. In its own documentation, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights records that “BNP publicly acknowledged” the involvement of its local leaders and activists in episodes of revenge violence (paragraph 217), including attacks on police stations, Awami League offices and personnel, with disciplinary measures such as expulsions imposed by the party itself. This acknowledgement directly undermines any narrative that the Awami League was the primary instigator of the August 2024 unrest; on the contrary, contemporaneous evidence demonstrates

²²⁴ Nijhoom Majumder (YouTube), *An Exclusive Interview with Former Mayor Jahangir Alam of Gazipur* (no date of upload) <<https://youtu.be/i6mwcaeJyq4?si=OtlSreSIvAwwcgay>> accessed 18 September 2025

²²⁵ Bangla Post Desk, 'Deaths During Student Protest: 4 Students' Bodies Exhumed in Feni for Autopsies' (*Daily Bangla Post*, 4 August 2025) <<https://en.dailybanglapost.com/country/9>> accessed 20 September 2025

²²⁶ Bangladesh Awami League, 'Response to the Report Published by the OHCHR on the Events of July-August in Bangladesh' (25 February 2025) <<https://www.albd.org/articles/news/41504/Bangladesh-Awami-League>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, Zakir Kibria, 'Mob Violence: Causes, Consequences, and Pathways to Justice' *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 11 April 2025) <<https://tds-images.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/mob-violence-causes-consequences-and-pathways-justice-3868831>> accessed 20 September 2025; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh* (16 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/OHCHR-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Recent-Protests-and-Unrest-in-Bangladesh-16082024_2.pdf> accessed 21 September 2025; Al Jazeera, 'At Least 90 Killed as Bangladesh Protesters Renew Call for Hasina to Quit' (4 August 2024) <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/4/more-than-20-killed-as-bangladesh-protesters-renew-call-for-hasina-to-quit>> accessed 22 September 2025; see more, Reuters, 'Bangladesh Bans Activities of Ousted PM Hasina's Party Following Protests' (11 May 2025) <<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-bans-activities-ousted-pm-hasinas-party-following-protests-2025-05-11>> accessed 20 September 2025.

that Awami League members and institutions were repeatedly the targets of these violent attacks.²²⁷

Direct-indirect allegations that the Awami League Government used or even weapons against crowds and protesters are unsubstantiated and contradicted by the documentary record. Prior to 5 August 2024, Awami League leadership and Government ministries had issued multiple directives mandating non-lethal crowd-control measures and suspending specified rallies in order to de-escalate tensions and protect public safety²²⁸. Portraying the Awami League as ordering indiscriminate violence disregards these documented restraint measures and mischaracterises their intent, which was clearly directed toward the protection of citizens and the maintenance of order. The incidents in Feni, Ashulia and Uttara East on 5 August 2024 have likewise been widely misrepresented as unprovoked acts of violence by police. In these areas, police officers perceived as affiliated with the Awami League were specifically targeted by politically motivated mobs who attacked them not merely as law-enforcement officials but as symbolic protectors of the governing party. For example, in Feni, the police station was stormed, looted and burned; officers were trapped and forced to defend themselves and their posts against sustained, organised violence²²⁹.

These circumstances render the attribution of deliberate or unprovoked lethal force to the Awami League or its supporters legally and factually untenable.

Under both Bangladeshi law and international human rights law, law enforcement officials retain the same inherent right to life and security as any other person. Article 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh enshrines the protection of life and personal security, which necessarily extends to police officers carrying out their duties²³⁰. This right to self-defence is likewise recognised under international instruments, including the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the United Nations. In the incidents at Ashulia and Uttara East, mobs equipped with petrol bombs, sharp weapons and other means of assault attacked police personnel in a manner that posed an immediate and grave threat to their lives. Faced with such imminent danger, the officers were legally entitled and compelled to take proportionate defensive measures to safeguard themselves and those around them²³¹.

In Ashulia and East Uttara of Dhaka, along with other Thanas, eyewitness reports show that the police, while responding to the violence, were forced into defensive actions to preserve their own lives, making the police response legally justifiable under the principle of self-defence.²³²

²²⁷ OHCHR report acknowledging BNP expulsion of 44 local leaders and activists for participating in revenge violence (paragraph 217); see, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh* (16 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/OHCHR-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Recent-Protests-and-Unrest-in-Bangladesh-16082024_2.pdf> accessed 21 September 2025;

²²⁸ Prothom Alo, 'DMP Bans All Sorts of Rallies, Processions in Capital' (19 July 2024) <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/city/686ltug3m0>> accessed 18 September 2025

²²⁹ Md Rafiqul Islam, '3 Feni Police Stations Attacked Following Sheikh Hasina's Departure' (7 August 2024) Dhaka Tribune <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/353941/3-feni-police-stations-attacked-following-sheikh>> accessed 18 September 2025.

²³⁰ Bangladesh Constitution, Article 31: Protection of life and personal security

²³¹ UN, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement 3, Vol II, 'Article 51' <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51/english/rep_supp3_vol2_art51.pdf> accessed 20 September 2025

²³² Observer Online Report, 'Policemen among 33 killed in Savar violence' (6 August 2024) *Observer* <<https://www.observerbd.com/news/483894>> accessed 26 September 2020; see also, Mahmudul Hasan, '225

Paragraphs 221-224

As noted in **paragraph 221** of the record, the assertion that police officers fled from their posts is not borne out by the available evidence. On the contrary, consistent documentation shows that after 5 August, law-enforcement personnel were repeatedly targeted, obstructed in the lawful exercise of their duties, and physically blocked from reaching police stations or responding to incidents. Political groups, including elements of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, were implicated in preventing police deployment through harassment and attacks²³³. In this context, the violence directed at law-enforcement officials constituted a deliberate effort to intimidate and incapacitate the security apparatus. Even incidents such as the 15 August assaults on Awami League supporters were not the result of police inaction but of armed opposition groups physically barring officers from intervening.²³⁴

The continuing reports of retaliatory violence after 15 August must be assessed within the broader political instability prevailing in the country at that time. While the necessity of independent and impartial investigations is fully acknowledged, it is equally important that any assessment of the situation remain proportionate and evidence-based so as not to exaggerate the scale of events or allow partisan narratives to distort the factual record. The appropriate emphasis should be placed on reconciliation, constructive dialogue, and inclusive governance as means of preventing further violence and fostering a more stable and resilient social fabric²³⁵.

Paragraphs 225-227

The attacks on media outlets such as Ekattor TV, Somoy TV, and ATN News cannot credibly be framed as retaliatory actions against alleged political bias, while it was sneered at a bit. Rather, the pattern of assaults demonstrates a broader and systematic campaign to suppress independent reporting on issues of national development. These outlets maintained a demonstrably neutral editorial posture, focusing on infrastructure and public-interest projects undertaken for the benefit of the nation, irrespective of political affiliation. The targeting of journalists, including those who now face criminal proceedings solely for their reporting, constitutes a grave violation of freedom of expression and press freedom protected under Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and under Articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The interim authorities' detention of respected media figures such as Mozammel Babu, widely regarded at the time as a pioneer of independent journalism, underscores the retaliatory nature of these measures. The projects covered by these outlets were not partisan initiatives but national programmes designed to advance the public good. Attacks on journalists and media organisations, therefore, represent not merely an

attacks on police in 6 months, concern over mob' (8 March 2025) *Prothom Alo* <<https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/m3dmngkxkx>> accessed 26 September 2025

²³³ Staff Correspondent, "“Serious acts of revenge violence” targeted AL members, cops: UN" *The Daily Star* (12 February 2025) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/serious-acts-revenge-violence-targeted-al-members-cops-un-3822721>> accessed 21 September 2025

²³⁴ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'Bangladesh: UN Report Finds Brutal, Systematic Repression of Protests, Calls for Justice for Serious Rights Violations' *Press Release* (United Nations, 12 February 2025) <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls>> accessed 21 September 2025

²³⁵ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), *Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh* (United Nations, 12 February 2025) <<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-fftb-hr-violations-bd.pdf>> accessed 21 September 2025

attempt to silence political opponents but a direct assault on the democratic fabric of Bangladesh and a dangerous step toward the erosion of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.²³⁶

As noted in **paragraph 226**, the Chief Advisor of the interim Government publicly acknowledged that the prosecution of certain murder cases was “*hurriedly done, following the old laws and practices.*” Even under this expedited framework, journalists and media professionals were brought to trial. These hasty proceedings were not merely the result of adherence to legal procedure; rather, they appear to have been part of a deliberate strategy by the interim Government to suppress critical journalism and silence dissenting voices, particularly those reporting on the developmental initiatives undertaken under the Awami League administration. The rapid prosecution of media personnel demonstrates a calculated effort to control the national narrative, curtail press freedom, and undermine democratic discourse. By compromising the integrity of judicial processes and prioritising expediency over fairness, the interim Government effectively created an environment in which freedom of speech and press freedom were subordinated to political objectives. As well, it was mentioned Chief of the interim Government murdered media freedom.²³⁷

Paragraphs 228-231

While **paragraphs 228–231** acknowledge that internal political and religious tensions in Bangladesh have contributed to the vulnerabilities of religious and ethnic minorities, it is essential to recognise that these attacks have also been intensified and manipulated by extremist Islamist elements with foreign agendas. Such actors have exploited periods of political upheaval to target and destabilise Bangladesh’s diverse communities, using the cover of domestic unrest to advance their ideological and geopolitical objectives. A proper understanding of these incidents requires a nuanced assessment that accounts not only for

²³⁶ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Bangladesh: UN report finds brutal, systematic repression of protests, calls for justice for serious rights violations’ (United Nations, 12 February 2025) <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, Aritra Banerjee, ‘Journalism Under Siege: Bangladesh’s Free Press Crisis Under Interim Govt Headed by Yunus’ *Sunday Guardian Live* (8 August 2025) <<https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/journalism-under-siege-bangladeshs-free-press-crisis-under-interim-govt-headed-by-yunus-136924/>> accessed 20 September 2025; ARTICLE 19 / Amnesty International et al, ‘Bangladesh: Interim government should protect freedom of expression and opinion’ (2025) <<https://www.article19.org/resources/bangladesh-interim-government-should-protect-freedom-of-expression-and-opinion/>> accessed 26 September 2025; see more, International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ‘Bangladesh: Two journalists arrested and harassed’ (27 August 2024) <<https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/article/bangladesh-two-journalists-arrested-and-harassed>> accessed 26 September 2025

²³⁷ Borderlens Desk, ‘Press Freedom Under Attack in Bangladesh: Rrag Report Reveals 230% Surge in Violence Against Journalists Since Dr Yunus Took Office’ (4 August 2025) <<https://www.borderlens.com/2025/08/04/press-freedom-under-attack-in-bangladesh-rrag-report-reveals-230-surge-in-violence-against-journalists-since-dr-yunus-took-office/>> accessed 20 September 2025; see also, International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), ‘Bangladesh: Violent Attacks and Cases Against Journalists Are on the Rise’ (12 June 2025) <<https://ishr.org/bangladesh-violent-attacks-and-cases-against-journalists-are-on-the-rise/>> accessed 20 September 2025; Dhaka Tribune, ‘DUJ Urges Interim Govt to Withdraw Murder Cases Against Journalists’ (31 August 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/356750/duj-urges-interim-govt-to-withdraw-murder-cases>> accessed 20 September 2025; Reporters Without Borders (RSF), ‘Bangladesh: RSF Calls on the Head of the Interim Government to End the Longstanding Repression Against Journalism’ (15 October 2024) <<https://rsf.org/en/bangladesh-rsf-calls-head-interim-government-end-longstanding-repression-against-journalism>> accessed 21 September 2025; see more, Sakshi Post, ‘878 Journalists Targeted Under Bangladesh Interim Govt; 230% Rise in Attacks: Rights Body’ (25 August 2025) <<https://www.sakshipost.com/news/878-journalists-targeted-under-bangladesh-interim-govt-230-pc-rise-attacks-rights-body-436667>> accessed 26 September 2025

domestic grievances but also for the external influences that amplified violence and further threatened the stability and security of affected populations²³⁸.

Abuses against members of distinct religious and indigenous groups

Paragraphs 232-236

Contrary to the suggestion that attacks on Hindu communities and their properties were primarily motivated by alleged affiliations with Awami League supporters, the evidence indicates a more complex and deeply rooted political dynamic. The regions cited in the OHCHR report, including Meherpur, Kushtia, and Dinajpur, have historically been strongholds of Islamist factions, notably Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir, which have consistently opposed the secular and democratic principles enshrined in Bangladesh's Constitution. These areas, rather than being identified as Awami League sympathisers, have instead been centres of Islamist radicalisation and politically motivated violence driven by anti-secular ideologies. While the violence against Hindu communities was tragically real, it is more accurately understood as part of a broader agenda by Islamist extremists seeking to undermine Bangladesh's secular framework and suppress non-Islamic identities. The perpetrators, aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir, acted with the intent to weaken the nation's pluralistic society and advance a vision of an Islamic state. Accordingly, these attacks should be interpreted as deliberate attempts to dismantle secularism, rather than isolated reactions to political affiliation or unrest²³⁹.

Attack on Religious Minorities and Tribal People

Paragraphs 237-239

The attacks observed during the unrest in Bangladesh were not the product of conventional political conflict between the Awami League and opposition factions, but rather the culmination of a longstanding ideological campaign by Islamist groups targeting the country's secular identity. These assaults were primarily driven by radicalisation and a deliberate attempt to marginalise religious and ethnic minorities perceived as symbols of Bangladesh's secular, non-Islamic ethos. While the prevailing political turmoil contributed to a fragile security environment, the principal catalysts were extremist ideologies intent on undermining the secular principles enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh²⁴⁰. These events underscore the vulnerability of minority communities during periods of political instability, particularly to actors both domestic and foreign seeking to impose narrow ideological agendas. The situation highlights the urgent need for stronger legal safeguards, accountability for perpetrators, and

²³⁸ Subrata Banarjee, 'The Cycle of Violence Against Minorities in Bangladesh' (21 August 2024) Devpolicy Blog <<https://devpolicy.org/the-cycle-of-violence-against-minorities-in-bangladesh-20240821/>> accessed 26 September 2025; see also, Animesh Roul, 'Rising Islamist and Anti-Hindu Sentiment in Bangladesh in Wake of Pahalgam Attack' (25 June 2025) *Terrorism Monitor* Volume 23, Issue 2 <<https://jamestown.org/program/rising-islamist-and-anti-hindu-sentiment-in-bangladesh-in-wake-of-pahalgam-attack/>> accessed 26 September 2025

²³⁹ The Daily Star, 'The Deep-Rooted Influence of Jamaat-e-Islami' *The Daily Star* (13 November 2020) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/news/the-deep-rooted-influence-jamaat-e-islami-2017193>> accessed 26 September 2025; see also, Dhaka Tribune, 'Jamaat-e-Islami and the Roots of Political Violence in Bangladesh' (19 April 2023) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/2023/04/19/jamaat-e-islami-and-the-roots-of-political-violence-in-bangladesh>> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁴⁰ Dhaka Tribune, 'Ahmadiyya Muslims and Sectarian Violence in Bangladesh' *Dhaka Tribune* (22 March 2023) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/2023/03/22/ahmadiyya-muslims-and-sectarian-violence-in-bangladesh>> accessed 26 September 2025

coordinated measures to protect all citizens irrespective of religious affiliation, which remain essential for the preservation of Bangladesh's democratic and pluralistic framework²⁴¹.

Furthermore, attacks on religious sites during the period of 5–15 August cannot be simplistically ascribed to religious intolerance. While often characterised as sectarian violence, substantial evidence indicates that many of these incidents were instead rooted in local political disputes or community-level tensions rather than purely religious motives. For example, the attack on the temple in Meherpur was driven by disputes over land ownership, rather than sectarian animosity¹¹. Similarly, the assault on the Kali temple in Nandipara arose from local land-related conflicts, rather than religious intolerance²⁴².

While Hindu temples and communities experienced widespread attacks, evidence does not support the assertion that these acts were motivated by political allegiance to the Awami League. Many affected communities are situated in areas with a historically strong influence of Islamist factions, such as Meherpur, a longstanding Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir stronghold²⁴³⁴². Far from being allies of the ruling party, these communities have often been marginalised by Islamist groups seeking to impose a narrow religious ideology, further highlighting that the violence against them was ideologically and politically motivated rather than partisan in nature.



Figure: 22 Photo printed in the Aljazeera concerning the existence of Hindu



²⁴¹ The Daily Star, 'Attacks Against Ahmadiyya Community' (6 March 2020) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/news/attacks-against-ahmadiyya-community-1902337>> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁴² Prothom Alo, 'Bangladesh Sees 2,500 Incidents of Communal Violence in 330 Days' (10 July 2025) <<https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/violence-religious-minorities>> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁴³ The Financial Express, 'Violence Against Religious Minorities' (6 October 2024) <<https://www.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/bangladesh/violence-against-religious-minorities>> accessed 20 September 2025



Source: Media photo, on file

While the statements were visible about accusing the Awami-aligned people, or even supporters, this is also misleading. While considering this, the depth suggests something different. It is essential to situate the targeting of religious minorities within the broader context of political unrest and Islamist radicalisation in Bangladesh. Hindu communities, alongside other minority groups, have frequently been perceived as vulnerable by radical Islamist factions, including elements influenced by foreign agendas intent on destabilising Bangladesh's secular framework. These actors sought to impose their ideological objectives through acts of violence, encompassing attacks on Hindu temples, shrines, and prominent religious figures, including leaders associated with ISKCON. As noted in the OHCHR report, the attack on the Kali temple was linked to local land disputes, demonstrating that such incidents were often manipulated by political factions rather than arising from genuine religious animosity²⁴⁴.

Moreover, episodes of mob violence against religious leaders, such as ISKCON's Chinmoy Prabhu, illustrate how individuals who do not conform to extremist agendas may become targets of political persecution. Despite the assaults faced by Prabhu and others, they were subjected to legal proceedings, underscoring the political manipulation behind these attacks. Reports from The Financial Express and Prothom Alo confirm that religious figures were

²⁴⁴ Dhaka Tribune, 'ISKCON Leader Arrested Amid Violence' (16 August 2023) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2023/08/16/iskcon-leader-arrested-amid-violence>> accessed 26 September 2025

targeted for their community involvement rather than any political affiliation with the former Government.²⁴⁵

Figure:23 Chinmay Prabhu on International Media



Source: Media photo, on file

While Hindu temples and communities experienced widespread attacks, evidence does not support the assertion that these acts were motivated by political allegiance to the Awami League. Many affected communities are situated in areas with a historically strong influence of Islamist factions, such as Meherpur, a longstanding Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir stronghold²⁴⁶. Far from being allies of the ruling party, these communities have often been marginalised by Islamist groups seeking to impose a narrow religious ideology, further highlighting that the violence against them was ideologically and politically motivated rather than partisan in nature.

Allegations of sexual violence: Paragraphs 240-242

As referenced in **paragraph** 241 and related sections, numerous legal cases were duly filed and processed in accordance with the law. However, a notable instance illustrating the lawlessness and mob violence during this period involves Mostofa Asif Arnab, who was accused of verbally harassing a woman for allegedly not wearing her “scarf in the right place.” Prior to the threats and ensuing violence, Mr. Arnab had already been granted bail by a competent court, demonstrating that legal remedies were in place. This case exemplifies how a personal dispute, potentially rooted in perceived religious or cultural norms, was escalated by mob mentality in an environment marked by a breakdown of law and order, where the rule

²⁴⁵ Prothom Alo, 'ISKCON Leader Arrested Amid Violence' (16 August 2023) <<https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/iskcon-leader-arrested>> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁴⁶ Wikipedia contributors, 'Allah'r Dal' (Wikipedia, 26 September 2025) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allah%27r_Dal> accessed 22 September 2025.

of law was insufficiently enforced. The failure of authorities to intervene allowed extrajudicial “justice” to prevail, highlighting the perils of public disorder overriding

Figure:24 Sexual offender Mostofa Asif Arnab being cherished by the Islamist mobs



Source: Media photo, on file

formal legal procedures. Significantly, this incident occurred within the University of Dhaka, a highly active and closely monitored environment; if lawlessness manifested here, similar or worse situations elsewhere should be understood in that broader context²⁴⁷.

²⁴⁷ The Business Standard, "DU Student Withdraws Harassment Case Amid 'Rape, Death Threats'" *The Business Standard* (7 March 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/du-student-withdraws-harassment-case-amid-threats-1086536>> accessed 26 September 2025

IX. Accountability Efforts

This section deals with questions of impunity and argues that the Hasina government had initiated accountability measures from judicial, legislative and administrative fronts well before 5 August 2024, while the interim government politicised accountability to silence its opponents.

Paragraphs 243-244

While the statements within 243-244 Paragraphs seemed to be very advising, reality must evolve. The paper moments and the reality are not the same. The OHCHR's recommendation that Bangladesh uphold international human rights law by providing effective remedies for violations is grounded in universally recognised principles. However, this assertion does not fully account for the exceptional circumstances surrounding the political instability and breakdown of law enforcement in the aftermath of the unrest. While extra-judicial killings, torture, and other serious violations of human rights merit thorough investigation, it is essential to recognise the extraordinary challenges faced by the Bangladesh Government in managing these issues during the period of chaos up to 5 August 2024. The execution of investigations was significantly impeded by widespread unrest, and any assessment of state response must consider the operational limitations imposed by the volatile environment²⁴⁸.

BOX 9: Awami League Government Followed Reasonable Application of Police Law

Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, in an interview with the research team (KII), defended the government's accountability and law-enforcement posture. He reiterated that the police operate under law and the Inspector General of Police, with the Home Ministry providing direction but not direct operational control; the Ministry may, however, initiate inquiries or form committees where wrongdoing is alleged.

Referring to the Abu Saeed death and related attacks near Rokeya University, the minister noted that medico-legal reports do not conclusively determine the cause of death and raise further questions. He insisted that existing laws and Standard Operating Procedures governing police conduct have long been in place in the subcontinent and have not been substantively altered.

The minister described on-site observations of disturbing incidents in several localities and acknowledged that isolated videos or remarks can be taken out of context. Two police officers in Jatrabari and Uttara were brutally killed. I was watching a video on those incident and somebody from around made comments around me of which I did not follow. He explained that, while law-based measures are preferred, when unrest moves beyond control the authorities resort to restrictive measures (including curfews). accountability.

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

²⁴⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh' (United Nations, 16 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/OHCHR-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Recent-Protests-and-Unrest-in-Bangladesh-16082024_2.pdf> accessed 20 September 2025

Allegation of no genuine accountability efforts up to 5 August is Unfounded: Paragraphs 245-251

The comprehensive allegation that national law enforcement and investigative agencies were inactive during the unrest is entirely unfounded. In situations of widespread civil disorder, Governments universally face operational limitations while striving to maintain public safety, and Bangladesh was no exception.

The Government took proactive measures to uphold justice and accountability, notably establishing a judicial inquiry on 17 July 2024 to investigate incidents of violence, including deaths, vandalism, and acts of terrorism linked to the quota reform protests. While this inquiry faced operational challenges due to the rapidly evolving political landscape, the Government maintained its commitment to transparency and legal oversight. In response to media and human rights concerns, mechanisms were instituted to review allegations, including direct briefings by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister and follow-up investigations. Contrary to claims by OHCHR, inquiries into the use of firearms and allegations of torture were initiated, and internal reviews were conducted by multiple police units and law enforcement agencies, with individual officers held accountable where excessive force was verified. Routine operations by intelligence and security agencies, including DGFI and NSI, were carried out to safeguard public order²⁴⁹. The Government did not neglect its legal obligations; rather, it actively managed a national crisis while ensuring due process for claims of misconduct. The active role of opposition factions in instigating violence further complicated efforts to achieve full accountability across all levels of law enforcement.

BOX 10: Minister's Snapshot on Accountability Measures

The government engaged directly with student representatives, agreeing in principle to meet their nine-point demand—excluding resignation—by initiating a judicial inquiry into the violence and pledging that any responsible for excessive force would face consequences. Ministers stressed that the Prime Minister was open to apology and redress, but negotiations faltered as student leaders, under pressure from extremist and external influences, lacked authority to declare concessions. Despite attacks on officials and police by infiltrating groups (Jamaat, Hefazat, BNP etc), the government maintained a commitment to *dialogue, accountability, and addressing* legitimate grievances through legal processes.

- *Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury Nowfel, Education Minister of the Awami League Government (2024)*

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

The establishment of the judicial inquiry on 17 July 2024 represented a significant and necessary measure by the Awami League Government to address the violent protests and public

²⁴⁹ Fortify Rights, 'Bangladesh: Ensure Accountability for Protest Killings and Violence, Support Survivors' (12 November 2024) <<https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2024-11-12/>> accessed 26 September 2025

unrest. The mandate of the inquiry was to investigate incidents of violence, vandalism, and acts of terrorism instigated by opposition elements, many of whom have a documented history of targeting state authorities. The inquiry was never intended to be one-sided; rather, it constituted an inclusive review aimed at identifying all perpetrators of violence, irrespective of political affiliation. Claims suggesting bias in the inquiry are unsubstantiated, as its central purpose was to assess the destruction caused by opposition actors and to restore public peace and order.

While the inquiry did not issue an interim report prior to 5 August, this delay was primarily a consequence of the acute security crisis that disrupted the functioning of judicial and investigative processes²⁵⁰. The Awami League unequivocally rejects allegations that the Government sought to suppress the truth. Security forces were deployed to uphold law and order during widespread unrest, and any application of force was directed toward protecting civilians and maintaining public safety in the face of violent rioters.

While in many spheres, the report has tried to show the vulnerabilities of the Government, at the same time, they were opposing the proactive approaches of law-enforcing agencies. Words from the same report are synonymous with each other. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) adheres to strict protocols governing the use of firearms, and any claims regarding unauthorised ammunition usage are investigated thoroughly. It is important to emphasise that law enforcement personnel frequently operated under high-pressure conditions, where necessary riot control measures could lead to confrontations with aggressive protesters. The Government remains committed to transparency and accountability, while recognising that the extraordinary nature of the unrest, exacerbated by deliberate instigations from opposition actors, often left security forces with constrained options to restore order²⁵¹.

The claim that law enforcement engaged in intimidation is categorically rejected. Throughout the period of political unrest, the Government maintained a clear and unwavering position of zero tolerance for violence and was fully committed to ensuring accountability for any excessive use of force by security personnel. While the presence of police in hospitals and communities during such turbulent times may have caused temporary confusion, all actions taken were within the lawful mandate of the Government to maintain public order. Allegations of intimidation are therefore inconsistent with the Government's conduct, which has consistently prioritised justice, transparency, and the protection of citizens. Any incidents of wrongful or overzealous behaviour by individual officers have been subject to formal investigation, and where appropriate, disciplinary measures have been implemented. The Government remains steadfast in upholding the rights of victims and ensuring that accountability and justice are fully realized²⁵².

On-going accountability efforts of the interim Government: Paragraphs 252-255

²⁵⁰ Prothom Alo, 'Sheikh Hasina's Trial: Judicial Process Mustn't Be Controversial' *Prothom Alo* (16 August 2024) <<https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/op-ed/ax3riixcwr>> accessed 26 September 2025.

²⁵¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh' (United Nations, 16 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/OHCHR-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Recent-Protests-and-Unrest-in-Bangladesh-16082024_2.pdf> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁵² Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission, Statement on accountability efforts (2024)

In response to claims regarding the purpose of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), such assertions are misleading. Neutral analyses have sometimes portrayed controversy; however, the establishment of the ICT was not a matter of political debate but a necessary and legitimate step to deliver justice for the victims of the 1971 Liberation War. The ICT's mandate is clear: to hold accountable those who committed atrocities and betrayed the nation during the struggle for independence. The tribunal addresses decades of impunity previously enjoyed by collaborators of the Pakistani military regime and constitutes a fundamental mechanism to safeguard the integrity of Bangladesh's independence and to uphold the legacy of the liberation struggle.

Paragraph 254 concerns regarding the appointment of defence lawyers, particularly those associated with Jamaat-e-Islami or other alleged war criminal factions, as chief prosecutors, merit scrutiny. Nevertheless, allegations of foreign influence or political bias against the ICT are often propagated by actors seeking to undermine Bangladesh's sovereign judicial process and obstruct accountability for the perpetrators of the 1971 atrocities. While certain international entities have expressed concerns about procedural fairness, such considerations should not obscure the essential objective of ensuring justice for crimes that defined the nation's founding. The Government's continued commitment to ICT proceedings reflects its adherence to the rule of law and the protection of foundational national values²⁵³.

Ultimately, the memory and legacy of the 1971 Liberation War are sacrosanct, and those responsible for war crimes must be held accountable. The ICT's work, notwithstanding the challenges and international scrutiny, remains indispensable for combating impunity, preserving national dignity, and ensuring that justice is served in accordance with both domestic and international legal standards²⁵⁴.

In **paragraph 255**, the OHCHR fact-finding committee raises several fair-trial concerns under the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Act. Consistent with the OHCHR's observations, we agree that the absence of essential fair-trial safeguards, particularly those relating to trial in absentia, which the ICT Act permits, could be weaponised as a judicial tool against senior Awami League leaders who remain in hiding for fear of unfair trials and arbitrary executions under the Yunus Government. What the committee does not address, however, is the unconstitutional amendment introduced by the Yunus Government that gave retrospective effect to changes in the ICT Act dating back to 6 January 2009. This date is significant because the 9th Jatiya Sangshad (National Parliament) elections were held on 29 December 2008, in which the Awami League-led Grand Alliance achieved a landslide victory. Following that election, Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as Prime Minister on 6 January 2009, marking the formal commencement of the Awami League's Government, a period that effectively paused after the July 2024 movement. The decision to apply the amendment retrospectively to this precise date reveals the political motive of the Yunus Government in seeking to legitimise actions against Awami League leaders through the ICT framework.

²⁵³ International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Bangladesh) <<https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-435.html>> accessed 20 September 2025; see also, OHCHR report acknowledging BNP expulsion of 44 local leaders and activists for participating in revenge violence (paragraph 217), United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh* (16 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/OHCHR-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Recent-Protests-and-Unrest-in-Bangladesh-16082024_2.pdf> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁵⁴ International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh, 'Prosecution and Accountability of 1971 War Criminals' (2024) <<https://www.ict-bd.org/prosecution-and-accountability-of-1971-war-criminals-2024>> accessed 23 September 2025

According to Article 35(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, ‘No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence’²⁵⁵.

Similar prohibitions against ex post facto criminal laws exist in many other countries across Asia and beyond. For instance, Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, Article 12(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 13(6) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978), Article 20(6) of the Constitution of Nepal (2015), and Article 39 of the Constitution of Japan (1947) all safeguard individuals from retrospective criminal liability. Comparable protections are found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), and section 11.2(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code (Cth) of Australia. At the international level, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) likewise affirms the principle that no one shall be held guilty of a criminal offence for an act that did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed.

The ICT Act was enacted in 1973, soon after independence, to prosecute 1971 war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, etc. The Act defines offences based on international crimes recognised before 1971 (Nuremberg Charter, Geneva Conventions, customary international law). Therefore, when it was argued that the ICT Act is based on retrospective effect from the very beginning by prosecuting the war criminals of 1971 when the Act did not exist, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has repeatedly held that: Crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes were already crimes under customary international law well before 1971. Therefore, prosecuting acts of 1971 under the 1973 Act does not violate Article 35(1) because the offences already existed in international law, even if not codified domestically²⁵⁶.

A few further observations from the Attorney-General’s Department and the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) are pertinent in clarifying why applying the ICT Act against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and other Awami League leaders cannot be justified, even though the same Act was previously applied retrospectively to prosecute war criminals. The Attorney-General’s Department of Australia emphasises that *laws must not impose criminal liability for acts that were not offences when committed, nor prescribe a heavier penalty than that which existed at the time of the act*, and that any retrospective criminal law must be *very carefully justified*²⁵⁷. This principle was elaborated in ALRC Report No 129, where the Commission examined protections against retrospective criminal legislation and stressed that, although such laws may be legally permissible in exceptional circumstances, they must never be designed to target or penalise specific individuals or groups unfairly²⁵⁸.

For instance, when the ICT Act was first enacted in 1973 and subsequently amended in 2013, the list of alleged war criminals was already identified, and the legislative changes were directed at known offences arising from the 1971 Liberation War. By contrast, as noted earlier,

²⁵⁵ Constitution of Bangladesh, Art 35(1)

²⁵⁶ *Abdul Quader Molla v. Bangladesh* (2013), *Chief Prosecutor v. Delwar Hossain Sayeedi* (ICT-1, 2013)

²⁵⁷ Attorney-General’s Department (Australia), ‘Prohibition on Retrospective Criminal Laws’ <<https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/human-rights-and-anti-discrimination/human-rights-scrutiny/public-sector-guidance-sheets/prohibition-retrospective-criminal-laws>> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁵⁸ Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Traditional Rights and Freedoms—Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws’ (Report No 129, 2015) <<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/traditional-rights-and-freedoms-encroachments-by-commonwealth-laws-alrc-report-129/>> accessed 26 September 2025

the latest amendment of 2024 appears intended to prosecute the Sheikh Hasina Government and the Bangladesh Awami League, and even to ban the political activities of the party before any specific criminal allegations have been judicially established. Though the fact-finding report claims ‘reasonable ground for belief’ the Sheikh Hasina Government has committed a crime against humanity, this rebuttal report unequivocally establishes that this claim is not valid and misleading. Moreover, the 2024 amendments introduce new grounds of liability, such as disqualification from public office merely upon being charged, and organisational penalties that did not previously exist. Applying these provisions to conduct that predates the amendments could therefore be challenged as an impermissible retrospective application of criminal or quasi-criminal penalties, in direct conflict with constitutional protections against ex post facto legislation.

Paragraph 256 catalogues suspensions, transfers, and prosecutions against police, BGB, and RAB officers. Yet OHCHR never interrogates whether these steps are genuine accountability measures or simply politically motivated purges. The irony is glaring accountability here is assessed under the “*terms of reference agreed with the interim Government*” (paragraph 243), a natural justice paradox, whereby the beneficiary of purges sets the evaluative framework. The absence of scrutiny of the Army, DGFI, and NSI is quietly noted but left unexamined, betraying reluctance to probe institutions aligned with the interim administration’s power calculus. The resulting narrative is not impartial oversight, but selective vengeance dressed up as accountability. As the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly emphasised (e.g., *Bleier v Uruguay*, HRC Comm. No. 30/1978), accountability requires independence and credibility, not processes conducted under the shadow of political expediency.²⁵⁹

In **Paragraph 257**, OHCHR critiques “*mass cases*” but curiously frames them as administrative dysfunction rather than exposing their substantive character: the systematic criminalisation of political opposition. The staggering figure of 98,137 accused, including 25,033 political leaders, is treated as a statistical curiosity rather than prima facie evidence of vindictive prosecution. In truth, this dragnet approach obliterates due process, overwhelms judicial capacity, and renders fair trials impossible.²⁶⁰ Yet OHCHR glosses over the obvious conclusion: these prosecutions were politically orchestrated, not legally grounded. That it treats comparable dysfunction under the ousted Awami League as “*no genuine effort*,” while narrating this as a mere irregularity, exposes the deep asymmetry in its methodology.

Paragraph 258 claims that Bangladesh “*lacks an effective independent mechanism*” to investigate police is well-known. Yet here, OHCHR paradoxically validates the interim Government’s reliance on police-driven investigations. If such mechanisms are inherently untrustworthy, then the ICT’s reliance on serving/former police investigators is equally flawed. This is a classic double standard: when it comes to the ousted Government, these flaws prove “*no genuine effort*,” but when it comes to the interim regime, they are tolerated as sufficient. Such inconsistency violates the impartiality OHCHR promised in **paragraph 244** and highlights the structural bias in its narrative.

Paragraph 259: Allegations of intimidation and tampering are accepted uncritically. OHCHR notes that many security officials remain in post but never explores how this coexists with the interim Government’s selective purges. Intimidation of victims and lawyers, if true, illustrates a systemic failure of accountability under the interim regime. Yet OHCHR frames these as

²⁵⁹ Human Rights Committee, *Bleier Lewenhoff and Valino de Bleier v Uruguay*, Communication No 30/1978 (29 March 1982) UN Doc CCPR/C/15/D/30/1978

²⁶⁰ Trechsel, Stefan, *Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings* (Oxford University Press 2005) 14-18

residual rogue acts rather than structural impunity overseen by the current authorities. Meanwhile, the on-going vengeance and killings after 5 August, reported widely elsewhere, are completely omitted, betraying the very duty of ex officio impartial investigations it proclaimed in **paragraph 244**.

BOX 11: No body contacted me:

I suffered physical assault after the fall of the precious regime. The crazy mob vandalised my office and did ablaze my car. My firearms were snatched away. My bodyguard was seriously injured. Apart from that my family was threatened to be destroyed by known and unknown entities by WhatsApp and social media. I also suffered several false cases too. I was not given any medical care. The interim government did not respond to any of my issues. I could not take any legal actions due to the indemnity law imposed by the interim government. However, it affected seriously my daily life and my family members. As there was imminent threats my family was supposed to change location at times. My children suffered traumatic experiences due to the unlawful mob activities. Still they do not go in public. One Victim Police Officer in a interview with the research team

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

Paragraph 260: The denial of access to defence lawyers, intimidation, and limited representation are grave breaches of natural justice. Instead of condemning them outright, OHCHR offsets these claims by mentioning the interim Government's "legal aid mechanism." This is indulgent and misleading. A sham substitute cannot fulfil the requirement of independent and effective remedies laid out in **para 244**. The true picture since 5 August has been one of systematic denial of due process, especially for those aligned with the Awami League or progressive ideals. OHCHR's refusal to call this out shows complicity in legitimising show trials and selective justice.

Paragraph 261: OHCHR acknowledges attacks on Awami League supporters, police, and minorities, but limits itself to citing "at least 100 arrests" in communal cases. It fails to test whether these arrests were genuine, prosecuted, or merely symbolic. This indulgent treatment stands in stark contrast to its scathing dismissal of the ousted Government's efforts. By not addressing whether prosecutions targeted perpetrators across the spectrum or whether state victims were systematically neglected, OHCHR erases whole categories of victims. The principle of equal protection of the law, affirmed in *General Comment No. 31* of the Human Rights Committee, is abandoned. Victims are implicitly divided into "worthy" and "unworthy," a profoundly dangerous precedent for international human rights reporting.

BOX 12: Statement 1 (19 July 2024, Rampura Police Station attack):

On 19 July, around 15–20 thousand people suddenly attacked Rampura Police Station. Though unprepared, we resisted under superior orders. With BGB and other forces, the situation was brought under control by 11 pm. At least 20 police officers, including OC Moshiur Rahman, were seriously injured. The attackers set fire to the police outpost and the PBI office, looted government property, and killed a PBI Inspector.

BOX 13: Statement 2 (18 July 2024, Rampura Bridge–Abul Hotel area):

On 18 July at about 10 am, while protests were ongoing near Rampura Bridge, extremists mingled with students and launched a deadly assault on police. They torched the traffic police box and about 20 motorcycles. Police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, but by 4 pm repeated bomb attacks left many officers injured, forcing us to retreat to Hatirjheel Police Station. The attack was the first of PTN attacks which included the

Paragraph 262: The indemnity order of 14 October 2024 is perhaps the starkest case of politicised impunity. By granting blanket protection to “*students and citizens*” of the uprising, the interim regime entrenched selective justice and codified revenge. While reading the October 14 order, interior ministry spokesman Faisal Hasan said²⁶¹,

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

Students and citizens who put forth all efforts to make this uprising successful will not face prosecution, arrest, or harassment for their acts between July 15 and August 8.

This impunity is a replica of the darkest practice of 1975, when indemnity was granted to the self-confessed killers of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The perpetrators of 5 August 2024, belonging to the same political belief system, are apprehensive that they too will be brought to justice for conspiring to unsettle an elected Government. Thus, this indemnity is not reconciliation, but a shield for their crimes. It is a blatant violation of the law, encourages unfettered violence, and has directly contributed to the gruesome reality Bangladesh has witnessed since 5 August dead bodies surfacing daily in rivers, with reports averaging 43 per month.²⁶² That OHCHR mentions this order only in passing and never brings this damning observation to light in its press briefings shows a hide-and-seek with the public at the cost of neutrality and objectivity. Instead of condemning this institutionalisation of impunity, OHCHR soft-pedals, thereby legitimising vengeance.

Paragraph 263: The reparations scheme is presented as evidence of redress, but OHCHR never asks who benefited. The vast sums (480m + 6.38b Taka) were politically directed toward protester victims, while families of Awami League supporters, police, and officials killed or assaulted were left out. This is reparations as a political reward, not impartial justice. By narrating it positively, OHCHR disguises the discriminatory and vindictive allocation of compensation. Victims of the wrong political identity are deliberately excluded, contradicting the non-discrimination principle in **paragraph 244**.

Paragraph 264: The so-called memorialization initiatives, playgrounds, “*Uprising Directorate*,” and curated exhibitions are nothing less than partisan memory politics. They seek to overwrite the glorious Liberation War of 1971 with a fabricated narrative of a “*Second Liberation of 2024*.” This is an attempt to erase national heritage and to canonise the violent overthrow of an elected Government as a sacred struggle. OHCHR irresponsibly lauds these projects as benign, failing to recognise that they are sheer nocturnal exercises by the Yunus administration to distort history. They aim to demoralise the spirit of 1971, which remains the foundational trauma and pride of the Bangladeshi nation. The report shows no understanding

²⁶¹ ‘Bangladesh immunity order sparks fears of justice denied’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 15 October 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/bangladesh-immunity-order-sparks-fears-justice-denied-3739596>> accessed 30 September 2025; see also, ‘Awami League condemns Home Ministry directives as immunity for protesters’ *Dhaka Tribune* (Dhaka, 14 October 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/362039/awami-league-condemns-home-ministry-directives-as>> accessed 30 September 2025

²⁶² “43 bodies a month recovered from rivers this year”, *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 30 August 2025) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/43-bodies-month-recovered-rivers-year-3973596>> accessed 22 September 2025

of the socio-economic and cultural context of Bangladeshi politics. It ignores that Dr. Yunus's gratitude to the students stems from a personal political debt; their agitation freed him from judicial accountability for labour law violations.²⁶³ Instead of investigating this manipulation of history, OHCHR validates it, revealing its callous and irresponsible approach to Bangladesh's political memory.

Paragraph 265: It is incomprehensible why OHCHR hails an unelected interim Government, devoid of constitutional or legal basis, for treaty ratification. Signing the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance under such circumstances is nothing but a political enigma, lacking genuine commitment. An unelected caretaker without a parliamentary mandate cannot meaningfully bind the state to international obligations. Under Bangladesh's Constitution, treaty ratification requires executive decision backed by parliamentary oversight. In the absence of Parliament, even the President is unlikely to have been properly briefed or consulted. To present this as a laudable act of accountability is misleading. In contrast, it was Sheikh Hasina's elected Government that ratified the ICC Rome Statute, a historic move reflecting Bangladesh's genuine willingness to bring perpetrators of genocide and international crimes to justice forty years after independence.²⁶⁴ A democratic leader who internationalised Bangladesh's commitment to accountability under the Rome Statute is hardly credible as an architect of international crimes herself, absent convincing evidence to the contrary. By praising the interim Government's superficial gestures while downplaying the elected Government's substantive contributions, OHCHR undermines its own impartiality and professionalism.

²⁶³ "Bangladesh court overturns Yunus' conviction in labour law case, lawyer says", Reuters (7 August 2024) <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-court-overturns-yunus-conviction-labour-law-case-lawyer-says-2024-08-07/> accessed 10 September 2025.

²⁶⁴ United Nations Treaty Collection, 'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court' https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en accessed 25 September 2025.

X. Findings on Responsibilities for Violations of International Law and Human Rights Abuses

This section refutes OHCHR’s attribution of responsibility arguing that law enforcement responses were proportionate, opposition violence is understated, and the crimes-against-humanity framework was wrongly applied.

1. Misrepresentation of Bangladesh Protests in July 2024

Response to Para 266–268:

The report wrongly suggests that the former Government systematically engaged in serious violations against peaceful protestors. This framing is misleading, malicious and factually incomplete for several reasons.

First, Protesters admitted their own act of violence. Student coordinators, including their allies (other political parties) themselves openly admitted that they would not have been successful without violence. They confessed to killing thousands of police officers²⁶⁵, burning metro rails and BTV Bhaban landmarks²⁶⁶. Such actions clearly prove the so-called “protests” were in fact a violent conspiracy, not a peaceful movement.

Second, Terrorist groups were involved under the veil of student protest.²⁶⁷ Extremist organisations, both international and domestic, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbut Tahrir, revealed their role, including the use of sniper trainers to aid the protestors²⁶⁸. Members of Hizbut Tahrir were seen coordinating with student organisers. Similarly, activists of Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, admitted to infiltrating the Awami League’s student wing (Chhatra League), disguising their identity, and committing armed violence while posing as rival activists²⁶⁹.

Third, Unprecedented brutality by protesters cannot be ignored. Though the fact-finding report repeatedly mentions student protests as peaceful events and non-violent, approximately 3,200 police officers were brutally killed, burnt alive, hanged naked upside down, or beaten to death, including a pregnant policewoman. Civilians, including women and children, were shot dead, or executed in horrifying ways such as Abu Said was taken to the hospital 6 hours after he was injured while attempting to assault on-duty police officers. These atrocities have no precedent

²⁶⁵ BBC News Bangla, ‘জুলাই অভ্যুত্থানে রাজনৈতিক দলের ভূমিকা কতটুকু?’ (‘What was the role of political parties in the July uprising?’) (YouTube, 25 September 2025) <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdVYY8TG0MI>> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁶⁶ July Revolution could not have been realized without metro rail fires, killing of police officers” *Dhaka Tribune* (Dhaka, 27 October 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/363300/coordinator-hasib-without-metro-fire-and-police>> accessed 24 September 2025

²⁶⁷ Extremist organisations both international and domestic such as Lashkar-e-Taiba <<https://www.india.com/news/world/lashkar-e-taiba-toppled-sheikh-hasina-government-in-bangladesh-shocking-reports-says-hasina-was-7850253/>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁶⁸ Facebook, ‘Facebook share video’ (archive at Perma.cc, 12 November 2024) <<https://perma.cc/EA36-3M24>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁶⁹ *TBS Report*, ‘Shibir cadres operated inside BCL to gain influence: Student leader Abdul Qader names a few’ *The Business Standard* (Dhaka, 4 August 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/politics/shibir-cadres-operated-inside-bcl-gain-influence-student-leader-abdul-qader>> accessed 16 September 2025; see also, *Bangla Tribune Desk*, ‘ছাত্রলীগ পরিচয়ে নির্যাতনের অংশীদার হবেন ‘ছাত্রশিবিরের নেতাকর্মীরা’ (‘Chhatra League Identity Used to Participate in Torture: Allegations Against Islami Chhatra Shibir Activists’) *Bangla Tribune* (online, 4 August 2025) <<https://www.banglatribune.com/politics/other-politics/909844/>> accessed 16 September 2025

in Bangladesh's history of political unrest. Shockingly, the current interim Government has ignored these crimes and even granted indemnity to the perpetrators, thereby legalising mass murder and terrorism.

Fourth, OHCHR took a double standard in defining “*human rights violations*”. In recent times, when Western countries such as the UK²⁷⁰, the USA²⁷¹, Turkey²⁷², or France²⁷³ use law enforcement to suppress violent riots, it is called “*restoring law and order*.” Yet, when the former Government of Bangladesh attempted to stop an armed and extremist-backed conspiracy, it has been labelled “*breach of human rights*.” This demonstrates a clear double standard in the UN's interpretation of state responsibility. Any responsible Government has a duty to protect citizens, public property, and the integrity of the state from conspiracies designed to overthrow it.

Thus, the omission of protestors' crimes, extremist involvement, and admissions of violence makes **paragraphs 266–268** of the report partial, misleading, and unacceptable. And as such, their attempt to draft notes at **paragraphs 266-268**, including others, is nothing but a classic instance of an attempt to picturise a one-sided, politically motivated narrative to validate the acts of some traitors who seized power from a legitimate and legal people's Government in Bangladesh.

2. Individual Culpability and Overall Accountability Undermined

Response to Para 269 (On Accountability & Responsibilities):

The impugned OHCHR report claims the interim Government has an obligation to ensure accountability. Yet, it deliberately ignores the fact that the Sheikh Hsian Government has initiated investigation into the matters.

Judicial Investigation by the Former Government:

Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hsian, on 18 July 2024, had formed a three-member independent Judicial Inquiry Committee to investigate the killings, arson, and looting during the unrest. She also invited UN assistance, including advanced technology, to ensure a credible investigation while the movement turned into riots.²⁷⁴

Suspension of Investigation by the Current Interim Government:

After assuming power, Dr. Yunus deliberately suspended the Judicial Inquiry Committee. His administration further issued an **indemnity ordinance**, protecting violent criminals,

²⁷⁰ David Batty and Rajeev Syal, ‘UK riots: how does the violence compare with unrest in August 2011?’ *The Guardian* (London, 7 August 2024) <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/aug/07/uk-riots-how-does-the-violence-compare-with-unrest-in-august-2011>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁷¹ Daniel Bukszpan, ‘America's Most Destructive Riots of All Time’ *CNBC* (New York, 1 February 2011) <<https://www.cnb.com/2011/02/01/Americas-Most-Destructive-Riots-of-All-Time.html>> accessed 22 September 2025

²⁷² BBC News, ‘World at One: Bangladesh protests – who is to blame?’ *BBC News* (online, 13 August 2024) <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp8jdk9jlgpo>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁷³ France's streets ablaze as antigovernment protests disrupt daily life’ *Al Jazeera* (online, 11 September 2025) <<https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2025/9/11/frances-streets-ablaze-as-antigovernment-protests-disrupt-daily-life>> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁷⁴ “PM: Foreign technical assistance to be taken for judicial inquiry committee” *Dhaka Tribune* (30 July 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/353121/pm-foreign-technical-assistance-to-be-taken-for>> accessed 15 September 2025

extremists, and political thugs from prosecution.²⁷⁵ This act directly contradicts international human rights standards, ensures impunity, and replicates the shameful 1975 indemnity ordinance that shielded the killers of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

1. Therefore, the responsibility for failing to ensure accountability lies not with the former Government but with the interim Government under Dr. Yunus, which has obstructed justice and promoted impunity.

2. In the above premises, it could safely be concluded that the OHCHR report (**paras 266–269**) fails to reflect the true picture of events. By disregarding the protestors’ unprecedented violence, extremist infiltration, the mass killings of police and civilians, and the subsequent indemnity granted by the interim Government, the report distorts reality and unfairly targets the former Government.

3. We, however, believe that any balanced and credible report must:

- Recognise the violent and conspiratorial nature of the so-called “*protest.*”
- Hold perpetrators, including extremist groups and student organisers, accountable for killings, arson and destruction across Bangladesh.
- Acknowledge the former Government’s establishment of an independent Judicial Inquiry Committee.
- Condemn the indemnity ordinance issued by the interim Government, which grants impunity for mass atrocities.

As a result, until these omissions are rectified, the OHCHR report remains biased, partial, and unfit as an objective human rights assessment.

3. Former Government’s Restraint Contradicts Claims of Pre-mediated Suppression

Rebuttal to UN Report (Paras 270–271)

The allegations in **paragraphs 270-271** misrepresent the chronology and nature of the protest movement. The report wrongly suggests that the former Government engaged in a premeditated plan to retain power “*at all costs.*” In reality, the Government exercised restraint for two full weeks and only intervened once the so-called “*student protest*” was overtaken by extremist and violent elements. The claim that actions taken between 15 July and 5 August were aimed at suppressing peaceful dissent is therefore factually incorrect and grossly misleading.

4. From “Peaceful Quota” Protests to “Extremist-Led Violence”

Response to Para 270:

Peaceful Demonstrations to Political Agitation:

- *1st July 2024- Student Mobilisation Under “Students Against Discrimination”:*

The protests initially began as peaceful demonstrations led by university students demanding the reinstatement of the 2018 quota system in civil service recruitment. The movement gained

²⁷⁵ “Justice Makers slams indemnity to those responsible for recent uprising in Bangladesh” *The Business Standard* (15 October 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/justicemakers-slams-indemnity-those-responsible-recent-uprising-bangladesh-967616>> accessed 16 September 2025

momentum when, on 4 July, the Supreme Court upheld a High Court ruling against reinstatement.

- *10 July 2024- Legal Stalemate and Increased Protest Activity:*

Despite the court's ruling, students continued their movement, advocating for a legislative commission to reassess the quota issue. Protesters intensified their activities by blocking roads and disrupting daily life.

- *12 July 2024- Nationwide Traffic Paralysis and Civil Disruptions:*

While initial demonstrations remained non-violent, the blockade of Shahbagh intersection led to severe disruptions in Dhaka. Until this point, law enforcement refrained from using force, maintaining order through minimal intervention.

- *16-19 July 2024- Escalation into Violence: Organised Extremist Involvement, Radicalisation and Targeted Destruction:*

From 16 July onward, the protests took a violent turn, marked by arson, attacks on key Government installations, and clashes with law enforcement. Evidence suggests the involvement of extremist political factions and radicalised groups that infiltrated the student-led movement. State-owned infrastructures, including metro rail stations, expressways, the Bangladesh Television headquarters, and major hospitals, were systematically targeted. Armed mobs wielding deadly weapons, including machetes and explosives, launched assaults on security forces and Government offices, leading to widespread destruction.

- *20 July 2024- Curfew Imposition and Army Deployment: Law Enforcement Response: Necessity and Legal Framework:*

In response to escalating violence, the Government imposed a curfew and deployed military personnel. The decision was based on national security considerations and legal provisions under the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) Sections 127-130 and Police Regulations of Bengal (PRB) 1943, Regulations 153(b) & 153(c), which authorise the use of force to disperse riotous assemblies and protect state properties.

- *26 July- 5 August 2024- Countering Extremist Violence:*

Despite efforts to restore order, extremist groups continued coordinated attacks on police officers and Government employees. Reports confirm the brutal killings of law enforcement personnel, including the hanging of a police officer from a footbridge in Jatrabari and the targeted murder of a pregnant female officer in Enayetpur Police Station.

The UNHRC's estimate of 44 police deaths fails to reflect the full scale of violence, as 187 police personnel remain unaccounted for, suspected to have been killed by extremist elements. Moreover, 607 police members sustained severe injuries, with many permanently incapacitated. Over 5,749 firearms and 651,609 rounds of ammunition were looted by the attackers, along with the destruction of 460 police stations and over 1,000 state-owned vehicles.

Peaceful protests were allowed until violence erupted:

The Government allowed it to continue for more than two weeks without a crackdown, respecting the right to peaceful assembly. Intervention only became necessary after 15 July 2024, when the protest escalated into an armed and violent movement, resulting in killings, arson, and the destruction of public property.

Despite efforts to restore order, extremist groups continued coordinated attacks on police officers and Government employees. Reports confirm the brutal killings of law enforcement personnel, including the hanging of a police officer from a footbridge in Jatrabari and the targeted murder of a pregnant female officer in Enayetpur Police Station.

Misinformation and Biased International Assessment:

The Case of Abu Sayeed and Mir Mahfuzur Rahman Mugdho: Distorted Narratives:

The deaths of student activists Abu Sayeed and Mugdho were widely publicised to incite public outrage. However, forensic reports indicate discrepancies in the claims against law enforcement. In Abu Sayeed's case, his injury was not immediately fatal, and no lethal weapons were used against Mugdho. The UNHRC's failure to verify these claims independently raises concerns about its impartiality.

Planned a conspiracy to overthrow the elected Government through violence.

Intelligence reports, later corroborated by the protestors' own confessions, confirmed that Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing (Islami Chhatra Shibir), Hizbut Tahrir, and other radical elements had infiltrated the protest.²⁷⁶ These groups openly admitted to using violent tactics, including sniper training, disguising themselves as Chhatra League activists to commit murders, and targeting police officers. Such admissions prove the protest was not a spontaneous or peaceful movement, but a conspiracy to topple the then-government.

Prime Minister's warning was justified, not repressive:

When the Prime Minister signalled a hardline approach after 15 July, it was in direct response to intelligence showing extremist infiltration and organised conspiracies, not to repress peaceful student voices. Any responsible head of Government has a duty to protect national security, public property, and innocent civilians from terrorist-backed violence.

5. Proportionate Law Enforcement Response

Response to Para 271 (Alleged Mobilisation of Armed Actors):

Law enforcement response was proportionate to extreme violence:

The report wrongly describes the Government's response as a campaign of “*extra-judicial killings*” and “*arbitrary arrests*.” In reality, police and law enforcement forces were facing an unprecedented onslaught: approximately 3,200 police officers were brutally murdered, burnt alive, hanged naked, or beaten to death, including a pregnant policewoman²⁷⁷. Civilians,

²⁷⁶ “Chhatra Shibir played direct role in mass uprising: Sarjis Alam” *The Business Standard* (31 December 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/chhatra-shibir-played-direct-role-mass-uprising-sarjis-alam-1031236>> accessed 15 September 2025

²⁷⁷ *Correspondent at Pabna*, ‘BNP leader faces heat over 'slip of the tongue' regarding Enayetpur police killings’ *The Daily Star* (online, 12 January 2025) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/bnp->

women, and children were also killed and raped in large numbers by protestors. To ignore these atrocities while blaming the state is both biased and unjust.

Armed violence came from protestors, not the state:

Far from being disarmed, the mobs were heavily armed with firearms, petrol bombs, machetes, and sniper weapons. They openly admitted to their violent tactics in interviews and public forums after the regime change. In such a context, the Government's mobilisation of security forces was not an attempt to retain power unlawfully, but an essential measure to prevent total anarchy and further bloodshed.

Failure of the current interim Government to prosecute perpetrators:

After coming to power, Dr. Yunus' regime issued an indemnity ordinance granting blanket immunity to those who committed these heinous crimes²⁷⁸. This includes murderers of thousands of police officers and civilians, rapists, and arsonists. By halting the judicial inquiry initiated by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the interim Government has ensured impunity. This is the real and on-going violation of international human rights obligations, not the lawful actions taken by the former Government to contain terrorist-backed violence.

And as such, the OHCHR's portrayal in **paras 270–271** is biased, incomplete, and misleading. Their impugned report ignores:

- The Government's restraint between 1–15 July.
- The infiltration of the protest by Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbut Tahrir, and other extremist groups, as admitted by themselves.
- The unprecedented scale of violence, killings, and destruction was committed by the protestors.
- The fact that law enforcement action was necessary to prevent the total collapse of law and order.
- The suspension of judicial investigations and the indemnity granted by the current interim Government are a real violation of human rights standards.

Therefore, the allegations in **paras 270–271** lack balance and fail to reflect the true sequence of events. Any impartial assessment must acknowledge both the violent crimes committed by the protestors and the former Government's duty to respond in defence of the state, its institutions, and its people.

6. Portraying a violent, extremist-driven movement as a “peaceful protest”

Rebuttal to UN Report (Paras 272-273):

The claims made in **paragraphs 272–273** are factually incorrect, misleading, and unsupported by credible evidence. They attempt to portray a violent, extremist-driven movement as a “*peaceful protest*” and misattribute fabricated statements to senior Awami League leaders to malign the former Government and justify a distorted narrative with malafide intent.

leader-faces-heat-over-slip-the-tongue-regarding-enayetpur-police-killings-3797776> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁷⁸ “JusticeMakers slams indemnity to those responsible for recent uprising in Bangladesh” *The Business Standard* (15 October 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/justicemakers-slams-indemnity-those-responsible-recent-uprising-bangladesh-967616>> accessed 15 September 2025

BOX 14: Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) President Saddam Hussain expressed his strong disapproval of the one-sided and biased interview

While sharing his personal observations on the July movement, Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) President Saddam Hussain expressed his surprise at how the quota reform movement evolved into a protest against the Sheikh Hasina government. According to Saddam, the government had already addressed the quota issue in 2018 by abolishing all quotas in higher-ranking government jobs. However, the matter resurfaced following a writ petition to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court and a subsequent ruling declaring the removal of quotas unconstitutional.

Saddam emphasised that the government consistently supported the students' logical demands. During his interview, he repeatedly mentioned that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had instructed them to remain patient and avoid any confrontation with the general students throughout the protest. When asked whether he shared these views with the OHCHR team, Saddam explained that although the team contacted him through a third party and conducted a 45-minute interview, it was one-sided and dismissive of his alternative perspective. He observed that the questions appeared to be framed with a predetermined mindset, seemingly aimed at eliciting responses that would serve their own narrative rather than reflecting a balanced inquiry

As President of the BCL, Mr Saddam expressed deep regret that more than half a million student members of the organisation have effectively lost their right to education in the aftermath of the protest. Following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, protesters allegedly targeted BCL activists as part of a campaign of repression: over 10,000 members reportedly had their academic certificates burned, hundreds were expelled from their educational institutions, and thousands more have either been arrested or forced into hiding to avoid detention under what he described as fabricated criminal charges.

Source: Interview taken by the Rebuttal Team on 25 September 2025 (Record on file)

7. Alleged Orchestrated Attacks by Chhatra League

Response to Para 272: Chhatra League and other Awami League supporters

The impugned UN report mischaracterises the nature of the events. By 15 July 2024, the so-called “*student protest*” had already been hijacked by extremist and radical groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir and Hizbut Tahrir. These groups have publicly confessed to infiltrating student organisations, disguising themselves as Chhatra League members, and committing murders and attacks under false identities. The very first attack was made on the Chhatra League by the violent protests. Therefore, the claim that Chhatra League alone orchestrated violence is malafide, partial and misleading.

Fabricated statements falsely attributed to leaders:

The allegation that the Chhatra League President pledged that “*no Razakar will be on the streets*” or that he gave directives to attack students is vague, unverified, and unsupported by

any credible source. Similarly, the suggestion that Obaidul Quader incited Chhatra League to suppress the protests is a misrepresentation designed to discredit Awami League leaders. Neither the Prime Minister nor senior Awami League officials ever issued directives to commit violence against students.

BOX 15: Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) General Secretary, Sheikh Wali Asif (Enan) confirmed that BCL never initiated any attack at Dhaka University

BCL Secretary Sheikh Wali Asif Enan, during his interview with the rebuttal team, expressed strong disapproval of what he described as a biased and baseless claim by the OHCHR team that BCL activists had attacked general students and escalated the violence. He firmly denied these allegations and confirmed that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had repeatedly instructed them not to engage in any form of violence against the general student body. According to Enan, the Prime Minister consistently advised, ***“Your purpose is to study and remain politically conscious. You must not resort to violence or terror.”***

Enan further stated that Prime Minister Hasina categorically urged them to maintain the highest level of patience when he, along with seven other core committee members of BCL, visited Gonobhaban (the official residence of the Prime Minister) in mid-July to report on the ongoing protests. Even when they expressed concern that armed cadres were infiltrating the protesting students and complicating the situation, the Prime Minister reassured them that the security forces were responsible for addressing such threats. She instructed them to remain calm and completely refrain from any form of violence. In accordance with her advice, BCL members stayed composed and avoided confrontation. Nevertheless, the protest movement became increasingly violent and, according to Enan, began deliberately provoking BCL members.

For example, at 3 a.m. on 14 July 2025, BCL announced a peaceful gathering in front of the Raju Sculpture at 12 noon on 15 July 2025. Upon learning of this, the protesting students declared a counter-procession at the same time and venue. To avoid potential conflict, BCL postponed their program to 3 p.m. Although the protesters assembled at the Raju Sculpture at noon, their numbers were initially small. Nevertheless, they continued their procession even past the rescheduled time. Around 3:30 p.m., when BCL members continued to exercise restraint, the protesting students allegedly began raiding residential halls and attacking BCL members without provocation.

Enan emphasized that at that point BCL members acted solely in self-defense. He also noted that several national dailies, including *Prothom Alo*, reported that the protesters had initiated the attack. However, he lamented that the protesting students were ultimately able to mislead the public through carefully crafted social media campaigns.

Source: Interview with the Legal Team, detailed record on file.

8. Alleged Attacks Led by Awami League Supporters: Response to Para 273

Use of “Razakar” [traitor] terminology contextualised:

The historical reference to “Razakar” [traitor] is linked to collaborators of Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War, many of whom were tied to Jamaat-e-Islami. Since Jamaat and its student wing Chhatra Shibir were confirmed to be infiltrating and driving the violence, any use of the

term was directed at war crime-linked conspirators, not at genuine students exercising democratic rights. Later, it was revealed that Jamaat-e-Islam and Chatro Shibir had substantially orchestrated the protest²⁷⁹.

Extremist admissions prove infiltration:

Multiple confessions by Islami Chhatra Shibir leaders, including public statements by Sarjis Alam, confirm that Chhatra Shibir was the main force behind toppling the elected Government. Hizbut Tahrir also admitted deploying snipers and providing armed support. These groups openly acknowledged working under disguises, including as Chhatra League members, while committing killings, arson, and other atrocities. The UN's failure to reflect this proves selective reporting to establish a one-sided comparative narrative.

Misrepresentation of events:

The report wrongly suggests that Chhatra League and Awami League members “*attacked*” protestors. In reality, it was the protestors, backed by extremist groups, who launched brutal attacks on Chhatra League activists to provoke confrontation and create a false narrative of state-backed violence.

Awami League did not attack students; it resisted conspirators:

As a political organisation, Bangladesh Awami League sought to defend democracy and resist conspirators who aimed to destabilise Bangladesh through extremist-backed violence. Actions taken by its members were not against peaceful students but against infiltrators and armed mobs who brutally murdered police officers, civilians, and Awami League activists. To portray these defensive actions as “*attacks on protestors*” is to erase the crimes of extremist groups and blame those who resisted them.

Accordingly, the allegations in **paragraphs 272–273** are baseless, unsubstantiated, and biased, for the following reasons:

- No verified evidence exists to prove that Awami League officials ordered or incited attacks.
- The so-called peaceful protest was already hijacked by Jamaat-e-Islami, Chhatra Shibir, and Hizbut Tahrir, who themselves confessed to violent infiltration and terrorist tactics.
- References to “*Razakar*” [traitor] are historically and contextually linked to Jamaat-e-Islami, the war criminal party that orchestrated the conspiracy.
- Awami League members acted in defence of democracy and public safety against extremist conspirators, not against genuine peaceful protestors.

And as such, until the UN acknowledges the infiltration, confessions, and extremist violence behind the July–August unrest, its narrative will remain incomplete and misleading.

9. Legality and Proportionality of Security Force Deployment during July–August 2024 Unrest

²⁷⁹ “Chhatra Shibir played direct role in mass uprising: Sarjis Alam” *The Business Standard* (31 December 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/chhatra-shibir-played-direct-role-mass-uprising-sarjis-alam-1031236>> accessed 16 September 2025; see also, *Our Correspondent, Pabna*, ‘BNP leader faces heat over ‘slip of the tongue’ regarding Enayetpur police killings’ *The Daily Star* (Dhaka, 12 January 2025) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/bnp-leader-faces-heat-over-slip-the-tongue-regarding-enayetpur-police-killings-3797776>> accessed 18 September 2025.

The assertions in **paragraphs** 274–277 present a biased and selective account of the July–August 2024 unrest. They wrongly frame the Government’s security response as “*indiscriminate*” and “*disproportionate*” while minimising the unprecedented level of violence and terror unleashed by protestors. This framing ignores both the scale of destruction and the legal duty of law enforcement agencies to protect lives, public property, and national security.

Response to Para 274: Alleged Unlawful Suppression of Peaceful Assembly-

- The claim that the police suppressed protests “*without valid grounds*” on 17 July is false and misleading.
- Police permitted the protests to continue freely from 1 July to 15 July, despite intelligence warnings, until violence erupted.
- From 15 July onwards, protestors ceased to be peaceful, armed mobs began killing police officers, setting fire to metro rail facilities, burning toll plazas, and attempting to storm Bangladesh Television (BTV) Bhaban.
- Under such conditions, police intervention was not only valid but a legal obligation under national and international law to protect the public, critical infrastructure, and state institutions.
- Protecting state infrastructure and law enforcement from violent extremists is a legal right, not a human rights violation.

Response to Para 275: Alleged Militarised Response-

- The deployment of RAB, BGB, and Ansar/VDP battalions was not pre-emptive militarisation but a lawful and necessary measure against escalating violence.
- Protestors were not merely “*blocking roads*”, they were armed, trained, and executing coordinated attacks, including targeted killings of approx. 3,200 police officers, many of whom were burnt alive or beaten to death.
- In such circumstances, no responsible Government could leave police forces unprotected. The deployment of additional security forces was proportionate to the extraordinary level of threat, not an attempt to suppress peaceful dissent.

Response to Para 276: Alleged Indiscriminate Use of Firearms was a Last Resort Defensive Measure

- The report admits that “*some elements*” in the crowds engaged in unlawful violence. This is a gross understatement: in reality, large sections of the protest movement were dominated by extremist groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir and Hizbut Tahrir, who confessed to using sniper rifles, disguises, and armed infiltration.
- The crowd’s attempt to seize BTV Bhaban on 18 July, alongside coordinated arson attacks on national infrastructure, amounted to an organised attempt to collapse state authority.
- In such a scenario, the Government’s instruction to security forces to use “*maximum force*” was not indiscriminate; rather, it was a last-resort defensive measure to prevent the collapse of national institutions and ensure public safety.

Response to Para 277: Alleged Point-Blank Killings-

- The allegation that security forces “*deliberately killed or maimed victims, including children, at point-blank range*” is unsubstantiated and one-sided.

- The report fails to acknowledge that children and civilians were deliberately used by extremist infiltrators as human shields, a tactic confirmed by multiple eyewitness accounts.
- Moreover, many of the deaths attributed to state forces were in fact caused by armed protestors themselves, who openly admitted to targeting civilians, using sniper fire, and staging attacks disguised as Government supporters.
- Without a verifiable and impartial investigation, such serious allegations cannot be accepted as fact.

It is therefore to conclude that **Paras 274–277** of the impugned UN report omit crucial facts and distort the reality of the events, including, but not limited to:

- Police allowed peaceful protest until 15 July, only intervening when it turned violent and deadly.
- Extremist groups hijacked the protest, committing murder, rape, arson, and destruction of infrastructure on an unprecedented scale.
- The deployment of security forces and use of strong measures were lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the terrorist-level threat posed.
- The UN’s narrative ignores the Government’s legal duty to protect its citizens and selectively blames law enforcement while downplaying protester-led atrocities.

Any impartial report must acknowledge that the July-August unrest was not a case of peaceful assembly suppressed by the state, but a premeditated conspiracy led by extremist groups to destabilise Bangladesh through terror and violence.

10. Lawful Emergency Measures, Mischaracterised Findings, and the Need for Independent Forensic Investigations

Rebuttal UN Paras 282 & 287:

The conclusions in **paragraphs 282 and 287** alleging that the political leadership of the former Government “*coordinated and directed*” an integrated campaign of serious violations and that no genuine investigations were undertaken are factually and legally unsustainable on the record available to date.

Measures were lawful responses to escalating violence, not a policy of persecution:

The State’s decision to impose curfew, deploy military personnel in support of civil authorities, and empower law enforcement to disperse violent assemblies was taken pursuant to Bangladesh’s statutory framework for public-order emergencies. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides magistrates and authorised officers with powers to control and disperse unlawful assemblies, and the Police Regulations of Bengal (1943) set out the circumstances in which force, including firearms, may be used to disperse riotous gatherings and protect life and property. These domestic provisions (CrPC; PRB) provided the legal basis for temporary military support to civil authorities during a period of rapid and violent escalation.

Defensive Measure under Legal framework for Public-order emergencies:

To combat rioting and preserve the lives and properties of the state and individuals, police and other law enforcement agencies are entrusted with power and authority by law. It is worth mentioning that the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) Section 127-130 and the Police

Regulation of Bengal (PRB) 1943 Regulation 153(b) & 153(c). PRB provisions state the scale of force to be used to disperse the rioters and preserve the lives and properties of the state. According to PRB Regulation 153, to save life and property, police are entitled to open fire on the unlawful and rioting crowd and even cause death. If the Magistrate is present there, he/she can give an order. If no Magistrate, officer in charge of a police station or any superior police officer is present, they can order to open fire. Details given below:

Police Regulations 153 (b) “as they are entitled by law to protect themselves and Crown property, e.g., their weapons, ammunition, motor transport, etc., against attack.” Such an attack may be met by force. This force should not inflict more harm than is necessary for protection but may extend to the causing of death. If these circumstances are fulfilled, a police officer of any rank, even that of a constable, is entitled to open fire.

Regulations 153 (c) “All ranks engaged in the suppression of a riot or in the dispersal of a riotous assembly must await the orders of a Magistrate, an officer-in-charge of a police station or a police officer superior in rank to such officer before firing”.

The impugned report of the UN HRC said that the force used by the police is disproportionate and inappropriate. It is not understandable how they reached such a conclusion. If there was no Magistrate present, as was the case mostly, the appropriateness of use of force by police is determined by an executive enquiry conducted by an executive Magistrate according to domestic law. The UNHRC does not have any authority to determine that without a report of an executive enquiry (if any).

Further, there was no indiscriminate firing. It was directed to the violent rioters who vandalised state properties and carried out inhumane and barbaric attacks on police and their family members, and innocent people. The report is superficial, biased, and one-sided and completely overlooked the widespread riotous situation created by the extremist rioters. It is evident that they try to favour the present regime. For the UN organisation, it is a matter of regret. They should have been neutral and impartial. The report is partial, one-sided and malafide.

Furthermore, they try to say it was a violation of human rights and a possible crime against humanity. Their comment obviously dents the image of the UN. It is defined in the ICC law what is crime against humanity is. When the state properties are burnt and Government officials are killed, the use of force by police or any security agencies to protect and prevent these entrusted by law cannot be a violation of human rights.

The fact-finding on the quota reform movement should have been carried out based on neutral perspectives and considering the deadly situations prevailing, which allowed police officers to use force to save their lives, public and private properties. They mainly used force based on the right of private defence and to prevent such deadly attacks by violent extremists disguised as protesters. Assessing violations of human rights should also cover such barbaric killing of police members.

On the other hand, it is obviously shocking that the present interim Government has issued an order indemnifying the violent extremist protesters directly involved in the killing of police members & burning police stations, vandalising state-owned properties and killing hundreds of innocent people. No lawful action will be taken against such violations of human rights and abuses. Family members of such killed police members, most of whom are low-ranking forces,

are completely ruined and hopeless to seek lawful actions against such brutal murder of their beloved one.

While protests were on-going, radical elements in the crowds committed a series of serious retaliatory violence against hundreds of Awami League activists and police members, which hasn't been reflected in the report. From 5 August, enraged crowds attacked Awami League offices, vandalised, looted, or burned down thousands of residences, homes and businesses belonging to Awami League leaders, Government officials, or their close family members. While the largest number of incidents of revenge violence seem to have taken place on 5 August and the days immediately after, OHCHR has failed or avoided to provide such statistics on violence being influenced by the interim Government.

OHCHR cannot provide its own estimate on the extent of revenge violence, in particular, the killings of police officers and Awami League members. They have mentioned the killing of 144 Awami League activists and 44 police members during attacks that occurred between 1 July and 15 August, which is too far from the actual statistics. Even OHCHR didn't assess the lynching of Awami League activists and police members independently. They merely depend on the statistics provided by the interim Government, which is biased, impartial, one-sided, purposeful, malafide.

The unrest was heavily penetrated and driven by organised extremist and political actors:

Credible contemporaneous reporting documents the active involvement of organised hard-line groups and elements of opposition networks in the July-August disturbances. Independent accounts and admissions by actors associated with Islami Chhatra Shibir and reports linking Hizb-UT-Tahrir and other hard-line formations to violent actions demonstrate that the unrest was not a purely spontaneous student exercise but attracted well-organised violent elements seeking to exploit disorder for political ends. The presence of such organised non-state violence is central to any assessment of the lawfulness, necessity and proportionality of State responses²⁸⁰.

Forensic and criminal standards of proof differ from the “reasonable grounds” standard used in the Report, as OHCHR itself calls for further investigations:

OHCHR's own methodology acknowledges that its findings were made on a “*reasonable grounds*” standard and that the evidence it assembled warrants further criminal investigation rather than immediate prosecutorial conclusions. This caveat is material: it confirms that the Report's legal characterisations (including imputations of a state policy to attack civilians) are provisional and require independent, case-by-case forensic work (ballistics, autopsies, chain-of-custody documentation) before conclusions on individual or command responsibility can be sustained in a criminal forum.

The Report's motive analysis is implausible on its face:

The allegation that the legitimately elected Government would direct a campaign of mass

²⁸⁰ “Shibir played role of allies in July-August uprising: Sarjis” *The Daily Star* (31 December 2024) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/shibir-played-role-allies-july-august-uprising-sarjis-3788651>> accessed 16 September 2025; see also, “Chhatra Shibir played direct role in mass uprising: Sarjis Alam” *The Business Standard* (31 December 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/chhatra-shibir-played-direct-role-mass-uprising-sarjis-alam-1031236>> accessed 16 September 2025

violence against its own population to “*remain in power*” is divorced from basic motive analysis: the principal beneficiaries of the July-August violence were those who sought to capitalise upon disorder to delegitimise the Government and advance a regime change agenda. The record shows that violent actors targeted police, state broadcasting infrastructure, transport nodes and political opponents’ tactics consistent with a deliberate strategy to induce the collapse of state capacity. This is strongly suggestive that non-state actors, not the Government, had the dominant motive to perpetrate large-scale violence.

Notwithstanding the operational challenges created by the scale of the unrest, state authorities did undertake investigative and judicial steps, and subsequent suspension/indemnity decisions by successor authorities have themselves created accountability concerns:

The former Government initiated inquiry mechanisms to examine killings, arson and looting during the unrest²⁸¹. After the transition of power, the interim Government’s suspension of earlier inquiries and reported policies providing indemnity for certain actors materially complicate the accountability landscape and, if anything, are more consistent with a pattern of obstructing truth-seeking than were the actions of the former Government. These developments warrant scrutiny by impartial mechanisms²⁸².

Comparable State practice demonstrates that deployment of military or national guard forces to support police during violent unrest is neither novel nor *per se* unlawful:

International practice shows numerous instances in which democracies have temporarily mobilised military or reserve forces to assist civil authorities confronted with mass disorder, and where time-sensitive public-order imperatives justified those measures while investigations followed:

United States (Los Angeles, 1992) - The Governor called out the National Guard to restore public order after riots that produced widespread arson, looting and dozens of deaths; the Guard’s law-and-order role was temporary and subject to civil-law oversight²⁸³.

United States (2020) - Federal and State National Guard units were deployed to assist civil authorities during large-scale protests and disturbances; the legal frameworks for such deployments and subsequent reviews demonstrate that temporary force augmentation is an accepted tool of last resort²⁸⁴.

United Kingdom (2011) - Following large-scale rioting, the UK examined contingency plans for military assistance to police (Operation Tempered and related planning), and commentators

²⁸¹ UNB, 'PM: Foreign Technical Assistance to Be Taken for Judicial Inquiry Committee' (*The Business Standard*, 30 July 2024) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/353121/pm-foreign-technical-assistance-to-be-taken-fo>> accessed 20 September 2025.

²⁸² UNB, 'JusticeMakers Slams Indemnity to Those Responsible for Recent Uprising in Bangladesh' (*The Business Standard*, 15 October 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/justicemakers-slams-indemnity-those-responsible-recent-uprising-bangladesh-967616>> accessed 25 September 2020

²⁸³ Jeff Wallenfeldt, 'Los Angeles Riots of 1992' (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 3 September 2025) <<https://www.britannica.com/event/Los-Angeles-Riots-of-1992>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁸⁴ Joseph Nunn, 'The President’s Power to Call Out the National Guard Is Not a Blank Check' (Brennan Center for Justice, 18 November 2024) <<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/presidents-power-call-out-national-guard-not-blank-check?utm>> accessed 25 September 2020

stressed that armed forces assistance should be a last resort while police retain primacy. The UK precedent underscores the international norm that military support to civil power, if limited, accountable and proportionate, is within the range of lawful State responses to severe public disorder²⁸⁵.

These examples show that providing immediate, temporary military assistance to overwhelmed civil law enforcement is a recognised contingency in democratic practice, provided that use of force remains necessary, proportionate and subject to oversight. That is the normative yardstick that should be applied to Bangladesh's decisions, not a pre-judged criminal presumption.

In the above premises, the Report's allegations in **paragraphs** 282 and 287 overreach the available evidence and conflate lawful, proportionate, and legally authorised measures to restore order with a categorical assertion of politically directed criminality. A credible path forward requires:

- Independent, transparent, and forensically rigorous investigations (ballistics, autopsies, chain-of-custody) into every contested lethal incident, with access to original evidence and witness protection. OHCHR's call for further criminal inquiries should be heeded as the appropriate next step.
- A comprehensive and balanced victims' registry that records civilian fatalities and law-enforcement casualties alike, and which is open to independent audit.
- International technical assistance (forensics, judicial capacity building) to ensure that findings are robust and meet international evidentiary standards before any imputations of State criminal policy are advanced publicly or in legal fora.

11. Misapplication of the Crimes against Humanity Framework

Rebuttal to UN Report (Paras 290–295):

The allegations in **paragraphs 290–295**, which claim that crimes against humanity were committed by the Government, are deeply flawed, one-sided, and lack credible evidentiary backing. They ignore the true nature of the protests, which, from 15 July 2024, ceased to be peaceful demonstrations and escalated into an organised violent movement, orchestrated by extremist groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and Hizbut-Tahrir. These groups themselves have publicly confessed to infiltrating student ranks, engaging in sniper training, arson, targeted killings, and disguising themselves as Chhatra League members to carry out atrocities.

By omitting these critical facts, OHCHR's conclusions fail the test of impartiality and accuracy, and instead propagate a distorted narrative that unfairly criminalises the state and its security forces.

Response to Para 290 (Crimes against Humanity Claim):

²⁸⁵ James Meikle, 'London Riots: Army Should Be Last Resort, Say Experts' (*The Guardian*, 9 August 2011) <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-army-last-resort>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, 'Operation Temperer' (Wikipedia, 9 April 2024) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Temperer> accessed 21 September 2025

- The invocation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute is misplaced. To qualify as crimes against humanity, the acts must be part of a “*widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population*” pursuant to a state policy.
- What occurred in Bangladesh was not an attack on civilians, but a defensive security response to a violent insurrection that targeted civilians, security officers, and critical state infrastructure.
- Thousands of violent actors set fire to metro rail, BTV Bhaban, police stations, highways, and toll plazas, and murdered on-duty police officers are acts that are consistent with terrorism, not peaceful dissent.
- Security operations were guided by lawful mandates under the *Penal Code 1860, Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) Sections 127–130, and Police Regulations of Bengal (PRB) 1943*, which empower the state to disperse riotous assemblies and protect national security.

Response to Para 291 (Targeting Civilians Claim):

- The assertion that security forces targeted “*students, opposition party members, journalists, and unemployed youth*” solely based on characteristics is unfounded.
- Arrests and interventions were targeted at those directly involved in violent acts or at risk of orchestrating violence, not at peaceful demonstrators.
- By mid-July, the protests were infiltrated by radical groups. Confessional statements from Islami Chhatra Shibir leaders (e.g., Sarjis Alam’s admission and Jamaat’s leaders admitting their role in the protest) prove that the protest was hijacked with the clear objective of toppling the democratic Government through violence, not peaceful dissent.
- Therefore, the arrests and detentions were legitimate counter-terrorism measures, not arbitrary persecution.

Response to Para 292 (Alleged Extrajudicial Killings)

- The claim that security forces engaged in systematic extrajudicial killings is unsupported by verifiable evidence.
- Many deaths attributed to state forces were in fact caused by protester-on-protester violence, extremist infiltrators, or arson and sabotage orchestrated by Jamaat-Shibir militants who admitted to killing both police and civilians.
- The allegation of “*shooting at point-blank range*” remains unsubstantiated by independent forensic investigation. Without impartial evidence, such claims remain speculative and politically motivated.
- Importantly, law enforcement officers themselves were among the main victims, with hundreds killed or injured, demonstrating that they were not aggressors but targets of the insurrection.

Response to Para 293 (Alleged Inhumane Acts and Maiming)

- The report accuses Awami League supporters and security forces of machete attacks and deliberate maiming. This is a gross distortion of facts.
- Eyewitness accounts and confessions show that violent infiltrators disguised as Chhatra League activists carried out such brutal attacks to falsely implicate the ruling party and create

anti-government sentiment²⁸⁶. Injuries among protesters occurred largely due to violent clashes between rival groups of protestors, arson attacks, and extremist tactics, not systematic state-led brutality.

Response to Para 294 (Alleged Torture in Custody)

- The sweeping allegation of “*systematic torture*” is unproven and lacks credible evidence.
- Many so-called “*victim testimonies*” collected by OHCHR were sourced from politically motivated exile groups and partisan NGOs, raising serious credibility concerns.
- Moreover, confessions of protesters about sniper training, attacks on police, and arson demonstrate that security agencies sought actionable intelligence to prevent further terrorist acts. Therefore, lawful security measures were necessary, not a systematic torture campaign²⁸⁷.

Response to Para 295 (Alleged Arbitrary Detention)

- The claim of “*thousands arbitrarily detained*” ignores the legal framework under which arrests were made.
- Individuals arrested were primarily involved in riot, arson, murder of police, sabotage of state infrastructure, and conspiracy against the state²⁸⁸.
- Arrests were made under lawful provisions of the CrPC, Penal Code, and Anti-Terrorism Act. Judicial oversight mechanisms existed, and detainees were subject to the criminal justice process.
- Allegations of warrantless home raids and detaining children are unsubstantiated and exaggerated. In reality, many minors were exploited by extremist groups as human shields, a war crime under international law, and were safely rescued by security forces, not unlawfully detained.

In light of the above, the OHCHR’s findings are politically biased, factually incomplete, and legally flawed. The impugned report:

- Fail to distinguish between peaceful protestors and extremist infiltrators engaged in terrorism.
- Mischaracterise lawful state security responses as crimes against humanity.
- Ignore confessions and evidence proving Jamaat-Shibir and Hizb-ut-Tahrir masterminded the violence.
- Selectively apply international law (Rome Statute) while disregarding the state’s legal duty to protect life, property, and sovereignty.

The truth is that between 15 July and 5 August 2024, Bangladesh faced an unprecedented violent insurrection disguised as a student protest. The Government and its security agencies acted within the law, under constitutional and statutory mandates, to protect the state and its citizens. To mislabel these actions as “*crimes against humanity*” is not only factually wrong but a dangerous attempt to delegitimise the state’s right of self-defence against terror and extremism.

²⁸⁶ TBS Report, 'Did Shibir’s DU Unit Secretary Farhad Also Hold a Post in Chhatra League?' (23 September 2024) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/did-shibirs-du-unit-secretary-farhad-also-hold-post-chhatra-league-948421>> accessed 25 September 2020

²⁸⁷ Jamuna TV, ‘The Army Chief Was Forced to Accept Yunus with Great Regret: Asif’ (YouTube, 18 July 2024) <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WxOdjWUS5hc>> accessed 21 September 2025.

²⁸⁸ Somoy News, 'Mirpur-10 Police Box Set on Fire' (18 July 2024) <<https://www.somoynews.tv/news/2024-07-18/4Nxxv83Jz>> accessed 21 September 2025

12. Interim Government's Failure to Prevent Mass Atrocities, Communal Violence, and Cultural Erasure

Rebuttal to UN Report Paragraphs 306 -308:

The portrayal of the situation under the interim Government following 8 August is misleading, incomplete, and in parts factually inaccurate. While the UN report suggests that the interim Government prioritised law enforcement and accountability, the reality on the ground since 5 August 2024 reflects an unprecedented **collapse of law and order** across Bangladesh, marked by unchecked violence, targeted attacks, and extremist mobilisation.

Collapse of Law and Order after 5 August:

Contrary to the UN report's narrative of stabilisation, lawlessness engulfed the nation after 5 August. Arson, looting, killings, and communal violence reached levels unseen in decades. Far from protecting civilians, the interim Government has presided over a situation where justice is absent, and violence is normalised:

- Numerous garment factories were vandalised and forcibly shut down, devastating the livelihoods of millions of workers and causing grave economic damage.²⁸⁹
- The Gazi Tyre factory tragedy, where approximately 180 workers were burned alive in an orchestrated arson attack, has been completely ignored by both the interim Government and international actors. This massacre alone underscores the regime's failure to prevent or even acknowledge crimes of mass violence²⁹⁰.
- Daily killings and assaults go unreported, and victims' families are left without recourse, as the justice sector remains **paralyzed**²⁹¹.

Communal and Extremist Violence on the Rise:

The interim Government's inaction has emboldened extremist groups and communal aggressors:

²⁸⁹ *Apparel Resources*, 'Around 140 Factories Shut, 134,000 Jobs Lost Amid Energy Shortages & Labour Unrest in Bangladesh' *Apparel Resources* (online, 24 December 2024) <<https://bd.apparelresources.com/business-news/sustainability/around-140-factories-shut-134000-jobs-lost-amid-energy-shortages-labour-unrest-bangladesh/>> accessed 16 September 2025; see also, Monira Munni, '59 Apparel Factories Shut as Labour Unrest Flares Up' *The Financial Express* (online, 24 September 2024) <<https://today.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/last-page/59-apparel-factories-shut-as-labour-unrest-flares-up-1727116019>> accessed 26 September 2025

²⁹⁰ *Prothom Alo*, '৬৭ শিল্পকারখানায় ভাঙচুর ও অগ্নিসংযোগের ঘটনা' ['Vandalism and Arson in 67 Industrial Factories'] *Prothom Alo* (online, 7 August 2024) <<https://www.prothomalo.com/business/industry/7chce8qnmng>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, *The Hindu*, 'A Grave Human Tragedy Unfolding in a Guttered Tyre Factory Near Dhaka' *The Hindu* (online, 25 August 2025) <<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/a-grave-human-tragedy-unfolding-in-a-guttered-tyre-factory-near-dhaka/article68577600.ece/amp/>> accessed 16 September 2025; see more, Saurav Hossain Siam, 'One year of Gazi Tyres tragedy: No closure yet for the families' *The Daily Star* (online, 25 August 2025) <<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/accidents-fires/news/one-year-gazi-tyres-tragedy-no-closure-yet-the-families-3970131>> accessed 16 September 2025

²⁹¹ *The Business Standard*, 'Interim Govt Failing to Meet Human Rights Promises: HRW' *The Business Standard* (online, 31 July 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/interim-govt-failing-meet-human-rights-promises-hrw-1201371>> accessed 20 September 2025; see also, Amnesty International, 'Interim Government Should Protect Freedom of Expression and Opinion' (6 March 2025) <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/9165/2025/en/>> accessed 20 September 2025.

- Since August, there has been a sharp escalation in attacks against Hindus and minorities, including widespread vandalism of temples, homes, and businesses. The Government has failed to act decisively against perpetrators²⁹².
- Extremist groups such as Hizb UT-Tahrir openly marched in Dhaka, led by students from Notre Dame College and Dhaka University, boasting of their role in orchestrating the July-August uprising. Their rhetoric and actions make clear that the so-called “*student movement*” was co-opted by extremist organizations²⁹³.
- Islamist groups now preach openly that Bangladesh must become an “*Islamic-only*” state, openly spreading hate speech against Hindus and other minorities without any attempt by the regime to intervene. This raises serious concerns of state complicity or at least wilful negligence²⁹⁴.

Systematic Destruction of National Heritage and History:

The UN report overlooks one of the gravest developments under the interim Government, the deliberate erasure of Bangladesh’s cultural and historical legacy:

Sculptures of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Rabindranath Tagore, Jibonananda Das, Michael Madhusudan Dutta, Begum Rokeya, and even the Language Martyrs have been demolished. This is nothing short of an attempt to rewrite Bangladesh’s identity and history.

On 5 February 2025, mobs destroyed the Bangabandhu Museum- the historic residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, central to the Liberation War legacy. This act of cultural desecration represents an assault not just on property but on the nation’s collective memory.

These acts are being carried out in broad daylight by extremist elements, yet the interim Government has taken no meaningful measures to protect these irreplaceable national symbols.

Violence against Political Opponents and Academics:

- Awami League leaders’ homes have been looted, vandalised, and set on fire without protection or investigation.
- Teachers across universities are being vilified, harassed, and physically attacked by radicalised students, many of whom openly admit to leading the violent uprising. Several teachers have been forced to resign under threats and intimidation, undermining Bangladesh’s education system.

Complicity and Failure of the Interim Government:

Instead of ensuring accountability, the interim Government has:

²⁹² Hannah Jose and Meghna Bali, ‘Hindus in Bangladesh Feel Betrayed by Attacks After Government’s Ouster’ *ABC News* (online, 13 August 2024) <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-13/bangladesh-hindu-protests-against-attacks-misinformation-spreads/104204946>> accessed 21 September 2025; see more, Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, ‘BHBCUC Reports 258 Communal Attacks in First Half of 2025’ (10 July 2025) <<https://bhbcop.org/news/25>> accessed 21 September 2025.

²⁹³ Ahmed Hussain, ‘Elite Dhaka Students March with Black ISIS Flags—It Reeks of Hizb ut-Tahrir’ (*ThePrint*, 11 October 2024) <<https://theprint.in/opinion/elite-dhaka-students-march-with-black-isis-flags-it-reeks-of-hizb-ut-tahrir/2306723/>> accessed 20 September 2025

²⁹⁴ YouTube, ‘ফ্যাসিস্ট আওয়ামী লীগ ইসকনের অপকর্মে মদদ দিয়েছে (The Fascist Awami League Has Supported ISKCON’s Wrongdoings) <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f0W2978Qw08>> accessed 26 September 2025; see also, ‘দেশ ছাড়া করার হুমকির অভিযোগ, নিরাপত্তা চায় হিন্দু পরিবার (‘Hindu Family Seeks Security Amid Threats of Expulsion from Country’) (Bangla bdnews24.com, 15 November 2024) <<https://bangla.bdnews24.com/samagrabangladesh/03ef5bacf882>> accessed 26 September 2025.

- Launched “*Operation Devil Hunt*” to target individuals who resisted arson and looting, rather than protecting victims.
- Failed to curb hate crimes on social media, where extremist propaganda circulates freely and incites violence.
- Adopted a posture of selective justice, focusing on alleged past abuses while ignoring the daily atrocities unfolding under its watch.

Misplaced Focus of the UN Report:

The OHCHR’s emphasis on “*transitional justice*” under the interim Government dangerously whitewashes the current regime’s failures:

- While the report underscores accountability for the past Government, it is silent on ongoing atrocities, including mass killings, cultural destruction, extremist rallies, and systematic communal violence after 5 August.
- This one-sided narrative risks legitimising the interim Government’s inaction, emboldening perpetrators, and deepening cycles of violence and impunity.

The period after 5 August has not been one of transitional justice or national healing, but rather one of lawlessness, extremist resurgence, cultural erasure, and communal violence. The interim Government has failed to safeguard citizens, protect minorities, or uphold Bangladesh’s historical identity. The UN’s failure to acknowledge these realities calls into question the impartiality and completeness of its assessment.

A credible and balanced account must recognise that current atrocities and extremist threats pose as grave a danger to Bangladesh as any alleged past misconduct, if not greater. Ignoring these realities undermines justice, fuels impunity, and risks enabling Bangladesh’s descent into chaos.

SECTION XI. Preventing Recurrence of Repression by Addressing Root Causes

This section focuses on the future reforms, arguing that OHCHR misdiagnoses the causes of unrest and that genuine solutions require addressing politicisation of the security sector, structural discrimination and mischaracterisations of development.

Paragraphs 309-311 advance two interrelated errors of analysis that fundamentally undermine the Report’s policy prescriptions:

Over-broad causal generalisation:

The Report treats the July–August 2024 events as the latest instance of a single, continuous pattern of State-led repression and thereby imputes to the former Government unitary policy intent to repress dissent. That conclusion elides crucial contemporaneous facts: by mid-July 2024, the demonstrations had been substantially infiltrated and co-opted by organised extremist and opposition networks that engaged in coordinated arson, targeted attacks on police and state infrastructure, and tactics designed to provoke the collapse of civil order. Credible contemporaneous reporting documents the presence and disruptive role of hard-line groups in the unrest. Any accurate assessment of causation or of whether force was systemic must therefore distinguish between (i) disproportionate or unlawful acts by State actors, and (ii) lawful defensive measures taken in the face of an armed, organised campaign to destabilise the State. The Report’s broad pattern under-weights the latter and thus overstates the probative force of historical precedents.

Selective omission of post-event dynamics that change accountability vectors:

The Report gives insufficient weight to the post-5 August deterioration in public order and the subsequent policy choices by the interim Government, notably the suspension of earlier judicial inquiry committee and reported indemnity-type measures that bear directly on who now control the investigative process and on where genuine impediments to accountability currently exist. In short, an assessment of systemic enabling structures must not only look backwards to institutional history but also forward to the present mechanics of accountability (which in this case reflects institutional disruption and contested investigatory authority). OHCHR itself framed its findings as requiring ‘further criminal investigation’ rather than as a closed prosecutorial dossier; that caveat is material and underscores the need for balanced, evidence-based inquiry rather than categorical attribution.

Rebuttal to Para 311:

Paragraph 311 of the OHCHR Report presents a superficial and unbalanced appraisal of the interim Government’s establishment of various reform commissions. While on the surface these commissions may appear as catalysts for institutional change, the paragraph uncritically accepts their formation as evidence of progress without examining their credibility, independence, or effectiveness. The absence of critical scrutiny is striking given that, since 8 August 2024, the interim Government has demonstrably failed to ensure law and order, protect minorities, prevent arson and vandalism of cultural heritage, or address the sharp escalation of extremist activity across Bangladesh.

By portraying these commissions as “*important catalysts*” without interrogating their mandate, composition, accountability mechanisms, or actual implementation record, the Report risks legitimising cosmetic gestures that have little practical impact. In fact, the so-called reforms have coincided with unprecedented levels of violence, the destruction of historic institutions such as the Bangabandhu Museum, and mass impunity for attacks against Awami League members and minorities. To praise the interim Government’s commissions in such circumstances amounts to rewarding inaction and legitimising a regime that has presided over the widespread breakdown of the rule of law.

Moreover, the **paragraph** fails to apply the same standards of accountability it demands of the previous Government. While the Report is quick to attribute intent and policy to former leaders, it remains conspicuously silent on the current leadership’s culpability in failing to prevent on-going atrocities. Such inconsistency reveals a double standard: the past is condemned in sweeping terms, whereas present failures are excused with vague references to “*potential reforms.*”

In summary, **paragraph 311** is analytically weak, politically selective, and divorced from the lived reality of violence and lawlessness in post-5 August Bangladesh. Rather than uncritically praising reform commissions, the Report ought to have insisted on demonstrable, measurable outcomes, genuine independence, and equal accountability for all actors, past and present.

1. Politicisation of the security sectors

The assertion in **paragraph 315** that police recruitment and promotions in Bangladesh were systematically politicised under the Awami League Government is both misleading and factually inaccurate. Recruitment to the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS), which includes the

Police Service of Bangladesh, is conducted exclusively through the Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC)- a constitutionally mandated independent body under *Articles 137–141 of the Constitution of Bangladesh*. The BCS examination follows a rigorous three-tier process comprising a preliminary MCQ test, a written examination, and a viva voce. This highly competitive process is open to all citizens and based solely on merit, leaving no scope for nepotism or political interference (Ref: Bangladesh Public Service Commission Act, 2018).

Furthermore, senior appointments within the police follow established rules under the *Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules 1981 Rules* and *The BCS (Examinations for Promotion) Rules, 1986* and subsequent service regulations, not arbitrary on political discretion. Allegations of DGFI, NSI or Special Branch “vetting” candidates on partisan grounds are unsubstantiated and contradict the transparent and rules-based promotion structure of the civil administration, like many other countries.

It is worth noting that similar recruitment and promotion mechanisms exist in many parliamentary democracies, such as the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) in India or the Federal Public Service Commission in Pakistan, both of which are also constitutionally independent and operate outside of partisan control. Bangladesh’s system is no different.

Thus, the sweeping claim of politicisation in paragraph 315 ignores the constitutional and legal safeguards in place, fails to provide credible evidence, and undermines the professionalism and integrity of Bangladesh’s civil service institutions.

2. Structural discrimination in law and in practice

The observation in **paragraph 331** reflects a fundamental misreading of Bangladesh’s constitutional history and liberation struggle. The 1972 Constitution, born directly out of the Liberation War of 1971, enshrined *Bengali nationalism* as one of the four state principles, not as an exclusionary identity, but as a unifying force against the genocide campaign carried out by the Pakistan military regime, which had explicitly denied the cultural and linguistic rights of Bengalis. The emphasis on “*Bengali*” identity must therefore be understood in the unique historical context of Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent state, where language and culture were central to the liberation movement.

It is incorrect to suggest that this constitutional framework marginalised non-Bengali groups. Article 28 of the Constitution explicitly prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, while Article 23 obliges the State to preserve and promote the culture of all communities. Furthermore, subsequent legal frameworks have continued to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous peoples and minority groups, demonstrating the inclusive intent of the Constitution.

The OHCHR’s commentary overlooks this historical and legal reality. Criticising the 1972 Constitution without adequate understanding of the Liberation War’s context risks undermining the foundational legitimacy of Bangladesh’s statehood and the sacrifices of millions who fought for freedom.

3. Mischaracterisation of Bangladesh’s Development and women’s empowerment under the Hasina Government

Rebuttal to UN Paras 332–333:

The assertions in **paragraphs 332–333** disregard the remarkable progress Bangladesh achieved under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, particularly in rural development, education, healthcare, social safety nets, and women’s empowerment. Over the past fifteen years, Bangladesh expanded its primary healthcare network to over 13,900 community clinics, reaching rural populations offering immunisation, antenatal/postnatal care, normal deliveries, and essential medicines while planning to add more clinics and refurbish thousands of existing ones²⁹⁵. The female secondary school stipend program continues to bear fruit: recent studies show it has boosted girls’ enrolment, delayed early marriage, and enhanced women’s participation in employment.²⁹⁶ International bodies have recognised Bangladesh’s community clinic-based healthcare model via a 2023 UN resolution and applauded its health service reach²⁹⁷.

The assertions in **paragraphs 332–333** further overlooked the substantial progress Bangladesh has made under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in poverty reduction and rural development. According to recent data from the World Bank report, extreme poverty declined to about 5.0 per cent in 2022 from significantly higher levels in previous years.²⁹⁸

Rural livelihood programmes, such as the *Nuton Jibon Livelihood Improvement Project*, have benefited nearly one million low-income households, most of them women, boosting incomes, improving food security, and access to health services²⁹⁹.

Initiatives like the National Urban Poverty Reduction Programme and the Livelihoods Improvement of Urban Poor Communities Project, in partnership with UNDP, have addressed urban poverty, improved living conditions, and empowered marginalised communities. These efforts, recognised in UNDP’s own publications, give credence to the view of Bangladesh as one of the better-performing countries in poverty alleviation and rural development, even while challenges remain³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁵ Business Inspection BD, ‘Bangladesh Expands Healthcare Reach with 14,253 Community Clinics’ (23 July 2023) <<https://businessinspection.com.bd/bangladesh-expands-healthcare-reach-with-14253-community-clinics/?utm>> accessed 21 September 2025; see also, TBS Report, ‘516 New Community Clinics Planned to Boost Grassroots Healthcare’ (20 August 2025) <<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/health/516-new-community-clinics-planned-boost-grassroots-healthcare-1216371?utm>> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁹⁶ Dhaka Tribune, ‘Bangladesh’s Investment in Girls’ Education Pays Off’ (13 March 2021) <<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/education/240961/bangladesh%E2%80%99s-investment-in-girls%E2%80%99-education-pays>> accessed 21 September 2025

²⁹⁷ Nandita Roy, ‘UN Recognition for Bangladesh’s Community Clinics’ (South Asia Monitor, 20 May 2023) <<https://www.southasiamonitor.org/un-watch/un-recognition-bangladeshs-community-clinics?utm>> accessed 21 September 2025.

²⁹⁸ World Bank, ‘Bangladesh Overview: Development News, Research, Data’ (27 June 2022) <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview?utm>> accessed 20 September 2025.

²⁹⁹ World Bank, ‘Building Community Institutions to Fight Poverty in Rural Bangladesh’ (27 June 2022) <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2022/06/27/building-community-institutions-to-fight-poverty-in-rural-bangladesh?utm>> accessed 25 September 2025.

³⁰⁰ United Nations in Bangladesh, ‘Low-Cost Climate-Resilient Housing in Chandpur: A Step Towards Urban Poverty Reduction’ (6 December 2023) <<https://bangladesh.un.org/en/254909-low-cost-climate-resilient-housing-chandpur-und-step-towards-urban-poverty-reduction?utm>> accessed 20 September 2025; see also, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Beyond Recovery: Towards 2030* (UNDP Bangladesh, 2023) <<https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/beyond-recovery-towards-2030?utm>> accessed 20 September 2025; see more, BRAC, ‘UNDP Ties Up with BRAC for Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh’ (20 February 2022) <<https://brac.net/latest-news/item/1349-undp-ties-up-with-brac-for-accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-bangladesh?utm>> accessed 21 September 2025

With regard to gender equality, Bangladesh has consistently ranked among the top performers in South Asia (*WEF Global Gender Gap Report, 2023*³⁰¹). It is particularly notable that during Sheikh Hasina's Government, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, and the Leader of the Opposition were all women simultaneously, a rarity in world political history and an emblem of Bangladesh's advancement in women's empowerment. To question women's participation in public and political life in this context appears not only misleading but dismissive of these extraordinary achievements.

Allegations of harassment during the protests, even if isolated, must not be mischaracterised as reflective of state policy or national culture. Bangladesh has enacted significant legal and policy frameworks to safeguard women's rights, including the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 2010 and the National Women Development Policy 2011. Suggesting that Bangladesh neglects women's empowerment or rural development is factually inaccurate and ignores well-documented progress.

SECTION XII: Conclusion

This concluding section summarises the rebuttal's overall position, arguing that the OHCHR report is partial, flawed and incomplete, and calls instead for a genuinely independent and broader investigation covering the full scope of July violence.

Upon a careful and detailed scrutiny of the OHCHR fact-finding report, it is evident that the document is selective, biased, and heavily distorted. The narrative advanced is constructed in a manner designed not to present a balanced account of the July–August 2024 events, but rather to malign and delegitimise the Government led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The report systematically omits or downplays critical facts, including violent infiltration of the protest movement by extremist and opposition forces, the large-scale targeting and killing of law enforcement personnel, destruction of vital public infrastructure, and the unprecedented post-5 August 2024 collapse of law and order marked by arson, looting, communal attacks, and heritage destruction. In doing so, it mischaracterises the complex reality as a singular state-directed policy of repression.

Here, it is pertinent to note that paragraphs which are not explicitly refuted or rebutted are the retaliation of the one-sided narrative to establish that the protest was peaceful and legitimate, which we have so far controverted to be wrong, and target-oriented to topple the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Therefore, the paragraphs were not explicitly addressed in this response, merely reflecting a repetition of a one-sided narrative that seeks to characterise the protests as peaceful and legitimate. However, this rebuttal report clearly illustrates that the OHCHR fact-finding report is not only factually misleading but also exhibits bias in its framework. The methodology employed by the fact-finding team vividly appears to be flawed and evidently designed with the political agenda of undermining and unlawfully dislodging the democratically elected Government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Hence, this rebuttal report underscores significant concerns regarding the OHCHR fact-finding report.

Further, we must approach this matter with empathy and a commitment to the truth and fairness, recognising the complexities of the situation and the importance of fair representation

³⁰¹ Time News BD, 'Report: Bangladesh Leads South Asia in Gender Parity' (14 June 2025) <<https://en.timenewsbd.net/bangladesh/xn0ZweG3dMDe/?utm>> accessed 20 September 2025

for all parties involved. The integrity of democratic institutions should be upheld, and efforts to delegitimise an elected Government through misleading narratives can have far-reaching consequences. This rebuttal report advocates a re-investigation and comprehensive examination of evidence, which would contribute positively to the discourse surrounding this important issue.

Our message is resolute and urgent: We strive for comprehensive justice. This necessitates a thorough re-investigation that will be impartial, inclusive and fair.

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APPENDIXES



বাংলাদেশ আওয়ামী লীগ
Bangladesh Awami League

Violence Against Women & Children

2024 - 2025



Introduction and Scope of the Crisis

Since August 2024, Bangladesh has witnessed a wave of high-profile cases involving rape, acid attacks, murder, and child abuse. These incidents not only expose the persistent vulnerabilities in society but also highlight deep-rooted flaws in law enforcement, judicial responsiveness, and social protection systems. This report seeks to document and critically analyze six major cases that have come to public attention over the past year. Each case demonstrates a different dimension of violence: acid attacks that scar victims for life, murders rooted in gendered power dynamics, rapes that reveal weak enforcement of the law, and child abuse that targets the most vulnerable. By examining these cases in depth, the report goes beyond documentation to uncover patterns of negligence, institutional weakness, and societal complicity that enable such crimes to persist.

The period from August 2024 to September 2025 has marked a devastating escalation in violence against women and children, described by human rights organizations as a “human rights crisis” of serious proportions. This rise in gender-based violence has unfolded against the backdrop of political instability, beginning with student-led protests over recruitment quotas in mid-2024. Those demonstrations rapidly evolved into demands for accountability and reform, creating a climate of unrest. As law enforcement weakened and institutions destabilized, perpetrators acted with greater impunity, intensifying an already critical situation for women and children across the country.

The six cases featured in this report illustrate how systemic failures compound personal tragedies. They reveal an environment where survivors are often silenced by stigma, families face pressure to withdraw complaints, and justice is routinely delayed or denied. Acid attack victims live with lifelong trauma, survivors of rape struggle against impunity and intimidation, and children endure violence in a culture that normalizes silence. Each case reflects not just an individual crime but the broader structural conditions patriarchal norms, lack of accountability, and ineffective protection systems that allow such violence to thrive.

Condensed Overview

The six cases explored in this report are diverse yet interconnected by the threads of impunity, patriarchal control, and systemic inadequacies.

- **Acid Attacks:** Acid violence remains one of the most horrific forms of gendered aggression in Bangladesh, often used as punishment for rejected marriage proposals or disputes over dowry. Despite strict laws, enforcement remains inconsistent, and survivors face lifelong medical and psychological consequences.
- **Murder Cases:** In several instances, women and girls who resisted harassment or abuse were silenced permanently through murder. These cases reflect the chilling reality of how violence is used to suppress agency and reinforce patriarchal dominance.
- **Rape and Sexual Violence:** High-profile rape cases since 2024 reveal both the scale of the problem and the systemic barriers victims face when seeking justice. Delays in trials, intimidation by perpetrators' families, and social stigma often compound the suffering of survivors.
- **Child Abuse:** Perhaps the most disturbing trend has been the increase in child-focused violence, where children—often underaged girls—become victims of sexual assault or physical abuse. These cases highlight both family vulnerabilities and state-level failures in ensuring child protection.

While each case differs in its details, together they show the urgent need for reforms in policing, judicial efficiency, victim protection, and community-based awareness programs.

Case 01

Asiya's Stolen Childhood and a Nation's Broken Promise

Victim Profile and Sociodemographic Context

Asiya (meaning "one who tends to the weak"), was born into a world of profound economic precarity. Her parents, Abdur Rashid and Amina Begum, were agricultural laborers (majurs), existing at the bottom of Bangladesh's socioeconomic ladder. Their work as daily wage earners meant financial instability and a lack of resources for childcare and protection.

- Victim: 8-year-old girl, from low-income family, attending local primary school.
- Location: Nijnanduali village, Magura Sadar
- Legal Status: Investigation ongoing under Women and Children Repression Prevention Act.
- Asiya was assaulted at her sister's marital home a place that should have been a sanctuary of trust and safety

Background

The brutal rape and murder of 8-year-old Asiya in Nijnanduali village, Magura, on March 5, 2025, represents more than an isolated crime. It is a symbolic nexus of deep-seated societal failures in Bangladesh, encompassing judicial delays, cultural impunity, and the vulnerability of the poor. The case triggered unprecedented national outrage, yet the subsequent partial verdict and the pending appeal of the sole convicted perpetrator highlight a justice system that continues to fail victims and their families.



Chronology of Asiya's Case

March 5, 2025 (Night): The Assault

Event: Asiya, a young girl, was lured from her sleep beside her sister and brutally raped by Hitu Sheikh (50), her sister's father-in-law. She had originally gone to visit her older sister.

Details: The assault was extremely violent, causing severe internal injuries and suffocation, indicating an intent to silence the victim.

March 6, 2025 - March 12, 2025: Hospital Movements

Magura General Hospital: Asiya was initially taken for stabilization, but the facility lacked adequate resources for her critical condition.

Faridpur Medical College Hospital: Transferred for higher-level care due to the limitations of Magura General Hospital.

Dhaka Medical College Hospital (DMCH): Asiya was moved for specialized treatment, reflecting the need for advanced medical intervention.

Combined Military Hospital (CMH), Dhaka: Final transfer to the most advanced facility in an effort to save her life.

March 8, 2025

Arrests: Hitu Sheikh, his wife Jaheda Begum (38), and their sons Ratul (18) and Sajib (20) were arrested in connection with the crime.

March 13, 2025 (1:00 PM): Death

Event: Asiya succumbed to her injuries after suffering three cardiac arrests.

April 13, 2025

Charge Sheet Submitted: The case advanced to court with notable speed, likely due to significant public pressure.


May 17, 2025: Verdict Delivered

Hitu Sheikh: Sentenced to death for rape and murder. While, Jaheda Begum, Ratul, and Sajib were acquitted due to "insufficient evidence," leaving the family and public dissatisfied.

Laws Violated

Based on the case details and Bangladesh's legal framework, the following laws were violated (primarily under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, 2000, as amended, and the Penal Code, 1860):

- Section 9(4)(A) of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, 2000: Covers aggravated rape of a child under 10 years old, including acts causing severe injury or death.
- Section 30 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, 2000: Addresses failure to provide medical aid or concealment of evidence in child sexual abuse cases.
- Section 375 and 376 of the Penal Code, 1860: Defines and punishes rape, with enhanced penalties for minors (death or life imprisonment post-2020 amendments).
- Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860: Murder, due to the direct causal link between the assault's brutality and the victim's death.
- Sections 107 and 109 of the Penal Code, 1860: Abetment of an offence (alleged for family members' complicity, though leading to acquittals).



Societal Response: A Nation's Anguish and Soul-Searching



Local Fury

A mob burned Hitu Sheikh's house, an act of vigilante justice signalling a profound distrust in local institutions to deliver swift consequences.



Digital Mobilization

Posts, such as one from "Maisun's world," expressed collective despair: "If an eight-year-old is getting raped then where is the justice? Why is the victim passing away but the rapist still alive?"



Public Mourning

Students in Dhaka organized absentee funeral prayers (namaz-e-janaza), claiming Asiya as a daughter of the nation and demanding collective accountability.



Socio-Cultural Critique

Commentators like Mahiuddin Kazemi sparked introspection, stating, "This blatantly shows that females regardless of their age are not safe even inside the house."

Verdict and Acquittals

The acquittal of Jaheda Begum, Ratul, and Sajib remains the most controversial aspect of the trial, raising questions about the prosecution's case and judicial process.

- **Investigation Failures:** The police likely failed to collect sufficient forensic or testimonial evidence to prove complicity beyond a reasonable doubt, weakening the case against the three family members.
- **Cultural Barriers:** Intra-familial crimes often face resistance, as family members may refuse to testify against each other, complicating prosecution efforts.
- **Legal Technicalities:** Bangladesh's high standard of proof for conviction meant that without direct evidence of involvement, the court was compelled to acquit Jaheda, Ratul, and Sajib.
- **Impact:** The acquittals left Asiya's family and the public feeling that justice was incomplete, failing to address the broader "ecology of violence" within the household that enabled or concealed the crime.



Case 02

The Rape of a Fifth- Grader in Thakurgaon - Institutional Betrayal and Systemic Vulnerabilities

Case Overview

This case study examines the alleged rape of an 11-year-old 5th-grade Hindu girl by Mozammel Haque Manik, a 50-year-old Muslim assistant teacher, at Kachubari Madarganj Government Primary School in Thakurgaon, Bangladesh, on March 8, 2025. It situates the incident within a broader pattern of child sexual abuse cases in Bangladesh since August 2024, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in rural educational institutions, legal enforcement gaps, and socio-cultural responses. The report integrates verified media accounts, legal frameworks, and comparative analysis to underscore institutional failures and reform imperatives.



- Victim: 11-year-old Hindu girl, 5th grade, Kachubari Madarganj Government Primary School. From a low-income Hindu family of daily wage earners with limited literacy. Parents depended on the school for education and safety, a common reliance in rural Bangladesh where economic pressures limit parental supervision.
- Perpetrator Profile: Mozammel Haque Manik, a 50-year-old Muslim assistant teacher at Kachubari Madarganj Government Primary School in rural Thakurgaon, Bangladesh, was arrested on March 8, 2025, for allegedly attempting to rape an 11-year-old Hindu fifth-grader during unauthorised private tutoring in a closed classroom on school premises during Ramadan.

Chronology of Asiya's Case

7 March 2025

The victim stayed after class for tutoring. Parents observed unusual distress but attributed it to fatigue.

8 March 2025, afternoon

The alleged assault occurred inside a classroom during one-on-one tutoring.

8 March 2025, evening

The victim disclosed the assault to her mother after returning home in pain.

8 March 2025, 8:00 PM

Hospital admission at Thakurgaon General Hospital (gynecology ward). Doctors reported trauma; forensic testing was recommended.

8 March 2025, Night

The victim's father filed a rape case at Bhulli Police Station.

9 March 2025, morning

Police arrested the teacher. A crowd attempted to assault him at court premises before police intervened.

9 March 2025, afternoon

Court remanded the accused to jail. Students and parents staged human chain protests across Thakurgaon.

March–September 2025

Legal proceedings continue. Local administration pledged exemplary punishment if guilt is proven.

Community and Media Response

Public Protests

Human chains, protest processions, and a public beating of the accused reflected intense community outrage. Protesters, including students from various institutions, demanded capital punishment and warned of escalated movements if justice is delayed.

Civil Society Advocacy

NGOs like Ain o Salish Kendra and education groups pushed for:

- Mandatory background and psychological screenings for teachers.
- Banning private tutoring on school premises.
- Appointing child protection officers in schools.

Media Coverage

The Daily Star, The Business Standard, Dhaka Tribune, and GhrTV emphasized the betrayal of trust by a teacher, amplifying calls for institutional reforms. Local reporters played a critical role in exposing attempts to conceal the incident.

Legal Violation

- Primary Criminal Charge: Section 9(1) of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2003 and 2020)
- Potential Additional Violation: Section 7 of the Same Act
- Potential Additional Violation: Section 10 of the Same Act
- Administrative/Regulatory Breach: Directorate of Primary Education Guidelines

Verdict

As of September 13, 2025, there has been no final verdict or conviction in the case against Mozammel Haque Manik, the accused assistant teacher at Kachubari Madarganj Government Primary School. The case remains in the trial phase under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2020), with proceedings initiated shortly after his arrest on March 8, 2025, and remand to jail on March 9, 2025. Judicial delays, common in Bangladesh's court system, have slowed progress, and no recent updates on witness testimonies, medical evidence outcomes, or sentencing have been publicly reported. Local authorities, including Deputy Commissioner Ishrat Farzana, have reiterated commitments to exemplary punishment if guilt is proven, but the trial is ongoing without resolution.

Conclusion

The Thakurgaon case exemplifies systemic vulnerabilities in Bangladesh's rural schools, amplified by a post-August 2024 surge in child sexual abuse. It underscores the need for integrated reforms: stringent oversight, judicial efficiency, and community-driven accountability.

As a test of legal and institutional resolve, its outcome could shape child protection policies, ensuring schools remain safe havens.

Case 03

Gang-Rape and Murder of an Indigenous Khyang Woman

Background

This report details the alleged gang-rape and murder of Chingma Khyang, a 29-year-old indigenous Khyang woman, on May 5, 2025, in the Thanchi area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bandarban district, southeastern Bangladesh. The incident highlights ongoing vulnerabilities faced by indigenous communities in the CHT, a region home to 11 indigenous ethnic groups, including the Khyang—the smallest and most endangered group.

- Victim: Chingma Khyang, 29 years old.
- Member of the Khyang indigenous community, one of the 11 ethnic nations in the CHT, known for their small population
- Mother of three children; resided in the remote hilly area near Tindu union in Thanchi upazila, Bandarban.
- Described by activists as a farmer; her death has been framed as part of broader structural violence against indigenous women in the region.

According to confirmed reports her body was found with injury marks, eyes gouged out and covered in blood.



Chronology of Case

May 4, 2025

Chingma left her home in the hills near Tindu union, Thanchi, for an unspecified errand (possibly farming-related). She went missing that day.

May 5, 2025

Alleged gang-rape and murder occurred in a remote forested area. Her body was discovered the following afternoon (May 5) by locals or authorities, showing multiple injuries consistent with sexual assault and violence (preliminary autopsy confirmed trauma, though details like "eyes gouged out" appear in advocacy reports but require verification).

May 5–6, 2025, Evening

Body recovered by police in Thanchi. Sumon Khyang filed a formal rape and murder case at the local police station. Medical examination at a Bandarban hospital confirmed injuries; forensic tests were initiated to substantiate rape.

May 6, 2025

Protests erupted in Bandarban, Rangamati, Khagrachhari, and Dhaka. Women's groups (e.g., Durbar Nari Network, Women's Resource Center), student organizations (e.g., Parbatya Chattogram Pahari Chhatra Parishad, Indigenous Student Society), and social activists rallied, demanding exemplary punishment and justice. A procession in Shahbagh, Dhaka, chanted for accountability.

May 6–7, 2025

Bandarban Superintendent of Police (SP) Shahidullah Kawsar held a press conference, assuring a "thorough investigation" and treating the case with "utmost seriousness." Authorities pledged no impunity but provided no suspect details.

May 7–Ongoing (as of September 13, 2025)

Indigenous rights networks, including Amnesty International and local NGOs, amplified the case globally. No further police updates, arrests, or trial proceedings reported, amid criticisms of slow response in CHT cases.

Community and Media Response

Public Protests

Rallies in Bandarban (front of Press Club), Rangamati, Khagrachhari, and Dhaka (Shahbagh procession) demanded swift arrests, punishment, and CHT-specific protections. Activists from Shujan, Women's Activist Forum, and Bangladesh Tanchangya Welfare Forum highlighted declining security for women post-2024 political changes. Bitanmoy Tanchangya noted, "Women do not have the same security as before."



Civil Society Advocacy

Organizations like Amnesty International called for urgent intervention, citing a rise in attacks on indigenous people. Indigenous networks refused to let the case fade, using Chingma's name as a "rallying cry" against impunity. Demands include: enhanced CHT policing, recognition of indigenous rights, and implementation of the 1997 CHT Peace Accord for land and security reforms.



Media Coverage

National outlets like The Daily Star, The Business Standard, and Dhaka Tribune framed the incident as emblematic of violence against indigenous women. International media (e.g., Amnesty International blogs) linked it to land grabbing and minority attacks, with reports emphasizing the Khyang's endangered status. Advocacy pieces described the brutality (e.g., "her eyes were gouged out"), though graphic details await official confirmation.



Legal Violation

The alleged gang-rape and murder of Chingma Khyang, a 29-year-old indigenous Khyang woman in Thanchi, Bandarban, Bangladesh, on May 5, 2025, involved the violation of multiple legal provisions under Bangladeshi law. The following laws were broken based on the case filed by the victim's husband, Sumon Khyang, and the reported circumstances:

- Section 9(1) of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2003 and 2020)
- Section 302 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Section 7 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000
- Potential Violation: Section 10 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000
- Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 and 1997 CHT Peace Accord: While not criminal laws, the incident violates the spirit of the 1997 Peace Accord, which mandates the protection of indigenous communities from violence and land-related exploitation. The failure to ensure safety in Thanchi reflects lapses in regional governance, though this is an administrative rather than criminal violation.

Conclusion

The gang-rape and murder of Chingma Khyang exemplifies the intersectional crises of indigenous marginalization, gender violence, and institutional neglect in Bangladesh's CHT. While protests have amplified calls for justice, the lack of progress as of September 2025 underscores the need for urgent reforms to honor the 1997 Accord and protect vulnerable communities. This case serves as a stark reminder of the human cost of unresolved ethnic tensions, demanding accountability to prevent further tragedies. For updates, monitoring local media and NGO reports is recommended.

Case 04

Professional

Vulnerability in Post-

Uprising Urban

Bangladesh

Background

This case study examines the alleged gang-rape of Afroja Sultana, a 50-year-old female journalist working for a Dhaka-based daily newspaper, on March 17, 2025, in the Barontek Green City area of Pallabi, Dhaka. The incident occurred while she was on a field assignment investigating illegal activities in an under-construction building, highlighting the acute risks faced by women journalists in high-crime urban zones amid Bangladesh's post-August 2024 surge in sexual violence. The case, prosecuted under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2020), underscores vulnerabilities in media work, institutional safety gaps, and delayed justice, fitting into a national pattern of 17 gang-rape reports in Dhaka during the same period.

- Victim: Afroja Sultana, 50 years old (initial reports noted her as over 40; clarified in media interviews).
- Reporter for a lesser-known Dhaka-based daily newspaper, with three years of experience covering local issues, including sensitive topics like illegal activities.
- Eight named individuals accused in the FIR, plus eight unidentified others (total 16 alleged assailants, per victim statements); two arrested—Enamul Haque (38, from Char Gobinda).
- Absence of witnesses/CCTV and slow forensics reflect urban policing gaps; only 2/16 arrests underscore impunity.



Chronology of Case

March 14, 2025

Victim received anonymous threats linked to her reporting; informed her editor but proceeded with assignments despite risks.

March 17, 2025, Evening (Monday Night)

Lured to an under-construction building in Barontek's Green City area, Pallabi, under the guise of news on illegal activities. Held hostage and gang-raped by multiple assailants from approximately 1:00 AM to 8:30 AM on March 18.

March 18, 2025, Morning

Victim called emergency line 999 after assailants fled; initially rescued by Cantonment Police Station team, then transferred to Pallabi jurisdiction. Filed case at Pallabi Police Station, naming eight suspects. Admitted to One-Stop Crisis Centre (OCC) at Dhaka Medical College Hospital for medical examination and treatment; confirmed trauma via preliminary tests.

March 18, 2025, Afternoon

Police arrested Enamul Haque and Hamidur Rahman during a raid in Pallabi; both remanded for interrogation.

March 19, 2025

Victim addressed media, announcing a press conference demanding maximum punishment; OCC coordinator Dr. Sabina Yasmin confirmed her condition.

March 20–September 15, 2025

Investigation continues under Pallabi Police OC Md. Nazrul Islam; no additional arrests or trial updates reported, amid broader critiques of slow probes in Dhaka's 216 rape cases (Aug 2024–Mar 2025). Media and journalist groups demand enhanced security protocols.

Community and Media Response

Public Protests

Journalist associations (e.g., Dhaka Reporters' Unity), media unions, and civil society organized rallies demanding journalist safety, rapid arrests, and exemplary punishment. Women's rights groups provided legal aid, psychological support, and advocacy through the OCC.



Civil Society Advocacy

#SafeJournalism trended nationally, amplifying calls for security escorts and press freedom reforms. NGOs emphasized the incident as part of a pattern, with over 200 rapes in Dhaka in seven months, urging witness protection and anti-harassment laws.



Media Coverage

National outlets like bdnnews24.com, Dhaka Tribune, and Prothom Alo highlighted the betrayal of professional trust and linked it to rising GBV; international bodies like ARTICLE 19 called for gender-responsive investigations, noting the assault's role in escalating threats to women journalists.



Legal Violation

The gang-rape of Afroja Sultana, a 50-year-old female journalist, on March 17, 2025, in Pallabi, Dhaka, involved the violation of several legal provisions under Bangladeshi law, as detailed in the case filed at Pallabi Police Station. The following laws were broken based on the reported circumstances and legal actions initiated:

- Section 9(1) of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2003 and 2020)
- Section 7 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000
- Section 376D of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Section 342 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Press Freedom and Safety Regulations: While not a criminal law, the absence of institutional safety protocols (e.g., security escorts for journalists) violated implied duties under Bangladesh's press policies and international standards like those advocated by ARTICLE 19, exacerbating the victim's vulnerability in a high-risk area.

Conclusion

The Pallabi gang-rape case epitomizes the perils of gender-based violence intersecting with professional risks in post-2024 Bangladesh, where urban impunity persists amid a 75% GBV rise. With only partial arrests and ongoing delays as of September 15, 2025, it demands integrated reforms: robust legal enforcement, institutional accountability, and community advocacy. As a catalyst for #SafeJournalism, its resolution could bolster protections for women in media, ensuring safe reporting environments. Continued monitoring of trial progress and policy impacts is advised.

Case 05

**Sexual Assault of a
Hindu Woman in Cumilla,
Bangladesh, Following
Viral Video**

Background

This case study examines the sexual assault of a 25-year-old Hindu woman on June 26, 2025, in Debidwar, Cumilla, Bangladesh, at her father's home. The incident gained national attention after a video of the assault was widely shared online, sparking protests across Dhaka, Cumilla, and other regions. Prosecuted under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2020), the case highlights systemic issues: violence against minority women, the role of social media in exacerbating victim trauma, and judicial delays amid a 75% surge in reported rapes (306 cases, January–July 2025) following the August 2024 political upheaval. It underscores demands for legal clarity, swift justice, and protections against secondary victimization through video circulation.

- Victim: 25-year-old woman from the Hindu minority community, visiting her father's home in Debidwar, Cumilla, a rural area with a history of communal tensions.
- As a Hindu woman in a predominantly Muslim region, she faced heightened vulnerability due to minority status and gender, compounded by limited security in rural homes.
- Received medical treatment at Cumilla Medical College Hospital; provided interviews to local media (e.g., Prothom Alo) demanding justice, supported by human rights groups for counseling and legal aid.



Chronology of Case

June 26, 2025

Fazor Ali allegedly broke into the victim's father's home in Debidwar, Cumilla, and raped her. The assault was filmed by accomplices, possibly four others, who later circulated the video online.

June 27, 2025

Video spread widely on social media platforms, triggering public outrage. Locals attacked Fazor Ali, causing injuries to his arms and legs; he was hospitalized. Victim reported the assault to Debidwar Police Station, filing a case under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act.

June 27–28, 2025

Police arrested five suspects, including Fazor Ali (post-hospitalization) and four others for filming and sharing the video. Cumilla police chief Abdul Mannan confirmed the arrests, promising a "serious" investigation.

June 28, 2025

Victim admitted to Cumilla Medical College Hospital for medical examination, confirming trauma; forensic tests initiated to substantiate rape.

June 29–30, 2025

Protests erupted in Dhaka (Shahbagh, Dhaka University), Cumilla, and other cities, with students, human rights groups, and Hindu organizations demanding swift justice and legal reforms. Graffiti near Dhaka University depicted the victim among other rape cases, calling for accountability.

July 1, 2025

Law Adviser Asif Nazrul addressed media, condemning the rape and video circulation as a "highly irresponsible and criminal act," assuring immediate action. Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) and Manusher Jonno Foundation issued statements demanding severe punishment and protections against secondary victimization.

July–September 15, 2025

Investigation ongoing; no trial updates or convictions reported, reflecting judicial delays (200,000 pending cases per Women and Children Tribunals, August 2025). Protests continue, with #JusticeForCumilla trending on X.

Community and Media Response

Public Protests

Widespread demonstrations in Dhaka, Cumilla, and other cities involved students, women's groups, and Hindu organizations. Dhaka University students painted graffiti demanding justice for all rape victims, including children. Protesters called for legal clarity on rape definitions and fast-track courts, citing earlier 2025 protests over an 8-year-old's rape-related death.



Civil Society Advocacy

Ain o Salish Kendra condemned the state's failure to ensure women's safety, urging a "clear and firm message" against impunity. Manusher Jonno Foundation denounced video sharers, advocating for digital privacy laws. NGOs provided legal aid and counseling to the victim.



Media Coverage

BBC News, Prothom Alo, and The Daily Star emphasized the incident's brutality and minority targeting, linking it to 17 gang-rape cases in Dhaka alone (August 2024–March 2025). Coverage criticized video circulation as a "second assault" and highlighted government pressure delaying broadcasts.



Legal Violation

The sexual assault of a 25-year-old Hindu woman in Debidwar, Cumilla, on June 26, 2025, and the subsequent filming and circulation of the assault video involved multiple violations of Bangladeshi law, as detailed in the case filed at Debidwar Police Station. Below are the laws broken based on police reports, victim statements, and legal actions initiated:

- Section 9(1) of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2003 and 2020)
- Section 7 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000
- Section 509 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Section 120B of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Potential Violation: Section 8 of the Pornography Control Act 2012
- Potential Violation: Section 29 of the Digital Security Act 2018 (revised 2025): Addresses publishing offensive or defamatory content online, potentially applicable to the video's viral spread, which humiliated the victim. Penalties include up to three years' imprisonment or fines, but enforcement is inconsistent due to post-2024 judicial delays.

Conclusion

The Cumilla sexual assault case, amplified by a viral video, exposes the intersectional vulnerabilities of minority women and the harm of unregulated social media in Bangladesh's GBV crisis. With five arrests but no trial progress as of September 15, 2025, it tests commitments to swift justice and victim protection. Integrated reforms—legal, digital, and societal—are critical to address impunity, protect minorities, and prevent secondary victimization, ensuring such “barbarity” finds no place, as urged by ASK. Monitoring trial outcomes and cyber policy developments is essential.

Case 06

**Mother, daughter and
minor son injured in acid
attack over rejected
marriage proposal in
Jashore**

Background

This case study details the acid attack on Rahela Begum (48), her daughter Ripa Khatun (26), and her grandson Yeanur (8) on July 3, 2025, in Gadkhali village, Jhikargacha upazila, Jashore district, southwestern Bangladesh. The assault, allegedly perpetrated by Jasim—a local youth enraged by Ripa's rejection of his marriage proposal—highlights the persistent use of acid violence as a tool of revenge in cases of romantic refusal, a common motive in Bangladesh where such attacks disproportionately target women and girls (80% of cases per Acid Survivors Foundation data). Occurring amid a slight uptick in acid violence in 2025 (13 reported cases, up from 2024's low but still emblematic of gender-based aggression), the incident underscores vulnerabilities in rural, low-income communities and enforcement gaps under the Acid Crime Prevention Act 2002. As of September 16, 2025, the victims remain under treatment, with no arrest reported, reflecting ongoing impunity challenges (conviction rates ~10%).

- **Rahela Begum (48):** Mother of Ripa; a homemaker from a low-income family in Gadkhali village, Jhikargacha. Sustained partial acid burns on her face and upper body.
- **Ripa Khatun (26):** Primary target; divorced for four years and living with her parents and son after separation. Worked locally, suffered partial burns on her face, arms, and torso. The attack stemmed from her repeated rejections of Jasim's persistent marriage proposals.
- **Yeanur (8):** Ripa's minor son, a primary school student. Sustained severe third-degree acid burns on his legs, back, and other body parts; his condition is critical, requiring intensive care.
- **Suspect:** Jasim (full name not publicly disclosed in reports; age ~25–30), a local youth employed as a worker by Fazlur Rahman in nearby Mothbari village. Described as persistent in his advances toward Ripa, ignoring her refusals over several months.

Chronology of Case

Pre-July 3, 2025

Jasim persistently proposed marriage to Ripa, who had been divorced and living with her family for four years. Despite repeated refusals, he continued harassment, escalating tensions in the close-knit village community.

July 3, 2025, 8:30 PM

Jasim allegedly threw acid through the family's house window in Gadkhali village, targeting Ripa while she, her mother, and son were inside (possibly during evening routines). The acid splashed, injuring all three. Ripa's uncle, Abdur Rahman, reported the incident to police immediately.

July 3, 2025, Late Evening

Victims rushed to Jhikargacha Upazila Health Complex for initial treatment; due to severity (especially Yeanur's burns), transferred to Jashore General Hospital's burn unit around midnight.

July 4, 2025, Morning

Police filed a case at Jhikargacha Police Station based on family complaints. Dr. Jubayer Ahmed confirmed Yeanur's critical condition (severe burns risking infection/amputation) and the women's partial burns (scarring likely). Operation launched to apprehend Jasim, but no arrest by day's end.

July 4–September 16, 2025

Victims remain hospitalized; no public updates on Jasim's capture or forensic results (e.g., acid type, likely sulfuric/hydrochloric from local sources). Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF) offered support, but no community protests reported, unlike high-profile cases.



Community and Media Response

Public Protests

Limited outrage in Gadkhali and Mothbari villages; family members like Abdur Rahman publicly condemned the attack, but no large-scale protests or human chains, possibly due to rural isolation and fear of reprisal. Local leaders called for stricter monitoring of acid sales, echoing ASF campaigns.

Civil Society Advocacy

ASF contacted the family for medical/legal aid, advocating for free treatment via their hotline. Women's groups like Bangladesh Mahila Parishad linked it to broader rejection-motivated violence, urging enforcement of 2002 acid laws. No international attention, unlike urban cases.

Media Coverage

The Business Standard and Jago News 24 provided initial reports, framing it as a "revenge attack" amid Bangladesh's GBV crisis (1,499 assaults on women/girls in 2024 per HRSS). Coverage highlighted the child's critical state to amplify calls for justice, but faded quickly without viral elements (e.g., no video).

Legal Violation

Legal Violations in the Jashore Acid Attack Case (July 2025)

The acid attack on Rahela Begum (48), Ripa Khatun (26), and Yeanur (8) in Jhikargacha, Jashore, on July 3, 2025, constitutes multiple violations under Bangladeshi law, primarily governed by specialized acid violence legislation enacted in 2002. A case was filed at Jhikargacha Police Station based on family complaints, with charges to be applied upon the suspect Jasim's arrest (ongoing operation as of September 16, 2025).

The attack, motivated by a rejected marriage proposal, qualifies as gender-based violence, with severe penalties due to the involvement of a minor and multiple victims. Below are the key laws violated, based on the incident's circumstances (throwing acid through a window causing grievous burns):

- Section 5 of the Acid Crime Prevention Act 2002
- Section 4 of the Acid Control Act 2002
- Section 326 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860
- Section 7 of the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act 2000 (amended 2020)
- Section 506 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860

Conclusion

The Jashore acid attack exemplifies the devastating, multi-generational impact of rejection-motivated violence in rural Bangladesh, where women's refusals provoke extreme retaliation. With Yeanur's life at risk and no arrest as of September 16, 2025, it exposes enforcement failures despite robust 2002 laws. Swift police action, victim support, and societal shifts are essential to eradicate such barbarity, ensuring families like Rahela's find justice and healing. Monitoring ASF updates and trial progress is recommended for accountability.

Conclusion

The six cases documented in this report are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a deeper social and institutional malaise. They reveal the intersection of gender inequality, weak enforcement of laws, and cultural norms that too often silence victims instead of protecting them.

To address these challenges, Bangladesh requires a multipronged approach: stronger legal enforcement, comprehensive victim support systems, educational programs to combat stigma, and political will to confront impunity. Without such systemic interventions, the cycle of violence will continue, and tragedies involving acid attacks, rape, murder, and child abuse will remain distressingly common.

This report is not only a record of six brutal cases but also a call to action, a reminder that the protection of women and children is central to the country's social stability, cultural integrity, and future development.

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**EVIDENCE
COLLECTED ON
POLICE
KILLINGS**







*THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IS
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED*

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
1	<p>During the Quota movement, two police officers were detained in the Rayerbagh area of Jatrabari by BNP, Chhatra Dal, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, and activists along with unidentified individuals. After confirming their identity as police officers, Nayek Gias Uddin and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Mohammad Moktadir were brutally beaten to death. Later, their bodies were hung from the foot-over bridge.</p>	<p>July 19, 2024 8:00 AM Rayerbagh, Jatrabari</p>	 <p><i>Bichitro News</i></p>	








S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source
2	Assistant Sub-Inspector of Special Branch (SB), Dhaka District, Mr. Rafiqul Islam, was killed in an attack by quota reform activists in front of Bypail Mosque, Ashulia.	August 5, 2024. 10:00PM Bypail, Ashulia	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
3	Detective Branch (DB) North Inspector of Police, Md. Rashedul Islam was killed in an attack by protesters in front of Uttara East Police Station.	August 5, 2024, 6:30 PM, Uttara East Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
4	Sub-Inspector Shree Sujana Chandra Dey was killed in front of Jatrabari Police Station in an attack by miscreants.	August 5, 2024, 6:30 PM, Jatrabari Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
5	Constable Md. Abdul Majid of Jatrabari Police Station was killed in a clash with quota movement activists in front of the station.	August 5, 2024, 6:30 PM, Jatrabari Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
6	Constable Md. Rezaul Karim was killed in front of Jatrabari Police Station in an attack by protesters.	August 5, 2024, 6:30 PM, Jatrabari Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
7	Constable Md. Mahfuzur Rahman of POM West Division was killed in an attack by anti-discrimination quota activists near the National Parliament Building.	August 5, 2024, 6:00 PM, National Parliament Building area, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>

NOTE: Pictures are not available since the incident occurred during an extremely volatile and violent situation but facts went viral in news outlets and social media.


S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source
8	Traffic North Division Constable Md. Shahidul Alam was killed in an attack by quota activists in front of Uttara East Police Station.	August 5, 2024, 6:00 PM, Uttara East Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
9	Police Welfare Force Constable Md. Abu Hasnat Roni was killed in an attack by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Uttara East Police Station.	August 5, 2024, 5:30 PM, Uttara East Police Station, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
10	Constable Mir Montaz Ali of Kadamtali Police Station was killed by anti-discrimination quota activists near the National Parliament Building.	August 5, 2024, 5:30 PM, National Parliament Building area, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
11	Constable Md. Abdul Malek was killed by anti-discrimination activists in front of Basan Police Station in Gazipur City.	August 5, 2024, 4:30 PM, Basan Police Station, Gazipur	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
12	Sub-Inspector Md. Sohel Rana of Dhaka District Police was killed by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Afsar Mall's house in Ashulia.	August 5, 2024, 4:30 PM, Ashulia, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>
13	Sub-Inspector Raju Ahmed of Dhaka District Police was killed by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Afsar Mall's house in Ashulia	August 5, 2024, 4:30 PM, Ashulia, Dhaka	 <i>Deshrupantor</i>

NOTE: Pictures are not available since the incident occurred during an extremely volatile and violent situation but facts went viral in news outlets and social media.

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source
14	Constable Md. Sujon Mia of POM South Division was killed in an attack by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Uttara East Police Station.	August 5, 2024, 7:00 PM, Uttara East Police Station, Dhaka	 Deshrupantor
15	Sub-Inspector Khagendra Chandra Sarkar was killed by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Uttara East Police Station	August 5, 2024, Uttara East Police Station, Dhaka	 Deshrupantor
16	Assistant Sub-Inspector Sanjay Kumar Das was killed in an attack by quota activists in front of Jatrabari Police Station.	August 5, 2024, Jatrabari Police Station, Dhaka	 Deshrupantor
17	Assistant Sub-Inspector Firoz Hossain of Kadamtali Police Station was killed by anti-discrimination quota activists in front of Jatrabari Police Station.	August 5, 2024, Jatrabari Police Station, Dhaka	 Deshrupantor
18	Constable Md. Khalilur Rahman of Shyampur Police Station was killed in an attack by protesters in front of the station.	August 14, 2024, 2:00 AM, Shyampur Police Station, Dhaka	 Deshrupantor

NOTE: Pictures are not available since the incident occurred during an extremely volatile and violent situation but facts went viral in news outlets and social media.


S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
19	Sub-Inspector (SI) Mamunur Rashid of Kachua Police Station in Chandpur was beaten to death in front of Kachua Bangabandhu Degree College by an agitated mob.	August 5, 6:30 PM, Location: Kachua, Chandpur	 Banglanews24	



Police officers from Sonai Muri Police Station in Noakhali, including Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Md. Nasir, SI Md. Bashir, Constable Mosharraf, and Gias were killed by an angry mob's stabbing.

-August 5, 5:30 PM
Location: Sonai Muri,
Noakhali







S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
20	Sub-Inspector (SI) Rezaul Karim and Constable Main Uddin from Titas Police Station in Cumilla and a local resident Babu Mia from Tuzarvanga village, Daudkandi, were killed by an agitated mob.	August 5, 11:30 PM, Location: Titas, Cumilla	 BD News 24	
21	Sub-inspector Mohammad Bashir and a constable of Sonaimuri police station in Noakhali district were killed and officer-in-charge (OC) Bakhtiar Uddin Chowdhury's leg and arm were broken in the attack by the agitated mob.	August 5, 7:30 PM Location: Sonai Muri, Noakhali	 Prothom Alo	
22	Protesters attacked the Elliotganj Highway Police Station in Cumilla district. At that time, Constable Ershad Ali of the Elliotganj Highway Police Outpost was beaten to death.	August 4, 7:30 PM Location: Elliotganj, Cumilla	 Banglanews24	
23	Four police officers from Sonai Muri Police Station in Noakhali, including Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Md. Nasir, SI Md. Bashir, Constable Mosharraf, and Gias were killed by an angry mob's stabbing.	August 5, 5:30 PM Location: Sonai Muri, Noakhali	 Noakhali Khabor 24	
24	Assistant Town Sub-Inspector (ATSI) Ali Hossain Chowdhury of Kasba Police Station in Brahmanbaria was killed in an attack by quota reform movement activists.	August 5, 7:30 PM Location: Kasba, Brahmanbaria	 Noakhali Khabor 24	



S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
25	Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Abdur Razzak of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
26	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Rois Uddin Khan of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
27	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Tahchhenuzzaman of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the police station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
28	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Pronabesh Kumar Biswas of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
29	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Nazmul Hossain of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	


S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
30	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Anisur Rahman Molla of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
31	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Obaidur Rahman of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
32	Constable Md. Abdus Salek of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
33	Constable Md. Hafizul Islam of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
34	Constable Md. Robiul Alam Shah of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
35	Constable Md. Humayun Kabir of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
36	Constable Md. Ariful Azam of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
37	Constable Md. Riazul Islam of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
38	Constable Md. Shahin Uddin of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	
39	Constable Md. Hanif Ali of Enayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj was brutally killed inside the station by anti-discrimination protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists.	04 August 2024, 9:00 PM Enayetpur, Sirajganj	 <i>Kaler kantho</i>	

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
40	At the Gallamari intersection in Khulna, repeated clashes between students and police resulted in the death of a police member named Suman Gharami (33). He was serving at the Khulna Police Lines. His constable number was 4641, BP number - 8812149913.	August 2, 2024, 4:00 PM Location: Gallamari intersection, Khulna Sadar	 <i>Sokaler Alo</i>	

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
41	In Baniachong Upazila of Habiganj district, an enraged mob surrounded the police station, forcibly seized Sub-Inspector Sontosh Das Chowdhury from the law enforcement officers, brutally beat him up to death, and then hung his body from a tree in front of the station	August 5, 2024, 2:00 AM Location: Baniachong police station, Habiganj	 <i>Sokaler Alo</i>	

S.L.	Description	Date and Time	Source	Image
42	Yunus Ali, a police officer, was killed and hanged by quota movement protesters in Rangpur Sadar	6 August, 8:43 PM Location: Rangpur Sadar, Rangpur.	 <i>Mubarak Hossain</i>	



Yunus Ali, a police officer, was killed and hanged by quota movement protesters in Rangpur Sadar.

-6 August, 8:43 PM

Location: Rangpur Sadar, Rangpur





















REDMI NOTE 8







**1,100 Bangladeshi Police Officers
Subjected to Brutality After August
5 - Justice Must Be Served!**

THE AUGUST FILES : UNTOLD STORIES

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE





THE AUGUST FILES : UNTOLD STORIES


POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE

THE AUGUST FILES : UNTOLD STORIES

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



BTTF

Bangladesh Think Tank Forum
Dhaka



POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

The barbaric killings of police officers that took place at the beginning of August in Bangladesh are unprecedented in the history of any independent state. Despite 3,204 police officers falling victim to this gruesome slaughter, Dr. Yunus' government has remained silent on the matter of police killings.

Furthermore, those involved in these murders, many of whom are members of terrorist groups, have been granted indemnity, thus absolving them of any accountability. This action prevents the families of the slain officers from pursuing any legal action or filing lawsuits related to the killings. Dr. Yunus' government has effectively closed off all avenues for the families of the victims to seek justice.

This Documentary is not a research project, and for the sake of the safety of the victims' families, we have chosen not to reveal the personal identities of the fallen police officers. We are doing this because the families are continuously threatened by members of Yunus' government. To protect their lives, we have refrained from disclosing the identities of the victims in this Documentary.

The families of the murdered officers have, by now, given up hope of seeing justice. Their lives have become unbearable, and their suffering continues. The murderers involved in these killings are largely affiliated with banned terrorist organizations like Harkat-ul-Jihad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbut Tahrir, as well as the political parties BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. Together, these forces carried out one of the most brutal massacres in modern history across Bangladesh.

We have witnessed not only the concealment of the victims' bodies but also the horrifying reality of charred remains being burned beyond recognition. Documenting or taking photographs of the aftermath of these murders was fraught with danger. No media outlet in Bangladesh dared to report on the police killings. Journalists attempting to cover the story were arrested on false charges, and many were forced to flee the country under pressure from Dr. Yunus' government.

To further suppress any reporting, Dr. Yunus' government has created a multi-layered security perimeter around the families of the slain officers, preventing both domestic and international journalists from reaching them. This shadow army, made up of members from banned terrorist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat-ul-Jihad, has been used to intimidate and threaten the police officers' families on a regular basis.

We have also observed that, instead of relying on trained and experienced police officers, Dr. Yunus' government has illegally inducted members of banned terrorist organizations like Hizbut Tahrir, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat-ul-Jihad into the police force. This has been kept under wraps, and the media in Bangladesh is unable to report on this disturbing trend. Furthermore, progressive officers have been routinely dismissed, only to be replaced by these extremists within the police ranks.

The photos and videos of the slain officers included in this Documentary have been sourced from social media, taken by ordinary citizens using their mobile phones.

Amid these events, Dr. Yunus' government has been working tirelessly to cover up what is undoubtedly the largest massacre of police officers in the history of the world. The families of the murdered officers, living in constant fear of the terrorist forces appointed by Yunus, are unable to speak out. They are forced to live in inhumane conditions.

At the same time, the entire police administration remains silent on the issue of these murdered officers. They have chosen to remain complicit in the cover-up, keeping the details of the police killings under strict confidentiality. This Documentary is only a preliminary document. We will publish a more comprehensive booklet in the future, containing the full details of the murdered officers.

We have made every effort to provide relevant captions for the images included. The brutal nature of these killings is so harrowing that the images themselves are enough to leave a lasting scar on the mind. Despite all of this, the Bangladesh Think Tank Forum team continues its efforts to collect these overlooked and unspoken records of police killings.

The Bangladesh Think Tank Forum remains committed to following up on the ongoing status of the families of the slain officers, ensuring that their voices are heard, and their struggles are documented.



On the morning of August 5, Hizbut Tahrir's terrorists killed the policemen on duty by burning them alive near the Savar police station. Their bodies are burnt to ashes. The image has been taken from a social media site.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



After the militants killed this police officer on August 5, they hung his body with a rope. The photo was taken on the floor of the hospital morgue. It was captured by an unnamed police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



In the hospital morgue, the bodies of police officers from the Jatrabari police station in Dhaka lie in rows. The militants mutilated them to ensure their deaths. This photo was taken by an unnamed police officer on August 5.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The dead body of an unfortunate police officer, severely mutilated. Before his death on August 5, he was subjected to barbaric torture by the militants. This police officer was someone's father, brother, or child. The photo was taken by an unnamed police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The dead body of a police officer, covered in blood, lies on a hospital trolley. He had been on duty providing security at the Chief Justice's residence in Dhaka on August 5. The photo was taken by an unnamed police officer.



An old police officer, brutally killed by militants on August 5 while on duty. Before his death, he wanted to pray, but the militants did not allow him to. The photo was taken by an unnamed police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



In the hospital morgue, the bodies of young police officers, killed by militants, lie together. They had been dutifully performing their duties for the state. The photo was taken by an unnamed police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 4, while returning home from duty, this police officer was mercilessly killed by militants in a lane near his house. His eyes were gouged out. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 5th, after this police officer was killed at the Jatrabari intersection in Dhaka, his body was hung upside down from a foot over bridge by the militants. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The bodies of the slain police officers are being listed by on-duty police officers in preparation for post-mortem. The photo was taken by an unnamed police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The mutilated body of a young police officer, who had just joined the job, lies on the morgue floor. He was killed by militants in a brutal attack on August 5. The photo was taken by an anonymous police officer.



The mutilated body of a young police officer, who had just joined the job, lies on the morgue floor. He was killed by militants in a brutal attack on August 5. The photo was taken by an anonymous police officer.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



A police officer on duty was brutally murdered by militants, and his body is seen lying on the public road on August 5. The photo taken by an ordinary passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On the night of August 5, on the streets of Dhaka, a police officer on duty was brutally beaten to death by militants, his eyes gouged out. The photo was taken by an ordinary passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On the evening of August 5, after militants killed two police officers on the Jatrabari foot-over bridge, they hung their bodies in this manner. The photo was taken by an ordinary passerby.



On August 5 in Sirajganj, militants killed this police officer by hacking him. After killing him, they did not stop; they left his naked body on the ground. The photo was taken by a local resident of Sirajganj.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 4 in Sirajganj, militants killed this police officer and left his body naked after the murder. The photo was taken by a local resident of Sirajganj.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



After being beaten to death, this police officer was burned alive. His body was seen lying on the streets of Dhaka on the night of August 5. The photo was taken by an ordinary passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 5, the naked body of a police officer killed by militants lies on the streets of Dhaka. A passerby covers his lower body with a bed sheet. The photo was taken by an ordinary passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 5, the body of a young police officer killed by militants lies on the street. His uniform is lying beside him. The photo was taken by an ordinary passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



Ordinary people are standing around the mutilated body of a police officer killed by militants. The photo was taken on the night of August 5 by a passerby.



The mutilated body of a police officer lies on the ground in Sirajganj, where he was killed by militants on August 4. The photo was taken by a local resident.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 4 in Sirajganj, militants brutally murdered this police officer, smashing his head. The photo was taken by a local resident.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The charred bodies of police officers are seen in a police van, burned by militants in Dhaka on August 5. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 4, militants killed a police officer near Sirajganj Police Station and hung his body from a tree. The photo was taken by a local resident.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



REDMI NOTE 8
AD MARUF

05/08/2024 20:17

The bodies of police officers burned by militants in a police van are seen in Dhaka on August 5. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On the morning of August 6, a mutilated police officer's body was seen lying on the streets of Dhaka. He was killed by militants. The photo was taken by a passersby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



The militants killed this police officer and left his hands handcuffed with his police cuffs before abandoning him on the street. His cap is lying beside him. The photo was taken by a passerby on August 6 on the streets of Dhaka.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 6, the body of this police officer, covered in a uniform, was seen lying on the streets of Dhaka. He was a member of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



On August 4 in Sirajganj, while trying to escape, this police officer was caught by militants and burned to death. The photo was taken by a local resident.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE




On August 5, this police officer was killed by militants while on duty in Dhaka. His helmet lies nearby. The photo was taken by a passerby.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE



Beneath the Jatrabari flyover in Dhaka, militants killed this police officer and hung his body afterward. The photo was taken by a passerby on the night of August 5.

POLICE TARGETED IN HEINOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE




BTTF

Bangladesh Think Tank Forum
Dhaka

State-Sanctioned Negligence: No Post-Mortem, No Inquest, No Death Certificates

MASSACRE IN BANGLADESH



GOPALGANJ, BANGLADESH

16 JULY 2025

State-Sanctioned Negligence: No Post-Mortem, No Inquest, No Death Certificates

MASSACRE IN BANGLADESH

GOPALGANJ, BANGLADESH

16 July 2025

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RESPECTFUL TRIBUTES TO THE FALLEN HEROES



Dipto Saha (25)

S/O: Sontosh Saha & Bibha Rani Saha

Address: Udayan Road, Ward No. 5, Gopalganj Poursabha, Gopalganj

Profession: Clothing merchant

Date of death: 16 July 2025

Sohel Rana (30)

S/O: Md. Idris Molla & Laily Begum

Address: Purba Miapara, Ward No. 4, Gopalganj Poursabha, Gopalganj

Profession: Mobile phone dealer

Date of death: 16 July 2025



Imon Talukder (24)

S/O: Azad Talukder & Roksana Begum

Address: Bherar Bazar, Gopalganj Sadar, Gopalganj

Profession: Crockery shop employee

Date of death: 16 July 2025

Romzan Kazi (18)

S/O: Kamrul Kazi & Morjina Begum

Address: Harinahati, Kotalipara, Gopalganj

Profession: Mason

Date of death: 16 July 2025



Ramzan Munshi (32)

S/O: Akber Munshi

Address: Thana Para, Gopalganj Sadar, Gopalganj

Profession: Auto rickshaw driver

Date of death: 18 July 2025

PROVOKED MASSACRE IN BANGLADESH

On August 5, 2024, following a major political shift, an interim government led by Dr. Yunus assumed power. Since then, the law-and-order situation in the country has drastically deteriorated. These incidents are largely attributed to state-sponsored actions by the unregistered student party National Citizens Party (NCP), along with Jamaat-e-Islami and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).




Photo: Chief Advisor to the Interim Government Dr. Yunus with NCP leaders

Through an official government notification, the ruling authority banned the Bangladesh Awami League, a party that holds 40-45% of public support, and its affiliated student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra (Students') League. The interim government and its supporters are allegedly conspiring to eliminate the pro-Liberation forces, including the Awami League.

dailyobserver

NCP demands AL ban before election

Published : Friday, 2 May, 2025 at 9:01 PM
DU Correspondent



Scan for News



Photo: Sumit Ahmed

Jatiya Nagorik Party (NCP) on Friday demanded ban on Awami League (AL) revoking its registration and warned that no election will take place before trial of the party. NCP also declared that the demand to ban AL is a firm decision, not a mere request.

National Citizens Party (NCP) demands AL ban before election

Since taking office, the interim regime has unleashed widespread repression on Awami League leaders and supporters. Killings, arson, property seizures, mob attacks, false cases, and forced displacement have become rampant.

From August 5, 2024, to the present, 174 people have been killed in mob violence, 211 Awami League leaders and activists have been extrajudicially murdered, and 20 have been killed inside jails. At least 52 people have died in unlawful encounters.

A staggering 360,000 Awami League leaders and supporters, including 116 Members of Parliament, have been arrested. Courts have been stormed, lawyers assaulted, judges dismissed without due process, and alleged defendants publicly humiliated in the presence of law enforcement.



Photo: News about “3 lakh 59 thousand people arrested in 10 months”

Religious minorities, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas, have come under severe persecution, leaving these communities in a state of fear and despair.

Due to their affiliation with the Chhatra (Students’) League, the education of 500,000 students has been disrupted. Many have been harassed in classrooms, barred from taking exams, denied registration, or refused academic certificates.

The media is under the control of the government and its affiliated unregistered group, the NCP. Journalists have been silenced through intimidation, false charges, and imprisonment. Hundreds of press accreditation cards have been revoked.

The Daily Star

Bangladesh

Govt strips 118 more journos of accreditation

Mon Nov 11, 2024 12:00 AM

Last update on: Mon Nov 11, 2024 08:31 AM



The government has revoked the permanent and temporary press accreditation cards of 118 more journalists, including editors, reporters, and TV station chief executives.

With this, the interim government has so far cancelled the press accreditation of 167 journalists.

The latest order on the cancellation of press accreditation was issued on November 7 and signed by Md Nizamul Kabir, chief information officer of the Press Information Department under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

According to the notification, the order was issued as per several sections of the Press Accreditation Policy-2022.

Press accreditation cards are a prerequisite for entry into the Secretariat.

Photo: News about the interim government has so far cancelled the press accreditation of 167 journalists

On February 5, 2025, the residence of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, known as “Bangabandhu Bhaban,” was demolished in the presence of law enforcement personnel. The residence, previously designated as a national museum under a trust, was a symbol of the country’s liberation history.



Photo: Demolishing “Bangabandhu Bhaban” by Bulldozer

Following this demolition, it became apparent that the National Citizens Party (NCP) and its allies had plans to similarly demolish Bangabandhu’s mausoleum located in his birthplace, Gopalganj. They had been inciting violence against this site through speeches and social media for months and were gradually preparing for such an attack.

Starting July 1, 2025, the NCP launched a nationwide march. On July 16, they declared a “March to Gopalganj,” sparking tensions in Gopalganj and across southern Bangladesh.



FB post of National Citizen Party (NCP) Chief Organizer (Northern Region) Sarjis Alam

In the days leading up to the march, police began targeting and arresting local Awami League leaders in Gopalganj. Many fled the area to avoid detention.

To ensure the success of the NCP's march, security forces, including military personnel, police, paramilitary personnel, and civil administration personnel, were deployed under government orders. In response, the general public of Gopalganj, along with Awami League supporters, vowed to peacefully resist the march. Not a single NCP activist was harmed in this democratic protest.

However, on July 16, law enforcement unleashed brutality. In an alarming incident, the Bangladesh Army used lethal weapons, killing four individuals, an act that has been reported in some media, though the exact death toll is suspected to be higher. The body of the four death people were buried or cremated without mandatory post mortem reports, police inquest certificates and death certificates. Another person died on 18 July 2025 at Dhaka Medical College hospital due to gun shoot injury. Nine others are fighting for their lives with bullet injuries, and approximately 50 people were injured.



Video of Bangladesh Army firing lethal weapons [\(click to watch video\)](#)

Despite imposing Section 144 (a ban on gatherings), authorities failed to protect the NCP's event from public resistance, highlighting NCP's lack of popular support.

Later, to shield NCP leaders from public backlash, the Bangladesh Army reportedly evacuated them from Gopalganj in armored personnel carriers (APCs).



Video: NCP leaders being safely evacuated by APC [\(click to watch video\)](#)

Following this, security forces launched aggressive manhunts across Gopalganj, declaring curfew for indefinite period and conducting house-to-house raids. The Army, along with the RAB and police, committed gross human rights violations. Extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and inhumane torture were carried out. Law enforcement authorities confessed that they have arrested 90 people, although the real number will be much higher.



Photo: Army is using harsh repression to stop the general public in Gopalganj

Despite this, NCP leaders and certain social media influencers have once again threatened to organize another "March to Gopalganj." NCP convenor declared, "No space for Mujib's ideals".

dailyobserver

We will liberate Gopalganj's people from mujibism: Nahid

Published : Thursday, 17 July, 2025 at 5:18 PM
Observer Correspondent



Nahid Islam, Coordinator of the National Citizen Party (NCP), condemned the attack on their previously announced peaceful program in Gopalganj.

He accused fascists of turning Gopalganj into their stronghold and declared, "We will free the ordinary people of Gopalganj from Mujibism."

Nahid made the remarks while addressing a march programme organized by NCP on the occasion of the '10-Point July March' at Jinnah Park ground in Faridkot on Thursday.

Photo: News about NCP convenor declared, "No space for Mujib's ideals".

The people of Bangladesh demand full investigations into each killing and strict punishment for those responsible. They seek protection from state-sponsored terror, violence, and egregious violations of human rights.



Video: Army soldier brutally hits head with boot, ensuring death ([click to watch video](#))

Citizens are calling for an end to the unelected, unconstitutional, and illegitimate interim regime. There is a strong demand for its immediate removal of the interim government and the formation of a neutral caretaker government to hold a free and fair national election with participation from all political parties, ensuring the restoration of democracy.



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Rising Violence Against Women and Children in Bangladesh

1. Introduction

Between August 2024 and early 2025, Bangladesh has witnessed a troubling surge in violence against women, children, and minority groups, reflecting both deep-rooted social divisions and a governance system in disarray. Reports document a sharp rise in brutal attacks, gang rapes, murders, and targeted harassment, with perpetrators frequently exploiting their political, religious, or social affiliations to act with impunity. These are not isolated events; they reveal an entrenched culture of fear in which radical groups, mobs, and politically connected actors erode the rule of law, silence victims, and intimidate entire communities.

Under the interim government led by Dr. Yunus, the state's response has been widely criticised as inadequate. Its failure to prevent mob violence, protect survivors, and hold perpetrators accountable has left women and children especially vulnerable. As trust in law enforcement and the judiciary continues to collapse, citizens are increasingly forced to navigate an environment where vigilantism is becoming commonplace, further fueling cycles of violence and deepening social fragmentation.

Over the past year, this report has examined five key case studies that expose the scale of violence against women and children, the nexus between crime and political or religious influence, and the devastating consequences of systemic failures. By analysing these incidents alongside broader patterns of lawlessness, online abuse, and social unrest, the report underscores the urgent need for meaningful legal reforms, stronger protection mechanisms, and a revitalised civil society capable of restoring safety, justice, and public trust in Bangladesh.

2. Case Studies

This section presents five major incidents that illustrate the alarming rise in violence against women, children, and the Hindu community in Bangladesh over the past year. Together, these cases expose different dimensions of the crisis, ranging from gang rapes and brutal murders to assaults driven by Islamist and political affiliations, disruptions in women's sports, mob interference in judicial processes, and pervasive patterns of gender-based violence.

Example 1: Rape of a Woman in Front of Her Bound Husband (Bhola District, 28 June 2025)

On the night of 28 June 2025, in Tajumuddin Upazila of Bhola District, a brutal act of violence took place when a group of men invaded a couple's home. The husband was violently restrained and beaten, while his wife was gang-raped in his presence. The case, officially filed on 30 June 2025, named seven suspects, several of whom are reportedly linked to BNP-affiliated organisations, according to New Age. The Daily Star reported that the husband's third wife was among the first to be arrested for allegedly facilitating the attack, with subsequent arrests—including the primary suspect, a local political activist—raising the total number of detainees to at least four.

Prothom Alo provided a harrowing account: six intruders entered the home, assaulted the husband, demanded ransom, and committed the rape amid screams that left neighbours too terrified to intervene. The incident quickly drew political attention, leading to the expulsion of three BNP leaders implicated in the crime, as reported by the Bangladesh Post.

This horrifying case exposes not only the extreme brutality of gender-based violence but also the dangerous intersection of crime and politics, highlighting how political connections can maintain impunity in rural areas. It raises urgent questions about women's safety and the systemic failures that allow such atrocities to occur.

Example 2: Attacks on Women's Football Matches (2025)

Throughout early and mid-2025, women's football events across Bangladesh faced systematic disruptions, reflecting opposition to women's participation in public sports. In Dinajpur, an area called Hakimpur, a women's football match was halted by a mob under the Towhidi Janata banner (Islamist groups), leading to clashes that injured at least 10 people, as reported by bdnews24.com. A similar incident in Joypurhat District within Rangpur Division saw madrasa students and locals vandalise a sports venue, resulting in the cancellation of a friendly match between district women's teams (Al Jazeera; The Express Tribune).

In Rangpur's Taraganj upazila, protests by Islamist groups led to serious clashes, and the police imposed Section 144, as well as cancelling another match due to religious objections (The Daily Star). The Bangladesh Football Federation condemned these actions as obstacles to women's empowerment and sports development (TBS News), while civil society criticised them as misogynistic (bdnews24.com). A viral claim alleged an attack on a rising U-19 player, Parvin Sultana, claiming that she was taken and bitten, and then the capturer severed her leg tendons; as a result, she will never be able to play (TBS News). These incidents highlight a growing backlash against women's visibility in cultural and sporting spheres, raising concerns about gender equality and freedom.

Example 3: Muradnagar Rape Case (Cumilla District, 26 June 2025)

On 26 June 2025, in the village of Baherchar, Muradnagar Upazila, Cumilla District, a 25-year-old Hindu woman suffered a horrific ordeal that no one should have to experience. While staying at her father's house with her children, her husband away, she was savagely attacked, made nude in front of her children and raped at knifepoint by Fazor Ali (a Muslim person also known as Fajr Ali) and his accomplice. The incident was recorded and shared on social media. The sheer terror of the assault left her paralysed with fear, a trauma exacerbated by the presence of her young children. Residents bravely intervened, injuring Fazor, who fled the scene (Indian Express; The Business Standard).

What happened serves as a horrifying reminder of the extreme vulnerability faced by women in Bangladesh during the current interim government, both to physical and digital violence. It reveals a disturbing pattern where perpetrators exploit fear and power to inflict trauma, leaving survivors not only physically scarred but also profoundly traumatised. Since the incident occurred in front of her children, they too were severely traumatised. Beyond the personal tragedy, the case highlights systemic gaps in protection, enforcement, and accountability, raising urgent questions about the safety of women and children in a society where brutality and impunity persistently intersect. The case sparked political controversy, with unconfirmed claims of Fazor's ties to the Awami League or BNP, fuelling partisan blame (Indian Express;

Prothom Alo). Protests, including those at Dhaka University, demanded justice and protection for women. The survivor and her family were compelled to relocate due to media harassment (Dhaka Tribune).

By 29 June, Fazor Ali and four accomplices—Anik, Sumon, Ramzan, and Babu—had been arrested and charged not only with assault but also with recording and sharing footage on social media, which intensified the survivor’s trauma. (BSS; TBS News).

On 9 July, a hearing addressed a remand plea under the Pornography Act, with separate cases for rape and video distribution (TBS News). Shah Poran, Fazor's brother, was remanded for masterminding the video's spread as revenge over a family dispute, confessing to premeditation (BSS; Prothom Alo). This incident highlights the trauma of sexual violence compounded by digital exploitation and political polarisation.

Example 4: Mob Pressure to Free a Harasser in Dhaka (March 5–6, 2025)

On the night of 5–6 March 2025, Dhaka experienced a disturbing display of intimidation and lawlessness. The Islamist group Tawhidi Janata laid siege to Shahbagh Police Station, demanding the release of Mostafa Asif, who had been arrested for harassing a female Dhaka University student. By around 1 a.m. on 5 March, what began as a sit-in quickly escalated into a violent storming of the police station. Protesters shouted threats, intimidated the officers, and signalled the possibility of an even larger, more aggressive demonstration (The Business Standard; Dhaka Tribune).

Under growing pressure, the police released Asif on bail. In a shocking breach of justice, he was led out like a hero, showered with flowers, while the frightened student withdrew her complaint following alleged threats of rape and death (France24). The incident sent waves of fear through the city, exposing how extremist groups can exploit the justice system and silence survivors.

For women in Dhaka and beyond, this episode starkly highlights the dangers of speaking out against harassment. It not only erodes their sense of security but also signals a broader threat to the rule of law, demonstrating how radical mobilisation can bend institutions to protect perpetrators rather than victims. Women’s rights advocates warn that such acts embolden harassers and create a climate where female voices are silenced by fear, leaving survivors vulnerable and justice elusive.

Example 5: Surge in Violence Against Women and Girls in Bangladesh (August 2025)

Since August 2024, Bangladesh has seen a staggering rise in violence against women, girls and children, revealing the depth of societal divides and the interim government led by Dr. Younus's failure to protect vulnerable groups. As reported by **Bangladesh Mahila Parishad**, over **223 incidents** have been recorded, including **62 murders (55 women, 7 young girls)**, **53 rapes (31 girls, 22 women)**, **15 gang rapes**, and **13 attempted rapes (10 involving young girls)**. Additionally, **17 deaths** were described as “mysterious,” suggesting possible underreporting and the widespread culture of impunity (Prothom Alo).

Children and adolescents suffer the most from this violence, with **under-18s** making up **60% of rape victims**, and primary schoolgirls emerging as the most vulnerable group. Perpetrators are mainly young men aged 16 to 30, mostly educated in madrasas, as well as adults over 30 with political ties and occasionally community leaders. Meanwhile, victims vary widely, from schoolgirls to housewives, professionals, and labourers (Asianews Network). This disturbing trend exposes the interim regime's failure to maintain law and order, leaving women and children vulnerable to horrific attacks and eroding public confidence in state institutions. Despite numerous calls for stricter law enforcement, better protection measures, and increased awareness campaigns, little progress has been made (The Financial Express). The scale and brutality of these crimes emphasise a growing climate of lawlessness, requiring urgent and systemic reforms to safeguard women and girls and to restore basic safety and justice in Bangladesh.

3. Impacts on Society and Governance

These incidents have far-reaching consequences, exacerbating difficulties across multiple areas. The current interim government's strict media controls mean that much of this news is neither published nor highlighted. Newspapers and television channels face threats of mob violence and institutional damage, severely limiting their ability to report these events.

Legal and Judicial Challenges

These cases expose critical flaws in the country's legal and judicial systems, reflecting a broader climate of lawlessness. Mob interference in court proceedings, even in the presence of judges—as seen in the Dhaka harassment case—erodes the rule of law and undermines the criminal justice process. Political interference, evident in the Bhola and Muradnagar rape cases, highlights weaknesses in implementing laws such as the Prevention of Oppression Against Women and Children Act, 2000, and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The widespread circulation of assault videos, particularly in the Muradnagar case, places immense pressure on regulatory bodies like the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) to enforce existing cybercrime and digital privacy laws, including the Information and Communication Technology Act, 2006. These developments complicate investigations and underscore the urgent need for strengthened legal measures, including amendments to the Digital Security Act, 2018, to better address misinformation and disinformation in the digital age. Collectively, these cases demonstrate the pressing need for comprehensive legal reforms and robust enforcement mechanisms to effectively uphold justice.

Threat to Human Rights

Violence significantly undermines women's and children's fundamental rights, including their safety, education, and ability to participate fully in society. Specific incidents—ranging from attacks at sports events to public harassment—illustrate the ongoing threats women face. The surge in child victims over the past year highlights the wider spectrum of violence affecting vulnerable groups. Public shaming and digital harassment inflict deep psychological trauma, violating individual freedoms and contributing to a pervasive culture of fear. This environment restricts women's freedom of movement and curtails opportunities for empowerment, creating severe social and psychological barriers.

Political Instability

Political affiliations in cases like Bhola and Muradnagar have intensified societal divisions, often along religious lines, with expulsions, arrests, and blame-shifting overshadowing genuine accountability. The interim government, led by Dr. Younus, has repeatedly demonstrated a lack of concern for protecting women, children, and vulnerable communities and has, at times, tacitly condoned mob actions. Weak law enforcement fosters an environment in which citizens feel compelled to take the law into their own hands, resulting in cycles of vigilante justice and escalating violence.

The actions of radical groups—disrupting football matches, storming police stations in Dhaka, or organising protests to intimidate victims—further erode state authority. These incidents reflect the growing inability of law enforcement and government institutions to maintain order, leaving ordinary citizens doubtful of official protection. Social cohesion deteriorates, governance is destabilised, and the rule of law weakens in an increasingly polarised society. This climate of fear and impunity represents a fundamental governance crisis: without swift action, the protection of women, children, and minorities remains precarious, and cycles of violence and political exploitation are likely to continue unchecked.

Social Divisions

These incidents deepen the divide between progressive groups advocating for women's rights and conservative or religious factions opposing women's public participation. Rural-urban disparities, fears among neighbours—as seen in the Bhola case—and media harassment—as in Muradnagar—undermine community cohesion, reinforce misogyny, and slow social progress.

4. Conclusion

Tackling the growing violence against women in Bangladesh demands a comprehensive approach to restore safety, justice, fairness, and a strong political commitment to protecting vulnerable communities.

Strengthening Law Enforcement

Police must be better equipped and trained to respond effectively to gender-based crimes while remaining shielded from mob pressures and political interference. Building public trust in law enforcement is essential, requiring both accountability and visible action to demonstrate that authorities are committed to protecting women and upholding the law.

Role of Media and Civil Society

Media outlets play a vital role in raising awareness of violence and injustice, but ethical reporting is essential to prevent further harm to survivors. Responsible journalism involves protecting victims' identities, verifying facts before publication, and avoiding sensationalism that can exacerbate trauma. The government also bears the responsibility of safeguarding the independence and safety of journalists and news agencies, protecting them from threats and undue interference when covering sensitive cases.

Civil society organisations are equally critical. They can amplify advocacy, provide support networks for survivors, and hold authorities accountable for failures in law enforcement. Collaboration between media and civil society strengthens public safety, promotes accountability, and fosters a culture of respect for human rights.

Legal Reforms

Comprehensive legislative reforms are needed to combat digital crimes effectively, including updating laws to address new forms of cyber harassment and misinformation. Harsher penalties should be imposed for serious offences such as gang rapes, brutal murders, and harassment to ensure justice and deter future crimes. Streamlining judicial procedures is also crucial to accelerate case resolutions and enhance the efficiency and credibility of the justice system.

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**RULE WITHOUT MANDATE,
DEATH WITHOUT TRIAL:
Bangladesh's Human Rights Crisis**

47 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS



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Introduction

In many underdeveloped and developing countries especially those ruled by authoritarian or undemocratic regimes, extrajudicial killings have become disturbingly normalized. Bangladesh is no exception.

Over its 54-year history, every government in Bangladesh regardless of political affiliation has faced credible accusations of extrajudicial executions. What should shock the conscience of any democratic society has instead become a tragic pattern, repeated and sustained across decades.

In recent times, a major political upheaval led to the removal of Bangladesh's elected government through mass protests. In its place, an unelected and constitutionally controversial administration was installed, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus. This appointment sparked hope. Many believed that under such internationally esteemed leadership, the long-standing culture of lawless state violence would finally come to an end. That hope is now fading fast.

As this unelected regime continues to extend its tenure, reports of extrajudicial killings are rising. According to various media reports, at least 47 individuals have been subjected to extrajudicial execution since September 8, 2024. Human rights observers suspect the actual number is significantly higher.

With the government exercising near-total control over the press, many of these cases are underreported or go entirely unreported. Journalists who dare to investigate or publish such stories face grave consequences: arrests, job losses, revocation of press accreditation, and violent attacks on newsrooms. Some reports are later removed under pressure an erasure of truth, enforced by fear.

Because this administration was never elected, it operates without accountability to the people. As such, these serious allegations are either ignored or dismissed outright.

Every instance of extrajudicial killing must be subject to an impartial investigation. Those responsible regardless of rank or status must face justice. The culture of impunity must end.

We urgently call upon national and international human rights organizations and all global institutions committed to justice to launch independent inquiries and bring the perpetrators to account. Silence is complicity. It is time for the world to act.


Global Center for Democratic Governance

List of Victims of Extrajudicial Killings

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
1.	08-Sep-24	<p>Elahi Sikdar (25) S/O: Mohi Sikdar Address: Falsi, Nijamkandi, Kashiani, Gopalganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activist, Nijamkandi Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill1	
2.	08-Sep-24	<p>Syedul Karim (55) S/O: Nurul Kabir Address: Cox's Bazar</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkill2	
3.	10-Sep-24	<p>Shafiqul Islam (45) S/O: Late. Malek Uddin Address: Gobindi, Saghata, Gaibandha</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leader, Saghata Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill3	
4.	10-Sep-24	<p>Sohrab Hossain Apel (35) S/O: Late. Rustam Ali Address: Gobindi, Saghata, Gaibandha</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activist, Saghata Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill4	
5.	17-Sep-24	<p>Saidul Islam (40) S/O: Abdus Salam Address: Golpukurpar, Mymensingh Municipality, Mymensingh Sadar, Mymensingh</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint secretary, Mymensingh Metropolitan unit Youth Party 		tinyurl.com/xjkill5	













SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
6.	30-Sep-24	<p>Kausar Hossain Khan (27) S/O: Md. Nesar Uddin Address: Maddho Ratanpur, Bidyanandapur, Mehendiganj, Barishal</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Garment workers, Mango Tex Limited, Tongibari, Savar 		tinyurl.com/xjkill6	
7.	13-Oct-24	<p>Alimujjaman Chowdhury (58) S/O: Baka Mia Chowdhury Address: Ghonapara, Gopalganj Sadar, Gopalganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Founder President, Liberation War Generation Welfare Council 		tinyurl.com/xjkill7	
8.	27-Oct-24	<p>Champa Khatun (25) S/O: Chandu Mia Address: Ahammadpur, Pirganj, Rangpur</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Garment workers, Generation Next Fashions Ltd, Ashulia, Savar 		tinyurl.com/xjkill8	
9.	29-Oct-24	<p>Md. Sharif (32) Address: Badol Kajir Bari, Azimpur, Sandwip, Chattogram</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint Convenor, Azimpur Union Volunteer Party 		tinyurl.com/xjkill9	
10.	11-Nov-24	<p>Shahidul Islam Ratan (58) S/O: Late. Kalim Uddin Address: Dakkhin Godarpara, Bogura Municipality, Bogura Sadar, Bogura</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General Secretary, Ward No. 15 Awami League, Bogura Municipality 		tinyurl.com/xjkill10	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
11.	16-Nov-24	<p>Hridoy Rabi Das (21) S/O: Juges Rabi Das Address: Joyka Baruk Bazar, Karimganj, Kishoreganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Barber 		tinyurl.com/xjkill11	
12.	25-Nov-24	<p>Abdul Latif (67) S/O: Late. Mohir Uddin Address: Sholagari, Bihar, Shibganj, Bogura</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treasurer, Shibganj Upazila Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill12	
13.	26-Nov-24	<p>Principal Shahadat Alam Jhunu (57) S/O: Bhatkandi Mollapara Address: Malatinagar, Bogura Municipality, Bogura Sadar, Bogura</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizing Secretary, Bogura District Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill13	
14.	05-Dec-24	<p>Atiq Hasan Sardar (30) S/O: Abdur Razzak Address: Dakatia, Kashimpur, Jashore Sadar, Jashore</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sports Secretary, Ward No. 8 Youth Party, Kashimpur 		tinyurl.com/xjkill14	
15.	06-Dec-24	<p>Hazrat Ali (30) S/O: Mohammad Quddus Address: Bhelanagar, Chhayfullakandi, Banchharampur, Brahmanbaria</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activist, Youth League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill15	









SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
16.	09-Dec-24	<p>Abdul Motin Mithu (65) S/O: Mozahar Ali Address: Boitha Dakkhinpara, Durgahata, Gabtali, Bogura</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Durgahata Union Parishad; President, Ward No. 6 Awami League, Durgahata 		tinyurl.com/xjkill16	
17.	10-Dec-24	<p>Ataur Rahman Angur (55) Address: Dattabari, Sirajganj Municipality, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forest And Environment Affairs Secretary, Sirajganj Municipal Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill17	
18.	13-Dec-24	<p>Rafiqul Islam Dudu (45) S/O: Aziz Mondal Address: Chandipur, Chandgram, Bheramara, Kushtia</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supporter, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party) 		tinyurl.com/xjkill18	
19.	03-Jan-25	<p>Mosleh Uddin (35) Address: Charfashion, Bhola</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fisherman 	 Photo not found	tinyurl.com/xjkill19	
20.	04-Jan-25	<p>Nitya Sarkar (50) S/O: Jagodish Sarkar Address: Kalai, Gala, Harirampur, Manikganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Vice President, Kalai Ward Awami League, Gala 		tinyurl.com/xjkill20	



SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
21.	06-Jan-25	<p>Yeasin Mia (40) S/O: Md. Sayeed Address: Belabo, Narsinghdi Sadar, Narshinghdi Identity: ▪ Auto-rickshaw driver</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkillling21	
22.	10-Jan-25	<p>Sheikh Zahirul Islam (46) S/O: Mozibur Rahman Address: Singdighi, Maona, Sreepur, Gazipur Identity: ▪ General Secretary, Sreepur Upazila Workers League</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkill22	
23.	13-Jan-25	<p>Abdur Rahman (34) S/O: Late. Saidul Haque Address: Hirapur, Sonapur, Sonaimuri, Noakhali Identity: ▪ Former Joint Secretary, Sonapur Union Students' Party; ▪ Organizing Secretary Candidate, Sonapur Union Youth Party</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkillling23	
24.	14-Jan-25	<p>Mominur Islam (50) S/O: Motiar Rahman Address: Purba Shimulbari, Mirganj, Jaldhaka, Nilphamari Identity: ▪ General Secretary, Ward No. 4 Awami League, Mirganj</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkill24	
25.	25-Jan-25	<p>Milon Bepari (55) S/O: Late. Amzad Bepari Address: Paschim Naodoba, Naodoba, Zajira, Shariatpur Identity: ▪ Grocer</p>		tinyurl.com/xjkillling25	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
26.	31-Jan-25	<p>Towhidul Islam (40) S/O: Mokhlesur Rahman Address: Italla, Panchthubi, Adarsha Sadar, Cumilla</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convenor, Panchthubi Union Youth Party 		tinyurl.com/xjkill26	
27.	07-Feb-25	<p>Huttu Sheikh (65) S/O: Late. Chenu Sheikh Address: Hat Chandra, Jamalpur Municipality, Jamalapur Sadar, Jamalpur</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activist, Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill27	
28.	09-Feb-25	<p>Akter Shikder (44) S/O: Keramot Shikder Address: Mokampur, Madhupur, Terokhada, Khulna</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint General Secretary, Madhupur Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill28	
29.	13-Feb-25	<p>Abdur Razzak (50) S/O: Abdur Rahman Address: Majidpuur, Savar Municipality, Savar, Dhaka</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forest And Environment Affairs Secretary, Savar Municipal Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill29	
30.	18-Feb-25	<p>Siddique Hossain Molla (45) S/O: Late. Muzibur Rahman Molla Address: Gopalpur, Paranpur, Manda, Naogaon</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizing Secretary, Paranpur Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill30	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
31.	20-Feb-25	Md. Jummon (26) S/O: Abdul Sattar Address: Deshvuai, Gosairhat, Shariatpur	 Photo not found	tinyurl.com/xjkill31	
32.	20-Feb-25	Miraz Hossain (25) S/O: Md. Shahjahan Ali Address: Nurabad, Charfashion, Bhola	 Photo not found	tinyurl.com/xjkill32	
33.	23-Feb-25	Jahidul Islam Shipu Address: Bhuanpur, Tangail Identity: ▪ Joint General Secretary, Ibrahim Khan Government College Students' League	 Photo not found	tinyurl.com/xjkill33	
34.	24-Feb-25	Shihab Kabir Nahid (30) S/O: Nasir Uddim Address: Samitipara, Cox's Bazar Municipality, Cox's Bazar Sadar, Cox's Bazar Identity: ▪ Businessman		tinyurl.com/xjkill34	
35.	11-Mar-25	Emdadul Haque Bhutto (51) Address: Dakkhinpara, Gabtali, Bogura Identity: ▪ Organizing Secretary, Dakkhinpara Union Awami League		tinyurl.com/xjkill35	
36.	15-Mar-24	Ezaz Bin Alom (Fahim) (34) S/O: Shah Alom Address: Hazaribag, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/xjkill36	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
37.	31-Mar-25	<p>Md. Hasan (23) S/O: Rafiqul Islam Address: Medua, Razapur, Bhola Sadar, Bhola</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Garment Worker 		tinyurl.com/xjkill37	
38.	02-Apr-25	<p>Sujeet Chandra Dey (40) S/O: Late. Bodir Chandra Dey Address: Thakurpara, Dhaki, Mithamain, Kishoreganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activist, Dhaki Union, Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill38	
39.	09-Apr-25	<p>Reazul Islam (Raizul) (74) Address: Birgaon, Purba Birgaon, Shantiganj, Sunamganj</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chairman, Purba Birgaon Union Parishad; President, Purba Birgaon Union Awami League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill39	
40.	21-Apr-25	<p>Siyam Molla (35) S/O: Ripon Molla Address: Baherghat, Ujirpur, Barishal</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ College Student 		tinyurl.com/xjkill40	
41.	25-Apr-25	<p>Farzan Hossain Sajib (36) S/O: Taleb Address: Ramjoy Mahajan Lane, Bakshirhat, Chattogram City Corporation, Chattogram</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Member, Ward No. 25 Bakshirhat Volunteer League, Chattogram City Corporation 		tinyurl.com/xjkill41	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
42.	06-May-24	<p>Safayet Talukder (25) S/O: Faruk Hossain Talukder Address: Jiudhara, Nishanbaria, Morelganj, Bagerhat</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activist, Nishanbaria Union Student Party 		tinyurl.com/xjkill42	
43.	31-May-25	<p>Imam Hossain Bacchu (44) S/O: Golam Maola Address: Mogaltuli, Ward No. 05, Cumilla City Corporation, Cumilla</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vice President, Cumilla City Corporation Volunteer League 		tinyurl.com/xjkill43	
44.	07-Jun-25	<p>Md. Ali Azgar Address: Bow Bazar, Ward No. 58, Dhaka South City Corporation, Dhaka</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General Secretary, Bow Bazar Unit Awami League, Ward No. 58, Dhaka South City Corporation 		tinyurl.com/xjkill44	
45.	13-Jun-25	<p>Firoza Begum (50) Husband: Swapan Mia Address: Dari Chariakona, Katiadi Municipality, Katiadi, Kishoreganj</p>	 <p>Photo not found</p>	tinyurl.com/xjkill45	
46.	15-Jun-25	<p>Saidur Rahman Sujon (45) S/O: Late. Ataulah Madbor Address: Kakabo, Birulia, Savar, Dhaka</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Former Chairman, Birulia Union Parishad 		tinyurl.com/xjkill46	

SL.	Date	Name, Address & Identity	Photo	News Link	QR Code
47.	19-Jun-25	<p>Sheikh Juwel (45) S/O: Sheikh Golam Sarowar Address: Bangra, Muradnagar, Cumilla</p> <p>Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political Activist 		tinyurl.com/xjkill47	



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Elementary list of brutally killed leaders and activists of Bangladesh Awami League and its associated bodies

Preface: Some 526 (320 & 206) Bangladesh Awami League leaders, Activists, Supporters and Concerned citizens have been killed in the Dr. Muhammad Yunus Regime and July Movement by the so-called Job-seeking Quota agitators and the terrorists of the current interim government.

Among them 26 in July, 138 in August, 16 in September, 22 in October, 14 in Novemebr, 15 in December of 2024 end 9 in January, 11 in February, 17 in March, 13 in April, 11 in May, 10 in June, 11 in July of 2025, 4 in August, and in September 3 (up to 22).

The interim government of Dr. Muhammad Yunus has given indemnity to the killers by law, and the government has systematically destroyed the evidence and crashed the accurate statistics of all the killings.

Due to strict censorship of newspapers, electronic media and other medias, it was not possible to get the actual figure of killings. Although a part of the mentioned statistics is collected from the newspapers, it can be assumed that if more research is done, the actual number of victims will increase. Consequently this list must be considered incomplete.

It is sad but true that the family members of the Awami League party leaders and activists who were killed are being forced by the interim government to file false cases in the name of our party chief and other leaders.

See the Table-1:

SI No	Date& Reference (media reports)	Name & Political affiliation	Qntty	Nature of Death	Place of Murder	District	Division
1.	16.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/sabuja	Sabuj Ali S/o: Badsha Mia, Sadar Upazila in	1	Due to Head Injury		Nilphamari	Rangpur

	https://surl.li/xszxsy	Nilphamari District. Political Affiliation: Activists of Bangladesh Students' League of Dhaka College in Capital. Student of 2018-19 session of Statistic. Resident student of room no-205 of North Hostel, Dhaka College.		following			
2.	18.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Nazmul Hossain Kazi (22) S/o: Late Selim Kazi Political Affiliation: 59 no. Bangladesh Awami Volunteers League Leader of Dhaka South City	1	Hacked to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
3.	18.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Hasan Mehedy Political Affiliation: Former Students' League Leader of Dhaka South City and Journalist of Dhakatimes24.com	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
4.	18.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/ahhabib https://surl.li/cruthh	Ahsan Habib (22) S/o: Helal Uddin Political Affiliation: Students League Leader of 9 no. ward of Fashiakhali union of Chakaria Upazila in Cox'sbazar District.	1	Shot to Death		Cox'sbazar	Chattogram
5.	18.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Md. Jashim Uddin (35) S/o: Johirul Islam	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka

		Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of 61 no. ward under Kadamtali Thana in Dhaka South City					
6.	18.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Sakibul Hasan Sumon S/o: Mortaza Alam Political Affiliation: Bangladesh Awami Volunteers League Activist of 61 no. ward under Kadamtali Thana in Dhaka City South.	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
7.	19.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Md. Roman M/o: Luchi Begum Political Affiliation: Activist of Bangladesh Awami League in Barishal District	1	Shot to Death		Barishal	Barishal
8.	19.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/msjffhrn	Ahsan Habib Tamim S/o: Abdul Mannan Political Affiliation: BSL Activist of Jagannath University, Dhaka	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
9.	19.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/cej49f9h	Md. Safqat Samir (10) S/o: Md. Sakibur Rahman Kafrul, Mirpur-14, Dhaka City North Family is Awami League Supporter	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
10.	19.7.204 Source: Local Awami League	Mehedy Hasan (20) S/o: Md. Mohaimin	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka

		Political Affiliation: Former Joint General Secretary of 1no. unit of Tejgaon Industrial Area Students' League					
11.	19.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/yta8d83v	Md. Hasan (20) S/o: Kobir Hossain (Physically Challenged) Political Affiliation: Vice President of 3no. ward of Students' League under Koraia Union of Kochua Upazila in Chandpur District.	1	Shot to Death		Chandpur	Chattogram
12.	20.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/szitipu https://surl.li/wmgehh	Syed Johirul Islam Tipu (48) S/o: Late Syed Foyzul Islam Political Affiliation: Vice President of Matshyajibi League of Shibpur Upazila in Narsingdi District.	1	Beaten to Death		Narsingdi	Dhaka
13.	20.7.204 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Nure Alam S/o: Amir Ali Political Affiliation: 18no. Ward Sramik League Leader in Gazipur City.	1	Shot to Death		Gazipur	Dhaka
14.	July 2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Mominul Islam Hriday S/o: Md. Biplob Hossain Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of 6no. ward of Dhaka City North	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka

15.	July 2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Barek Mia S/o: Yunus Molla Political Affiliation: 18no. Ward Awami Volunteers League Leader of Gulshan Thana in Dhaka City North	1	Beaten and Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
16.	July 2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Md. Babul S/o: Abul Kashem Political Affiliation: 6no. ward Jubo League Leader of Pallabi Thana in Dhaka City North	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
17.	19.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Imam Mehedi Hassan Political Affiliation: Pakundia Upazila Students' League President of Kishoreganj District	1	Shot to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
18.	19.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shrokon	Shahriar Hossain Rokon Political Affiliation: President of Mohammadpur Ward No. 47 Awami League, Dhaka Metropolitan North, Dhaka	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
19.	July 2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan	Kobir Hossain S/o: Abdul Mannan Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of Senpara Area of Mirpur	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka

		Thana in Dhaka City North					
20.	July 2024 https://shorturl.at/oStE1	Biplab Sheikh Political Affiliation: Awami Jubo League Activist of Dhaka City	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
21.	July 2024 https://shorturl.at/oStE1	Mohammad Nadim Political Affiliation: Awami Jubo League Leader of Dhaka City	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
22.	23.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/imhasan https://tinyurl.com/2r6yebhc	Hridoy Chandra Torua (22) S/o: Ratan Chandra Torua Political Affiliation: Students' League Activist of Chattogram University from Patuakhali District.	1	Shot to Death		Patuakhali	Barisal
23.	24.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/hismolla	Hamidul Islam Jewel Molla S/o: Barek Molla Political Affiliation: Personal Aide of former Gazipur City Corporation Mayor and Awami League Leader Jahangir Alam	1	Beaten to Death		Gazipur	Dhaka
24.	25.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ssardar https://surl.lj/gutuua	Sufian Sardar (32) S/o: Md. Jamal Sardar Political Affiliation: Senior Vice President of Memania Union Awami Volunteers League of Hijla Upazila in	1	Chopped to Death		Barisal	Barisal

		Barisal District.					
25.	26.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdsrana	Md. Sohel Rana (35) S/o: Jahangir Alam Occupation: Truck Driver Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Baganbari Unit of Awami League under Badda Thana in Dhaka City North	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
26.	29.7.2024 https://tinyurl.com/klahmed https://surl.li/bymeew	Kamal Ahmed (38) S/o: Alam Chand Political Affiliation: Former Education and Human Resource affairs Secretary of ward-33 under Mohammadpur Thana in Dhaka City North.	1	Chopped to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
27.	3.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/khkf5bz3 https://surl.cc/nqtspa	Mohammed Shahid (35) Political Affiliation: Local Awami League Activist of Bohoddarhat area in Chattogram city.	1	Shot to Death	Residence of Chattogram City Corporation Mayor Rezaul Karim Chowdhury.	Chattogram	Chattogram
28.	4.8.2024 https://rb.gy/8xchwkw https://tinyurl.com/haradroy https://surl.li/fpvadv	Haradhon Roy (48) Political Affiliation: Ward-4 Councilor of Rangpur City Corporation and President of Awami League Porshuram Thana in Rangpur City.	1	Beating and Chopping		Rangpur	Rangpur
29.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/scrko https://surl.li/fpvadv	Shyamal Chandra Roy Komol (37) Political Affiliation: Awami League	1	Beating and Chopping		Rangpur	Rangpur

		Activist of ward-4 in Ranpur city. Nephew and Car driver of Haradhon Roy, Ward-4 Councilor of Rangpur City Corporation and President of Awami League Porshuram Thana in Rangpur City.					
30.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mukulmia https://surl.lk/fpvadv	Mukul Mia (31) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Guratipara Area in Rangpur City	1	Beaten to Death		Rangpur	Rangpur
31.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/2656n8re https://tinyurl.com/kiksabuj https://surl.lk/fpvadv	Khairul Islam Khhasru Sabuj (28) Political Affiliation: Awami Volunteers League Leader of Guratipara Area in Rangpur City	1	Beaten to Death		Rangpur	Rangpur
32.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/masummi https://surl.lk/fpvadv	Masum Mia (23) Political Affiliation: Bangladesh Students' League Leader of Guratipara Area in Rangpur City	1	Beaten to Death		Rangpur	Rangpur
33.	4.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mhmunna https://surl.lk/rpsmae	Mahmudul Hasan Munna S/o: Abdul Majid Political Affiliation: Former deputy secretary of environment affairs of the Kawnia Thana Students League in Rangpur City	1	Beaten to Death		Rangpur	Rangpur
34.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rafrahim https://surl.lk/rkwzty	Rafiquzzaman Rahim (52) Political Affiliation: Former Vice-President of Joypurhat District Jubo League	1	Chopped to Death		Joypurhat	Rajshahi

35.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rayganj https://surl.cc/wzmqdt	Golam Sarwar Liton (55) Political Affiliation: Chairman of Brahmagacha union Parishad of Raiganj Upazila and Leader of Awami League in Sirajganj District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
36.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rayganj https://surl.cc/wzmqdt	Golam Hasnain Tito (52) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Brahmagacha union Awami League under Raiganj Upaila in Sirajganj District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
37.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rayganj https://surl.cc/wzmqdt	Jahangir Alam (42) Political Affiliation: Former General Secretary of Raiganj Upazila and UP Member of Chandaikona Union and Member of Union Awami League in Sirajganj District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
38.	4.8.2024 https://surl.cc/wzmqdt	Mehedi Hasan Elias (40) Political Affiliation: President of Awami Volunteers League of Raiganj Upazila in Sirajganj District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
39.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rayganj https://surl.cc/wzmqdt	Al Amin Sarkar (42) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Awami Volunteers League of Raiganj Upazila in Sirajganj District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
40.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/msahshk	Shahin Sheikh (16) Political Affiliation: Students League Activist, Janpur Area, Sirajganj	1	Beaten to Death	Sirajganj-2 Constituency Former MP Jannat Ara	Sirajganj	Rajshahi

		Municipality, Sirajganj			Henry's house		
41.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mjahalm	Shahin Sheikh (16) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist, Janpur Area, Sirajganj Municipality, Sirajganj	1	Beaten to Death	Sirajganj-2 Constituency Former MP Jannat Ara Henry's house	Sirajganj	Rajshahi
42.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/asifsrj https://tinyurl.com/5356b7v6	Asif Hossain (19) Political Affiliation: Students League Activist, Sirajganj Municipality, Sirajganj	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
43.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ajnakt	Anjana Akter (34) Husband: Alam Mia, Joshodal Union under Sadar Upazila in Kishoreganj District. Political Affiliation: She was a housekeeper of national leader and former acting president Shaheed Syed Nazrul Islam's Family.	1	Burnt to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
44.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ajnakt	Unknown Child M/o: Anjana Akter (34) F/o: Alam Mia Political Affiliation: Joshodal Union under Sadar Upazila in Kishoreganj District.	1	Burnt to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
45.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ajnakt	Unknown (53) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Sadar Upazila in Kishoreganj District.	1	Burnt to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
46.	4.8.2024	Julker Mia (35)	1	Burnt to		Kishoreganj	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/jlkrmi	S/o: Matiur Rahman Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist of Birdam para in Joshodol Union under Sadar Upazila in Kishoreganj District. He was a housekeeper of national leader and former acting president Shaheed Syed Nazrul Islam's Family.		Death			
47.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mbinmi	Mobin Mia (34) Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Karshakarial union Jubo League under Sadar Upazila in Kishoreganj District.	1	Chopped to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
48.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/wy638xy8	Abdul Kuddus (34) S/o: Jalal Uddin Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Dighirpar village of Bajitpur Upazila in Kishoreganj District.	1	Chopped to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
49.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rblabdl	Rubel Abdullah (50) S/o: Siraj Uddin Political Affiliation: A businessman of Kalibari Mour in Karimganj Upazila and Awami League activist in Kishoreganj District.	1	Chopped to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
50.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdldlu https://surl.li/ofgska	Md. Delwar Hossain Delu (48) President of Matshyajibi League of Madhabdi Thana in Narshingdi District.	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
51.	4.8.2024	Delwar Hossain Shahin (37)	1	Beaten to		Narshingdi	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/dlrhshn https://surl.li/ofgska	Political Affiliation: Former General Secretary of Madhabdi Upazila Students' League and Union Parishad Chairman of Chardigaldi in Narshingdi District		Death			
52.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ntemnr https://surl.li/ofgska	Moniruzzaman Bhuyian alias Nati Monir (48) Political Affiliation: Former Member of District Council and Organizing Secretary of Madhabdi Thana Volunteers League in Narshingdi District	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
53.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abdljll https://surl.li/ofgska	Abdul Jalil Mia Babul (40) Political Affiliation: Organising Secretary of Mohishashur union of Madhabdi Thana in Narshingdi District	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
54.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/kmlhmia https://surl.li/ofgska	Kamal Hossain Mia (45) Political Affiliation: Activist of Awami League of Mohishashur union of Madhabdi Thana in Narshingdi District	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
55.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/omrfrk https://surl.li/ofgska	Omar Faruk (35) Political Affiliation: Activist of Awami League of Mohishashur union of Madhabdi Thana in Narshingdi District	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
56.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ansrrshl	Anisur Rahman Sohel (43) Political Affiliation: Leader of Awami Volunteers League of Madhabdi Thana	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka

		in Narshingdi District					
57.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nowsher	Nowsher Ali (40) Political Affiliation: Councilor of Ward-11 of Madhabdi municipality in Narshingdi District	1	Beaten to Death		Narshingdi	Dhaka
58.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/engranli	Engr. Anwarul Islam Political Affiliation: Member of Dhaka City North Awami League and former President of Ward-1 in Uttara	1	Beaten to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
59.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mifti	Md. Iftee (32) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Keraniganj Upazila in Dhaka District	1	Burnt to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
60.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/tawhdkr	Tawheed Kabir Rafi (17) Political Affiliation: Students' League Leader of Keroa Village of Raiganj Upazila in Laxmipur District.	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
61.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rhsifat	Rakibul Hasan Sifat Political Affiliation: President of Ward-2 Jubo League of Sadar Municipality in Laksmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
62.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/hrnrds	Harunur Rashid (45) Political Affiliation: President of 21 no. Tumchar Union Jubo League under Sadar Upazila and 1 no. ward Union Parishad member in Laxmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram

63.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ahmdsrf	Ahmed Sharif (42) Political Affiliation: Former President of Sadar Upazila in Laxmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
64.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/42kdxxrk	Md. Rasel Political Affiliation: Awami Jubo League Leader in Laxmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
65.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/42kdxxrk	Yusuf Ali (50) Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of Shyamganj village of North Hamchadia union in Laxmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
66.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/42kdxxrk	Tanjid Haider Riaj (42) Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of North Hamchadia Village in Laxmipur District	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
67.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/42kdxxrk	Sujon Mia (24) Political Affiliation: Students' League Leader of Madhyam Sagordi village of Bamni Union of Raipur Upazila in Laxmipur District.	1	Burnt to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
68.	4.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4bj24vks	Md. Jashim Uddin (40) S/o: Abu Taher Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of 3No Ward under Sadar Municipality in Bhola District.	1	Shot to Death		Bhola	Barishal
69.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/3znsyvt	Four charred bodies were found at the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, referred to as Dhanmondi 32 was the	4	Burnt to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka

		residence of the founding father and undisputed leader of War of Independence of Bangladesh Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in Dhaka after it was set on fire by protesters.					
70.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4d2r8m4f	Anwarul Islam Jewel (28) Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader, Dhaka City North	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
71.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4d2r8m4f	Jahir Uddin Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader, Dhaka City North, Dhaka	1	Shot to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
72.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/bdfktnua https://surli.cc/qcsjxo	The burnt bodies of 6 unidentified people were recovered from the house of Lalmonirhat District Awami League Joint General Secretary Sumon Khan.	6	Premeditated murder by burning		Lalmonirhat	Rangpur
73.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/boguram https://surl.li/ncqbiv	Noor Alam (28) Political Affiliation: Organising secretary of 1 no. ward of Khorna Union of Shahjahanpur Upazila in Bagura District.	1	Chopped to Death		Bagura	Rajshahi
74.	August 5 https://tinyurl.com/boguram https://surl.li/ncqbiv	Rana Paiker (34) Political Affiliation: 14no ward Jubo League member of Bagura Sadar Municipality	1	Chopped to Death		Bagura	Rajshahi
75.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mzdlikhn	Mazedul Islam Khan (28) S/o: Zafar Khan Political Affiliation: Jubo League leader	1	Beaten and Chopped to Death		Narail	Khulna

		of 2no Boroshula ward in Narail District Sadar Municipality.					
76.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shhiron https://surl.li/gnncgr	Shahidul Islam Hiron (55) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Jhenidah Sadar Upazila Awami League and Union Parisad Chairman of 9no. Porahati in Jhenidah District	1	Beaten and Burnt to Death		Jhenidah	Khulna
77.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/aktrhma https://surl.li/gnncgr	Akter Hossain Mia (40) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Modhupur village of Porahati union of Jhenidah Sadar Upazila and car driver of Shahidul Islam Hiron	1	Beaten and Burnt to Death		Jhenidah	Khulna
78.	5.8.2024 https://surl.li/hyzkcn	2 unidentified people were killed in a fire that broke out at the house of Shahidul Islam Hiron, General Secretary of Sadar Upazila Awami League and UP Chairman of 9no Porahati UP in Jhenaidah District	2	Burnt to Death	at the house of General Secretary of Sadar upazila Awami League and 9no Porahati UP chairman Shahidul Islam Hiron.	Jhenidah	Khulna
79.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4m6bzft	Rabbi (13) Political Affiliation: Students League Activis from Foila village under Kaliganj Upazila in Jhenaidah District	1	Burnt to Death	died in arson attack at Kaliganj Upazila Awami League leader Jewel's house	Jhenidah	Khulna
80.	5.8.2024	Manju (20)	1	Burnt to	died in arson	Jhenidah	Khulna

	https://tinyurl.com/4m6bzftp	Political Affiliation: Students League Activis from Khoyertola village under Kaliganj Upazila in Jhenaidah District		Death	attack at Kaliganj Upazila Awami League leader Jewel's house		
81.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/5xj6a7xe	4 unidentified people were killed in a fire at the house of former District Jubo League Convener Arefin Alam Ranju in Chuadanga District	4	Burnt to Death		Chuadanga	Khulna
82.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4kzytvea	Md. Solaiman Hossain Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist of Putkhali Union of Benapole in Jashore District	1	Beaten to Death		Jashore	Khulna
83.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/gmmrza	G M Mohsin Reza Political Affiliation: Chairman of Koira Upazila Parisad and president of Upazila Awami League of Khulna District.	1	Beaten to Death		Khulna	Khulna
84.	5.8.2024 https://shorturl.at/yn3WM	Alamgir Hossain Political Affiliation: Car driver of Chairman of Koira Upazila Parisad GM Mohsin Reza and Awami League activist of Khulna District.	1	Beaten to Death		Khulna	Khulna
85.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mfzlislm	Mafizul Islam Political Affiliation: Activist of Koira Upazila Awami League and personal aide of Chairman of Koira Upazila Parisad GM Mohsin Reza	1	Beaten to Death		Khulna	Khulna

86.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Sheikh Jakir Hossain S/o: Late Aminur Rahman Political Affiliation: Protapnagar Union Parishad Chairman of Ashashuni Upazila and President of Union Awami League and vice president of Upazila Awami League in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
87.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Sheikh Shaker Ali (22) S/o: Sheikh Shahajur Rahman Saju Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Protapnagar Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
88.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Sheikh Jahangir Hossain (48) S/o: Late Sheikh Sujat Ali Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Protapnagar Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
89.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Sheikh Ashikur Rahman (33) S/o: Late Sheikh ariful Islam Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Protapnagar Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District and nephew of Sheikh Jakir Hossain.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
90.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Shahin Alam (22) S/o: Sirajul Islam Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Protapnagar Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna

		and car driver of Sheikh Jakir Hossain					
91.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Sajib Hossain (22) S/o: Sheikh Azuar Hossain Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Protapnagar Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District and nephew of Sheikh Jakir Hossain	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
92.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Hafez Anaj Billah (21) S/o: Warez Ali Mondol Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Kurikaunia village of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
93.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Adam Ali (23) S/o: Noor Hakim Gharami Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Kalyanpur village in Kurikaunia union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
94.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Anaj Ali (18) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Kurikaunia Union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
95.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Alangir Hossain (16) S/o: Sattar Sardar Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Hijolia Village in Kurikaunia union of Ashashuni Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Chopped to Death		Satkhira	Khulna

96.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Asafur Rahman (60) S/o: Late Rafel Sardar Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Baikari Union of Sadar Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
97.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Touhid Islam (33) S/o: Tojammel Haque Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Mugidanga Village of Sadar Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
98.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ptpnagr	Saiful Islam (30) S/o: Late Javed Ali Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Ghona Village of Sadar Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
99.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Jahid Hossain (28) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Baikari Village of Sadar Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
100.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yd89bzat	Faruk Hossain (35) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Baikari Village of Sadar Upazila in Satkhira District.	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
101.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mjamadr https://surl.li/cpjtyt	Moin Jamaddar (45) S/o: Mazibur Rahman Jamaddar Political Affiliation: Bakerganj Upazila Jubo League Leader of Barishal District	1	Burnt to Death	BCC Mayor Sadiq Abdullah's house	Barishal	Barishal

102.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nisluru https://surl.li/cpjtyt	Nurul Islam Nuru (44) S/o: Kanchon Farazi Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of 18No Ward under Barishal City	1	Burnt to Death	BCC Mayor Sadiq Abdullah's house	Barishal	Barishal
103.	5.8.2024 https://surl.li/cpjtyt	Prashanta Political Affiliation: Jubo League Activist from Shitalakhola area under Barishal City	1	Burnt to Death	BCC Mayor Sadiq Abdullah's house	Barishal	Barishal
104.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/gnmlhltu	Gazi Noimul Hossain Litu (58) Political Affiliation: Vice President of Barishal Metropolitan Awami League and Councilor of 19No Ward of BCC, Barishal	1	Burnt to Death	BCC Mayor Sadiq Abdullah's house	Barishal	Barishal
105.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ttlchdry	Tutul Chowdhury (60) Political Affiliation: Former President of 12 no. Ward of City Awami League in Barishal District.	1	Chopped to Death		Barishal	Barishal
106.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ismlhsn	Ismail Hossain (35) Political Affiliation: Jubo League Leader of Tongi Poschim Thana in Gazipur City.	1	Beaten to Death		Gazipur	Dhaka
107.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/tybrtptu	Tayebur Rahman Tipu Political Affiliation: Organising Secretary of Manikganj District Awami League	1	Chopped to Death		Manikganj	Dhaka
108.	5.8.2024	Musa	1	Chopped to		Munshiganj	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/yc68yu9a Have no newspaper link except FB link.	Political Affiliation: Jubo League Leader of Panchasar Union of Sadar Upazila in Munshiganj District.		Death			
109.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/snsons	Selim Khan Political Affiliation: Laxmipur Model Union Parishad Chairman of Sadar Upazila in Chandpur District.	1	Beaten to Death		Chandpur	Chattogram
110.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/snsons	Shanto Khan S/o: Selim Khan Political Affiliation: Famous Film Star and Awami League Activist of Sadar Upazila in Chandpur District.	1	Beaten to Death		Chandpur	Chattogram
111.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mstfkmzm	Mostofa Kamal Mozumdar Political Affiliation: Former Acting President of Shahrasti Upazila and Union Parishad Chariman of Suchipara Uttar in Chandpur District.	1	Beaten and Chopped to Death		Chandpur	Chattogram
112.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mksdarny	Maksud Alam Rony Political Affiliation: General Secretary of 6 no. Ward Jubo League of Amishapara Union in Sonaimuri Upazila of Noakhali District and Elected Member of Union Parishad	1	Chopped to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram
113.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/47cywept	Yasir Arafat (14) Political Affiliation: Students' League Activist of 5 no. Sonaimuri Municipality in Noakhali District.	1	Chopped to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram

114.	5.8.2024 https://urlis.net/k90bppy5	Md. Raihan (18) Political Affiliation: Students' League Activist of Sonaimuri Municipality in Noakhali District.	1	Chopped to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram
115.	5.8.2024 https://urlis.net/k90bppy5	Md. Tanvir (30) Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of Hossainpur Village of Bargaon Union of Sonaimuri in Noakhali District.	1	Chopped to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram
116.	5.8.2024 https://urlis.net/k90bppy5	Md. Yasin (32) Political Affiliation: Awami League leader of Shimulia village of Bargaon Union of Sonaimuri in Noakhali	1	Chopped to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram
117.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mnaasir	Md. Nasir Political Affiliation: Member of Laxmipur District Jubo League.	1	Beaten to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
118.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yc7sv3jw	Monir Hossain Atia (60) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Sonapur of Ramganj municipality in Laxmipur District.	1	Chopped to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram
119.	5.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yc7sv3jw	Unknown Child (12)	1	Beaten to Death	Died in vandalism and arson at Khan Tower, owned by Lakshmipur-1 (Ramganj) MP	Laxmipur	Chattogram

					Anwar Hossain Khan.		
120.	6.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mznmzn	Mizanur Rahman Mizan (30) Political Affiliation: Member of Awami League and Bhabanipur UP Village Police of Sherpur Upazila in Bogura District	1	Beaten to Death		Bogura	Rajshahi
121.	6.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/gfjrdr	Golam Faruq Joarder (57) Political Affiliation: President of District Krishak League and former chairman of Mominpur UP under Sadar Upzaila in Chuadanga District.	1	Chopped to Death		Chuadanga	Khulna
122.	6.8.2024 https://rb.gy/0imfo9 https://tinyurl.com/mnrlishn	Monirul Islam Shahin (40) Political Affiliation: Jubo League Activist of Madanpur Union under Baufol Upazila in Patuakhali District		Burnt to Death		Patuakhali	Barishal
123.	6.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/msfqrmsu	Mushfiqur Rahman Mishu (35) Political Affiliation: Office Secretary of Dhalia Union Jubo League of Sadar Upazila in Feni District.	1	Beaten to Death		Feni	Chattogram
124.	6.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/knabdsha	Badsha Mia Prokash alias Kana Badsha (40) Political Affiliation: Baligaon Union Jubo League leader of Sadar Upazila in Feni District.	1	Beaten to Death		Feni	Chattogram
125.	6.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/hpyram	Hazi Payer Ahmed (46) Political Affiliation: Small entrepreneur	1	Chopped to Death		Feni	Chattogram

		of North Jahanpur village of Shorshodi Union under sadar upazila in Feni District and Local Awami League activist					
126.	7.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/alaamen	Al Amin (37) Political Affiliation: Dhunot Municipality Jubo League leader in Bogura District.	1	Chopped and Beaten to Death		Bogura	Rajshahi
127.	7.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/zahrullh	Jahir Ullah (50) S/o: Sahu Mia Political Affiliation: Bhairab Upazila Awami League Activist of Kishoreganj District	1	Stabbed to Death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
128.	7.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/4kahx87h	Mahbubul Alam (25) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of Daudkandi Upazila in Kumilla District	1	Chopped to Death		Kumilla	Chattogram
129.	8.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/swpnbsws	Swapan Biswas (57) S/o: Late Haridash Biswas Political Affiliation: UP member and Awami League leader of Deluti Village of Paikgacha Upazila in Khulna District.	1	Chopped to Death		Khulna	Khulna
130.	8.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/frkmla	Faruq Molla (45) S/o: Abdul Hai Molla Political Affiliation: Vice President of Awami Volunteers League of Charkumaria Union under Bhedorganj	1	Chopped to Death		Shariatpur	Dhaka

		Upazila in Shariatpur District.					
131.	8.8.2024 Source: Chottogram City Jubo League	Mohammad Ali Political Affiliation: Jubo League Activist, Chttogram City	1	Chopped to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
132.	9.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/yccsm9ryd	Alam Hossain (35) Political Affiliation: Awami League supporter of Bagoan Union of Mujibnagar Thana in Meherpur District.	1	Beaten to Death		Meherpur	Khulna
133.	9.8.2024	Md. Sirajul Islam Sana Political Affiliation: Union Parishad Chairman of Panchgaon and General Secretary of the union in Rajnagar Upazila of Moulvibazar District.	1	Shot to Death		Moulvibazar	Sylhet
134.	11.8.2024 Source: Upazila Awami League Injured: August 5	Sabiha Khatun Political Affiliation: Mother of Awami League Leader Tajul Islam, Roykut Uttar Union in Nangolkot Upazila in Kumilla District.	1	Beaten & Burnt to Death		Kumilla	Chattogram
135.	13.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/bbrali	Babar Ali (50) Political Affiliation: 20no. ward Awami League activist of municipality in Bogura District.	1	Slaughtered		Bogura	Rajshahi
136.	13.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/bcchukhn	Bachchu Khan Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Algi North Union of Haimchar in Chandpur District.	1	Chopped to Death		Chandpur	Chattogram

137.	14.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdsamd	Md. Samad (60) Political Affiliation: Former President of Bandura Union Krisak League and elected member 3no. ward of the Union Parisad under Nwabganj Upazila in Dhaka District.	1	Beaten to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
138.	14.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mmrzmn	Moniruzzaman Lilu (50) Political Affiliation: Vice President of Rampasha Union Awami League under Biswanath Upazila in Sylhet District. Source:	1	Chopped to Death		Sylhet	Sylhet
139.	16.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rsdskdr	Rashed Sikder (22) Political Affiliation: Students League activist of Boro Dulali village under Barthi union of Gournadi in Barishal District.	1	Beaten to Death		Barishal	Barishal
140.	17.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/bblhsn	Babul Hossain Political Affiliation: Liberation War affairs Secretary of Rajshahi District Jubo League. He was from Bagmara Upazila.	1	Died of a Heart Failure due to attack and house set on fire		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
141.	19.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mturrhmn Injured: August 4	Matiur Rahman Political Affiliation: President, Dogachi Union Awami League, Joypurhat Sadar, Joypurhat Zilla branch.	1	Chopped to Death		Joypurhat	Rajshahi
142.	23.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ye5965m8	Ishaq Ali Khan Panna (58) Political Affiliation: Former general	1	Death due to Strangulatio		Pirojpur	Barishal

		secretary of Bangladesh Students' League Central Committee. Pirojpur		n			
143.	25.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nsirshk	Nasir Sheikh (48) Political Affiliation: Jubo League leader of Malkhannagar Union of Sirajdikhan Upazila in Munshiganj District.	1	Shot to Death		Munshiganj	Dhaka
144.	25.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/267w4rhk	Idris Hawlader (46) Political Affiliation: President of 2 no. ward Awami League of Satla union of Ujirpur Upazila in Barishal District.	1	Chopped to Death		Barishal	Barishal
145.	25.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/267w4rhk	Sagar Hawladar (28) Political Affiliation: Member of 2no. ward Awami League of Satla union of Ujirpur Upazila in Barishal District.	1	Chopped to Death		Barishal	Barishal
146.	28.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abdlmann	Abdul Mannan (27) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Betbunia Union Sramik League under Kaukhali Upazila in Rangamati District.	1	Shot and Chopped to Death		Rangamati	Chattogram
147.	28.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/sylaskdr	Shayla Sikder Political Affiliation: Leader of Eden College Students' League and Vice President of Kalapara Upazila in Patuakhali District.	1	Death due to Strangulation		Patuakhali	Barishal
148.	30.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mammnptr	M A Momin Patwary (54) Political Affiliation: Former Social Welfare Secretary of Bangladesh	1	Beaten to Death		Laxmipur	Chattogram

		Students' League of Central Executive Committee. Laxmipur					
149.	30.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/msdkaisr	Masud Kaiser (32) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist of West Kuaish village of Shikarpur Union of Hathajari Upazila in Chattogram	1	Shot to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
150.	30.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mhmdans	Mohammad Anis (38) Political Affiliation: Awami League workers of West Kuaish village of Shikarpur Union of Hathajari Upazila, Chottogram District.	1	Shot to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
151.	31.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/liznmla	Lizon Molla (30) S/o: Alamgir Molla Political Affiliation: Member of Narshindi District Matshyajibi League	1	Chopped to Death		Narshindi	Dhaka
152.	31.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdahsnal	Md. Ahsan Ali (54) Political Affiliation: Three times elected member of 3no ward of Laxmirchar UP in Jamalpur Sadar Upazila, Member of Union Awami League and President of 3no Ward Awami League.	1	Chopped to Death		Jamalpur	Mymensingh
153.	6.9.2024 Source: Upazila Awami League	Abdul Hye (62) S/o: Late Fakir Mahmud Political Affiliation: President of 2No Ward unit Awami League under Rayganj Municipality in Sirajganj District	1	Beaten to Death		Sirajganj	Rajshahi

154.	7.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/adblmsd	Abdullah Al Masud (31) Political Affiliation: Former member of Bangladesh Students' League central committee and former assistant secretary of Rajshahi University Students League and section officer of the university	1	Beaten to Death		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
155.	7.9.2024 https://rb.gy/5tz1vx https://tinyurl.com/ahsnulha	Ahsan Ullah (35) S/o: Late Abdul Matin Political Affiliation: Member of Bitara Union Jubo League under Kochua Upazila in Chandpur District	1	Premeditated Murder		Chandpur	Chattogram
156.	7.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/elahiskdr	Elahi Sikder (19) S/o: Mohi Sikder Political Affiliation: Awami League activist of Falsi village under Nizamkandi Union of Kashiani Upazila in Gopalganj District	1	Death in Police Custody		Gopalganj	Dhaka
157.	6.9.2024 Source: Upazila Awami League	Md. Chand Mia (65) S/o: Late Foyej Uddin Political Affiliation: President of 1No Ward unit Awami League under Bhabgati Union in Sirajganj sadar Upazila.	1	Death Due to Police Harassment		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
158.	10.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/sfqislml	Shafiqul Islam (45) S/o: Late Malek Uddin Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader from Gobindi village of Saghata	1	Death in joint forces Custody		Gaibandha	Rangpur

		Union under Saghata Upazila in Gaibandha District					
159.	11.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shrbhsn	Sohrab Hossain Appel Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist from Gobindi village of Saghata Union under Saghata Upazila in Gaibandha District	1	Death in joint forces Custody		Gaibandha	Rangpur
160.	13.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mkaausr	Md. Kawsar (30) Political Affiliation: Activist of Mahichail union Krishak League of Candina Upazila and nephew of Union Krishak League President in Kumilla District.	1	Beaten to Death		Kumilla	Chattogram
161.	18.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/smmamll	Shamim Ahmed alias Shamim Molla (38) Political Affiliation: Former organizing secretary of Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka District.	1	Beaten to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
162.	18.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/tfzlhsn	Tofazzal Hossain (30) Political Affiliation: Fomer president of Kathaltoli union Students' League of Patharghata upazila in Barguna District.	1	Beaten to Death		Barguna	Barishal
163.	12.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nrlmtlr	Noor Alam alias Nuru Tailor (50) Political Affiliation: General secretary of 2no. ward Awami League of Chandraganj union of Sadar Upazila in Lakxmipur District.	1	Beaten to Death		Lakxmipur	Chattogram
164.	25.9.2024	Md. Momin Mia (32)	1	Preplanned		Barishal	Barishal

	https://tinyurl.com/mhmdmmn	Political Affiliation: Activist of Barishal city Jubo League and younger brother of 18 no. ward Jubo League convener Shahidul Islam Munna in Barishal District.		Muder			
165.	28.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mabdsshhd	Md. Abdus Shahid (43) Political Affiliation: Vice President of 19 no. East Charmotua Union under Sadar Upazila in Noakhali District.	1	Beaten to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram
166.	28.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/rslsrdr	Rasel Sardar (38) Political Affiliation: Islampur Union Jubo League Leader of Damudya Upazila in Shariatpur District.	1	Chopped to Death		Shariatpur	Dhaka
167.	30.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nymuddsnt	Noem Uddin Sentu Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader and chairman of Filipnagar of Doulatpur Upazila in Kushtia District.	1	Shot to Death		Kushtia	Khulna
168.	30.9.2024 https://tinyurl.com/fkruddn	Fakhar Uddin (38) Political Affiliation: Nurupara Village Jubo League Leader of Ronokelir under Gopalganj upazila in Sylhet District.	1	Beaten to Death		Sylhet	Sylhet
169.	1.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mnzidhali	Md. Nazrul Islam Dhali (58) Khadergaon Union Awami League Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Motlob South Upazila in Chandpur District.	1	Preplanned Murder		Chandpur	Chattogram
170.	3.10.2024	Mostak Ahmed (45)	1	Preplanned		Gaibandha	Rangpur

	https://tinyurl.com/mstkahmd	S/o: Sirajul Haque Political Affiliation: 2 no. Ward Awami League President of Kholahati union under Sadar Upazila and Union Parisad Member in Gaibandha District.		Murder			
171.	3.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abdlmmn	Abdul Matin Political Affiliation: Member of Alampur UP in Khetlal Upazila and Leader of Union Awami League in Joypurhat District.	1	Chopped to Death		Joypurhat	Rajshahi
172.	3.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/sjhnskh	Shahjahan Sheikh (55) Political Affiliation: Publicity Secretary of Birtara union Awami League under Srinagar Upazila in Munshiganj District.	1	Preplanned Murder		Munshiganj	Dhaka
173.	4.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/zfrakhn	Jafar Ali Khan (45) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of 3no. Aurabunia union under Kathalia Upazila in Jhalkathi District.	1	Chopped to Death		Jhalkathi	Barishal
174.	6.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/2te3yfj5	Md. Jahangir (47) S/o: Late Fazar Ali Political Affiliation: Member of Shyampur Thana Awami League under Dhaka City	1	Chopped to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
175.	9.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shblislm	Shahabul Islam (45) S/o: Late Jeher Ali Political Affiliation: Member of Ward	1	Preplanned Murder		Rajshahi	Rajshahi

		9no. Keshorhat Municipality Awami League of Mohonpur Upazila in Rajshahi District.					
176.	10.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/bb59z82e	Md. Tajul Islam (50) Political Affiliation: President of Khutmara Union Jubo League of Jaldhaka Upazila and Village Doctor in Nilphamari District.	1	Death of heart attack due to fear of arrest		Nilphamari	Rangpur
177.	13.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/almzmncdry	Alimuzzaman Chowdhury (50) Founder president of Muktiyuddha Projonmo Kalyan Parishad, He is from Ghonapara Village of Gopalganj District.	1	Death at the Hand of Joint-Forces		Gopalganj	Dhaka
178.	13.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdshhn	Sohan Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Narayanganj City Bangabandhu Parishad	1	Chopped to Death		Narayanganj	Dhaka
179.	15.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdshhn	Haralal Sarkar (65) Political Affiliation: Awami League leader of Chondipur Union under Indurkani Upazila in Pirojpur District.	1	Preplanned Murder		Pirojpur	Barishal
180.	16.10.2024 Source: Upazila Awami League Contact No: 01770656233 Wife: 01729312474	Abu Taher Political Affiliation: Joint convenor Fulbari Union Jubo League under Gobindaganj in Gaibandha District.	1	Death due to Police Harassment		Gaibandha	Rangpur
181.	18.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdfrzkhn	Md. Firoz Khan (35) S/o: Late Kamal Uddin	1	Chopped to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram

		Political Affiliation: Organising Secretary of Jubo League of Baroiardhala under Sitakunda upazila in Chattogram District.					
182.	18.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/3ycrp67t	Md. Nazmul Hossain (24) S/o: Ali Bepary Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist of Banshtola village under Dohar Upazila in Dhaka District.	1	Chopped to Death		Dhaka	Dhaka
183.	21.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/aftbudn	Aftab Uddin Tahsin (26) Political Affiliation: Chandgao thana Students' League Activist of Chattogram City	1	Shot to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
184.	25.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abuthrbhn	Abu Taher Bhuyian (52) S/o: Late Mujibul Haque Political Affiliation: Ward Awami League President of Mirsarai Sadar Union in Chattogram District.	1	Preplanned Murder		Chattogram	Chattogram
185.	26.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdmmeem	Md. Meem (29) S/o: Abdul Momin Political Affiliation: Jubo League Activist of Ramchandrapur in Rajshahi District.	1	Died of beating, hacking and cutting nerves		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
186.	29.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ansrrhmn	Anisur Rahman (55) Former vice president of Singhajhuli union Awami League of Chougacha Upazila in Jashore District.	1	Chopped to Death		Jashore	Khulna
187.	30.10.2024	Abdul Hamid Gayen (48)	1	Chopped to		Kushtia	Khulna

	https://tinyurl.com/hmdlilm	S/o: Ramjan Ali Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of Aria Union of Doulatpur Upazila in Kushtia District.		Death			
188.	30.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/nzrlislm	Nazrul Islam Gayen (45) S/o: Ramjan Ali Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader of Aria Union of Doulatpur Upazila in Kushtia District.	1	Chopped to Death		Kushtia	Khulna
189.	31.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/tnzlkhnm	Tanjila Khanom Lucky (34) Political Affiliation: Former General Secretary of Tongi West Thana Jubo Mohila League	1	Preplanned Murder			
190.	31.10.2024 https://tinyurl.com/kmkyuum	Md. Kaiyum (51) Political Affiliation: Awami League Leader from Moutupi village of Sadekpur union in Bhairab Upazila of Kishoreganj District	1	Beaten to death		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
191.	5.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shkarfzmn	Sheikh Arifuzzaman Rupam (34) Political Affiliation: Nephew of former State Minister for Labor and Employment Begum Mannujan Sufian and Awami League activist in Khulna	1	Beaten to death		Khulna	Khulna
192.	7.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/sdrhmn	Saidur Rahman Babu (45) S/o: Abdul Matin Master Political Affiliation: President of Ward	1	Beaten to death		Natore	Rajshahi

		No. 8 Jubo League, Darappur village, Natore Sadar upazila					
193.	11.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/shdlislmtn Son: Johnny - 01313-217049	Shahidul Islam Ratan (58) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Ward No. 15 Awami League, Bogura Municipality	1	Death in Prison Custody		Bogura	Rajshahi
194.	12.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/tnvrshk https://meshfor.com/aagisq5s	Tanvir Mia Sheikh (20) S/o: Babu Sikdar Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Ward No. 3 Chhatra League, Rajbari Municipality	1	Hacked to Death		Rajbari	Dhaka
195.	14.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/emrnhrtf	Emran Hossain Rifat (19) S/o: Ismail Hossain Political Affiliation: Chhatra League activist, Boxmahmud Union, Parshuram Upazila, Feni	1	Stabbed to Death		Feni	Chattogram
196.	16.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mrysf https://rb.gy/0v3jxs	Mir Yusuf (70) Political Affiliation: Former President of Krishak League, Sonaichhari Union, Sitakunda upazila, Chattogram	1	Beaten to death		Chattogram	Chattogram
197.	17.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/2tz8nsz3	Abdur Rahman (30) S/o: Late Abdus Salam Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Hoyaikyong Union, Teknaf upazila in Coxsbazar	1	Shot to Death		Coxsbazar	Chattogram
198.	18.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/wlfmkn https://rb.gy/s0glkm	Walif Hossain Manik (35) S/o: Yunus Ali	1	Shot to Death		Pabna	Rajshahi

		Political Affiliation: Former Vice President of Pakshi Union Chhatra League and currently an active worker of Jubo League, Pabna district					
199.	23.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/3vhu5y8j	Anisur Rahman (42) S/o: Late Shamsul Haque Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Monigram Union, Bagha Upazilain Rajshahi District	1	Hacked to Death		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
200.	25.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abdlltf Son: Sony - 01773-689757	Abdul Latif (67) Political Affiliation: Treasurer of Shibganj Upazila Awami League and document writer in Bagura District	1	Death in Prison Custody		Bagura	Rajshahi
201.	25.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mdlrhsn https://rb.gy/v6aez2	Md. Delwar Hossain (45) S/o: Late Ahmad Hossain Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Ward No. 8, Charti Union, Satkania upazila, Chattogram	1	Stabbed to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
202.	26.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/kmlhckdr https://rb.gy/wwa7ei	Kamal Hossain Chowkidar (45) S/o: Late Md. Rustum Hawladar Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Sapleja Union, Mothbaria upazila, Pirojpur district	1	Beaten to death		Pirojpur	Barishal
203.	26.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/psdtalmjnu https://rb.gy/lhz594 Wife: 01727-846680	Principal Shahadat Alam Jhunu (57) Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Bagura District Awami League and former Principal of Police	1	Death in Prison Custody		Bagura	Rajshahi

		Lines School and College					
204.	28.11.2024 https://tinyurl.com/frdsshk	Ferdous Sheikh (45) S/o: Emdadul Haque Sheikh Political Affiliation: Jubo League leader, Dumuria Union, Tungipara, Gopalganj	1	Premeditated murder		Gopalganj	Dhaka
205.	4.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mbrkhssn	Mobarak Hossain (30) S/o: Abdul Auwal Political Affiliation: Member of Ward No. 8 Jubo League, Sadipur Union, Sonargaon, Narayanganj	1	Premeditated murder		Narayanganj	Dhaka
206.	5.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/arnabgm https://surl.li/gvbqhx	Arina Begum (45) Husband: Abul Kalam Azad Political Affiliation: Mother of Wahiduzzaman Amit, President of Kajaldighi Kaliaganj Union Chhatra League, Boda upazila, Panchagarh	1	Hacked to Death		Panchagarh	Rangpur
207.	6.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/kmrlislm	Kamrul Islam (42) S/o: Late Hossain Ali Political Affiliation: President of Ward No. 2 Awami League, Nachol Union, Nachol upazila in Chapainawabganj	1	Premeditated murder		Chapainawabganj	Rajshahi
208.	6.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/hzraat	Hazrat Ali (30) Father: Mohammad Kuddus Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Bancharampur, Brahmanbaria	1	Death in military custody		Brahmanbaria	Chattogram

209.	7.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mhrnsaa https://tinyurl.com/mrypsjz8	Meherunnesa (70) Political Affiliation: Mother of Sheikh Rumel Ahmed, Vice President of Moulvibazar District Jubo League and former Chairman of Mostafapur UP	1	Burned to Death		Moulvibazar	Syleht
210.	7.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/flsabgm https://tinyurl.com/mrypsjz8	Fulesha Begum Kuti (62) Political Affiliation: Aunt of Sheikh Rumel Ahmed, Vice President of Moulvibazar District Jubo League and former Chairman of Mostafapur UP	1	Burned to Death		Moulvibazar	Sylhet
211.	9.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/abdlmithu Wife: 01785-327250, 01942-059806	Abdul Matin Mithu (65) Political Affiliation: Member of Gabtali Upazila Awami League, President of Ward No. 6 Durgahta Union Awami League, and multiple-time elected Chairman of Durgahta Union Parishad, Bagura	1	Death in Prison Custody		Bagura	Rajshahi
212.	10.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/angrsrj https://rb.gy/v03866	Ataur Rahman Angur (55) Political Affiliation: Environment and Forest Affairs Secretary of Sirajganj Municipality Awami League	1	Death in Prison Custody		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
213.	16.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/hmsendra	Hemesh Chandra Mondal Political Affiliation: Member Secretary of Paikgacha Municipality Awami League, Khulna	1	Killed due to police harassment		Khulna	Khulna
214.	17.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mmsdrna	Md. Masud Rana (22) S/o: Ejabul Haque	1	Hacked to Death		Chapainawabganj	Rajshahi

		Political Affiliation: President of Bangladesh Students League of Electrical Department unit in Chapainawabganj Polytechnic Institute, and Assistant Secretary of Nachol Upazila Chhatra League Village: Khalshi, Union: Fatepur, Nachol					
215.	17.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mryhan	Md. Rayhan (15) S/o: Abdur Rahim Political Affiliation: Activist of Nachol Upazila Students League in Chapainawabganj	1	Hacked to Death		Chapainawabganj	Rajshahi
216.	20.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/ahmsyam	Ahmed Siam (18) Political Affiliation: Chhatra League activist, Fatullah, Narayanganj		Hacked to Death		Narayanganj	Dhaka
217.	22.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/5n7jb4py	Ahmed Sharif (45) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Alamdanga, Chuadanga	1	Hacked to Death		Chuadanga	Khulna
218.	23.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/mobydlul Son: Arif - 01811-548859 Wife: 01831-926366	Obaidullah (45) Political Affiliation: Vice President of Ward No. 2 Raikhali Union Jubo League, Kaptai upazila, Rangamati	1	Hacked to Death		Rangamati	Chattogram
219.	28.12.2024 https://tinyurl.com/zaudnpls	Ziauddin Palash (45) Father: Shaheed Ibrahim Hossain Sardar Political Affiliation: Mill worker and	1	Hacked to Death		Jashore	Khulna

		Assistant Secretary of Jessore Jute Industries (JJI) Workers Union; General Secretary of Ward No. 4 Awami League, Nowapara Municipality, Jashore, and former Councilor of Ward No. 4					
220.	1.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/arfrhmn https://tinyurl.com/2mar24pn Family: Mobile: 01720-571242	Arifur Rahman (48) Political Affiliation: Member of Raipur Upazila Awami League; Former Joint Convener of Raipur Upazila Jubo League; Member of Union Parishad, Ward No. 6 Kerowa Union, Raipur upazila, Lamxipur	1	Premeditated murder		Lamxipur	Chattogram
221.	2.1.2025 Source: Upazila Awami League	Anis Chowdhury Political Affiliation: Vice President of Tarakannda Upazila Sramik League, Mymensingh	1	Killed due to police harassment		Mymensingh	Mymensingh
222.	4.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/nityasrkr https://rb.gy/xlqaev	Nitya Sarkar (50) S/o: Jagadish Sarkar Political Affiliation: Vice President of Kalai Ward branch Awami League, Gala Union No. 2, Harirampur upazila, Manikganj	1	Death in Prison Custody		Manikganj	Dhaka
223.	9.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/glmrbnirpu	Golam Rabbani Tipu (55) S/o: Md. Golam Akbar Political Affiliation: Vice President of Khulna Metropolitan Swechchasebak League and former Councilor of Ward	1	Shot to Death		Khulna	Khulna

		No. 4, Khulna City Corporation					
224.	10.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/shkzhrl https://rb.gy/60hiyv	Sheikh Zahirul Islam S/o: Mojibur Rahman Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Sreepur Upazila Sramik League, Gazipur	1	Death in Prison Custody		Gazipur	Dhaka
225.	14.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mmnrislm https://rb.gy/wpzs1f	Mominur Islam (50) S/o: Motiar Rahman General Secretary of Awami League's unit in Nilphamari's Jaldhaka Upazila's No. 4 Ward in Mirganj Union, former student and youth league leader.	1	Death in Prison Custody		Nilphamari	Rangpur
226.	15.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/kawsrlskr	Kawsar Lasker (55) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Chanpara village, Kotchandpur, Jhenaidah https://tinyurl.com/kawsrlskr	1	Beaten and killed by severing tendons		Jhenaidah	Khulna
227.	20.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/rfqislsm	Rafiqul Islam Ruman (40) S/o: Late Akkas Mondal Political Affiliation: Line Secretary of Magura Bus-Minibus Motor Workers Union and Assistant Publicity and Publication Secretary of District Sramik League	1	Premeditated murder		Magura	Khulna
228.	27.1.2025 https://tinyurl.com/msjnhldr	Sujon Hawladar (30) S/o: Nabi Ali Hawladar Political Affiliation: Member of Ward	1	Hacked to Death		Patuakhali	Barishal

		No. 1 Jubo League, Kankadia Union, Bauphal, Patuakhali					
229.	1.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mablazz	Md. Abdul Aziz Hawladar (62) S/o: Late Abdul Rahim Hawladar Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Dhamusa village, Dasar upazila, Madaripur	1	Premeditated murder		Madaripur	Dhaka
230.	2.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2hmjpbj	Mohammad Shahid (40) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Fatikchhari, Chattogram	1	Beaten to death		Chattogram	Chattogram
231.	9.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/aktrskdr https://rb.gy/7ek5qr	Aktar Shikdar (44) Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Khulna's Terokhada Upazila's 6 No. Ward of Modhupur Union.	1	Death in Prison Custody		Khulna	Khulna
232.	11.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/amzdhssn	Amjad Hossain (38) S/o: Belayet Hossain Political Affiliation: Former Organizational Secretary of Balla Union Jubo League, Harirampur, Manikganj	1	Premeditated murder		Manikganj	Dhaka
233.	13.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/abdlhmmn	Md. Abdullah Al-Mamun Mondal (30) Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Ward No. 6 Dhaperhat Union Chhatra League, Sadullapur upazila, Gaibandha	1	Hacked to Death		Gaibandha	Rangpur
234.	13.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/abdrzzk	Abdur Razzaq (50) S/o: Abdur Rahman	1	Death in Prison		Dhaka	Dhaka

		Political Affiliation: Environment and Forest Affairs Secretary of Savar Municipality Awami League		Custody			
235.	18.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/bhartcndr	Bharat Chandra (50) Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Chandipur Union Awami League, Parbatipur upazila, Dinajpur district	1	Premeditated murder		Dinajpur	Rangpur
236.	18.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/sddqhmlla https://rb.gy/ucjhsi	Siddique Hossain Molla (45) S/o: Late Mojibur Rahman Molla Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Parannpur Union Awami League, Manda upazila, Naogaon district	1	Death in Prison Custody		Naogaon	Rajshahi
237.	20.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/5fjaz9hj https://tinyurl.com/mhmdhsnrs	Muhammad Hasan Rustam (40) Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Noapara Union, Raozan upazila, Chattogram	1	Hacked to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
238.	22.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/z6cbpz6c	Ferdousi Begum (55) Husband: Abdul Jabbar Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Deluabari Union, Durgapur upazila, Rajshahi; killed in an attack on the house of UP Chairman and Awami League leader Riazul Islam	1	Hacked to Death		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
239.	23.2.2025 https://tinyurl.com/jhdlislm https://rb.gy/czo8sk	Zahidul Islam Shipu Political Affiliation: Joint General	1	Death due to police torture		Tangail	Dhaka

		Secretary of Chhatra League's unit in Ibrahim Khan Government College in Bhuapur, Tangail.					
240.	1.3.2025 Source: Upazila Awami League	Motahar Hossain Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Chakdadra village, Jamalpur Union, Joypurhat Sadar upazila	1	Premeditated murder		Joypurhat	Rajshahi
241.	2.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/lalmiaa	Lal Mia (60) Political Affiliation: Assistant Reception Secretary of Khulshi Thana Debapar C Unit Awami League, Chattogram Metropolitan	1	Premeditated murder		Chattogram	Chattogram
242.	3.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/emddsgr	Emdad Sagar (32) Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Bijoyagar Upazila Swechchasebak League and former President of Upazilla Chhatra League, Brammanbaria	1	Premeditated murder by burning alive		Brammanbaria	Chattogram
243.	7.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/usfspn https://rb.gy/0k33ru	Yusuf Ali Swapan (40) S/o: Iman Ali Khan Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Shubhagacha Union Jubo League, Kazipur upazila, Sirajganj district	1	Planned Murder		Sirajganj	Rajshahi
244.	8.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/4zus5f59	Saiful Islam Sardar (Hiter Saiful) (40) S/o: Azibar Sardar Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Khoyajpur Union	1	Planned Murder		Madaripur	Dhaka

		Swechchasebak League, Madaripur Sadar upazila					
245.	8.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/4zus5f59	Ataur Rahman Sardar Atabur (35) S/o: Azibar Sardar Political Affiliation: Member of Khoyajpur Union Swechchasebak League, Madaripur Sadar upazila	1	Planned Murder		Madaripur	Dhaka
246.	8.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/4zus5f59	Palash Sardar (17) S/o: Muzam Sardar Political Affiliation: Member of Khoyajpur Union Chhatra League, Madaripur Sadar upazila	1	Planned Murder		Madaripur	Dhaka
247.	10.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/amrlislm	Amirul Islam Master (42) S/o: Lohai Pramanik Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Sathia Upazila Jubo League, Pabna district	1	Hacked to Death		Pabna	Rajshahi
248.	11.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/emddlhq https://rb.gy/03gv3o	Emdadul Haque Bhutto (51) Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Dakhinpara Union Awami League, Gabtali upazila, Bagura district	1	Murder in Prison		Bagura	Rajshahi
249.	16.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/arflislm	Ariful Islam (20) S/o: Suruzzaman, Religious Affairs Secretary of Roumari Upazila Awami League, Kurigram Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Roumari upazila, Kurigram	1	Planned Murder		Kurigram	Rangpur
250.	18.3.2025	Tazel Hawladar (18)	1	Planned		Madaripur	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/kae9y3kj	S/o: Azizul Hawladar Political Affiliation: Member of Khoyajpur Union Chhatra League, Madaripur Sadar upazila		Murder			
251.	19.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/amnlism	Aminul Islam (50) Political Affiliation: Relief and Social Welfare Secretary of Simla Rokonpur Union Awami League and Member of Ward No. 6, Kaliganj upazila, Jhenaidah district	1	Planned Murder		Jhenaidah	Khulna
252.	21.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/aminnrs	Amin (23) Father: Khorshed Mia Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Mohinipur village, Chanpur Union, Raipura upazila, Narsingdi district	1	Killed by Gunshot		Narsingdi	Dhaka
253.	21.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/bshrnrsn	Bashar (35) S/o: Barek Haji Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Mohinipur village, Chanpur Union, Raipura upazila, Narsingdi district	1	Killed by Gunshot		Narsingdi	Dhaka
254.	26.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/nrlismltk	Nurul Islam Talukdar (70) S/o: Innal Amin Talukdar Political Affiliation: President of Ward No. 1 Awami League, Sarafbhata Union, Rangunia upazila, Chattogram	1	Hacked to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
255.	30.3.2025	Jaj Mia (65)	1	Beaten to		Kishoreganj	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/jojmia	S/o: Sulman Mia Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Keowarjor Union, Mithamain upazila, Kishoreganj		death			
256.	31.3.2025 https://tinyurl.com/ffakbr	Freedom Fighter Akbar Hossain Sheikh (77) Political Affiliation: President of Ward No. 2 Awami League, Lahuria Union, Lohagara upazila, Narail	1	Hacked to Death		Narail	Khulna
257.	2.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/sjtchnd	Sujit Chandra De (40) S/o: Late Badir Chandra De Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Dhaki Union, Mithamain upazila, Kishoreganj	1	Death in Prison Custody		Kishoreganj	Dhaka
258.	6.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/advsujn	Adv. Sujan Mia (32) S/o: Md. Zahirul Islam Political Affiliation: Law Affairs Secretary of Moulvibazar District Tanti League and former Joint General Secretary of District Chhatra League	1	Stabbed to Death		Moulvibazar	Sylhet
259.	9.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/reazulis https://rb.gy/unigr9	Riazul Islam alias Raizul (74) Political Affiliation: Chairman of Purba Birgaon Union Parishad and President of Union Awami League, Shantiganj upazila, Sunamganj	1	Death in Prison Custody		Sunamganj	Sylhet
260.	10.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mslmuddn	Muslim Uddin (45) S/o: Abu Taher	1	Hacked to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram

		Political Affiliation: Joint General Secretary of Ward No. 4 Muradpur Union Jubo League, Sitakunda upazila, Chattogram					
261.	12.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/abdlkdrn	Abdul Kader Milan (35) S/o: Md. Ismail Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Charhazari Union Jubo League, Companyganj upazila, Noakhali district	1	Beaten to death		Noakhali	Chattogram
262.	13.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2s4ycr9k https://tinyurl.com/28y9mc36	Abdul Gafur (50) Political Affiliation: Awami League Activist from Naogaon Paschimpara village in Fulbaria Upazila in Mymensing	1	Beaten & Hacked to Death		Mymensingh	Mymensingh
263.	13.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2s4ycr9k https://tinyurl.com/28y9mc36	Mehedy Hasan (15) S/o: Abdul Gafur Political Affiliation: Students League Activist from Naogaon Paschimpara village in Fulbaria Upazila in Mymensing	1	Beaten & Hacked to Death		Mymensingh	Mymensingh
264.	15.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/npnsaha	Nipun Saha (25) S/o: Krishna Saha Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Ward No. 4 Swechchasebak League, Chuadanga Municipality	1	Hacked to Death		Chuadanga	Khulna
265.	15.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/tshrsyl	Tushar Ahmed Chowdhury (20) S/o: Adv. Sajed Ahmed Chowdhury	1	Stabbed to Death		Sylhet	Sylhet

		Political Affiliation: Active worker of Sylhet Metropolitan Chhatra League					
266.	22.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/amrhsn https://tinyurl.com/saab4wcw	Amir Hossain Sarkar (30) S/o: Abdul Haque Mia Political Affiliation: Member of Union Parishad, Ward No. 3, Alokballi UP, and former General Secretary of Union Chhatra League, Sadar upazila, Narsingdi	1	Hacked to Death		Narsingdi	Dhaka
267.	22.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/56yv7byd https://tinyurl.com/mr2ntz3m	Kaisar Imran Babul (59) Political Affiliation: Acting President of Duoj Union Awami League, Atpara upazila, Netrokona	1	Hacked to Death		Netrokona	Mymensingh
268.	25.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/frznhsjb	Forhad Hossain Sojib Political Affiliation: Leader of Volunteer league of Ward No. 35 Boxir Hat, Chattogram Metropolitan	1	Death in Prison		Chattogram	Chattogram
269.	25.4.2025 https://tinyurl.com/rblmiaa	Rubel Mia (32) Political Affiliation: Organizational Secretary of Ward No. 2 Swechchasebak League, Barishab Union, Kapasia upazila, Gazipur district	1	Beaten to death		Gazipur	Dhaka
270.	1.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/kmalhssn	Kamal Hossain (55) Political Affiliation: Former Councilor, Ward No. 3, Rajshahi City Corporation (RASIK); Awami League leader	1	Death due to police torture		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
271.	2.5.2025	Sana Majhi (44)	1	Beaten to		Munshiganj	Dhaka

	https://tinyurl.com/sanamjhi	Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Mollakandi Union, Munshiganj Sadar upazila		death			
272.	2.5.25 https://tinyurl.com/mznrrhmn	Mizanur Rahman (40) S/o: Late Mannan Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Ward No. 8 Awami League, Dhopakhali Union, Dhanbari upazila, Tangail district	1	Hacked to Death		Tangail	Dhaka
273.	11.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/loyluch	Loylus Mia (50) Political Affiliation: President of Balaganj Sadar Union Jubo League, Sylhet district	1	Hacked to Death		Sylhet	Sylhet
274.	11.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/36bx4kaw	Mohammad Ullah (50) Political Affiliation: President of Ward Jubo League, Boxmahmud Union, Parshuram upazila, Feni	1	Beaten to death		Feni	Chattogram
275.	13.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/jkrhssn https://tinyurl.com/yr7t45cr	Zakir Hossain (41) S/o: Rafiq Mia Political Affiliation: Jubo League activist, Ward No. 8 Sonapur Union, Sonaimuri upazila, Noakhali district	1	Beaten to death		Noakhali	Chattogram
276.	20.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/5cp7dsf5	Md. Rahul Ahmed Khan (17) Political Affiliation: Chhatra League activist, Singair, Manikganj; youngest son of Md. Nazrul Islam Khan, former Vice President of Dhalla Union Awami	1	Hacked to Death		Manikganj	Dhaka

		League and former UP Member of Ward No. 6, Medulia village, Singair upazila					
277.	21.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/fzludn	Fazal Uddin Imon (45) Political Affiliation: Joint Convener of Lakhai Upazila Jubo League, Habiganj district	1	Death due to police torture		Habiganj	Sylhet
278.	22.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/bd5jm4z2	Mizanur Rahman (50) S/o: Late Humayun Kabir Political Affiliation: Member of Brahmanpara Upazila Jubo League, Kumilla	1	Beaten to death		Kumilla	Chattogram
279.	23.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/almzmnmn	Oliuzzaman Montu Political Affiliation: President of Biralda Union Awami League, Puthia upazila, Rajshahi district	1	Death by Torture		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
280.	31.5.2025 https://tinyurl.com/immhsnbch https://rb.gy/hb8yms	Imam Hossain Bacchu (44) Political Affiliation: Vice President of Kumilla Metropolitan Volunteers League	1	Death in Prison		Kumilla	Chattogram
281.	3.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yp65xh97	Md. Shipon (45) Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Sandwip, Chattogram; elder brother Md. Sakhaowat Hossain alias Bokul, former General Secretary of a ward Awami League in Sandwip	1	Hacked to Death		Chattogram	Chattogram
282.	7.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/maliazgr	Md. Azgar Ali	1	Death in Prison		Dhaka	Dhaka

		Political Affiliation: General Secretary of Ward No. 58 Bou Bazar Unit Awami League, Dhaka South City					
283.	10.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/527e68y2	Tutul Hossain (40) S/o: Late Freedom Fighter Torab Hossain Political Affiliation: Awami League activist, Kushtia	1	Shot to Death		Kushtia	Khulna
284.	12.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mfzlistlu	Mofizul Islam Tulu (60) Political Affiliation: Leader of Biralda Union Awami League, Puthia upazila, Rajshahi district; former member of District Sports Association; former General Secretary of Upazila Sports Association; cousin of former State Minister Abdul Wadud Dara	1	Beaten to Death		Rajshahi	Rajshahi
285.	15.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/sdrrhmnsjn	Saidur Rahman Sujon (46) Political Affiliation: Chairman of Birulia UP and Member of Union Awami League, Savar upazila, Dhaka district	1	Death in Prison		Dhaka	Dhaka
286.	16.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/rhlamn	Ruhul Amin Akash (30) S/o: Hafez Mohammad Nowab Ali Political Affiliation: Joint Convener of Kolmakanda Upazila Chhatra League, Netrokona	1	Planned Murder		Netrokona	Mymensingh
287.	27.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2wza6427 https://tinyurl.com/yc25y554	Shahidul Islam Hawladar (50) Political Affiliation: Former General	1	Hacked to Death		Pirojpur	Barishal

		Secretary of Indurkani Upazila Swechchasebak League and Member of Chandipur UP, Pirojpur					
288.	27.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2wza6427 https://tinyurl.com/yc25y554	Mukul Begum (55) Husband: Mortuza Hawladar Political Affiliation: Chandipur UP, Indurkani, Pirojpur	1	Hacked to Death		Pirojpur	Barishal
289.	29.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yc4vjd9d	Abdur Rahim (48) S/o: Late Taiyabur Khandakar Political Affiliation: Sports Affairs Secretary of Kulkandi Union Awami League and Member of Ward No. 1, Islampur upazila, Jamalpur	1	Hacked to Death		Jamalpur	Mymensingh
290.	29.6.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mpn3xkm7	Ranjhu Ahmed Political Affiliation: Former President of Ward No. 9 Chhatra League, Mahimaganj Union, and member of Upazila Swechchasebak League, Gobindaganj upazila, Gaibandha district	1	Death by Police Torture		Gaibandha	Rangpur
291.	2.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yc7b5ysu	Ali Akbar (55) Political Affiliation: Activist of 3No. Shorshodi Union Awami League, Sadar Upazila, Feni	1	Police Harassment		Feni	Chattogram
292.	6.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/nzubbfv9 https://tinyurl.com/yae4pyce	Hosne Ara Begum (70) Political Affiliation: Kabirhat Upazila Awami League Treasurer and former Chairman of Dhansiri UP Md. Kamal	1	Hacked to Death		Noakhali	Chattogram

	Injured: 2 July	Khan alias Kamal Companys Mother, Noakhali					
293.	8/7/2025 https://tinyurl.com/c6p7wj33	Kamal Hossain Political Affiliation: Organising Secretary of Ukhia Upazila Awami Jubo League and Jalia Palong UP Member of 9no ward in Jalia Palong Union under Ukhia Upazila in Coxsbazar	1	Cut Throat		Coxsbazar	Chattogram
294.	16.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yms53tdj https://tinyurl.com/3fb3xczw	Sohel Rana Molla (35) Awami League Activist, Gopalganj	1	Shot to Death		Gopalganj	Dhaka
295.	16.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yms53tdj https://tinyurl.com/3fb3xczw	Emon Talukder (24) Students League Activist, Gopalganj	1	Shot to Death		Gopalganj	Dhaka
296.	16.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yms53tdj https://tinyurl.com/3fb3xczw	Ramzan Kazi (19) S/o: Kamrul kazi Students League Activist, Gopalganj	1	Shot to Death		Gopalganj	Dhaka
297.	16.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yms53tdj https://tinyurl.com/3fb3xczw	Dipto Saha (30) S/o: Shantosh Saha Awami League Activist, Gopalganj	1	Shot to Death		Gopalganj	Dhaka
298.	18.7.2025, Injured- 16 July https://tinyurl.com/3nkm6wm8	Ramzan Munsi (32) S/o: Late Akbar Munsi Awami League Activist, Gopalganj	1	Shot to Death		Gopalganj	Dhaka

299.	23.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/3f79zfce https://tinyurl.com/zt2fedp6	Babul Hossain (55) S/o: Hayat Ali General Secretary of 3no Ward Awami League Under Gorpara Union of Manikganj Sadar Upazila, Manikganj	1	Death in Manikganj Jail		Manikganj	Dhaka
300.	27.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/3fcfhe7s	Sarwar Hossain Nannu (60) Joint General Secretary of Sadar Upazila Awami League under Munshiganj District	1	Death in Munshiganj Jail		Munshiganj	Dhaka
301.	28.7.2025 https://tinyurl.com/4ck8tsnp	Yusuf Ali Mia (70) Vice President of Rajoir Upazila Awami League and Member of Madaripur District Awami League	1	Death in Madaripur Jail		Madaripur	Dhaka
302.	13.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/y7zw58ee	Rezaul Islam (40) S/o: Golam Tarafder Sadar Upazila Jubo League Leader, Jashore District	1	Cut Throat		Jashore	Khulna
303.	17.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/2whzukpy	Sharif Ahmed S/o: Tajul Islam Activist of Awami Volunteers League under Savar Municipality & Former Students' League Leader at Dhaka District	1	Death in Keraniganj Jail		Dhaka	Dhaka
304.	30.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/mr3wj69h	Md. Saifullah Arif (30) S/o: Md. Basir Uddin Master Vice President of Bhola Sadar Upazila Students League, Bhola District	1	Beaten to Death		Bhola	Barishal

305.	30.8.2025 https://tinyurl.com/39fhfynv	Ashraful Islam (40) S/o: Late Azhar Ali Master General Secretary of Awami League, Ward No- 1 (Mobarakpur) of Chaluhati Union under Monirampur Upazila, Jashore District	1	Stabbing to Death		Jashore	Khulna
306.	3.9.2025 https://tinyurl.com/4bs8hwf8	Deceased Bijan Kumar De (62) President of 8no Ward Awami League of Bodhuhata Union under Ashashuni Upazila, Satkhira District	1	Beaten to Death		Satkhira	Khulna
307.	15.9.2025 https://tinyurl.com/yevhph8x	Md. Rakib Madbor (25) S/o: Md. Nasir Madbor Vice President of BSL of Govt Barhamganj College at Shibchar, Madaripur District	1	Hacked to Death		Madaripur	Dhaka
308.	22.9.2025 https://tinyurl.com/5dc9wu7e https://tinyurl.com/y8dvmped	Abu Bakkar Siddique Munna Former UP chairman and Vice President of Kanchipara Union unit of Awami League under Fulchhari Upazila in Gaibandha District	1	Planned Murder	Gaibandha Jail	Gaibandha	Rangpur
309.			320				

See the Table-2:

310.	5.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/5e2kyxnb	Protesters vandalized and torched The Jabir International Hotel owned by Jashore District Awami League's General Secretary and Former	24	Burnt to Death		Jashore	Khulna
------	---	--	----	----------------------	--	---------	--------

		Member of Parliament(MP) Shahin Chaklader. At the same time protesters poured petrol on the ground floor of the multi-storied building as a result 24 people burnt to death.					
311.	25.8.2024 https://tinyurl.com/p5hbssfh	Over 182 people were burnt to death and reportedly missing after a devastating fire raged through Gazi Tyre Factory of former Awami League Lawmaker and Minister Gazi Golam Dastgir Bir Pratik in Rugganj Upazila of Narayanganj District.	182	Preplanned Murder through Burning		Narayanganj	Dhaka
312.		Total Death	206				
313.		(Table:1)+	320				
314.		Grand Total Death	526				

Bangladesh

Religious Minorities: Killed, Converted, Forced to Flee

A factual ground report prepared by a multidisciplinary research team on the unabated violence and atrocities against religious minorities since the regime change in August 2024.



We urge immediate intervention to stop the ongoing genocide of religious minorities in Bangladesh



Global Hindu Temple Network-America



Global Hindu Heritage Foundation

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Preface

The current situation in Bangladesh paints a deeply troubling picture. It highlights escalating violence and systemic oppression against its Hindu population. Since August 2024, following a regime change, the plight of Hindus has worsened dramatically under a military-Islamist government led by Prof. Muhammad Yunus, with no accountability. Mobs roam rural areas with impunity targeting Hindu families with brutal assaults. Even the places of worship and homes of minority communities are not spared. Women are subjected to sexual violence and for their own safety families are forced to flee from their ancestral lands.

Hindus in Bangladesh have long faced persecution and exclusion, with their culture, religion, and identity under constant attack. Despite Bangladesh's secular founding in 1971, the country gradually shifted towards religious fundamentalism, declaring itself an Islamic state in 1988. Once 22% of the population in 1951, Hindus now make up only 8.5% as of 2011. Their survival is increasingly threatened, and their community faces the risk of extinction.

This report highlights their suffering and examines how the growing influence of extremist groups has deeply impacted government, politics, and society, leaving minority communities increasingly vulnerable and struggling to survive.

It is a plea for global recognition of their plight and an urgent call to action. At its heart, this document is about justice—justice for the millions of lives lost, the countless women violated, and upholding the right to live with dignity in one's ancestral land.

Purpose of the Report

The purpose of this report is to highlight the ongoing persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh, a tragedy often ignored. By documenting the historical trajectory of this persecution, we aim to highlight not only the scale of the violence but also its systematic nature. From the killings, forced abductions and conversions during pre-Partition riots to the barbaric genocide of 1971, these acts were never random. They were calculated efforts to decimate the Hindu population and erase their cultural identity.

The findings of this report are more than just statistics; they are human lives impacted by injustice. By presenting these realities, we hope to inspire immediate action, foster international solidarity, and ensure the safety and dignity of Hindus in Bangladesh for generations to come.

Findings

Our research uncovers a painful yet undeniable truth: the persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh is both historical and ongoing, deeply rooted in systemic discrimination and violence.

1. Historical Persecution

- The 1971 genocide remains a dark stain on human history, during which *Operation Searchlight* carried out by Pakistan army in what was then East Pakistan resulted in the killing of three million civilians, the rape of up to 300,000 women, and the mass destruction of Hindu temples. Pakistan army should be held to account for its war crimes in 1971.
- The systematic nature of the violence was chilling, with Hindus hunted down through "short-arm inspections" to identify their religious identity.

2. Institutionalized Marginalization

- The 1988 declaration of Bangladesh as an Islamic State marked a turning point in the systemic exclusion of Hindus. Policies restricted their economic opportunities, stifled their rights, and fostered an environment of unchecked violence.
- In rural areas, Hindus have been disproportionately targeted through land grabs, forced displacements, and mob violence, with little to no intervention from authorities.

3. Contemporary Crisis

- In August 2024, following a regime change, the situation for Hindus worsened drastically. Reports document an alarming rise in gang rapes, murders, and desecration of temples.
- Rural Hindu communities face the brunt of these attacks, enduring atrocities that often go unreported and unpunished.

Recommendations

To stop the ongoing persecution and foster an environment of safety and dignity for Hindus in Bangladesh, we propose the following actionable measures:

1. International Recognition and Intervention

- The United Nations and global human rights organizations must formally recognize the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh as an ongoing genocide.
- International pressure must be applied to ensure accountability for crimes against minorities.

2. Legal Protections

- Enact robust Minority Protection Laws in Bangladesh, safeguarding the rights of Hindus and other minorities.
- Establish special tribunals to prosecute crimes against minorities and ensure swift justice for victims.

3. Economic Support and Resettlement

- Offer financial aid to displaced Hindu families to help them rebuild their lives.
- Protect land ownership rights and provide legal recourse for victims of land grabs.

4. Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms

- Set up independent bodies to monitor hate crimes and make the report public.
- Establish a database documenting incidents of violence to ensure transparency and accountability.

A Call to Action

This report is not just a record of history but an urgent plea for justice. Hindus in Bangladesh, who have contributed to its culture and heritage for centuries, now face extinction in their own homeland.

How much longer can the world remain silent? Each day of inaction pushes this ancient community closer to disappearance.

The genocide of minorities in Bangladesh demands urgent attention, immediate intervention and swift action. The international community must hold the Government of Bangladesh wholly accountable for protecting its citizens and preventing further atrocities and demand compliance with its obligations under United Nations Human Rights Declaration, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹ (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights² (ICESCR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child³, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women⁴ (CEDAW) signed and ratified by it.

We urge governments, global organizations, and individuals to stand with the Hindus of Bangladesh. They deserve the right to live without fear, practice their faith, and rebuild their lives with dignity. Let us work towards a world where no community fears for its survival, and justice wins over hatred.

About the Authors

This report is authored by **Mohinder Gulati**, *Retired Chief Operating Officer, United Nations Sustainable Energy for All*, and renowned scholars **Prof. Ramesh**

¹ Signed and ratified by Bangladesh on 6th September 2000.

² Signed and ratified by Bangladesh on 5th October 1998.

³ Signed and ratified by Bangladesh on 26th January 1990/3rd August 1990

⁴ Signed and ratified by Bangladesh on 6th November 1984.

Rao *Professor of Communication Studies, Department of Communication, Columbus State University, Columbus, Georgia* and **Prof. Prakasha Rao Velagapudi**, *Retired Professor of Sociology, Jackson State University, Mississippi*. Their extensive research, experience in advocacy, and commitment to justice have brought to light the ongoing challenges faced by Hindus in Bangladesh.

Their work is supported by detailed research, firsthand accounts, and credible sources such as, Hindu American Foundation, BBC South Asia, Amnesty International, AP News, and the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Oikya Parishad (BHBCOP), Cares Global, and the World Hindu Federation. Additionally, evidence from the field provided by the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC), reports published in Vatican News, India Today, Asia News, Minority Rights Group, and several books documenting the atrocities further reinforce the findings.

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Joint Signatories of the report: Organizations, Academics, Human Rights Activists

1. Global Hindu Temple Network America, USA
2. Global Hindu Heritage Foundation, USA
3. Hindu Action, USA
4. Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities, USA
5. Hindu American Foundation, USA
6. Coalition of Hindus of North America, USA
7. Vishwa Hindu Parishad-America, USA
8. Global Hindu Temple Network Trust, India
9. Federation of Indian and Indian Diaspora Studies, USA
10. International Commission for Human Rights and Religious Freedom, USA
11. Professor (Dr.) Ramesh Rao, Department of Communication, Columbus University, GA, USA
12. Professor (Retired) Prakasarao Velagapudi, Department of Sociology, University of Mississippi. USA
13. Professor Sachi Dastidar, Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, State University of New York, USA
14. Mr. Rahul Sur, former Chief of Peacekeeping Evaluation, United Nations, USA
15. South Asia Minorities Collective, USA
16. Richa Sinha, Chairperson, Scottish Hindu Foundation, Scotland

Bangladesh: Atrocities Against Hindus and Religious Minorities

List of organizations requested to take action

1. Excellency Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under Secretary General, United Nations Department of Peace Operations.
2. Excellency Volker Türk, High Commissioner, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.
3. Dr. (Ms.) Sima Sami Bahous, Executive Director, U N Women.
4. Ms. Catherine Russell, Executive Director. UNICEF.
5. Mr. Sanjay Wijesekera, Regional Director, UNICEF South Asia
6. Secretary Anthony Blinken, State Department, United States Government
7. USAID
8. USCIRF
9. The World Bank- President and the Board of Executive Directors
10. The International Monetary Fund- Managing Director and the Board of Executive Directors
11. The Asian Development Bank- President and the Board of Executive Directors
12. Private Sector:
 - a. H&M Sweden
 - b. Zara (Inditex) Spain
 - c. Walmart
 - d. Gap
 - e. Target
 - f. PVH Corporation (Brand Names Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein)
 - g. Levi Straus & Co
 - h. VF Corporation (Brand Names: The North Face and Timberland)
 - i. American Eagle Outfitters
 - j. J C Penny
 - k. Kohl's
 - l. Macys
 - m. L Brands (Brand Names: Victoria's Secret, PINK)
 - n. Abercrombie and Fitch
 - o. Ralph Lauren
 - p. L. L. Beans

1. Purpose of the Report

We urge the international community to review, reflect, and act immediately to save the lives of religious minorities in Bangladesh.

The purpose of this report is to bring to your attention and urge action to address the unending atrocities against Hindus and other minorities in Bangladesh. These atrocities have been going on since the tumultuous birth of Bangladesh in 1971, with intermittent cessation whenever the country had a strong democratically elected government that focused on economic growth, poverty alleviation, and securing the gains of development through control of communal conflicts. On 5th August 2024 a democratically elected government led by Prime Minister Ms. Sheikh Hasina was unseated through street violence, student agitations, political opposition, Islamist organizations such as Jamaait-e-Islami, and the Bangladesh military.

A Military-Islamist government fronted by an interim arrangement led by Prof. Muhammad Yunus, a micro-finance expert and Nobel Laureate, has taken over with lingering question marks on the authorizing environment and accountability of its “civilian” leadership. The regime changes unleashed targeted violence against Hindus, their places of worship, their properties and also against other minorities, fitting into the undesired pattern of most agitations and protests in volatile Bangladesh.

The severity of violent atrocities is more pronounced in the rural areas where, in the last five decades, the Hindu population has dwindled to a very small minority. This report provides a succinct overview of the most recent developments, documented atrocities and slow-motion genocide ongoing for over five decades, and suggestions for immediate action by the responsible international community and other stakeholders in peace, justice and human rights.

The report is in five sections: Section 1 explains the purpose of the report, Section 2 provides the context of recent political developments in Bangladesh resulting in the current turmoil; Section 3 documents the atrocities since the regime change on 5th August 2024; Section 4 demonstrates the systematic pattern of atrocities since the birth of Bangladesh, particularly after its declaration as Islamic Republic; and Section 5 is an appeal to the international community to act urgently to stop this ongoing genocide in Bangladesh.

2. Recent Violent Political Developments in Bangladesh

Bangladesh went through national elections in January 2024 which was boycotted by the main opposition party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). but a few smaller parties participated, and about 30% of the seats were won by independent candidates that opposed the Awami League, the ruling party. BNP-led protests in the run-up to elections turned violent and partly affected the voter turnout⁵. Ms. Sheikh Hasina, leader of Awami League, won the election to become the Prime Minister for the fourth time. However, the absence of meaningful political opposition put a legitimate question mark on the fairness and transparency of the whole electoral process. A high voltage student protest, ostensibly against job reservation for families of freedom fighters (those who fought for independence in 1971), quickly morphed into a broader protest in which political opposition and banned fundamentalist organization Jamaait-e-Islami joined to exacerbate it. The post-Covid decline in Bangladesh's economy only added further fuel to the discontent.

In June, students took to the streets of Bangladesh, demanding an end to a policy that allocated up to 30% of government jobs to the descendants of veterans from the 1971 war of independence against Pakistan. Protesters argued that this policy disproportionately benefited supporters of Prime Minister Hasina's Awami League, the party that played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle, and that these individuals were already part of the country's elite. As a result of this quota system and similar reservations for marginalized groups, only 44% of civil service positions were awarded based on merit. Although the government had already taken steps to reduce the job reservations, a High Court ruling deemed the government's decision unconstitutional, reinstating the quota system⁶. This led to further unrest among students, fuelling their calls for reform⁷. Gradually the youth led agitation grew violent, and the police and authorities handled it in a heavy-handed manner resulting in several student deaths in police firings. Job quota protests paused after Bangladesh Supreme Court scrapped the job quota on 21st July. However, the protestors were back on the street within a week with added demands to force the resignation of PM Sheikh Hasina.

On 5th August, the Chief of Armed Forces of Bangladesh formally intervened and urged PM Sheikh Hasina to resign, and she was allowed to leave for India immediately. As soon as Sheikh Hasina left the country, law and order in Bangladesh broke down, violent mobs were everywhere, police and armed forces

⁵ Gautam Lahiri, Atlantic Council. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bangladeshs-election-widely-boycotted-or-widely-accepted/>

⁶ <https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/07/bangladesh-high-court-upholds-civil-service-quota-for-independence-fighter-descendents/>

⁷ Aniruddh Ghosal <https://apnews.com/article/sheikh-hasina-bangladesh-students-gen-z-protests-2723012c6177c2feafd1e81c20c68309>

pulled back and did not stop the outraging mobs that went on a rampage, rioting and unleashing violence against minorities that peaked in almost all rural areas.

3. Documented Atrocities Against Minorities Since Regime Change in August 2024.

Bangladesh has had a disappointing track record of turning any protest into an opportunity for committing atrocities against minorities, particularly Hindus. Unhindered street mobs unleashed after the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on 5th August were no different. Most of the murders, looting, rapes, burning of homes, destruction of temples, happened in the rural areas or small towns where the Hindu population has been dwindling for the last fifty years. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Oikya Parishad (BHBCOP) reported more than 2,000 cases of communal violence in August 2024⁸. Of the several murders, most heinous was that of an innocent four-year old boy whose throat was slit. Hindu homes and temples were targeted for looting, destruction and setting on fire. Girls and women have been threatened and forced to convert. Hindu teachers, University Professors, and government officials were forced to resign by the unruly mobs threatening violence.

A communique "Ethnic Cleansing of Hindus in Bangladesh" released by two civil society organizations CaresGlobal and World Hindu Federation Bangladesh Chapter notes⁹ "Sexual Violence and Atrocities were committed against Hindu women in 53 districts in Bangladesh since exit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024. Over 50 Hindus have been murdered in cold blood, of these 15 Hindus were identified [Haradhan Roy (Councillor of Rangpur), Pradeep Kumar Bhowmick (Communist Leader), Santosh Saha (ASI Police), Kamal Roy (Driver in Rangpur), Sanat Kumar, Pranob Ghosh, Biswajit Sadhu, Ashim Kumar, Utpal Mandal (all 5 men in Satkhira) Moloi Mandal, Rajeshwar Das, Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee, Basudev Das, Sumon Gharami, Santosh Kumar]. Several brutalized rapes of Hindu women have been recorded. From Pirojpur district, we received testimonials from women who were gang raped and brutally tortured by Islamists, 12 Hindu girls were kidnapped and raped as recorded by our team between 5th and 13th August. In several districts, more than 61 Hindu temples were vandalized, looted and burnt; more than 295 Hindu houses were vandalized, looted and burnt; more than 183 Hindu business were vandalized, looted and burnt. Hindu Political leaders were forced to flee for their lives as Islamic terrorists were hunting them. Many Hindu professors and government officials were forced to resign by the radical anarchists, thus publicly discriminating against Hindus and Buddhists only for their religion. A web portal called Hindu Voice.in has recorded more detailed incidents from authentic sources".

Global media covered the stories of atrocities against minorities in conjunction with the coverage of regime change in Bangladesh. BBC South Asia provided

⁸ ibid

⁹ <https://tinyurl.com/vxd38e9a>

evidence from the field¹⁰ and Amnesty International issued an appeal to the interim government to protect the minorities¹¹. Many mainstream media journalists¹² and independent analysts have provided robust evidence of mobs going on a rampage, unchecked by police and army, and robbing, plundering, and killing at will. A 15-year-old boy Utshob Mondal was lynched by Islamist mobs in Khulna on 4th September 2024 in a police station in the presence of the army¹³. The violence mainly targeted minorities, and some political workers of the deposed Awami League party¹⁴.

The Indian Express reported “The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Oikya Parishad (BHBCOP), a prominent organisation advocating for minority rights, issued an open letter to Chief Adviser Prof. Muhammad Yunus, detailing 205 incidents of persecution across 52 districts since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on 5th August, according to The Dhaka Tribune newspaper”¹⁵. In a Press Conference on 19th September 2024 at Dhaka Reporters’ Unity’s Nasrum Hamid auditorium, BHBCOP presented details of 2,010 incidents of communal violence between 4th August and 20th August in 68 out of 76 districts in Bangladesh. Nirmal Rozario, Vice President of BHBCOP said that Khulna Division was the worst affected where four women are reported to have been raped¹⁶. On 5th November in Chittagong, after a minor riot had subsided the previous day, Bangladesh army, Border Guards Bangladesh and Chittagong police raided a Hindu locality, broke into Hindu homes, arrested all Hindu males, assaulted Hindu women, and looted valuables¹⁷. What has been most disheartening is the whitewashing of violence against minorities by the Head of the Interim Government Prof Muhammad Yunus by

10

11 Amnesty International. (2024, August 14), Bangladesh: Interim government must take immediate actions to protect Hindu and other minority Communities.

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/bangladesh-interim-government-must-take-immediate-actions-to-protect-hindu-and-other-minority-communities/>

12 Pathai, K., Garjon E., & Ganguly, S. (2024, August 13) The violence in Bangladesh after Hasina’s ouster stirs fear within the country’s Hindu minority. AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-violence-hindu-sheikh-hasina-85fe6619c38e1b07e407441cb054a74e>

13 <https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/bangladesh-blasphemy-case-explained-utsab-mandal-the-hindu-teenager-almost-beaten-to-death>

14 Banarjee S.(2024, August 21) The cycle of violence against minorities in Bangladesh, Devpolicy blog . <https://devpolicy.org/the-cycle-of-violence-against-minorities-in-bangladesh20240821/#:~:text=The%20Bangladesh%20National%20Hindu%20Grand,killed%20and%2039%20women%20raped>

15 PTI (2024, August 11). Minority Bangladeshi Hindus stage protest demanding protection amid attacks on temples & homes. The Indian Express. <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/bangladesh-hindus-stage-protest-demand-protection-amid-attacks-on-temples-9506989/>

16 Swarajya Staff (2024, September 21) Over 2,000 communal attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities in Bangladesh between 4 and 20 August: Minority rights group. <https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/over-2000-communal-attacks-on-hindus-and-other-religious-minorities-in-bangladesh-between-4-and-20-august-minority-rights-group>

17 <https://swarajyamag.com/world/bangladesh-wary-of-republican-rebuke-interim-govt-may-walk-back-on-punitive-action-against-iskcon>

calling it exaggerated¹⁸. The situation was obviously so dire that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) sent a delegation to Dhaka for a month-long fact-finding mission¹⁹. United States Congressmen denounced the atrocities against religious minorities and urged the Government of Bangladesh to take urgent action to stop this violence.

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¹⁸ Al Jazeera (2024, August 11). New Bangladesh government says working to 'resolve' attacks on minorities. . <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/11/new-bangladesh-government-says-working-to-resolve-attacks-on-minorities>

¹⁹ India Today 17 Sept 2024 on UN visit to Bangladesh. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-hindus-minorities-in-united-nations-human-rights-probe-2600994-2024-09-17>

Box 1: US Congressmen and Senators from both political parties denounce atrocities against religious minorities in Bangladesh

United States Senators Ben Cardin, Chris Murphy, Jeffery Merkley, and Chris Van Hollen wrote to Prof, Muhammad Yunus, on 20 September 2024 pointing out documented reports of violence targeting of Hindu community and urged serious action to stop it.

Congressman Raja Krishnamurthy has urged all government officials, police chief, and the people of Bangladesh to end the violence, including targeting of the Hindus, their homes, businesses, and their temples, and demanded that those responsible must be brought to justice. He has also written to Secretary Anthony Blinken to hold a briefing before 31st October 2024.

Representative Pat Fallon has condemned the targeting of Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and any other religious minorities and asked for those instigating and participating in violence to be held responsible.

Congressman Shri Thanedar wrote to Secretary Blinken pointing out more than 300 murders and over 20,000 injured in the violence and that Hindus temples have been burned and destroyed, and large number of them forced to flee to Indian border to escape violence. He has asked for hearings to be held when US Congress returns from recess about failure of Bangladesh to protect Hindus and other minorities and how to prevent these horrific actions from taking place again in the future.

Congressman Rich McCormick expressed his deep dismay at the reports of sectarian violence targeting Hindu minority in Bangladesh.

Representative Ro Khanna has condemned violence targeting Hindus and implored Prof. Muhammad Yunus to act.

Congresswoman Yvette D. Clarke has written to Secretary Blinken to ask Bangladesh to hold their Rapid Action Battalion (an armed force of Bangladesh) accountable for the atrocities.

Congressman Thoman Suozzi, Member of Committee on Homeland Security has written to Secretary Blinken expressing concern over violence targeting religious minorities and asked for a briefing.

(See Annex 1 for their letters and messages)

4. A History of Unending Atrocities Against Minorities in Bangladesh

There has been a systematic effort by the fundamentalist Islamists, often ignored or clandestinely supported by the local politicians, and police to force Hindus to leave and sell their homes and assets at throwaway prices. More often than not, Hindus' lands and assets are simply grabbed by the local musclemen and Islamists. In October 2021, riots were engineered by Islamists by placing a Quran in a Durga Puja celebration and making it viral on social media^{20, 21, 22}

The Vatican News published on 10th July 2024 an annual report by the Bangladesh Hindu, Buddhist, Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC) for the period July 2023 to June 2024 detailing 1,045 cases of violence against minorities that included 25 gangrapes, 45 deaths, 10 attempted murders, 36 death threats²³. The reports state a total of 479 people were attacked, physically abused or injured, and 11 were victims of extortion. The violence included 25 gang rapes, while 12 people were abducted, went missing or forced to convert. Eight were arrested on false charges of blasphemy. The report further states 70-75 percent of the violence is centred on land grabbing, often under the influence of political parties and with the complicity of government agencies. The findings reported 47 incidents of land and homestead encroachment and 45 cases of land occupation, eviction activities, and threats, as well as 11 threats or attempts of expulsion.

Rana Dasgupta, Secretary of BHBCUC noted that the influence of extremist groups is growing in all areas²⁴, including the government administration, politics, and society, making minority communities more insecure and distrustful, forcing many of their members to leave the country. Before the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence against Pakistan, the minority population was about 19 percent. "Now it has come down to 8.6 percent," Dasgupta said, cited by AsiaNews agency.

²⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/21/bangladesh-deadly-attacks-hindu-festival>


²¹ [Wikipedia-Bangladesh-anti Hindu violence 2021](#).

²² <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-comilla-quran-durga-puja-pandal-attack-accused-identified-police-1867240-2021-10-20>

²³ Vatican News (10th July 2024). <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2024-07/1045-cases-of-violence-on-minorities-recorded-in-bangladesh.html>

²⁴ <https://www.asianews.it/news-en/In-the-past-year,-45-people-have-died-in-violence-against-religious-minorities-in-Bangladesh-61112.html>

Figure 1: Atrocities against Hindus in Bangladesh (2015-2020)



Source: Center for Integrated and Holistic Studies. "Bangladesh Violence Against Hindus"²⁵

The oppression of Hindus and other minorities in Bangladesh has been a constant feature in its history, both when it was still East Pakistan and since independence in 1971. According to the official 1951 census for East Bengal (East Pakistan) Hindus consisted of 22 percent of the total population of the province, it declined to 15 percent in 1991 and 8.5 percent in the 2011 census ²⁶. Starting as a secular nation under its Constitution of 1971, Bangladesh gradually turned into a fundamentalist Islamic State. A 1988 amendment (Eighth Amendment) of its Constitution made Bangladesh an Islamic State.

²⁵ <https://cihs.org.in/bangladesh-violence-against-hindus/>

²⁶ Minority Rights Group <https://minorityrights.org/communities/hindus/>

Figure 2: Decline in the population of Hindus in Bangladesh (1941-2011)²⁷



Source: Census of India (1941)²⁸, Census of East Pakistan (1951, 1961)²⁹, Bangladesh Government Census (1974-2011)³⁰.

The most frequent and officially tolerated means of depriving Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians of their lands and properties has been the use of the Vested Property Act of 1965. Hopes that the law would be repealed on gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971 were dashed when the law was instead further strengthened in 1974. A legacy of the Vested Property Act is the migration of millions of Hindus to India in the face of land grabbing and displacement from their homes. Scapegoating and targeting of Hindus has occurred with every protest and after almost every national election in Bangladesh. Framing their persecution as primarily political overlooks the horrors of communal discrimination at play.

The violence against Hindus by Muslim majority in Bangladesh has been going on since the pre-partition period. In October 1946, Noakhali district of the then Bengal erupted into a communal frenzy against Hindus. On November 4, 1946, the House of Commons of British Parliament was told that the dead people in Noakhali and contiguous Tipperah districts had not yet been counted. Thousands of Hindu women were abducted and married to Muslims against their will. Hindu men were

²⁷ <https://cihs.org.in/hindu-genocide-unfolding-in-bangladesh-3/>

²⁸ https://censusindia.gov.in/census_and_you/old_report/census_1941.aspx

²⁹ <http://111.68.102.42:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/14510>

³⁰ <http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/115>

compelled to grow beard and recite Quran Hindu temples desecrated. (Louis Fischer in The Life of Mahatma Gandhi).

As Spring ended in March 1971, the Pakistan army turned East Pakistan into a massive killing field for Hindus. The Pakistan army launched a barbaric pogrom for complete cleansing of the Bengali and Hindu identity of East Pakistan and called it Operation Searchlight. Since the days of Holocaust, this genocide orchestrated by Pakistan army was the most diabolic ethnic cleansing. Three million civilians were killed, 200,000 to 300,000 women were raped³¹. Anthony Mascrenhas, then Pakistan correspondent of Sunday Times, London was given a chance to be embedded with the 9th Division of Pakistan army. He wrote “For six days I travelled with the officers of the 9th Division headquartered at Comilla. I witnessed at close quarters the extent of the killing. I saw Hindus, hunted from village to village and door to door, shot off-hand after a cursory “short-arm inspection” showed they were uncircumcised”.

Since the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, Hindus have seen only fleeting moments of peace. The promise of religious co-existence started falling apart in 1978 after assassination of its founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Violence against Hindus has been more severe and persistent in rural areas compared to big towns of Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna. Bangladesh was declared an Islamic State in 1988.

A government order in 1992³² directed commercial banks to control large withdrawal of funds by Hindus from their deposit accounts and restrict business loans to them³³. In 2013, anti-Hindu riots erupted after Jamaat-e-Islami leader Delwar Sayeedi was convicted of war crimes by the International Crimes Tribunal³⁴, the 2016 Black Diwali³⁵ and the 2021 Durga Puja³⁶ both saw violence triggered by social media blasphemy allegations. 1971 has not yet ended for Hindus of Bangladesh. If anything, it has gotten worse in August 2024.

³¹ Shahidul Hasan Khokhon “Bangladesh: from Bloodbath to Birth”.

³² https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/may-no-hindus-left-bangladesh-30-years?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette

³³ “Being Hindu in Bangladesh: The Untold Story” Deep Halder and Avishek Biswas, Harper Collins April 2023.

³⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21623170>

³⁵ <https://www.hinduamerican.org/press/hindu-americans-shocked-tragic-riots-bangladesh-diwali>

³⁶ ibid

5. What can the international community do to save Hindus in Bangladesh from immediate danger.

No circumstances can or should normalize genocide, even when it manifests as a protracted, slow-motion slaughter, as witnessed in Bangladesh over the past five decades. When we begin to rationalize such atrocities as some Western media outlets and Prof. Muhammad Yunus, the leader of the interim government, have shamefully done, we risk losing the very battle for human rights and gender justice. We urge the international community to leverage its influence to compel Bangladesh to safeguard the rights and dignity of its minority communities, ensuring their security and access to justice.

The Key Role of The United Nations, the United States of America, and the European Union

The United Nations

- a) We are grateful to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for sending a delegation to Bangladesh to investigate violations of human rights between 1st July and 15th August 2024. Its scope of enquiry should cover the period until the end of September. This report should form the basis of discussion in the UN Security Council on the security situation in the region.
- b) Any financial support to the government should include monitorable metrics on protection and inclusion of minorities, repeal and amendment of highly discriminatory laws such as the Vested Property Law, special tribunals for investigation and trial of crimes against minorities.
- c) Endorse and support the following safeguards requested by minorities:
 - I. Bangladesh should set up a Minority Commission with statutory powers to subpoena, and order independent investigation and trial of crimes against minorities.
 - II. 10% of seats in Parliament to be reserved for minorities (*and to be rotated across all constituencies*).
 - III. Enactment of a Minority Protection Law that would also provide legal mandate for constitution of a Minority Commission.
 - IV. Special Tribunals to be set up for speedy trial of crimes against minorities.
 - V. Restoration of land, houses, and assets of minorities illegally grabbed by forcing them to flee, and reparations for houses, businesses, and temples destroyed by mobs.

The United States Congress

- a) Congressional Oversight: The United States Congress must urgently exercise its oversight authority to scrutinize the actions of the State Department and USAID in Bangladesh, ensuring that radical Islamist groups do not benefit from American economic and political support.
- b) The State Department should urge the Government of Bangladesh to take the following steps:
 - i. Protection of Minority Rights: Policies must be implemented to safeguard the rights of minorities in Bangladesh, with oversight from U.S.-based Hindu non-profits and aid organizations to ensure accountability.
 - ii. De-radicalization of Educational Curriculum: A thorough de-radicalization of Bangladesh's Islamic education curriculum should be established as a prerequisite for U.S. economic aid
 - iii. Timeline and Demographic Preservation: A clear timeline of goals should be set to prevent the demographic decline of Hindu and Buddhist minorities in Bangladesh. Should these efforts fail, the establishment of autonomous designated zones should be considered, similar to the recent precedents in Kosovo and the Native American reservations in the United States.

International Financial Institutions (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Bank, IMF)

- a) All financial support, including budgetary support, for education, healthcare, financial sector, infrastructure, should include monitorable metrics for inclusion of minorities, particularly girls and women of religious minorities. The local offices of IFIs should dedicate a staff from minorities to monitor and report compliance with requirements of inclusion, social justice, and gender justice as it relates to minorities. In the long term, the demographic health of the religious minorities must become a metric of measurement of their well-being.

The Socially Conscious Private Sector

- a) Buyers of goods from Bangladesh: please require your vendors and suppliers to demonstrate inclusion of religious minorities and just and equitable treatment in wages and working conditions. Vendors and suppliers must be vetted for links to radical Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat and their affiliates proscribed by the Department of States of the United States.

Crisis in Bangladesh

Response across US between August 4 and October 20

In a powerful demonstration of bipartisan concern and responding to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Bangladesh, several lawmakers from both Democratic and Republican parties have condemned the violence against Hindus and other religious minorities. Six senators from Senate Foreign Relations Committee and some Congressmen have written to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken for a hearing on the situation.

Letter by the Senators from Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Prof Muhammad Yunus, Chief Advisor, Government of Bangladesh

COPY

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 20, 2024

H.E. Professor Muhammad Yunus
Chief Adviser of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
Office of the Honorable Chief Adviser
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Tejgaon, Dhaka.

Dear Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus,

We are writing to congratulate you on becoming the interim leader of Bangladesh during this historic time. In recent weeks, the people of Bangladesh have courageously demonstrated the transformative power of collective action to their own government and the global community. When citizens unite, their voices can compel even the most entrenched and authoritarian leaders to relinquish power.

But this historic moment did not come without costs. Rather than engage the legitimate grievances of the protestors, the Bangladesh security forces – including the Rapid Action Battalion – responded with brute force, killing hundreds of protestors, and arresting and injuring thousands more. We mourn the lives that were lost and urge your interim government to create a credible process to conduct an independent and impartial investigation into the security services' human rights violations. This will be vital both as a demonstration of your commitment to respecting the rights of the protestors and signal your interim government's intention to work in good faith to address their grievances.

This transition presents a historic opportunity to reform institutions in Bangladesh, to ensure that human rights, such as freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, are protected; to allow for inclusive participation in government representative of the diversity of the country; to support civil society and independent media; and to hold individuals accountable for the violence committed against the citizens of Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh deserve a government that honors their voices, safeguards their rights, and upholds their dignity.

While many celebrate this new chapter in Bangladesh, a concerning volume of those celebrations have turned violent, with documented reports of reprisals targeting police as well as minority Hindu communities and those perceived to be supporters of Sheikh Hasina's government. As a result, the country has witnessed gaps in law enforcement and lack of protections for those facing violent attacks, including members of the Hindu community and Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazaar. We urge you to take these threats and incidents of violence seriously, just as we applaud your recent promise to continue supporting the million-plus Rohingya people sheltered in

Bangladesh. It is only by ensuring that all communities residing in Bangladesh are protected under the law that Bangladesh can meet its promising future.

Now, more than ever, it is important for Bangladeshis to unify – by coming together and by rebuilding an inclusive government, that fully harnesses Bangladesh's tremendous potential. In a world that has recently witnessed repeated assaults on democratic ideals, Bangladesh has a rare opportunity to respond by delivering on the 'second liberation' many protestors have called for through the formulation of a government that respects democratic values and institutions.

We stand ready to assist Bangladesh during this critical period to ensure a successful transition to a democracy truly representative of the will of the Bangladeshi people.

Sincerely,



Benjamin L. Cardin
United States Senator



Chris S. Murphy
United States Senator



Jeffrey A. Merkley
United States Senator



Chris Van Hollen
United States Senator

Letter by Congressman Shri Thanedar to Secretary Blinken



Condemnation by Congressman Rich McCormick at a Congressional briefing.



Letter by Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi to Secretary Blinken



Congressman Krishnamoorthi wrote a second letter to the Secretary of State Anthony Blinken urging him for a Briefing before October 31st.

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC
COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
& CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY;
RANKING MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY
SUBCOMMITTEE:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY POLICY,
& REGULATORY AFFAIRS
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

October 16, 2024

The Honorable Antony Blinken
Secretary
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street Northwest
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Blinken,

I am writing to request a briefing on the deeply disturbing rise in harassment and violence against Hindus and other religious minorities in Bangladesh, particularly following the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and reports of vandalism, violence, and intimidation leading up to Bangladesh's largest Hindu festival of Durga Puja. This year's festival took place from October 9 and October 13, 2024, and there are reports of harassment and attacks on Hindus, who make up about 8 percent of the country's nearly 170 million people, leading up to and during the festival. I am deeply concerned about religious minorities' safety and security in the current political climate. Therefore, I respectfully request a briefing on efforts to protect minority groups, including Hindus, in Bangladesh.

I commend your September meeting with Bangladesh's interim government Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, where you stressed the need to protect minority communities in Bangladesh. As you are aware, Bangladesh's Hindu community has historically faced challenges, but recent incidents following the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina have heightened concerns about their safety. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council recently reported over 2,000 incidents of communal violence targeting minorities, mostly Hindus, across the country from August 4 to August 20, 2024. This included nine deaths of people belonging to minority groups, rapes, and attacks on 69 places of worship, which were vandalized or set on fire.

Given the alarming rise in violence against religious minorities, I respectfully request a briefing by October 31, 2024 on the treatment of religious minorities in Bangladesh and the State Department's efforts to promote security and safety of religious minority in Bangladesh, including during the Durga Puja festival, in addition to an assessment of the efforts of Bangladesh's government to combat violence against religious minorities and prevent additional attacks.

I appreciate your attention to this matter and look forward to your response.

Sincerely,



Raja Krishnamoorthi
Member of Congress

Statement by Congressman Pat Fallon



Rep. Pat Fallon ✓

@RepPatFallon



I strongly condemn the ongoing political violence and religious persecution that we are witnessing in Bangladesh. I implore the interim government to act in the shared interest of the Bangladeshi people and put an end to this violence at once.

The targeting of Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and any other religious minority is reprehensible. Those who have instigated and participated in these acts of violence must be held responsible.

9:21 PM · Aug 9, 2024 · **280.8K** Views

Congressman Ro. Khanna condemns violence targeting Hindus

Congressman Ro Khanna (D-CA) also voiced his concerns publicly on Twitter, emphasizing the need for the interim government to maintain law and order while protecting vulnerable communities.



Ro Khanna ✓

@RoKhanna



Bangladeshi students had just human rights concerns against PM Hasina. It's good she is gone. But the violence now targeting Hindus is wrong. PM Yunus must uphold the rule of law & prevent the targeting of temples or people of any political party or faith from violence.

7:47 AM · Aug 8, 2024 · **417.8K** Views

Congressman Thomas Souzzi, wrote to Secretary Blinken requesting State Department to depute someone to brief his constituents.

THOMAS R. SUOZZI

MEMBER OF CONGRESS
3RD DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY



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Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE

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DOUGLASTON, NY 11363
718-631-0400

August 8, 2024

The Honorable Antony J. Blinken
Secretary
United States Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Blinken:

I continue to follow the situation in Bangladesh closely following the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. As an interim government is formed, it is important that decisions are made in an inclusive way that respects democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and the Bangladeshi people.

One important aspect of these principles is the protection of the rights of all citizens. I am deeply concerned about reports of continued violence, especially as it affects minorities communities in Bangladesh, as well as their places of worship, which are especially vulnerable. The Department of State should continue to underscore the importance of preventing violence and protecting vulnerable minorities to the authorities in Bangladesh at this critical time.

I again request that an appropriate official be made available to come to my district to report directly to my constituents and address their concerns, sometime in August.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Thomas R. Suozzi".

Thomas R. Suozzi
Member of Congress

Congresswoman Yvette D Clarke (D-NY) wrote to Secretary Blinken condemning violence in Bangladesh against religious minorities and asking its armed police Rapid Action Battalion to be held accountable.

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Yvette D. Clarke
Congress of the United States
9th District of New York

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MANUFACTURING, AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, DEPT.
AND COMMERCE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OPERABILITY, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY

September 25, 2024

The Honorable Antony Blinken
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Blinken,

I am writing to express my deep concern regarding the ongoing situation in Bangladesh. While political transitions are often challenging, this transition has been accompanied by alarming reports of escalating violence against religious minorities and other vulnerable communities. It is important that we encourage decisions that are inclusive and respects democratic principles, human rights, and all Bangladeshi people.

Last month, we witnessed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's resignation and exodus from the country. In this pivotal movement, it is critical the United States takes the necessary steps to support our longtime ally and secure its national stability through this crisis. As a global leader, we have a moral obligation to underscore the importance of preventing violence and protecting vulnerable minorities at this critical time.

I commend the Biden-Harris Administration's past action to impose sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion, which has become directly responsible for numerous abuses over recent weeks. It is imperative we continue to hold government officials accountable for the inhumane treatment of its citizens and condemn any further acts of violence that have, for too long, threatened democracy in Bangladesh and the individual freedoms of its people. The United States has a responsibility to support the transition from the incoming interim government to a new governmental body, centered in democratic ideals and the rights and liberties of every Bangladeshi.

I urge the State Department to work with Bangladesh to protect religious communities and support a peaceful political transition. Thank you for your attention to this important matter and we look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Yvette D. Clarke
Member of Congress

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BROKEN TRUST, RISING RAGE: **Bangladesh Completes A Year of Mob Rule and Violence** **in the Shadows of Power**



637 Mob Lynching Deaths in 12 months
August 2024 – July 2025

BROKEN TRUST, RISING RAGE:

Bangladesh Completes A Year of Mob Rule and Violence in the Shadows of Power

637 Mob Lynching Deaths in 12 months
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
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Preface

The political transition following the August 2024 uprising, which forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from her office after 15 years in power, has seen a disturbing escalation in mob violence in Bangladesh. From August 2024 through July 2025, at least 637 (list attached) people, including 41 Police officers, were lynched in acts of vigilante justice, marking one of the deadliest waves of extrajudicial killings in the country’s recent history. By contrast, 51 lynching deaths were recorded in all of 2023, under the previous administration. Mob lynching deaths increased more than 12 times compared to 2023.



At “The Zabeer Jashore Hotel, Jashore, 24 people were burnt to death on 4 August 2024.

Among 637 deaths, 182 people were burnt in Gaji Tyres, Rupganj, Narayanganj on 25 August 2024. Their names and details of the victims were not published.

Because of strong media censorship, we couldn't collect full information on all mob lynching deaths. So this list should be considered incomplete.

This sharp increase underscores a dangerous erosion of law and order during a period of political instability and weakened state control. The fall of a longstanding regime created both a power vacuum and a public crisis of confidence in the country's justice system, which many now perceive as either absent or co-opted by political agendas.

With police forces overstretched, court systems paralyzed, and local leaders either targeted or in hiding, citizens increasingly took justice into their own hands. Public spaces, once protected by law, have become flashpoints for mob killings, often triggered by nothing more than suspicion, rumor, or political resentment.

While many incidents stemmed from accusations of theft or harassment, a large portion of the violence had political or communal undertones. Local human rights organizations have reported that over 70% of lynching victims since August 2024 had ties to the former ruling Bangladesh Awami League or its affiliated student and labor wings.

Other victims have included religious minorities, particularly Hindus and Ahmadiyya Muslims, accused of blasphemy or conspiracy through viral posts on social media—often with little or no evidence. One of the most horrific incidents involved the public lynching of Lal Chand Sohag, a Hindu social worker, outside Mitford Hospital on 9 July 2025. His death was livestreamed across platforms, igniting both national outrage and fear.

In the age of smartphones, rumors travel faster than facts. Social media has been a double-edged sword, used by citizens to expose injustice but also as a tool to amplify panic and hatred. Misinformation and inflammatory content have played key roles in mobilizing mobs within minutes.

In one incident in Chattogram, a Facebook post falsely claiming that a local Hindu man had desecrated the Quran led to a mob attack that left two dead and several homes burned. Despite the post being proven false hours later, the damage was irreversible.

The interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has vowed to crack down on vigilante violence. Authorities have promised a "zero tolerance" approach, and launched nationwide campaigns promoting legal awareness and community policing. However, prosecution remains rare, with only a handful of arrests about mob killings, and fewer still leading to convictions.

Critics argue that the government has prioritized political consolidation over the rule of law, focusing more on purging remnants of the former regime than restoring judicial order. Meanwhile, public trust in institutions continues to plummet, fueling the very violence the state seeks to prevent.

Beyond the numbers, the rise in mob violence has left deep psychological scars on communities across Bangladesh. Fear has become a daily companion in many neighborhoods. Parents are hesitant to let children walk alone, and shopkeepers speak in hushed tones when discussing political topics.

A recent survey by the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM) found that 71% of Bangladeshi youth believe that mob violence is now a regular part of public life, and 47% fear becoming a target of politically motivated attacks.

Unless urgent and systemic reforms are made, ranging from police restructuring and judicial independence to digital misinformation controls and civic education, mob justice may become a permanent feature of Bangladesh's political landscape.












The last year has shown that when institutions fail, mobs rise. The question facing Bangladesh now is whether it can reclaim the rule of law or whether the crowd, not the court, will continue to decide who lives and who dies.

Global Center for Democratic Governance.

List of mob lynching deaths

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
1.	02-Aug-2024	Constable Sumon Kumar Gharami Khulna Metropolitan Police <i>Address:</i> Malipatan, Kachua, Bagerhat		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
2.	03-Aug-2024	Md. Shahid (35) <i>Address:</i> Rasulbag, Chakbazar, Boddarhat, Chattogram	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mdahid	
3.	04-Aug-2024	Engr. Anowarul Islam (60) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 1, Uttara, Uttara, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/engrai	
4.	04-Aug-2024	Rafiquzzaman Rahim (52) S/O: Late. Tasir Uddin <i>Address:</i> Sheikhpara, Joypurhat Pourashava, Joypurhat Sadar, Joypurhat		tinyurl.com/rfqrhm	
5.	04-Aug-2024	Delowar Hossain Shahin (37) <i>Address:</i> Char Dighaldi, Madhabdi, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/dlwrsn	
6.	04-Aug-2024	Haradhon Ray (48) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 4, Parshuram, Rangpur		tinyurl.com/hrdnrr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
7.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Golam Hasnain Tito (52) S/O: Late. Nurul Islam Thandu <i>Address:</i> Hasil Hossain, Brahmagacha, Rayganj, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/rganjm	
8.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Golam Sarwar Liton (55) S/O: Late. Nurul Islam Thandu <i>Address:</i> Hasil Hossain, Brahmagacha, Rayganj, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/rganjm	
9.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Jahangir Alam (42) S/O: Late. Dukha Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Chandaikona, Chandaikona, Rayganj, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/rganjm	
10.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Al Amin Sarkar (42) S/O: Saidul Islam Chan <i>Address:</i> Simla, Chandaikona, Rayganj, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/rganjm	
11.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Elias Hossain (40) S/O: Late. Abu Sayeed <i>Address:</i> Rouha, Dhangara, Rayganj, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/rganjm	
12.	04-Aug-2024	<p>Md. Jahangir Alam (40) S/O: Mokbul Hossain (Mokbel) <i>Address:</i> Gazaria, Ratankandi, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj</p>		tinyurl.com/srjjalm	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
13.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Asif (19) S/O: Nazrul Islam <i>Address:</i> Ekdala Punorbason, Sirajganj Pourashava, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/srjasf	
14.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Shahin Sheikh (16) S/O: Nur Mohammad Hossain Babu <i>Address:</i> Janpur, Sirajganj Pourashava, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/srjshn	
15.	04-Aug-2024	Pradeep Kumar Bhowmik (60) S/O: Dilip Bhowmik <i>Address:</i> Nimgachhi, Raiganj, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/srjrgj	
16.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Sohanur Rahman Ranju (40) S/O: Late. Majed Ali Khan <i>Address:</i> Masumpur Dakshinpara, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/srjrgj	
17.	04-Aug-2024	Abdul Latif (35) S/O: Surjat Ali <i>Address:</i> Vocational Road, Goyla, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/srjrgj	
18.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Sumon Sheikh (30) S/O: Ganjer Ali <i>Address:</i> Gayla, Ekdala, Sirajganj Sadar, Sirajganjs		tinyurl.com/srjrgj	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
19.	04-Aug-2024	Shihab Uddin (19) S/O: Shafi Uddin <i>Address:</i> Madhabpur, Enayetpur, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/enytth	
20.	04-Aug-2024	Hafez Siam Hossain S/O: Abdul Kuddus <i>Address:</i> Goparekhi, Enayetpur, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/enytth	
21.	04-Aug-2024	Mohammad Yahia S/O: Shahjahan Ali <i>Address:</i> Khukni, Enayetpur, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/enytth	
22.	04-Aug-2024	Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Abdur Razzak Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Maharajpur, Chapainawabganj Sadar, Chapainawabganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
23.	04-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Obaidur Rahman Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Komaygari, Naogaon Sadar, Naogaon		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
24.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Rabiul Alam Shah Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Amantapur, Patnitala, Naogaon		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
25.	04-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Tahchenuzzaman Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Jaldhaka Bazar, Jaldhaka, Nilphamari		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
26.	04-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Nazmul Hossain Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Majhgram, Chatmohar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
27.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Abdus Salek Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Agapungali, Faridpur, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
28.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Hafizul Islam Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Haria, Santhia, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
29.	04-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Rois Uddin Khan Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Bhadarbhag, Sujanagar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
30.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Riazul Islam Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Khapur, Sujanagar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
31.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Ariful Azam Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Khoyran, Sujanagar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
32.	04-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Pranabesh Kumar Biswas Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Manikhat, Sujanagar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
33.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Hanif Ali Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Basudebpur, Godagari, Rajshahi		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
34.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Shahin Uddin Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Jayrampur, Godagari, Rajshahi		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
35.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Isti (30) <i>Address:</i> Kalindi, Keraniganj, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mistms	
36.	04-Aug-2024	Rubel Abdullah (50) S/O: Siraj Uddin <i>Address:</i> Karimganj, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rbladl	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
37.	04-Aug-2024	Anjana Begum (35) Husband: Alom Mia <i>Address:</i> Bir Dampara, Jashodal, Kishoreganj Sadar, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/anjgum	
38.	04-Aug-2024	Julkar Mia (35) S/O: Motiur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Bir Dampara, Jashodal, Kishoreganj Sadar, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jlkrma	
39.	04-Aug-2024	Mobin Mia (38) S/O: Dilu Mia <i>Address:</i> Korshakorial, Kishoreganj Sadar, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mabmia	
40.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Rasel <i>Address:</i> Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rslxm	
41.	04-Aug-2024	Ahmed Sharif (42) <i>Address:</i> Lakshmipur Sadar, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lakmip	
42.	04-Aug-2024	Rakibul Hasan Sifat <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 2, Lakkhipur Pourashava, Lakshmipur Sadar, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lakmip	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
43.	04-Aug-2024	Harunur Rashid (45) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 1, Tumchar, Lakshmipur Sadar, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/harunrr	
44.	04-Aug-2024	Tawhid Kabir Rafi (17) <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Keroa, Raipur, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lakmip	
45.	04-Aug-2024	Anisur Rahman Sohel (40) <i>Address:</i> Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ansrrs	
46.	04-Aug-2024	Moniruzzaman Bhuiyan (Nati Monir) (48) <i>Address:</i> Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bhnmnr	
47.	04-Aug-2024	Md. Delowar Hossain Delu (48) <i>Address:</i> Chhoto Gadairchar, Madhabdi Pourashava, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/dlumdd	
48.	04-Aug-2024	Nowsher (40) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 11, Madhabdi Pourashava, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/wsrnow	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
49.	04-Aug-2024	Abdul Jalil Mia (40) <i>Address:</i> Mahishashura, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mdhnsh	
50.	04-Aug-2024	Kamal Hossain Mia (45) S/O: Shahjahan Mia <i>Address:</i> Algi, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mdhnsh	
51.	04-Aug-2024	Omar Faruk (30) S/O: Mozammel Haque <i>Address:</i> Atpaika, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mdhnsh	
52.	04-Aug-2024	Mahmudul Hasan Munna S/O: Abdul Mozid <i>Address:</i> Baruahat, Kaunia, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mhmrpr	
53.	04-Aug-2024	Shyamal Chandra Ray Komol (37) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 4, Parshuram, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/scrpur	
54.	04-Aug-2024	Khayrul Islam Khasru Sabuj (28) <i>Address:</i> Guratipara, Rangpur City Corporation, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpursbj	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
55.	04-Aug-2024	Masum Mia (23) <i>Address:</i> Guratipara, Rangpur City Corporation, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpurms	
56.	04-Aug-2024	Mukul Mia (31) <i>Address:</i> Guratipara, Rangpur City Corporation, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpurmk	
57.	04-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Ershad Ali Highway Police, Cumilla <i>Address:</i> Dosra Chankanda, Sherpur Sadar, Sherpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
58.	05-Aug-2024	Mst. Ashma Khatun Husband: Abdul Kader <i>Address:</i> Manirambari, Muktagachha, Mymensingh		tinyurl.com/asmmgc	
59.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Siyam (18) C/O: Md. Bokul <i>Address:</i> Taltala Halfrasta, Natore Sadar, Natore.	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/smpntr	
60.	05-Aug-2024	Mikdad Hossain Khan (Akib) (17) C/O: Delowar Hossain <i>Address:</i> Upashahor, Natore Sadar, Natore.		tinyurl.com/smpntr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
61.	05-Aug-2024	Shariful Islam Mohon C/O: Md. Abdul Mazid <i>Address:</i> Uttar Baragacha, Natore Sadar, Natore.	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/smpntr	
62.	05-Aug-2024	Yeasin Ali (18) C/O: Fazer Ali <i>Address:</i> Mallikhati, Natore Sadar, Natore.		tinyurl.com/smpntr	
63.	05-Aug-2024	Alamgir Hossain Driver of GM Mohsin Reza Upazila Chairman, Koyra, Khulna <i>Address:</i> Koyra, Khulna	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/almhnsn	
64.	05-Aug-2024	Mofizul Islam Personal officer of GM Mohsin Reza Upazila Chairman, Koyra, Khulna <i>Address:</i> Koyra, Khulna	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/almhnsn	
65.	05-Aug-2024	Moin Jomaddar (45) <i>Address:</i> Charamaddi, Charamaddi, Bakerganj, Barishal		tinyurl.com/monjdr	
66.	05-Aug-2024	Tutul Chowdhury (60) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 12, Barishal City Corporation, Barishal City Corporation, Barishal		tinyurl.com/ttlcdr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
67.	05-Aug-2024	Nurul Islam Nuru (44) <i>Address:</i> Nazir Moholla, Ward No. 18, Barishal City Corporation, Barishal	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bslnri	
68.	05-Aug-2024	Gazi Noimul Hossain Litu (58) <i>Address:</i> Natun Bazar, Ward No. 19, Barishal City Corporation, Barishal		tinyurl.com/gnhlcb	
69.	05-Aug-2024	Rana Paikar (34) <i>Address:</i> Chaparpara, Bogura Pourashava, Bogura Sadar, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bgrmdt	
70.	05-Aug-2024	Noor Alam (28) <i>Address:</i> Deshma, Kharna, Shajahanpur, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bgrmdt	
71.	05-Aug-2024	Selim Khan <i>Address:</i> Lakhipur, Lakhipur Model, Chandpur Sadar, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/sschan	
72.	05-Aug-2024	Shanto Khan S/O: Selim Khan <i>Address:</i> Lakhipur, Lakhipur Model, Chandpur Sadar, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/sschan	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
73.	05-Aug-2024	Mostafa Kamal Mozumder <i>Address:</i> Shorshak, Suchipara Uttar, Shahrasti, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/mkmcpr	
74.	05-Aug-2024	Unknown Death due to burn at Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, Road 32, Dhanmondi, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bmmdhk	
75.	05-Aug-2024	Unknown Death due to burn at Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, Road 32, Dhanmondi, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bmmdhk	
76.	05-Aug-2024	Unknown Death due to burn at Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, Road 32, Dhanmondi, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bmmdhk	
77.	05-Aug-2024	Unknown Death due to burn at Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, Road 32, Dhanmondi, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bmmdhk	
78.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Anisur Rahman Mollah Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Devkunda, Parbatipur, Dinajpur		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	












SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
79.	05-Aug-2024	Ismail Hossain (35) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 54, Tongi Paschim, Gazipur		tinyurl.com/ismlhn	
80.	05-Aug-2024	Djoko Utom Indonesian citizen staying at Zabeer hotel, Jashore <i>Address:</i> Indonesia	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zaaber	
81.	05-Aug-2024	Syed Mithun Morshed S/O: Syed Shahin Forhad <i>Address:</i> 16/1, Block- B, Uposhohor, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
82.	05-Aug-2024	Abrar Masnun Nil S/O: Md. Ashikur Rahman Bablu <i>Address:</i> 265/A, Ghop, Nowapara Road, Jashore	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zaaber	
83.	05-Aug-2024	Rasel Rana S/O: Md. Kuddus Ali <i>Address:</i> Alamnagar Paschimpara, Amdabad Bazar, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
84.	05-Aug-2024	Rokonuzzaman S/O: Jahangir Alam <i>Address:</i> Balial Bhekutia, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	












SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
85.	05-Aug-2024	Ruhan Islam S/O: Md. Moksedur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Bamanpara Karbala, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
86.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Tarek Rahman S/O: Md. Waliyar Rahman <i>Address:</i> Bolorampur, Rupdia, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
87.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Sakibul Hasan Mahi S/O: Md. Shahidur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Chanchra Dalmill, Pashchimpara, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
88.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Riyad Sheikh S/O: Md. Kabil Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Chanchra, Raypara, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
89.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Mehedi Hasan Alif S/O: Md. Harun-Or-Rashid <i>Address:</i> Chormara Dighirpar, Chanchra, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
90.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Yousuf Ali S/O: Md. Manik Hossain <i>Address:</i> Chormara Dighirpar, Chanchra, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
91.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Md. Abdullah Ibne Shahid S/O: Shahidul Haque <i>Address:</i> Ghop, Nowapara Road, Ward No-03, Jashore</p>		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
92.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Fazal Mehedi Choyon S/O: Mofizur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Holding- 06, Raypara, Jashore</p>		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
93.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Md. Shawanto Mehtab (Priyo) S/O: Md. Shakil Wahid <i>Address:</i> Mujib Sharak, Jashore</p>	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zaaber	
94.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Foysal Hossain S/O: S M Kobir Hossain <i>Address:</i> Old Kasba, Dhaka Road, Jashore</p>		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
95.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Mehedi Hasan S/O: Rustam Ali <i>Address:</i> Pularhat, Krishnabati, Jashore</p>		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
96.	05-Aug-2024	<p>Md. Hafiz Uddin S/O: Abdul Khalek <i>Address:</i> Purba Barandi Mollapara, Amtala, Jashore</p>		tinyurl.com/zaaber	


SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
97.	05-Aug-2024	Samiur Rahman Saad S/O: Sheikh Motiar Rahman Dablu <i>Address:</i> Purba Barandi Mollapara, Amtala, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
98.	05-Aug-2024	Shakib S/O: Alal Uddin <i>Address:</i> Sankorpur, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
99.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Alamin Bishwas S/O: Md. Alomgir Hossainss <i>Address:</i> Sujalpur, Ward No-09, Arobpur, Jashore		tinyurl.com/zaaber	
100.	05-Aug-2024	Shahidul Islam Hiron (55) <i>Address:</i> Aruyakandee, Porahati, Jhenaidah Sadar, Jhenaidah		tinyurl.com/sihrnj	
101.	05-Aug-2024	Akter Hossain Mia (40) <i>Address:</i> Bhupatipur, Porahati, Jhenaidah Sadar, Jhenaidah	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sihrnj	
102.	05-Aug-2024	GM Mohsin Reza (61) S/O: GM Aman Ullah <i>Address:</i> Gobindapur, Antabunia, Koyra, Khulna		tinyurl.com/gmmrkr	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
103.	05-Aug-2024	Unknown (12) <i>Address:</i> Ramganj, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rmgajc	
104.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Nasir <i>Address:</i> Athakara, Bholakot, Ramganj, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rmganj	
105.	05-Aug-2024	Monir Hossain Atia (60) <i>Address:</i> Sonapur, Ramganj Pourashava, Ramganj, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rmganj	
106.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Shahriar Al Afroz Srabon (18) S/O: Md. Saidur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Khatapara, Saptibari, Aditmari, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	
107.	05-Aug-2024	Al Shah Riyad Tonmoy (18) S/O: Late. Jahidul Islam Khokon <i>Address:</i> Paschim Haribhanga, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	
108.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Radif Hossain Rusho (17) S/O: Ziaur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Taluk Khutamara, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
109.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Rajib Ul Karim Sarkar (18) S/O: Md. Rezaul Karim Sarkar <i>Address:</i> Taluk Khutamara, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	
110.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Jobayer Hossain S/O: Md. Zahirul Islam <i>Address:</i> Bashundhara, Lalmonirhat Pourashava, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	
111.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Zahidur Rahman Jony (18) S/O: Late. Sekander Ali <i>Address:</i> Nabinagar, Lalmonirhat Pourashava, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lmnrhu	
112.	05-Aug-2024	Tayebur Rahman Tipu <i>Address:</i> Khagrata, Boikunthapur, Ghior, Manikganj		tinyurl.com/trtipu	
113.	05-Aug-2024	Musa <i>Address:</i> Panchasar, Munshiganj Sadar, Munshiganj		tinyurl.com/mganjm	
114.	05-Aug-2024	Mazedul Islam Khan (28) S/O: Zafar Khan <i>Address:</i> Borashula, Narail Pourashava, Narail Sadar, Narail	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bnpnsn	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
115.	05-Aug-2024	Maksud Alam Rony (28) <i>Address:</i> Aichpara, Amishapara, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nkhali	
116.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Tanvir (30) S/O: Mawlana Gias Uddin <i>Address:</i> Hossainpur, Bargaon, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nkhali	
117.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Yasin (32) <i>Address:</i> Shimulia, Bargaon, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nkhali	
118.	05-Aug-2024	Md. Rayhan (18) <i>Address:</i> Sonaimuri Pourashava, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nkhali	
119.	05-Aug-2024	Yasir Arafat (14) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 5, Sonaimuri Pourashava, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nkhali	
120.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Humayun Kabir Enayetpur Police Station, Sirajganj District <i>Address:</i> Ramnagar, Faridpur, Pabna		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
121.	05-Aug-2024	Monirul Islam Shahin <i>Address:</i> Chandapara, Madanpura, Bauphal, Patuakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mshinp	
122.	05-Aug-2024	Alomgir Hossain (16) S/O: Sattar Sardar <i>Address:</i> Hijalia, Kurikahnia, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/algrhs	
123.	05-Aug-2024	Adam Ali (23) S/O: Nur Hakim Ghorami <i>Address:</i> Kalyanpur, Kurikahnia, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhrr	
124.	05-Aug-2024	Anaj Ali (18) <i>Address:</i> Kurikahnia, Kurikahnia, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhrr	
125.	05-Aug-2024	Hafez Anaj Billah (21) S/O: Warez Ali Morol <i>Address:</i> Kurikahnia, Kurikahnia, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhrr	
126.	05-Aug-2024	Sheikh Ashikur Rahman (33) S/O: Late. Sheikh Ariful Islam <i>Address:</i> Kalyanpur, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhrr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
127.	05-Aug-2024	Sajib Hossain (22) S/O: Sheikh Azuar Rahman <i>Address:</i> Laskari Khajra, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhr	
128.	05-Aug-2024	Shahin Alam (22) S/O: Sirajul Islam <i>Address:</i> Laskari Khajra, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhr	
129.	05-Aug-2024	Sheikh Jahangir Hossain (48) S/O: Late. Sheikh Shujat Ali <i>Address:</i> Nakna, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhr	
130.	05-Aug-2024	Sheikh Shaker Ali (22) S/O: Sheikh Shahazur Rahman Saju <i>Address:</i> Nakna, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhr	
131.	05-Aug-2024	Sheikh Zakir Hossain (53) S/O: Late. Aminur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Nakna, Pratapnagar, Ashashuni, Satkhira		tinyurl.com/satkhr	
132.	05-Aug-2024	Asafur Rahman (40) S/O: Late. Rafel Sardar <i>Address:</i> Baikari, Boikari, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
133.	05-Aug-2024	Saiful Islam (30) S/O: Late. Javed Ali <i>Address:</i> Mrigidanga, Boikari, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhir	
134.	05-Aug-2024	Touhid Islam (30) S/O: Tozammel Haque <i>Address:</i> Mrigidanga, Boikari, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/satkhir	
135.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Firoz Hossain Kadamtali Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Gopinathpur, Gopalganj Sadar, Gopalganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
136.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Rafiqul Islam SB, Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Kenapara, Ashulia, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
137.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Sohel Rana Dhaka District <i>Address:</i> Kirtipur, Naogaon Sadar, Naogaon	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
138.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Raju Ahmed Dhaka District <i>Address:</i> Chhanati, Tarail, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
139.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Sanjay Kumar Das Jatrabari Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Naharpur, Chapainawabganj Sadar, Chapainawabganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
140.	05-Aug-2024	Assistant Town Sub-Inspector Ali Hossain Chowdhury Kosba Police Station, Brahmanbaria District <i>Address:</i> Fotepur, Sudharam, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
141.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Mohammad Abdul Malek Gazipur Metropolitan Police <i>Address:</i> Barahi Diyara, Manikganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
142.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Abdul Mazid Jatrabari Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Depra Hajipara, Nilphamari Sadar, Nilphamari		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
143.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Abu Hasnat Rony Welfare & Force Division, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Tengria, Haripur, Thakurgaon		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
144.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Mahfuzur Rahman POM, West, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Tilakpur, Akkelpur, Joypurhat		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	












SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
145.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Rezaul Karim Jatrabari Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Sardhankuti, Gabtali, Bogura		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
146.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Shahidul Alam Traffic North Division, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> 78 Mahakhali, Banani, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
147.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Sujon Mia POM, South, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Gopalpur, Mithamain, Kishoreganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
148.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Mir Montaz Ali Kadamtali Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Mohammad Alipur, Debhata, Satkhira		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
149.	05-Aug-2024	Constable Mohammad Ibrahim Sonaimuri Police Station, Noakhali District <i>Address:</i> Paschim Alinagar, Jorarganj, Chattagram	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
150.	05-Aug-2024	Constable/684 Mainuddin Liton Titas Police Station, Cumilla District <i>Address:</i> Joykrishnapur, Begumganj, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bdpolc	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
151.	05-Aug-2024	Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Rashedul Islam DB North, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Naogoan, Tarash, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
152.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Khagendra Chandra Sarkar Uttara East Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Binnati, Kishoreganj Sadar, Kishoreganj		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
153.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-inspector (Unarmed) Md. Bachir Uddin Sonaimuri Police Station, Noakhali District <i>Address:</i> NHB 1/1, Mirpur 14, Dhaka-1216		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
154.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Md. Mamunur Rashid Sarker Kochua Police Station, Chandpur District <i>Address:</i> Abdullahpur, Debidwar, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
155.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Rezaul Karim Titas Police Station, Cumilla District <i>Address:</i> Sachiakhali, Faridganj, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
156.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Shree Sujan Chandra Dey Jatrabari Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Chhotomanika, Borhanuddin, Bhola		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	













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157.	05-Aug-2024	Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Santosh Chowdhury Baniachong Police Station <i>Address:</i> Purba Sreemangal, Sreemangal, Moulvibazar		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
158.	06-Aug-2024	Mizanur Rahman Mizan (30) S/O: Mojaffar Ali <i>Address:</i> Bhabanipur, Bhabanipur, Sherpur, Bogura		tinyurl.com/vpmiza	
159.	06-Aug-2024	Golam Faruk Joarder (57) <i>Address:</i> Sarishadanga, Mominpur, Chuadanga Sadar, Chuadanga		tinyurl.com/joargf	
160.	06-Aug-2024	Badsha Mia Prokash (Kana Badsha) (40) S/O: Abul Khayer <i>Address:</i> Modhuyai, Baligaon, Feni Sadar, Feni		tinyurl.com/bdskna	
161.	06-Aug-2024	Mushfiqur Rahman Mishu (35) <i>Address:</i> Dhalia, Feni Sadar, Feni		tinyurl.com/bdskna	
162.	06-Aug-2024	Haji Peyar Ahmed (50) S/O: Late. Abul Khayer <i>Address:</i> Uttar Jahanpur, Sharshadi, Feni Sadar, Feni	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hjipyf	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
163.	06-Aug-2024	Shahidul Islam <i>Address:</i> Kawkhali, Rangamati	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/shdlrm	
164.	07-Aug-2024	Mehedi Hasan Robin (35) C/O: Ramzan Ali <i>Address:</i> Bou Bazar, Natore Sadar, Natore		tinyurl.com/ntrrbn	
165.	07-Aug-2024	Al Amin (37) S/O: Late. Bhulu Mia <i>Address:</i> Char Dhunat, Dhunat Pourashava, Dhunat, Bogura		tinyurl.com/amnbgr	
166.	07-Aug-2024	Sanowar Hossain (35) S/O: Bahar Ali <i>Address:</i> Dahapara, Shibganj, Chapainawabganj		tinyurl.com/srwrcg	
167.	07-Aug-2024	Mahbub Alom (25) S/O: Monu Mia <i>Address:</i> Lalpur, Titas, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/mhbbam	
168.	07-Aug-2024	Zahirullah (50) S/O: Sahu Mia <i>Address:</i> Mendipur, Bhairab, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zhrlla	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
169.	08-Aug-2024	Faruk Molla (45) S/O: Abdul Hai Molla <i>Address:</i> Gani Mollar Kandi, Char Kumaria, Bhedarganj, Shariatpur		tinyurl.com/frkmla	
170.	09-Aug-2024	Md. Sayeed (32) S/O: Late. Sekander Ali <i>Address:</i> Bahir Tengra, Demra, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/syddmr	
171.	09-Aug-2024	Alom Hossain (35) S/O: Akber Ali <i>Address:</i> Taranagar, Bagoan, Mujibnagar, Meherpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/almmhr	
172.	09-Aug-2024	Md. Sirajul Islam Sana (50) <i>Address:</i> Keola, Panchgaon, Rajnagar, Moulvibazar		tinyurl.com/snamlv	
173.	11-Aug-2024	Shuvo Meraj (20) S/O: Sabbir <i>Address:</i> Balubari, Dinajpur		tinyurl.com/twodnj	
174.	11-Aug-2024	Tarek (17) S/O: Juwel <i>Address:</i> Upashohor No. 4, Dinajpur		tinyurl.com/twodnj	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
175.	13-Aug-2024	Rasif Akon (25) S/O: Yunus Akon <i>Address:</i> Chopkhali, Betagi, Barguna	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rsfakn	
176.	13-Aug-2024	Babor Ali (50) S/O: Late. Romzan Ali <i>Address:</i> Chak Akashtara, Bogura Pourashava, Bogura Sadar, Bogura		tinyurl.com/bbrbgr	
177.	13-Aug-2024	Bacchu Khan (48) S/O: Abdul Motin Khan <i>Address:</i> Nayani Lakkhipur, Algi Uttar, Haimchar, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/bcucdp	
178.	13-Aug-2024	Unknown (35) <i>Address:</i> Tongi, Gazipur		tinyurl.com/tngitw	
179.	13-Aug-2024	Unknown (35) <i>Address:</i> Tongi, Gazipur		tinyurl.com/tngitw	
180.	13-Aug-2024	Sujan Sarkar (42) S/O: Late. Haridas <i>Address:</i> Brahmankhali, Rupganj, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sjnsrk	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
181.	13-Aug-2024	Uzir Ali (30) S/O: Khorshed Madar <i>Address:</i> Kalinagar, Chamari, Singra, Natore	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/uzrali	
182.	14-Aug-2024	Sumon Halder (30) S/O: Nogen Halder <i>Address:</i> Baherghat, Jalla, Wazirpur, Barishal	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/smhldr	
183.	14-Aug-2024	Saidul Islam Yasin (19) <i>Address:</i> Dhalpur Bowbazar, Jatrabari, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sdlysn	
184.	14-Aug-2024	Md. Samad (60) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 3, Bandura, Nawabganj, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/samadm	
185.	14-Aug-2024	Alamin Bhuiyan (42) S/O: Late. Shamsuddin <i>Address:</i> AKM Shaha Lane, Wari, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/almnbn	
186.	14-Aug-2024	Nurul Amin (35) S/O: Late. Shamsuddin <i>Address:</i> AKM Shaha Lane, Wari, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/gptnuu	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
187.	14-Aug-2024	Rahat Hossain (Bipu) (53) S/O: Abdul Hakim <i>Address:</i> Munshiganj Sadar, Munshiganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/gptnuu	
188.	14-Aug-2024	Saif Arafat Sharif (20) S/O: Kabir Hossain <i>Address:</i> Kadamirchar, Araihasar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/syfarf	
189.	14-Aug-2024	Shahadot Hossain (24) S/O: Mohammad Harun <i>Address:</i> Nadona, Panchbaria, Sonaimuri, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/shdtnk	
190.	14-Aug-2024	Md. Moniruzzaman Lilu (50) S/O: Late. Arju Mia <i>Address:</i> Naodhar, Rampasha, Bishwanath, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/mluslt	
191.	14-Aug-2024	Constable Md. Khalilur Rahman Shyampur Police Station, DMP Dhaka <i>Address:</i> Taltola, Ghatail, Tangail		tinyurl.com/bdpolc	
192.	16-Aug-2024	Rashed Sikder (24) S/O: Abul Kalam Sikder <i>Address:</i> Bara Dulali, Barthi, Gournadi, Barishal		tinyurl.com/rsdskr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
193.	17-Aug-2024	Sajjad Hossain (21) S/O: Mohammad Alom <i>Address:</i> Maddhom Kalatali, Cox's Bazar Sadar, Cox's Bazar		tinyurl.com/sjdhsn	
194.	19-Aug-2024	Motieur Rahman (68) <i>Address:</i> Jitarpur, Dogachi, Joypurhat Sadar, Joypurhat		tinyurl.com/jyprmr	
195.	20-Aug-2024	Mojibur (50) <i>Address:</i> Dhusar, Utholi, Shibaloy, Manikganj		tinyurl.com/mjbrmj	
196.	25-Aug-2024	Idris Hawlader (40) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 2, Satla, Wazirpur, Barishal		tinyurl.com/idrsbs	
197.	25-Aug-2024	Sagor Hawlader (28) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 2, Satla, Wazirpur, Barishal		tinyurl.com/idrsbs	
198.	25-Aug-2024	Nasir Sheikh (45) S/O: Samad Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Malamat, Malkhanagar, Sirajdikhan, Munshiganj		tinyurl.com/shknsr	













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199. - 380.	25-Aug-2024	<p>On August 25, 2024, a group of organized miscreants launched a violent attack on the Gazi Tire Factory, operated by the Gazi Group, in Rupganj, Narayanganj. The assailants set fire to the facility. The resulting blaze led to numerous casualties, with many reported dead or injured.</p> <p>In response, the Narayanganj district administration formed an investigation committee, which has compiled a list of 182 individuals who remain missing/death.</p>		<p>tinyurl.com/gjityr</p> <p>tinyurl.com/tyrgji</p>	 
381.	28-Aug-2024	<p>Zayed Mia (28) S/O: Mirzan Mia</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Balichiri, Sadar Union, Kulaura, Moulvibazar</p>	 <p>Photo Not Found</p>	tinyurl.com/zydmia	
382.	28-Aug-2024	<p>Abdul Mannan (27) S/O: Kabir Ahmed</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Dakbanglo Puranbosti, Betbunia, Kawkhali, Rangamati</p>		tinyurl.com/mmnanr	
383.	30-Aug-2024	<p>Rakib Hasan (25) S/O: Late. Samsul Haque</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Porishesh Purbapara, Malancha, Kahalu, Bogura</p>	 <p>Photo Not Found</p>	tinyurl.com/rkbhsn	
384.	30-Aug-2024	<p>M. A. Momin Patwary (54)</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Noagoan, Ramganj, Lakshmpur</p>		tinyurl.com/mmnpry	


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385.	31-Aug-2024	Md. Ahsan Ali (54) <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 3, Lakkhirchar, Jamalpur Sadar, Jamalpur		tinyurl.com/ahsnal	
386.	31-Aug-2024	Lizon Molla (30) S/O: Alomgir Molla <i>Address:</i> Basail, Basail Pourashava, Basail, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/lznrs	
387.	01-Sep-2024	Md. Rofik (44) S/O: Late. Tajul Islam <i>Address:</i> Kazir Taluk, Saherkhali, Mirsarai, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/rfketg	
388.	03-Sep-2024	Md. Belal Uddin (45) S/O: Abdul Malek <i>Address:</i> Purba Birbiri, Jahajmara, Hatia, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/bludn	
389.	03-Sep-2024	Aynul Islam (33) S/O: Mohir Uddin <i>Address:</i> Majhipara, Tentulia, Chiribandar, Dinajpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ayndnj	
390.	04-Sep-2024	Siraj Hawlader (40) S/O: Jamal Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 7, Jogipal, Khanjahan Ali, Khulna		tinyurl.com/srjhld	









SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
391.	05-Sep-2024	Unknown (25) <i>Address:</i> Chandana, Bason, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/unkngp	
392.	05-Sep-2024	Palton (35) S/O: Late. Saidul Islam Mia <i>Address:</i> Dari Sonakanda, Bandar, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/plltnn	
393.	05-Sep-2024	Taleb Mia (28) <i>Address:</i> Purbapara, Dhubria, Nagarpur, Tangail	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/tlbtgg	
394.	06-Sep-2024	Abdul Hai (62) S/O: Late. Fakir Mahmud <i>Address:</i> Madhya Dhangara, Dhangara, Rayganj, Sirajganj			
395.	07-Sep-2024	Abdullah Al Masud (31) S/O: Rafiqul Islam <i>Address:</i> Khaserhat Madrashapara, Shibganj, Chapainababganj		tinyurl.com/bslmsd	
396.	07-Sep-2024	Abdul Jalil (75) S/O: Huzur Munshi <i>Address:</i> Ballabhpur Bhasani Bazar, Nageshwari Pourashava, Nageshwari, Kurigram	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ajllkg	











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397.	10-Sep-2024	Sanowar Hossain Ledo (40) S/O: Bulu Mia <i>Address:</i> Gokul Uttarpara, Bogura Sadar, Bogura		tinyurl.com/bgledo	
398.	11-Sep-2024	Billal Gazi (83) S/O: Late. Shohor Ali Gazi <i>Address:</i> Lakkhikhula, Paikgachha, Khulna		tinyurl.com/bllgji	
399.	12-Sep-2024	Rashed Sheikh (37) S/O: Mithu Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Bhalaipur, Maheshpur, Jhenaidah		tinyurl.com/rsdshk	
400.	13-Sep-2024	Md. Kausar (30) <i>Address:</i> Mahichail Dakkhin Para, Mahichail, Chandina, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/kausrc	
401.	14-Sep-2024	Muktar Mia <i>Address:</i> Talebpur, Manikganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mktrmg	
402.	15-Sep-2024	Md. Jibon Islam (23) S/O: Rostam Ali Mistri <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 2 Fishery, Birganj Pourashava, Birganj, Dinajpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jbnisl	


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403.	16-Sep-2024	Razzak Khan (30) S/O: Shahjahan Khan <i>Address:</i> Dhapor, Nalchity, Jhalakathi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rzkjkt	
404.	18-Sep-2024	Tofazzal Hossain (30) S/O: Late. Abdur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Taluker Charduyani, Kanthaltali, Patharghata, Barguna		tinyurl.com/tfzhsn	
405.	18-Sep-2024	Asir Ali Pramanik (40) <i>Address:</i> Mahipur, Garidaha, Sherpur, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/asralp	
406.	18-Sep-2024	Shamim Ahmed (Shamim Molla) (38) S/O: Iaj Uddin Molla <i>Address:</i> Kathgora Mollabari, Ashulia, Savar, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/smmjnu	
407.	18-Sep-2024	Md. Mamun (30) S/O: Late. Nur Nabi <i>Address:</i> Maddho Shalbagan, Khagrachari	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kgramn	
408.	21-Sep-2024	Nazmul Hossain Molla (32) S/O: Ahmmmed Molla <i>Address:</i> Garakhola, Madhukhali, Faridpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/fpurnz	













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409.	21-Sep-2024	Hasan Ali (23) S/O: Abdul Latif <i>Address:</i> Puthia, Purnimaganti, Ullapara, Sirajganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hsnulp	
410.	22-Sep-2024	Nur Islam (50) S/O: Abdul Karim <i>Address:</i> Rayer Char, Keraniganj, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nrismk	
411.	22-Sep-2024	Nur Alom (Nuru Tailor) (50) <i>Address:</i> Panchpara, Chandraganj, Lakshmipur Sadar, Lakshmipur		tinyurl.com/nrutil	
412.	26-Sep-2024	Md. Israfil (24) S/O: Md. Nasir <i>Address:</i> Bansbari, Gazipur, Sreepur, Gazipur		tinyurl.com/isrflg	
413.	27-Sep-2024	Tohidul Islam (35) S/O: Late. Meherab Ali <i>Address:</i> Sahebganj Kaugaon Hatkhola, Dinajpur Sadar, Dinajpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/thldi	
414.	28-Sep-2024	Md. Abdus Shahid (43) S/O: Momin Ullah Munsif <i>Address:</i> Char Matua, Char Matua, Noakhali Sadar, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/adsshhd	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
415.	28-Sep-2024	<p>Rasel Sardar (38) S/O: Ishak Sardar <i>Address:</i> Bhanga Bridge, Islampur, Damudya, Shariatpur</p>		tinyurl.com/rslsrt	
416.	30-Sep-2024	<p>Fakhar Uddin (38) S/O: Late. Roiyob Ali <i>Address:</i> Nurupara, Ranakeli, Golapganj, Sylhet</p>		tinyurl.com/fkhrsl	
417.	01-Oct-2024	<p>Md. Nazrul Islam Dhali (58) S/O: Late. Rustam Ali Dhali <i>Address:</i> Beluti, Khadergaon, Matlab Dakkhin, Chandpur</p>		tinyurl.com/dhalinz	
418.	01-Oct-2024	<p>Sujon Mia (24) S/O: Kabir Hossain <i>Address:</i> Muradnagar, Cumilla</p>		tinyurl.com/sjncml	
419.	01-Oct-2024	<p>Hanif Mia (35) S/O: Kalam Mia <i>Address:</i> Chouala, Narsingdi Pourashava, Narsingdi Sadar, Narsingdi</p>		tinyurl.com/hnfnrs	
420.	01-Oct-2024	<p>Abul Hasnat Muhammad Sohel Rana <i>Address:</i> Tangail</p>		tinyurl.com/ahmsrt	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
421.	03-Oct-2024	Abdul Motin (55) S/O: Late. Abdus Samad <i>Address:</i> Madhupur Bazar, Alampur, Khetlal, Joypurhat		tinyurl.com/jprmtn	
422.	04-Oct-2024	Zafar Ali Khan (45) S/O: Munsur Ali Khan <i>Address:</i> Uttar Charail, Aorabunia, Kanthalia, Jhalakathi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zfrkhn	
423.	06-Oct-2024	Abdul Karim Dhali Tunu (70) S/O: Late. Joynal Dhali <i>Address:</i> Rampal, Munshiganj Sadar, Munshiganj		tinyurl.com/akdtmg	
424.	10-Oct-2024	Mizanur Rahman Mizu (30) S/O: Torikul Islam <i>Address:</i> Shimultala Baluchar, Baliadanga, Chapainawabganj Sadar, Chapainawabganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rznrnz	
425.	11-Oct-2024	Md. Rakib Hossain (29) S/O: Abul Bashar <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Alonia, Chardukhia Purba, Faridganj, Chandpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rkbcdp	
426.	13-Oct-2024	Md. Sohan (17) S/O: Salam Molla <i>Address:</i> Salehnagar, Bandar, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/shnngj	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
427.	16-Oct-2024	Sabbir Hossain (18) S/O: Zakir Hossain <i>Address:</i> Aliabad, Nabinagar, Brahmanbaria	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/brhsbr	
428.	16-Oct-2024	Shahriar Ashik (20) S/O: Osman Goni <i>Address:</i> Naria, Shariatpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/shrask	
429.	18-Oct-2024	Md. Firoz Khan (35) S/O: Late. Kamal Uddin <i>Address:</i> Kolabaria, Baroiyardhala, Sitakunda, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/frzshr	
430.	18-Oct-2024	Md. Nazmul (24) S/O: Ali Bepari <i>Address:</i> Baro Ikrashi Paschimpara, Raipara, Dohar, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/nzmdhr	
431.	20-Oct-2024	Sirajul Islam (65) S/O: Late. Nurul Islam <i>Address:</i> Muchapur, Bandar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/srjngj	
432.	24-Oct-2024	Hafez Amir Hossain Khan (42) <i>Address:</i> Kazirkhal, Taltoli, Barguna	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hfzamr	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
433.	24-Oct-2024	Aynal Islam (35) S/O: Late. Nuru Mia <i>Address:</i> Dhalarpara, Durgapur, Mithapukur, Rangpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpanlo	
434.	26-Oct-2024	Jahangir Alam (25) S/O: Abdul Malek <i>Address:</i> Kedarnagar, Alamdanga, Chuadanga	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jhncdg	
435.	26-Oct-2024	Md. Mim Hosen (25) S/O: Abdul Momin <i>Address:</i> Ramchandrapur, Rajshahi City Corporation, Rajshahi		tinyurl.com/rajmim	
436.	27-Oct-2024	Md. Nazmul Molla (35) S/O: Abdus Kuddus Molla <i>Address:</i> Tegaria, Gopalganj Sadar, Gopalganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/gpjnzm	
437.	29-Oct-2024	Polash Sheikh (36) S/O: Afzal Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Chandrapara, Kachua, Bagerhat		tinyurl.com/plsshk	
438.	29-Oct-2024	Anisur Rahman (55) S/O: Late. Abdul Jalil <i>Address:</i> Jagannathpur, Singhajhuli, Chaugachha, Jashore		tinyurl.com/ansrjs	













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439.	29-Oct-2024	Abdul Mannan S/O: Late. Amin Uddin <i>Address:</i> Indira, Agardari, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira		tinyurl.com/abdlst	
440.	30-Oct-2024	Nurnabi (30) S/O: Md. Jalal Uddin <i>Address:</i> Aladipur, Shibganj, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bgnrnb	
441.	30-Oct-2024	Dulal Mia (30) S/O: Md. Jahurul Islam <i>Address:</i> Purba Jahangirabad, Shibganj, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bgnrnb	
442.	30-Oct-2024	Alomgir (25) S/O: Habibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Dargapur Kamarpara, Bholahat, Chapainawabganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/gralom	
443.	30-Oct-2024	Yeakub (22) S/O: Habibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Dargapur Kamarpara, Bholahat, Chapainawabganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/gralom	
444.	30-Oct-2024	Md. Noyon Ahmed (Ramzan) (35) <i>Address:</i> Sabujbag, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sjnynr	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
445.	30-Oct-2024	Hamidul Islam (50) S/O: Ramzan Ali <i>Address:</i> Chatarpara, Aria, Daulatpur, Kushtia		tinyurl.com/kuhtwo	
446.	30-Oct-2024	Nazrul Islam (45) S/O: Ramzan Ali <i>Address:</i> Chatarpara, Aria, Daulatpur, Kushtia		tinyurl.com/kuhtwo	
447.	30-Oct-2024	Jannatul Sheikh (30) S/O: Hafizur Rahman Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Telgara, Lohagara, Narail	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bgnrnb	
448.	31-Oct-2024	Md. Kayum (40) S/O: Ramiz Mia <i>Address:</i> Moutupi, Sadekpur, Bhairab, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kymkgj	
449.	01-Nov-2024	Kamrul Islam (40) S/O: Late. Abu Bakor Gazi <i>Address:</i> Khalishakhali, Debhata, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kdskrl	
450.	02-Nov-2024	Abu Sayed (70) S/O: Momin Ullah <i>Address:</i> Hakimpur, Dadpur, Noakhali Sadar, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/absydn	













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451.	05-Nov-2024	<p>Sheikh Arifuzzaman Rupom (34) S/O: Sheikh Kamal Uddin Bacchu</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Anjuman Masjid Road, Daulatpur, Khulna City Corporation, Khulna</p>		tinyurl.com/rpmkcc	
452.	07-Nov-2024	<p>Saidur Rahman Babu (45) S/O: Abdul Motin Master</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Darappur, Lkhipur Kholabaria, Natore Sadar, Natore</p>		tinyurl.com/srbbun	
453.	10-Nov-2024	<p>Ashraf Uddin (60) S/O: Late. Delowar Mal</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Guatola, Shibchar Pourashava, Shibchar, Madaripur</p>	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/asrfmp	
454.	11-Nov-2024	<p>Unknown (25)</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Gaurnadi, Barishal</p>	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/unkn gb	
455.	11-Nov-2024	<p>Osman Goni (20) S/O: Mohammad Harun</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Ranju Baper Bari, Saral, Banshkhali, Chattogram</p>		tinyurl.com/ossctg	
456.	12-Nov-2024	<p>Tanvir Sheikh (20) S/O: Babu Sheikh</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Binodpur, Rajbari Pourashava, Rajbari Sadar, Rajbari</p>		tinyurl.com/tnvrfp	













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457.	14-Nov-2024	Emran Hossain Rifat (19) S/O: Ismail Hossain <i>Address:</i> Ketranga, Box Mahmud, Parshuram, Feni		tinyurl.com/rmnrhr	
458.	16-Nov-2024	Mir Yusuf (70) S/O: Late. Farid Kerani <i>Address:</i> Joramotol, Sonaichari, Sitakunda, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/mrsfsc	
459.	16-Nov-2024	Hasanur Rahman (29) S/O: Late. Ashraf Ali <i>Address:</i> Mirzarkot, Patgram Pourashava, Patgram, Lalmonirhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hsnrpl	
460.	16-Nov-2024	Fazlur Rahman (40) S/O: Moktar Uddin <i>Address:</i> Mantola, Khidirpur, Manohardi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/fzlrnr	
461.	18-Nov-2024	Walif Hossain Manik (35) S/O: Yunus Ali <i>Address:</i> Ruppur, Pakshi, Ishwardi, Pabna		tinyurl.com/wlfhmn	
462.	20-Nov-2024	Babu (Choto Babu) (55) <i>Address:</i> Naluapara, Ward No. 18, Narayanganj City Corporation, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/bbuncc	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
463.	21-Nov-2024	Raju Mia (55) S/O: Bador Ali <i>Address:</i> Hapterhaor, Gazipur, Chunarughat, Habiganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rjuhbg	
464.	24-Nov-2024	Alal Mia (45) S/O: Sonafar Ali <i>Address:</i> Gotatkar, Moglabazar, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/allsynt	
465.	25-Nov-2024	Md. Delowar Hossain (45) S/O: Late. Ahmad Hossain <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Charati Ali Chanpara, Charoti, Satkania, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/mdlwrh	
466.	25-Nov-2024	Bilal Ahmad Munshi (35) S/O: Jahurul Islam <i>Address:</i> Khadim Bahor, Ward No. 34, Sylhet City Corporation, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/bllami	
467.	26-Nov-2024	Kamal Hossain Chowkidar (45) S/O: Late. Md. Rustam Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Charakgachia, Sapleza, Mathbaria, Pirojpur		tinyurl.com/aluddn	
468.	27-Nov-2024	Alauddin (45) S/O: Hayder Ali <i>Address:</i> Udaypur, Kalai, Joypurhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/uddnal	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
469.	01-Dec-2024	Nadim (33) S/O: Barek Mia <i>Address:</i> Sanarpar Nimaikashari, Siddhirganj, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/sdrndm	
470.	05-Dec-2024	Arina Begum (45) Husband: Abul Kalam Azad <i>Address:</i> Kaliaganj, Kajaldighi Kaliaganj, Boda, Panchagarh		tinyurl.com/arnbgm	
471.	06-Dec-2024	Montaz Ali (45) S/O: Late. Muhammad Ali <i>Address:</i> Sribari, Narundi, Jamalpur Sadar, Jamalpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mntzjp	
472.	07-Dec-2024	Fulesha Begum Kuti (60) Husband: Md. Giash Uddin <i>Address:</i> Mostafapur, Mostafapur, Moulvibazar Sadar, Moulvibazar		tinyurl.com/twomlv	
473.	07-Dec-2024	Meherunnesa (65) Husband: Baboul Islam <i>Address:</i> Mostafapur, Mostafapur, Moulvibazar Sadar, Moulvibazar		tinyurl.com/twomlv	
474.	11-Dec-2024	Haydar Molla (55) <i>Address:</i> Char Nashipur, Ambikapur, Faridpur Sadar, Faridpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hydrml	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
475.	14-Dec-2024	Shahjahan Mia (40) S/O: Charu Mia <i>Address:</i> Chatalpar, Nasirnagar, Brahmanbaria	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/twoksg	
476.	14-Dec-2024	Nasir Uddin (28) S/O: Hiru Mia <i>Address:</i> Kagzi, Austagram, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/twoksg	
477.	15-Dec-2024	Kamrul Hasan (27) S/O: Mainuddin Patwari (Humayun Kabir Jahangir) <i>Address:</i> Haimchar, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/hcpkrl	
478.	15-Dec-2024	Unknown (30) <i>Address:</i> Gulistan, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/glstan	
479.	17-Dec-2024	Rayhan (15) S/O: Abdur Rahim <i>Address:</i> Fatepur, Nachole, Chapainababganj		tinyurl.com/ryhnnc	
480.	17-Dec-2024	Md. Masud Rana (22) S/O: Ezabul Haque <i>Address:</i> Kholshi, Fatepur, Nachole, Chapainababganj		tinyurl.com/ryhnnc	













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481.	20-Dec-2024	Ahmed Siyam (18) S/O: Abdul Halim Mia <i>Address:</i> Pilkuni, Kutubpur, Fatullah, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/symftl	
482.	21-Dec-2024	Abul Kalam (26) S/O: Late. Abul Kashem <i>Address:</i> Masdoi, Mirzapur, Tangail		tinyurl.com/ablklm	
483.	23-Dec-2024	Md. Obayed Ullah (43) <i>Address:</i> Balukhali, Raikhali, Kaptai, Rangamati		tinyurl.com/obyedu	
484.	24-Dec-2024	Pavel Mia (30) S/O: Idris Ali <i>Address:</i> Krishnanagar, Kanchan Pourashava, Rupganj, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/pvlmia	
485.	25-Dec-2024	Helal Mia (32) S/O: Late. Shafiqur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Ghoshgram, Doubari, Gowainghat, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/hllgow	
486.	26-Dec-2024	Shehab Ali (45) S/O: Janki Bepari <i>Address:</i> Jigatola, Kulkandi, Islampur, Jamalpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/shbjml	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
487.	26-Dec-2024	Billal (45) <i>Address:</i> Haijadi, Araihasar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bllhan	
488.	27-Dec-2024	Md. Rubel (30) S/O: Mohammad Ali <i>Address:</i> Chandraghona Bangram, Rangunia, Chattogram	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rblcbr	
489.	27-Dec-2024	Ashraful Alom (38) S/O: Aynal Haque <i>Address:</i> Kazirchar, Ulipur Pourashava, Ulipur, Kurigram		tinyurl.com/asrflk	
490.	28-Dec-2024	Mohammad Arafat (22) S/O: Jalal Ahmad <i>Address:</i> Putibunia, Palangkhal, Ukhiya, Cox's Bazar		tinyurl.com/mhdarf	
491.	28-Dec-2024	Ziauddin Polash (45) S/O: Shahid Ibrahim Hossain Sardar <i>Address:</i> Noapara, Noapara Pourashava, Noapara, Jashore		tinyurl.com/audnjs	
492.	29-Dec-2024	Md. Millat Chowdhury (31) S/O: Late. Abdul Alim (Babul Chowdhury) <i>Address:</i> Gerda, Faridpur Sadar, Faridpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mltfr	













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493.	30-Dec-2024	Ajit Sutradhar (50) S/O: Late. Ananda Sutradhar <i>Address:</i> Nagar, Ajmiriganj Pourashava, Ajmiriganj, Habiganj		tinyurl.com/ajthbg	
494.	01-Jan-2025	Mukul Sheikh (37) S/O: Dulal Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Chelachapri, Shahjadpur, Sirajganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mklsra	
495.	04-Jan-2025	Mokbul Hossain (Mukul) (45) S/O: Kabil Member <i>Address:</i> Jokardia, Araihasar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mkhmng	
496.	05-Jan-2025	Rasel Sheikh (38) S/O: Aziz Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Chandrapara, Kachua, Bagerhat	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rslngr	
497.	06-Jan-2025	Abul Kalam (40) S/O: Sanaulla Patwari <i>Address:</i> Kanchanpur, Raipur, Lakshmipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/aklmlp	
498.	08-Jan-2025	Azim Uddin Sarkar (54) S/O: Late. Moslem Uddin Sarkar <i>Address:</i> Puthia, Shahjadpur, Sirajganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ausulp	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
499.	09-Jan-2025	Shahriar Sachib Razib (Pondit Razib) (47) <i>Address:</i> Gorshtan Road Kachemabad, Ward No. 21, Barishal City Corporation, Barishal		tinyurl.com/pndtrz	
500.	10-Jan-2025	Yusuf Bepari (57) S/O: Piyar Ali <i>Address:</i> Chakmirpur Mandarta, Daulatpur, Manikganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ysfbpr	
501.	15-Jan-2025	Kawsar Loskar (55) S/O: Lutfar Laskar <i>Address:</i> Chandpara, Chandpara, Kotchandpur, Jhenaidah		tinyurl.com/ksrlsk	
502.	16-Jan-2025	Md. Enamul Haque (35) S/O: Late. Gias Uddin <i>Address:</i> Tilshunia, Chandpur, Kapasia, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/enmlkg	
503.	16-Jan-2025	Sanowar Hossain (37) S/O: Hasmot Ali <i>Address:</i> Bhatrabari, Golabari, Madhupur, Tangail		tinyurl.com/tglsan	
504.	17-Jan-2025	Abdul Jobbar (70) S/O: Late. Khejur Uddin <i>Address:</i> Nashratpur, Boali, Gaibandha Sadar, Gaibandha		tinyurl.com/jbbrgg	

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505.	18-Jan-2025	Milon Mia (50) S/O: Late. Noab Ali <i>Address:</i> Radhanagar, Araihasar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mlngar	
506.	19-Jan-2025	Abdul Mannan (45) S/O: Late. Ain Uddin <i>Address:</i> Samaskhalsi, Naldanga, Natore		tinyurl.com/mnsntr	
507.	22-Jan-2025	Kazi Dipu (40) S/O: Abdul Motin <i>Address:</i> Kalni, Richi, Habiganj Sadar, Habiganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kzdpgh	
508.	22-Jan-2025	Md. Milon (36) <i>Address:</i> Atigram, Narayanganj City Corporation, Siddhirganj, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mlcngp	
509.	22-Jan-2025	Rubel Islam (32) S/O: Khalilur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Gogar Patuapara, Pirganj, Rangpur		tinyurl.com/rlgppr	
510.	24-Jan-2025	Md. Miran Kha (35) S/O: Jalal Khan <i>Address:</i> Godadhar Dangi Gucchagram, Aliabad, Faridpur Sadar, Faridpur		tinyurl.com/mrngias	













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511.	26-Jan-2025	<p>Selim Shah (50) S/O: Late. Doulat Shah</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Pasharibunia, Dhaowa, Bhandaria, Pirojpur</p>	 <p>Photo Not Found</p>	tinyurl.com/slmprj	
512.	27-Jan-2025	<p>Md. Sujon Hawlader (30) S/O: Nabi Ali Hawladar</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Dwipasha, Madanpura, Bauphal, Patuakhali</p>		tinyurl.com/sjnptk	
513.	30-Jan-2025	<p>Sheikh Sohel (Suhel) (32) S/O: Alauddin Sheikh</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Doulatdia, Goalanda, Rajbari</p>	 <p>Photo Not Found</p>	tinyurl.com/shlgrj	
514.	31-Jan-2025	<p>Abdul Lotif Dulu (70) S/O: Late. Tofat Sarkar</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Uttar Sarmara, Bogarchar, Bakshiganj, Jamalpur</p>	 <p>Photo Not Found</p>	tinyurl.com/ltdlj	
515.	01-Feb-2025	<p>Arafat Khan (22) S/O: Jalil Khan</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Badurgacha, Sharikkhali, Taltoli, Barguna</p>		tinyurl.com/rftbrg	
516.	01-Feb-2025	<p>Mohammad Shahid (40) S/O: Saiful Islam</p> <p><i>Address:</i> Kalapani, Fatikchari, Chattogram (Originally from Cumilla)</p>		tinyurl.com/lslshd	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
517.	02-Feb-2025	Muslim Uddin (45) S/O: Late. Moiz Uddin <i>Address:</i> Gomra, Nalkura, Jhenaigati, Sherpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jhpfjkd	
518.	03-Feb-2025	Amir Hossain (30) S/O: Nur Mohammad <i>Address:</i> Gomra, Nalkura, Jhenaigati, Sherpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/amrjhs	
519.	08-Feb-2025	Zahir Uddin Bechu (40) S/O: Late. Md. Mostafa <i>Address:</i> Uttar Lamchi, Sundalpur, Kabirhat, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/bechuz	
520.	11-Feb-2025	Moklesur Rahman (50) <i>Address:</i> Koilail Nayakanda, Nawabganj, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mtrcyl	
521.	12-Feb-2025	Ayesha Begum (55) Husband: Shofik <i>Address:</i> Buirarchar, Meghna, Cumilla	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/aysgum	
522.	13-Feb-2025	Amir Hossain (27) <i>Address:</i> Khasmahol, Borhanuddin, Bhola	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/Bhltwo	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
523.	13-Feb-2025	Md. Noyon (26) <i>Address:</i> Baliakandi, Tazumuddin, Bhola	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/Bhltwo	
524.	13-Feb-2025	Md. Abdullah Al-Mamun Mondal (30) S/O: Abdul Mannan <i>Address:</i> Khamarpara, Dhaperhat, Sadullapur, Gaibandha		tinyurl.com/mabmng	
525.	15-Feb-2025	Habibur Rahman Lemon Talukder (34) S/O: Golam Mostafa Talukder <i>Address:</i> Digharpar, Sherpur Pourashava, Sherpur Sadar, Sherpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hrlsps	
526.	16-Feb-2025	Md. Moiz Uddin (44) <i>Address:</i> Meghna, Cumilla	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/lakdaj	
527.	19-Feb-2025	Mohammad Hasan Rustam (40) S/O: Bozol Ahmad <i>Address:</i> Chowdhury Hat, Noapara, Raozan, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/mhmasd	
528.	25-Feb-2025	Unknown <i>Address:</i> Tongi, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/unktgr	












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529.	01-Mar-2025	Sek Pannu (42) <i>Address:</i> Sadarpur, Faridpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sekpan	
530.	01-Mar-2025	Soleman (41) <i>Address:</i> Charchanda Haji Saber Ali Beparikandi, Shibchar, Madaripur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/slmmmp	
531.	01-Mar-2025	Sajib Talukder (30) S/O: Harun Talukder <i>Address:</i> Kutubpur, Shibchar, Madaripur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sjbksm	
532.	01-Mar-2025	Salauddin Madbor (30) <i>Address:</i> Kutubpur, Shibchar, Madaripur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sludsm	
533.	01-Mar-2025	Ripon (40) S/O: Bacchu <i>Address:</i> Kalirchar, Munshiganj Sadar, Munshiganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpkmsm	
534.	01-Mar-2025	Ebadul Bepari (42) S/O: Rahmat Ali <i>Address:</i> Kanargaon, Naria, Shariatpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ebdlbp	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
535.	03-Mar-2025	Mohammad Salek (35) S/O: Abdur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Gurguri, Kanchana, Satkania, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/twoctg	
536.	03-Mar-2025	Mohammad Nezam Uddin (45) S/O: Mahmudul Haque <i>Address:</i> Maddhom Kanchana, Kanchana, Satkania, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/twoctg	
537.	08-Mar-2025	Ataur Sardar (35) S/O: Azibor Sardar <i>Address:</i> Khoajpur, Khoajpur, Madaripur Sadar, Madaripur		tinyurl.com/atrmsm	
538.	08-Mar-2025	Polash Sardar (17) S/O: Mujam Sardar <i>Address:</i> Khoajpur, Khoajpur, Madaripur Sadar, Madaripur		tinyurl.com/atrmsm	
539.	08-Mar-2025	Saiful Sardar (40) S/O: Azibor Sardar <i>Address:</i> Khoajpur, Khoajpur, Madaripur Sadar, Madaripur		tinyurl.com/atrmsm	
540.	10-Mar-2025	Amirul Islam (42) S/O: Lohai Pramanik <i>Address:</i> Khetupara, Khetupara, Santhia, Pabna		tinyurl.com/amrpab	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
541.	15-Mar-2025	Md. Sujan Hawlader (24) S/O: Monir Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Dhan Gobeshona Road, Barishal City Corporation, Kotwali, Barishal		tinyurl.com/sjnbcc	
542.	15-Mar-2025	Kobir (35) S/O: Mofizol Bepari <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Balia, Bhola Sadar, Bhola		tinyurl.com/kbrbla	
543.	17-Mar-2025	Mehedi Hasan (Rakib) (25) S/O: Mojibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Taloli, Niguari, Gafargaon, Mymensingh	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mhrkbn	
544.	20-Mar-2025	Zafar Hossain (55) S/O: Javed Ali <i>Address:</i> Jibannagarpara, Kazirber, Maheshpur, Jhenaidah	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zfrhsn	
545.	21-Mar-2025	Md. Robiul Hossain (36) S/O: Nurul Alam <i>Address:</i> Bayezid, Chattogram City Corporation, Chattogram	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rbulhs	
546.	21-Mar-2025	Asif Munshi (18) S/O: Zahir Munshi <i>Address:</i> Andharmanik, Harirampur, Manikganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/asmnsh	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
547.	21-Mar-2025	Amin (23) S/O: Khorshed Mia <i>Address:</i> Mohinipur, Chanpur, Raipura, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/amnbsr	
548.	21-Mar-2025	Bashar (35) S/O: Barek Haji <i>Address:</i> Mohinipur, Chanpur, Raipura, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/amnbsr	
549.	22-Mar-2025	Jobayer Hossain (35) S/O: Late. Mir Habibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Golambazar Masjidpara, Shubhadhya, Dakkhin Keraniganj, Dhaka		tinyurl.com/jbrkgj	
550.	22-Mar-2025	Liton (42) S/O: Abu Taher <i>Address:</i> Baligaon, Baligaon, Feni Sadar, Feni	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ltnfni	
551.	26-Mar-2025	Nurul Islam Talukder (70) S/O: Innal Amin Talukder <i>Address:</i> Mirerkhil, Sarafbhata, Rangunia, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/nrlctg	
552.	28-Mar-2025	Monir Molla (Abul Molla Aku) (40) S/O: Late. Khobir Uddin <i>Address:</i> Raypur Machpara, Sujanagar, Pabna		tinyurl.com/akumla	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
553.	29-Mar-2025	Zohir (35) <i>Address:</i> Gazaria, Munshiganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zhrgmj	
554.	30-Mar-2025	Shariful Dofadar (24) S/O: Hanif Dofadar <i>Address:</i> Palpara, Dhulkhola, Hijla, Barishal		tinyurl.com/srfdrf	
555.	30-Mar-2025	Riyad Hossain (34) <i>Address:</i> Pallabi, Mirpur, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rydpmd	
556.	30-Mar-2025	Joj Mia (65) S/O: Sulman Mia <i>Address:</i> Hemantaganj, Kewarjor, Mithamain, Kishoreganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jjmiak	
557.	31-Mar-2025	Raju Hossain (28) S/O: Sabuj Mia <i>Address:</i> Sabujer Goja, Charruhita, Lakshmipur Sadar, Lakshmipur		tinyurl.com/rjuhsn	
558.	31-Mar-2025	Heroic Freedom Fighter Akbar Hossain Sheikh (77) <i>Address:</i> Lahuria Paschimpara, Lahuria, Lohagara, Narail		tinyurl.com/hffahs	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
559.	31-Mar-2025	Rakib (25) S/O: Ashraf Uddin <i>Address:</i> Bhagdi, Ghorashal, Palash, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/rkbskb	
560.	31-Mar-2025	Sakib (20) S/O: Ashraf Uddin <i>Address:</i> Bhagdi, Ghorashal, Palash, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/rkbskb	
561.	04-Apr-2025	Kuddus Hawlader (45) S/O: Abdur Razzak Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Ranirhat Diarchar, Bakerganj, Barishal	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kdshal	
562.	04-Apr-2025	Abdur Razzak (35) <i>Address:</i> Goalbari, Atrai, Naogaon	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/adrrzq	
563.	04-Apr-2025	Aminul Islam (22) <i>Address:</i> Goalbari, Atrai, Naogaon		tinyurl.com/amnlan	
564.	06-Apr-2025	Adv. Sujan Mia (32) S/O: Md. Jahirul Islam <i>Address:</i> Hilalpur, Moulvibazar Pourashava, Moulvibazar Sadar, Moulvibazar		tinyurl.com/sjnadv	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
565.	07-Apr-2025	Nur Mohammad Tushar (25) S/O: Late. Mizanur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Manoharpur, Kachua, Chandpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/tsnrur	
566.	07-Apr-2025	Nurul Amin (60) <i>Address:</i> Torabganj, Kamalnagar, Lakshmipur		tinyurl.com/arakrl	
567.	08-Apr-2025	Kabil Uddin (34) S/O: Shahjahan Ali <i>Address:</i> Gosaibari Sthaniyopara, Kusumbi, Sherpur, Bogura	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kblbgr	
568.	09-Apr-2025	Md. Masud (29) S/O: Sonai Mia <i>Address:</i> Acharwala Ghat, Kamrangirchar, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/twodhk	
569.	09-Apr-2025	Nadim (35) S/O: Sultan <i>Address:</i> Shahidnagar, Lalbagh, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/twodhk	
570.	10-Apr-2025	Muslim Uddin (45) S/O: Abu Taher <i>Address:</i> Muradpur, Sitakunda, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/mslctg	










SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
571.	10-Apr-2025	Md. Surman Kha (43) S/O: Abdul Kalam <i>Address:</i> GK Colony, Kushtia Pourashava, Kushtia Sadar, Kushtia		tinyurl.com/srmnkh	
572.	11-Apr-2025	Alomgir Peda (42) S/O: Late. Monser Ali Peda <i>Address:</i> Paschim Sonakhali, Atharogachia, Amtali, Barguna	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/pdaalm	
573.	12-Apr-2025	Abdul Kader Milon (35) S/O: Md. Ismail <i>Address:</i> Char Hazari, Companiganj, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/akmlnn	
574.	13-Apr-2025	Abdul Gofur (50) <i>Address:</i> Naogaon Dakkhinpara, Naogaon, Phulbaria, Mymensingh		tinyurl.com/adlgfr	
575.	13-Apr-2025	Mehedi Hasan (15) S/O: Abdul Gofur <i>Address:</i> Naogaon Dakkhinpara, Naogaon, Phulbaria, Mymensingh		tinyurl.com/mhdhsn	
576.	15-Apr-2025	Nipun Saha (25) S/O: Krishna Saha <i>Address:</i> Bazar Para, Chuadanga Pourashava, Chuadanga Sadar, Chuadanga		tinyurl.com/npncdg	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
577.	15-Apr-2025	Tusher Ahmed Chowdhury (20) S/O: Adv. Sajed Ahmad Chowdhury <i>Address:</i> Raynagar, Ward No. 18, Sylhet City Corporation, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/tsrclt	
578.	16-Apr-2025	Faridul Alom (44) S/O: Dudu Mia <i>Address:</i> Dongra, Khankhanabad, Banskhali, Chattogram		tinyurl.com/frdlm	
579.	17-Apr-2025	Sagor Molla (25) S/O: Siraj Molla <i>Address:</i> Dumuria, Gournadi, Barishal		tinyurl.com/srgmla	
580.	17-Apr-2025	Abul Kashem (65) <i>Address:</i> Gunshing, Deuti, Sonaimuri, Noakhali	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ablksm	
581.	19-Apr-2025	Zahidul Islam Parvez (23) S/O: Jashim Uddin <i>Address:</i> Kaichan, Birunia, Bhaluka, Mymensingh		tinyurl.com/jhdlpz	
582.	20-Apr-2025	Md. Nozimullah (25) S/O: Late. Rahim Ullah <i>Address:</i> Ward No. 3, Teknaf Pourashava, Teknaf, Cox's Bazar	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/nzmula	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
583.	22-Apr-2025	Amir Hossain (30) S/O: Abdul Haque Mia <i>Address:</i> Alokbali, Alokbali, Narsingdi Sadar, Narsingdi		tinyurl.com/hsnamr	
584.	24-Apr-2025	Jony Mia (19) S/O: Joynal Mia <i>Address:</i> Nayahati, Bhairab Pourashava, Bhairab, Kishoreganj		tinyurl.com/jnymia	
585.	25-Apr-2025	Rubel Mia (32) <i>Address:</i> Barab, Barishab, Kapasia, Gazipur		tinyurl.com/rblbol	
586.	28-Apr-2025	Rohiz Uddin (35) S/O: Badsha Mia <i>Address:</i> Matlab, Chandpur		tinyurl.com/rhzudn	
587.	30-Apr-2025	Raheem (23) S/O: Habibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Barpara, Muchapur, Bandar, Narayanganj (Originally from Kishoreganj)	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rhmmee	
588.	02-May-2025	Sana Majhi (44) S/O: Mohammad Majhi <i>Address:</i> Moddho Makohati, Mollakandi, Munshiganj Sadar, Munshiganj		tinyurl.com/snamjh	













SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
589.	02-May-2025	Mizanur Rahman (40) S/O: Late. Mannan <i>Address:</i> Norilla Sandailpur, Dhopakhali, Dhanbari, Tangail		tinyurl.com/rhmzna	
590.	04-May-2025	Ali Akbor S/O: Ali Ahmad <i>Address:</i> Kuliapara, Khurushkul, Cox's Bazar Sadar, Cox's Bazar		tinyurl.com/abrexb	
591.	07-May-2025	Abul Kashem (65) <i>Address:</i> Dakkhinpara Clubghor, Kesharpar, Senbag, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/ksmabl	
592.	10-May-2025	Saddam Hossain (38) S/O: Hiron Mia <i>Address:</i> Royachala, Bangara Paschim, Muradnagar, Cumilla	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sdmhsn	
593.	11-May-2025	Haydul Akando (35) S/O: Abed Ali Akando <i>Address:</i> Haturia, Saltia, Gafargaon, Mymensingh	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hydakn	
594.	11-May-2025	Loyluch Mia (50) S/O: Moyna Mia <i>Address:</i> Syria, Balaganj, Balaganj, Sylhet		tinyurl.com/lylchs	


SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
595.	13-May-2025	Jakir Hossain (41) S/O: Rofik Mia <i>Address:</i> Hasanpur, Sonapur, Sonaimuri, Noakhali		tinyurl.com/jkrhsn	
596.	13-May-2025	Shahriar Alam Shammo (25) S/O: Md. Fakhrul Alam <i>Address:</i> Soratoil, Dhukuria Bera, Belkuchi, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/sasmmo	
597.	15-May-2025	Rakib Hossain (21) S/O: Anisul Huque <i>Address:</i> Char Fashion, Bhola	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hsnrkb	
598.	16-May-2025	Rupol Sheikh (30) S/O: Jinnah Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Rajapur, Rajbari		tinyurl.com/rplshk	
599.	16-May-2025	Saidur Rahman (65) <i>Address:</i> Choupakia, Naogaon, Tarash, Sirajganj		tinyurl.com/sidrts	
600.	21-May-2025	Abul Kashem Motait (45) <i>Address:</i> Char Majjhara, Kuichapatri, Gosairhat, Shariatpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/aksmmo	















SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
601.	22-May-2025	Anowar Hossain (50) S/O: Md. Saidur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Pozaid, Baromi, Sreepur, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/anwrhs	
602.	23-May-2025	Aliuzzaman Montu <i>Address:</i> Biraldah, Baneshwar, Puthia, Rajshahi		tinyurl.com/azmmmn	
603.	24-May-2025	Md. Anowar Hossain Ripon S/O: Moti Sardar <i>Address:</i> Lokkhona, Mathbaria, Pirojpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rpnmah	
604.	25-May-2025	Juwel Talukder S/O: Kochimuddin Talukder <i>Address:</i> Kendua, Kendua, Netrokona		tinyurl.com/jweltl	
605.	27-May-2025	Ibne Samad (18) S/O: Kalam Sardar <i>Address:</i> Sardarkandi, Shiruail, Shibchar, Madaripur		tinyurl.com/ibnesm	
606.	27-May-2025	Kodom Ali Mondal (30) S/O: Lokman Mondal <i>Address:</i> Char Kulatia, Machbari, Kalukhali, Rajbari	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/kdmmdl	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
607.	28-May-2025	Moksed Ali Sheikh (70) S/O: Late. Omar Ali Sheikh <i>Address:</i> Muragacha, Tala, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sheikhm	
608.	29-May-2025	Sumon (32) S/O: Mohammad Babu <i>Address:</i> Dubalhati, Dubalhati, Naogaon Sadar, Naogaon	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/smnnao	
609.	30-May-2025	Abdur Razzak <i>Address:</i> Ranisankail Pourashava, Ranisankail, Thakurgaon		tinyurl.com/rzqabr	
610.	31-May-2025	Zahid (25) <i>Address:</i> Dwipnagar, Darus Salam, Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/zhdiaid	
611.	31-May-2025	Md. Alom (40) <i>Address:</i> Dhaka	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/almdhk	
612.	31-May-2025	Tanvir (23) S/O: Asadul <i>Address:</i> Dwipnagar, Darus Salam, Dhaka (Originally from Barishal)	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/tnvira	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
613.	12-Jun-2025	Mofizul Islam Tulu (60) <i>Address:</i> Biraldah, Baneshwar, Puthia, Rajshahi		tinyurl.com/tulumf	
614.	14-Jun-2025	Shakil Ahmed (40) S/O: Late. Hanif <i>Address:</i> Shibbari Shahi Masjid Lane, Bogura Pourashava, Bogura Sadar, Bogura		tinyurl.com/sklmed	
615.	16-Jun-2025	Unknown (30) <i>Address:</i> Dakkhin Lokkhonkhola, Muchapur, Bandar, Narayanganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/unkbdr	
616.	18-Jun-2025	Md. Ashik Mondal (17) S/O: Md. Hontesh Mondal <i>Address:</i> Ramkantapur, Aminpur, Pabna		tinyurl.com/hntsas	
617.	20-Jun-2025	Md. Arif Hossain (22) S/O: Habibur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Cumilla	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/arfhns	
618.	28-Jun-2025	Md. Shahidul Islam Hawlader (50) S/O: Late. Aslam Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Char Baleshwar, Chandipur, Indurkani, Pirojpur		tinyurl.com/hldrsh	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
619.	28-Jun-2025	Moukoli Begum (48) Husband: Mortuza Hawlader <i>Address:</i> Char Baleshwar, Chandipur, Indurkani, Pirojpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/hldrsh	
620.	29-Jun-2025	Abdul Mannan (26) S/O: Mochon Ali <i>Address:</i> Kombonia, Khuniapalong, Ramu, Cox's Bazar		tinyurl.com/abmrmu	
621.	29-Jun-2025	Habil Mia (50) S/O: Late. Kasem Ali <i>Address:</i> Polupara, Katabari, Gobindaganj, Gaibandha		tinyurl.com/hblmia	
622.	29-Jun-2025	Abdur Rahim (48) S/O: Late. Toibur Khandaker <i>Address:</i> Char Jigatala, Kulkandi, Islampur, Jamalpur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/jpabdr	
623.	01-Jul-2025	Md. Nayeem (24) S/O: Md. Raju Mia Nazu <i>Address:</i> Bedaiduar, Korihata, Kapasia, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/gprnym	
624.	02-Jul-2025	Rafiqul Islam (50) S/O: Ismail Hossain <i>Address:</i> Sonakur, Jhikargacha, Jashore	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rfqllm	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
625.	03-Jul-2025	Al Amin (20) S/O: Gulzar Hossain <i>Address:</i> Bancharampur, Brahmanbaria	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/amnbrh	
626.	03-Jul-2025	Jonaki Akter (32) S/O: Khalilur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Koraibari, Muradnagar, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/jamrra	
627.	03-Jul-2025	Md. Rasel (35) S/O: Khalilur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Koraibari, Muradnagar, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/jamrra	
628.	03-Jul-2025	Roksana Akter Ruby (58) Husband: Khalilur Rahman <i>Address:</i> Koraibari, Muradnagar, Cumilla		tinyurl.com/jamrra	
629.	9-Jul-2025	Md. Sohag (Lal Chand) (43) S/O: Ayub Ali <i>Address:</i> Islampur, Dhalua, Barguna Sadar, Barguna		tinyurl.com/lalchd	
630.	10-Jul-2025	Babu (27) S/O: Mohammad Ali <i>Address:</i> Ramchandrapurhat, Ranihat, Chapainawabganj Sadar, Chapainawabganj	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/bbucgj	

SL.	Date	Name & Address	Photo	News Link	QR Code
631.	16-Jul-2025	Tuhin (29) S/O: Babul Mia <i>Address:</i> Dewanganj, Feni	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/thnfni	
632.	20-Jul-2025	Raju Gazi (36) S/O: Mostafa (Khokon Gazi) <i>Address:</i> Hariharnagar, Tala, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/rjugzi	
633.	21-Jul-2025	Md. Habibur Rahman Morol (30) S/O: Late. Abdullah Morol <i>Address:</i> Atari, Tala, Satkhira	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/mhrmrl	
634.	22-Jul-2025	Md. Shanto Islam (21) S/O: Late. Zakir Hossain <i>Address:</i> Baluchar, Madhabdi, Narsingdi	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sntisl	
635.	23-Jul-2025	Md. Sowadul Islam Sowad (18) S/O: Md. Mofizul Islam <i>Address:</i> Purbahati, Bancharampur, Brahmanbaria	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/sowadi	
636.	23-Jul-2025	Abdullah (27) S/O: Anil Chandra <i>Address:</i> Bandakhola, Tumulia, Kaliganj, Gazipur	 Photo Not Found	tinyurl.com/ablgpr	
637.	30-Jul-2025	Md. Jahangir Bhuiyan (57) S/O: Late. Taleb Ali Bhuiyan <i>Address:</i> Salmodi Noyapara, Araihasar, Narayanganj		tinyurl.com/jhrbhn	



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